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I. Introduction 
Online intermediaries in various forms – including search engines, social media, or app 
platforms – play a constitutive role in today’s digital environment. They have become a new type 
of powerful institution in the 21st century that shape the public networked sphere, and are subject 
to intense and often controversial policy debates. This paper focuses on one particular force 
shaping the emergence and future evolution of online intermediaries: the rapidly changing 
landscape of intermediary governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and 
markets. Building upon eight in-depth case studies and use cases, respectively, this paper seeks 
to distill key observations and provide a high-level analysis of some of the structural elements 
that characterize varying governance regimes, with a focus on intermediary liability regimes and 
their evolution.!
Analyzing online intermediary governance issues from multiple perspectives, and in the context 
of different cultures and regulatory frameworks, immediately creates basic problems of semantic 
interoperability. Lacking a universally agreed-upon definition,2 this synthesis paper and its’ 
underlying case studies are based on a broad and phenomenon-oriented notion of online 
intermediaries, as further described below. In methodological terms, the observations shared in 
this synthesis paper offer a selective reading and interpretation by the authors of the broader 
take-ways of a diverse set of case studies examining online intermediary governance frameworks 
and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam.3 These case studies, in turn, have emerged in the context of an 
international research pilot by the Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers 
(NoC), through a process of in-person consultations and remote collaborations among the 
researchers, and are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online 
intermediaries in the digital age.4 !
As a synthesis document, this paper is not aimed at providing a detailed or even comprehensive 
discussion of online intermediary governance, but it is rather intended to capture some of the 
insights and observations emerging from the analysis and comparative discussion of a limited – 
albeit diverse – sample of national regimes through an internationally coordinated academic 
research effort. The synthesis paper therefore does not cover all aspects of intermediary 
governance, but focuses on the issues that are examined in the case studies.  
For a more detailed account of country-specific frameworks and their interaction with online 
intermediaries, as well as a deeper analysis of the issues highlighted in this paper, we refer to the 
set of case studies released in tandem with this synthesis. Together, these materials seek to 
complement important policy-oriented research efforts on online intermediaries by strengthening !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 But see OECD. The Economic and Social Role of Online intermediaries (2010), 9. 
http://www.oecd.org/Internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf: “’Online intermediaries’ bring together or facilitate 
transactions between third parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products and 
services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to third parties.” 
3 See Appendices A – H for the full text of the case studies. Additionally, the case studies are available for comment 
at https://publixphere.net/i/noc/page/Online_Intermediaries_Research_Project_Case_Studies.  
4 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers, 2014 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_ToTBKP5ITVWTl0UzV0U3B2RlU/view?usp=sharing. 
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the evidence-base,5 and contributing to our shared understanding of the various policy options 
available, including their impact on, and interplay with, online intermediaries.!
II. Terminologies and Perspectives 
A. Framework 
Recently, there has been an exponential increase in the use of the ambiguous term 
“intermediaries” in policy debates, which corresponds with the emergence of a new category of 
actor in the digitally networked environment and suggests a structural – and not just incremental 
– change in the information ecosystem. 
Despite a number of important studies in this area,6 the phenomenon is still a moving target and 
the term “intermediary” often serves as a fallback phrase in the absence of a clear-cut definition. 
In certain policy contexts and jurisdictions, the term is sometimes used as a rhetorical tool to 
indicate that a given service does not fall within the category of traditional media services and – 
consequently – is not encompassed by traditional media regulation. These issues of qualification 
and categorization under existing laws and policies are another reason why the meaning of the 
term should be carefully reflected upon.  !
Various disciplines conduct research on online intermediaries and are likely to frame this 
research differently, as an initial literature review in the context of this project suggests.7 But 
different approaches to the phenomenon also exist within individual domains or disciplines. 
From a legal perspective, for instance, there are various angles from which to look at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See in particular the efforts by the United Nationals Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO) 
(e.g. UNESCO, The Open Society Foundation, and the Internet Society, “The Freedom of Expression Online – The 
Role of Online intermediaries”. Executive Summary. [Presented at IGF, Istanbul, September 5, 
2014]http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/foe_online_intermediaries.pdf ); 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (e.g. "Online intermediaries and Creative Content." World 
Intellectual Property Organization. http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/Internet_intermediaries/); La Rue, Frank. 
"Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression." 2013. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf; 
generally, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the Center for Democracy 
and Technology (CDT) (e.g. “Intermediary Liability | Center for Democracy & Technology.” 
https://cdt.org/issue/free-expression/intermediary-liability/.); the Association for progressive Communication (APC) 
(e.g. "Intermediary Liability." The Association for Progressive Communication. January 1, 2014. 
https://www.apc.org/en/irhr/intermediary-liability.), "Online intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability." Article 19. 
Accessed December 10, 2014. http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37242/en/Internet-intermediaries:-
dilemma-of-liability., “Intermediary Liability | Center for Democracy & Technology.” Accessed December 10, 
2014. https://cdt.org/issue/free-expression/intermediary-liability/.; and “The Manila Principles On Intermediary 
Liability: Version 0.9,” Organization, December 1, 2014, 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kAkqgt3cRb65d8ik6vWYgpk6DYpP8ABA43ljgDiGOf8/edit?usp=sharing. 
6 Most notably the work of the OECD, see in particular OECD. The Economic and Social Role of Online 
intermediaries. 2010. p. 9. http://www.oecd.org/Internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf and the other efforts mentioned 
supra, note 4. See also, “Fostering Freedom Online – The Role of Online intermediaries,” United Nations 
Organization for Education, Science, and Culture (UNESCO). 19 Jan. 2015. 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf.  
7Kulk, Stefan, Tijana Milosevic, and Melinda Sebastian. “Online Intermediaries: A Thematic Analysis of their 
Social Role and Functions,” The Global Network of Internet & Society Center, Working Paper, 2014. 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1h1WmsijKVWgrky2GHhqqI1lytZejkwnMc35CZKeeUXU/edit?usp=sharing. 
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phenomenon, which might lead to different definitions. In countries that have enacted a specific 
framework for media regulation, the main difference might be the service’s impact on public 
opinion making. In regards to liability, the focus might lie in the control over and the technical 
ability to take content down. From the perspective of freedom of speech, intermediaries perform 
a new type of activity and create a space for individuals to express themselves online, a function 
that can be examined in greater depth.!
Economists are interested in the location of online intermediary services within the value chain. 
It is characteristic that intermediaries are positioned between content providers and customers. 
Furthermore, the added value that intermediaries create might help to frame this group of 
services. From a media studies perspective, the way that services are integrated into daily life 
and the meaning that we collectively create by using intermediaries – e.g. the creation of new 
types of public spheres – is important. Intermediaries are associated with specific social practices 
and these practices, in turn, reflexively construct the service provided. In a similar fashion, 
studies on technical artifacts as institutions can ask how entities like algorithms, on which many 
online intermediary services are based, can be seen as institutions. !
In the context of this cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary research effort, we do not attempt 
to come up with a uniform definition of online intermediaries. Rather, we take a 
phenomenological approach and use socially and economically significant real world services as 
guiding examples. As such, this research effort has focused on services that are: (a) “in between” 
content and users; (b) show structural relevance to public communication (i.e. are not merely 
private); and (c) are not traditional journalistic-editorial (“media”) services. We are aware that 
the various elements of this definition refer to complex concepts, however, the definition serves 
as a workable proxy for the purposes of the case studies. !
Core examples of “online intermediaries” that surfaced within this framework and were 
examined in the context of the case studies include search engines, micro blogs, social media, 
and user generated content platforms, among others. The intention of this research effort is not to 
limit the study of this subject to those cases, but use them pars pro toto to distill the essential 
characteristics of online intermediaries.!
B. Observations 
With this tentative framework in mind, the analysis of the case studies leads to a series of high-
level observations regarding questions of definition, categorization, and typology. At a basic 
level, the legal frameworks we reviewed revealed a significant variety in the definitions of online 
intermediaries.8 In some jurisdictions, platforms that might be seen as “edge cases” under the 
parameters outlined above are defined as intermediaries and have been examined in the 
respective country cases study. The IT Act of India, for instance, sets forth a very broad 
definition of intermediaries, including telecommunication carriers, Internet service providers, 
and other backbone services.9 In the Turkish case study, to take a second example, e-commerce 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See also “The Manila Principles On Intermediary Liability: Version 0.9,” December 1, 2014. 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kAkqgt3cRb65d8ik6vWYgpk6DYpP8ABA43ljgDiGOf8/edit?usp=sharing. 
9 Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediaries in India”, 
The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 8.  
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platforms have played a key role in conflicts over intermediary liability and thus serve as an 
important use case in this research effort.10!
The type of intermediary that plays a key role in a given policy or legal debate is context-specific 
and depends on various factors, particularly the country or region’s political economy. In the 
European Union, search engines such as Google have largely dominated legal and policy 
conversations. The most visible manifestation of this situation can be seen in the recent CJEU 
ruling on the so-called “right to be forgotten” or, more precisely, the “right to be delisted”.11 
While the former could be construed to mean the right of an affected person to have certain 
information completely wiped from the Internet, the “right to be delisted” constitutes the right to 
have information deleted from the listings of search engines and web catalogues, thus merely 
erasing links to the actual content. Therefore the term “right to be delisted” will be used in this 
document when referring to the case. In the U.S., user-created content platforms have been the 
focus in many of the recent law and policy debates. Overall, several case studies indicate a 
potential shift of attention in law and policy-making towards heavily algorithm-based 
intermediaries. !
While lawmakers around the world realize that intermediaries play a special role, they tend not to 
form strict categories and define such services as they used to define broadcasting. If there are 
specific rules, they often link to abstractly defined actions (such U.S. safe harbor rules and the 
Marco Civil, for example). The European E-Commerce Directive is a hybrid that attempts to 
define types of services based on abstract prototypes. The various prototypes in mind (“caching” 
providers, host providers, access providers) might be one reason for the challenges with this 
approach to categorizing intermediaries.  
Finally, the case studies demonstrate how law and policymakers, regulators, and Courts in 
different parts of the world continue to struggle with the task of framing the specific functions 
that different types of intermediaries fulfill. In some instances, the functional approach is 
avoided altogether and replaced by more familiar questions of definition, as in the case of the 
recent CJEU ruling. Similarly, the possible effects of interventions are an area of concern and 
debate given the dynamic nature of the service ecosystem. !
III. Governance Structures and Models  
A. Overview 
The different systems for intermediary governance can be divided into two very broad groups. 
First, there are systems where intermediaries are explicitly addressed, and where there is a 
governance system especially designed to deal with intermediaries. Second, there are systems 
where general rules are applied to intermediaries. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Beceni, Yasin and Nilay Erdem. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Turkey (eBay Case)”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015). 
11 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española De Protección De Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González. 




The significance of this distinction becomes apparent when analyzing the situation in Brazil 
before and after the Marco Civil came into force. Before the enactment of the Marco Civil, 
decisions on the liability of online intermediaries were influenced by three completely different 
understandings applied by Brazilian Courts.12 One understanding led to an exemption of the 
provider from any liability for third party behavior; a second interpretation enforced a stricter 
liability regime grounded in the concept of risk of the providers’ activity; and a third would 
trigger the liability of the provider to the existence of culpability on its part.13 With the Marco 
Civil now in force, there is a special civil liability regime for intermediaries. However, it is too 
soon to foresee what rules the Courts will apply in specific cases based on the new law, and what 
types of intermediaries will be covered. However, though it is unclear how this will be applied in 
practice, at least there is now a coherent regulatory structure within Brazilian law.!
The U.S. can serve as an example of a system with an explicit and far ranging special regulatory 
framework for intermediaries. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and Section 512 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act14 are pivotal pieces of regulation constituting a “safe 
harbor” for online intermediaries. The same is – at least in principle – true in the European 
Union, where the E-Commerce Directive15 provides specific liability exemptions for online 
intermediaries. However, due to the limited scope of the exemption (injunctions are, for 
example, not covered by the regime) and – to some degree – uncertainty about how to apply the 
exemptions, European harmonization could not prevent the emergence of a rather fragmented 
system regarding intermediary liability.16 !
Studying the country cases presented here leads to the insight that different types of conflicts are 
predominant in different countries. While in Vietnam – and to some extent in Thailand and India 
– intermediaries mainly face takedown requests on grounds of state interest (in a broad sense, 
including the protection of the honor of the king in Thailand), in most of the other countries 
examined in this study it is user-user divergences that fuel the majority of conflicts. The first 
pattern may stem from a more interventionist approach of some governments; however, it may 
also be based on the differing strengths of personal rights and different cultures of the 
complainants in the countries examined. It is interesting to note that claims based on copyright 
are dealt with by a separate liability system in basically all of the countries covered by this study. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Lemos, Ronaldo, and Carlos Affonso Pereira De Souza. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Brazilian 
Courts and the Internet – Rulings Before and After the Marco Civil on Intermediary Liability”, The Global Network 
of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 2. 
13 Lemos, Ronaldo, and Carlos Affonso Pereira De Souza. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Brazilian 
Courts and the Internet – Rulings Before and After the Marco Civil on Intermediary Liability”, The Global Network 
of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 2. 
14 47 U.S. Code § 230 - Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material; 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title47/USCODE-2011-title47-chap5-subchapII-partI-
sec230/content-detail.html.  
15  European Parliament. Directive 2000/31/EC, “Directive on Electronic Commerce,” European Union. June 8, 
2000, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NOT/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031. 
16 Angelopoulos, Christina. Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for 
Copyright Infringement in Europe. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
November 28, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2360997. !
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Another relevant distinction is whether a liability regime provides a safe harbor for 
intermediaries or not. Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the U.S. 
is probably the most prominent example of a safe harbor clause. The basic rule here is that if 
there is no content curation, there is no liability. Thus, under the DMCA, the way that providers 
treat content is key. To some extent there is a safe harbor for intermediaries that do not exercise 
editorial control under the Indian IT Act.17 Considering algorithmic journalism and similar 
developments, it will become rather difficult to draw such distinctions regarding curation in 
future.  !
The above-mentioned safe harbor clause in the E-Commerce Directive of the EU shows that not 
all harbors are equally protected against the strong wind of third-party claims. The directive 
defines different types of intermediary roles, and categorization into one of these roles typically 
leads to a provider being held not liable. Whether search engines fall into one of those categories 
and can consequently profit from safe harbor provisions is not entirely clear. However, while the 
explicit objective of the regulation was to create a safe harbor, especially to promote innovation 
in Europe, there are only limited cases in which the directive in fact provided such a “safe 
harbor.”18 !
Another significant characteristic of any intermediary governance system is whether it 
establishes a notice-and-take-down procedure or not, and whether this procedure is set up as a 
condition for obtaining optional safe harbor protection or as a mandatory test of liability (i.e., 
failure to respond to a lawful notice immediately triggers liability). There can be an explicit 
regime, like in India,19 or a situation like in Europe, where the CJEU ruling on data protection 
and search engines20 resulted in a de-facto notice-and-take-down-procedure without a clear legal 
basis. The CJEU claims that search engine providers are controlling data processing when a user 
searches for a name of an individual, and that they must consider requests to delist names from 
search results. The decision is based on the European Data Protection Directive and answers 
questions submitted by a Spanish Court. Since it enables any person to request that a link be 
removed from search results, the ruling has been associated with the “right to be forgotten.” This 
controversial judgment21 requires search engine operators to establish a notice-and-take-down-
procedure to comply with the European data protection framework. !
B. Focus Areas 
Internet liability regimes can serve as a model for contextual regulation. Laws do not regulate the 
behavior of an operator or an intermediary directly by prohibiting or ordering a specific 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediaries in India”, 
The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 8-9. 
18!For the effect of the safe harbor clause (and its limits) on a European level see in particular Case C- 324/09, L 
‘Oréal v eBay, 12 July 2011, Case C-70/10, Scarlet v SABAM, 24 November 2011 and Case C- 360/10, SABAM v 
Netlog, 16 February 2012. !
19 Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediaries in India”, 
The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 21. 
20 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española De Protección De Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González. 
European Court of Justice. 13 May 2014. 
21 Kuczerawy, Aleksandra, and Ausloos, Jef. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: European Union and 
Google Spain”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 19-20. 
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behavior.22 Rather, the core of a liability regime is generally a set of conditions under which the 
operator will be held liable for third party content. Depending on mechanisms for enforcement 
and implementation, these regimes can lead to specific governance structures being formed 
within the operator of an intermediary, such as a notice-and-take-down-procedure to deal with 
user-user-conflicts on an online platform. Most countries examined in the case studies do not 
directly govern intermediaries but rather govern them indirectly via mechanisms of contextual 
regulation. While licensing regimes exist in some jurisdictions (Thailand can serve as an 
example),23 it is noteworthy that they are reportedly used less for direct regulation in the 
traditional sense – for instance via licensing conditions – but rather as an enforcement 
mechanism.!
The outcome of such indirect contextual regulation very much depends on the incentives and 
disincentives created by the system. For the functioning of an intermediary governance system, 
setting the right incentives is key. First and foremost this is true for the operator of the 
intermediary. The case of Korea24 demonstrates that this is a difficult task in the complex 
environment defined by Internet regulation. The clause in the respective law in Korea25 
mentioning “temporary action” does create an incentive for the operator of an intermediary to 
remove content after having received notice, regardless of whether the content is legal or illegal. 
While this does not seem to be the intent of the law, it is rational for intermediary operators to act 
this way if they want to avoid liability. Looking at incentives created by the system, it is 
instructive to look at the users’ end as well. The notice and-take-down system in Turkey creates 
greater incentives for users who believe his or her rights have been infringed upon to file a 
lawsuit directly with the Courts, rather than use the notice-and-take-down-system.26 Obviously 
there is the risk of undesirable secondary effects in this situation because it is hard for a 
lawmaker to anticipate the actions of intermediary operators, if the lawmaker even tries to do this 
– which is not always the case with liability rules. In India, the Supreme Court will hear a case in 
the spring of 2015 regarding the rules that the government enacted under the safe harbor clause, 
which have been criticized for creating incentives to remove all content – illegal or legal – in the 
event of a notice.27 !
This reflection about incentives already focused on the different actors in a governance system. 
Looking at the governance structure at large, which emerges from – or is at least influenced by – 
a liability regime, reveals the structure of rules and the roles of different actors in such a system. 
In many cases the structure does not seem to be the result of a regulatory strategy, but a result of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See Baldwin, Robert, and Martin Cave. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
23 Ramasoota, Pirongrong. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediary Liability in Thailand”, 
The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers(2015), 3. 
24 Park, Kyungg-Sin. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability – Not Just Backward but 
Going Back”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015). 
25 Park, Kyung-Sin. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability – Not Just Backward but 
Going Back”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 6. 
26 Beceni, Yasin and Nilay Erdem. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Turkey (eBay Case)”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 12. 
27 cf. Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediaries in 
India”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015).!
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the interplay of different actions. Take the CJEU ruling – the search engine case – as an example 
again.28!
The CJEU decision can be seen as European institutions showing Google its limits. However, in 
doing so, the ruling moves the responsibility for deciding user-user-conflicts – i.e. conflicts 
between the person affected vs. the owner of the web page that contains the information about 
that person – to the search engine operator, since the operator is responsible under the data 
protection regulation for its search results. Any decision by Google can, of course, be subject to 
scrutiny by the data protection officer or the Courts, however, the initial decision remains with 
Google. Not only that, in absence of more detailed criteria – in the directive or in the Court’s 
reasoning – regarding how to balance the interest of the person that wants a link removed and the 
interest of the owner of the respective web page or the general public at large to have access to 
this web page, Google has to come up with rules regarding how to solve such conflicts and 
balance the rights involved. Unintentionally the CJEU has created a mandatory notice-and-take-
down-procedure, the rules of which are governed by search engines.  
This also tells the story about the role of another type of actor in the governance system: the 
Courts. While the CJEU ruling on search engines is a very special case, in many countries we 
can see the relevance of single Court’s decisions in shaping the given intermediary governance 
system. What we can learn from studying this aspect is that it puts a burden on the Courts to 
develop a coherent liability system in this complex environment (remember the three different 
ways to apply the general liability rules in Brazil). Furthermore, the Courts with their procedures 
and instruments to gain and process knowledge are not designed to anticipate the secondary 
effects of their judgments. The incentives created by judgments and the governance structure 
emerging from this cannot easily be anticipated by Courts.!
It has already been mentioned that most of the intermediary governance systems contain notice-
and-take-down-procedures – be it intentionally designed, as a de facto development, an optional 
procedure for obtaining a safe harbor, or a mandatory test of intermediary liability – as an 
essential part of their structure, and there is a great variety of such systems. The fact that notice-
and-take-down has become a very “fashionable” way to treat user-user conflicts on intermediary 
platforms has been criticized from a normative standpoint, to the extent that the procedure 
becomes a mandatory test of intermediary liability. The report by Frank La Rue29 clearly states 
that an operator of an intermediary should not be put in the position to decide whether to remove 
content or not; it should be up to an independent Court or another independent body within a 
government to judge the legality or illegality of making content available. A mandatory notice-
and-takedown procedure is likely to violate La Rue’s recommendation. 
Two aspects of a notice-and-take-down-procedure seem to be significant. The first is the design 
of the procedure; models range from having no procedural requirements at all to models with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española De Protección De Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González. 
European Court of Justice. 13 May 2014. For more detail see: Kuczerawy, Aleksandra, and Ausloos, Jef. “Online 
Intermediaries Case Studies Series: European Union and Google Spain”, The Global Network of Internet & Society 
Research Centers. 
29 La Rue, Frank. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression." United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights. 2013. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf. 
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fine-tuned procedures set out in a bylaw, such as that established by the administration in India.30 
The other significant aspect is the treatment of the operator of the affected web site and the 
general interest in easy access to online information. Only very rarely is there a mandatory notice 
to the operator of the web page before a take-down happens,31 or is a structured appeal procedure 
launched by the operator in question.!
Depending on the nature of the claim, the procedure adopted by an intermediary to deal with 
notices can be an automated system like ContentID by YouTube, which allows YouTube to 
identify copyright protected content and have it removed, or a manual system, like the procedure 
which as been established by Google to deal with the over 160,000 requests as of end of October 
2014 following the CJEU ruling. Alternatively, hybrid systems exist where a large amount of 
potentially protected content will be dealt with automatically, but the hard cases are treated 
manually. !
IV. Role of the Government  
The case studies reveal that governments – in addition to technological and market factors – are 
among the most important forces that shape the online intermediary landscape of a given 
country. The respective roles government can play are rather diverse and often overlapping, 
ranging from “governments as users” to “governments as regulators” of intermediaries. Focusing 
on the latter, the case studies demonstrate that, even within the role of the government as a 
regulator of online intermediaries, we can find important functional nuances in terms of different 
manifestations and interpretations of this role. Further, the case studies suggest that different 
institutions within the government might be involved in the respective online intermediaries 
governance regime, depending on the underlying regulatory model and strategy (see previous 
section). In some countries, government agencies are the key regulators; other governance 
regimes heavily rely on Courts. The analysis also points to structural similarities and differences 
among the case studies when it comes to the specific approach to compliance and enforcement, 
ranging from emphasis on technical means to licensing requirements. The following paragraphs 
highlight some of the key findings in each of these issue areas. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediaries in India”, 
The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 5. 
31 U.S. 17 U.S.C. 512(g)(2)(A) (g) Replacement of Removed or Disabled Material and Limitation on Other 
Liability.—(1) No liability for taking down generally. — Subject to paragraph (2), a service provider shall not be 
liable to any person for any claim based on the service provider's good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, 
material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing. 
(2) Exception. — Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to material residing at the direction of a subscriber of 
the service provider on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider that is removed, or 
to which access is disabled by the service provider, pursuant to a notice provided under subsection (c)(1)(C), unless 
the service provider — (A) takes reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled 
access to the material; Holland, Adam, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, 
and Nick Decoster. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States”, The 
Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 11-13. 
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A. Functions 
The case study series reveals that governments have varying motives for regulating online 
intermediaries. In broad terms of regulatory theory,32 the primary reasons to intervene and 
regulate might have to do with externalities (e.g. compelling online intermediaries to bear the full 
costs of service rather than pass on to third parties), can be motivated by the desire to ensure 
certain levels of “essential” services (e.g. creation of and access to a diverse information 
ecosystem with multiple sources), or may be aimed at balancing unequal bargaining power (e.g. 
to protect vulnerable interests or populations, such as children), to name just a few examples. 
Viewed from a broader functional angle, however, the case studies suggest that the majority of 
governance models outlined above fall into three in practice overlapping but nonetheless 
analytically distinct categories: enabling, leveling, or constraining. !
The most prominent example where the governance model serves largely the function of an 
enabler is the U.S. legal framework. As already mentioned above and described in detail in the 
respective country case study,33 the U.S. framework is characterized by extensive safe harbors 
that dramatically limit the liability exposure of online intermediaries. The case study analysis and 
various other (including empirical) studies suggest that this particular governance arrangement 
has enabled the flourishing and growth of online intermediaries in the U.S. and, as a result, 
promoted the functions performed by online intermediaries.34 While the historic motives for 
introducing these liability limitations were rather nuanced (in the case of the U.S. 
Communications Decency Act [CDA], for instance, the lawmaker wanted to enable content self-
regulation by online intermediaries without exposing them to liability),35 contemporary policy 
debates refer to this enabling function largely in relation to either economic benefits (e.g. 
incentives to innovate without fear of liability) or in the context of fundamental rights (e.g. 
elimination of chilling effects).36!
Another function that online intermediary governance models (in general) and liability regimes 
(in particular) can perform is the role of a leveler. Traces of such a leveling function can be 
found in several countries with notice-and-takedown systems where the governance model is 
targeting online intermediaries as “the in between” to strike a balance between the interests of 
different parties, for instance between copyright owners and users in the realm of copyright. The 
CJEU’s right to be delisted decision might be seen as another manifestation of such an approach, 
aimed at leveling the playing field (“fair balance” in the words of the CJEU) between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 See generally, e.g., Baldwin, Robert, and Martin Cave. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
33 Holland, Adam, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, and Nick 
Decoster. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015). 
34 See, e.g., Bramble, Nicholas. "Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure." Hastings Law Journal 
64, no. 325 (2013). http://www.hastingslawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Bramble-64.2.pdf. 
35 Cannon, Robert. "The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act: Regulating 
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway." Federal Communications Law Journal 51 (1996). 
http://www.cybertelecom.org/cda/cannon2.htm. 
36 See, e.g., Bankston, Kevin, David Sohn, and Andrew McDiarmid “Shielding the Messengers: Protecting 
Platforms for Expression and Innovation.” Center For Democracy and Technolocy. December 2012. 
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf, But see Seltzer, Wendy. "Free Speech 
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment." Harvard Journal 
of Law & Technology 24 (2010): 171. http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v24/24HarvJLTech171.pdf. 
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legitimate interests of the Internet users potentially interested in having access to information and 
the data subject’s fundamental rights. As these two examples indicate, the leveling function of 
online intermediary governance models can either be implemented through a (generalized) rule 
such as a DMCA-style notice-and-takedown mechanism, or based on a standard that requires a 
case-by-case analysis, as in the case of the CJEU’s right to be delisted decision. !
Third, governance models – especially in the form of liability regimes in the context of this study 
– typically perform a constraining function by ordering online intermediaries to take specific 
action or implement certain measures. Even leveling regimes often perform a constraining 
function, as in the case of notice-and-take-down regimes where online intermediaries have to 
meet certain obligations in order to benefit from safe harbor protection. But the case studies have 
also revealed situations where the constraining effects are more specific or targeted. In the case 
of Thailand, for instance, the law directly imposes content liability on online intermediaries to 
preserve the public order (lèse majesté)37 or enable the control of the flow of information 
(through censorship and surveillance) under the coup-ruled government. Blocking statutes such 
as the Turkish Internet Law are highly visible and controversial examples where law serves 
predominantly a constraining function in the online intermediaries space.38 The licensing regime 
in Vietnam imposes hard constraints under which online intermediaries have to operate, to give 
another example from the case study series.39!
B. Branches 
Looking at the role of governments as regulators, the case studies show that different branches of 
the government may serve as core pillars of a given online intermediary governance system. The 
series also demonstrates that the basic layout and different degrees of government involvement 
lead to key questions regarding incentives, legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. In 
addition to these fundamental issues, the case studies also hint towards a rather underexplored 
dimension of the governance problem: the role of knowledge when it comes to the regulation of 
online intermediaries, as such expertise – for instance with respect to the understanding of how 
different types of intermediaries technically work – might be distributed unequally across the 
different branches of the government that are involved in the respective governance models. !
Most of the governance models studied in the context of this research project heavily rely on the 
Court system to put these models aimed regulating online intermediaries into practice. Until the 
recent enactment of the Marco Civil, Brazil was among the countries where online intermediary 
governance almost entirely resided in the realm of Courts. An alternative type of regime puts 
emphasis on government agencies when it comes to online intermediaries. With respect to non-
copyright issues, Korea is an example where a government agency, in form of the Korean 
Communication Standards Commission, plays an important role within the intermediary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Ramasoota, Pirongrong. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediary Liability in Thailand”, 
The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 4.  
38 Beceni, Yasin and Nilay Erdem. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Turkey (eBay Case)”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015).  
39 Nguyen, Thuy. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Roles and Liabilities of Online Intermediaries in 
Vietnam – Regulations in the Mixture of Hope and Fear”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research 
Centers (2015). 
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governance framework.40 An extreme version of a government agency-based governance 
regimes are countries with licensing requirements. In Vietnam, for instance, the providers of 
online social networking sites and general news websites have to obtain a license from the 
government before offering such services.41 !
Court-centric regimes are characteristic for democratic countries, while agency-focused 
intermediary governance frameworks are more prevalent in countries with limited rule of law. 
The U.S. governance system with its heavy reliance on Courts is at one end of the spectrum in 
the case study series, while Thailand with its tight control over online intermediaries through the 
National Council for Peace and Order marks the other.42 Further, Court-based governance 
regimes play a particularly important role with respect to copyright issues, as even some 
countries with relatively strong government agency involvement in non-copyright issues refer to 
Courts in this area, as the case of Korea illustrates.43 !
But even in countries with largely Court-centric regimes lines might be blurring. While U.S. 
intermediary governance heavily relies on Courts, governmental agencies can play a prominent 
role at least when it comes enforcement, as the role of state government in the context of Section 
230 CDA demonstrates.44 Similarly, government agencies in the form of data protection 
authorities are important players in the EU when it comes to online intermediary governance.!
C. Enforcement 
The previous sections already clearly illustrates that governments not only set the general – and 
at times specific – framework conditions under which online intermediaries operate, but are also 
instrumental when it comes to the implementation and enforcement of a given governance 
model. With respect to compliance and enforcement issues, a number of observations gained 
from the case study series are noteworthy. !
At the most abstract level, the comparative analysis of different governance regimes indicates 
that the incentive structures created by the governments – whether by design or through mere 
practice – are key in understanding compliance with and enforcement of online intermediary 
governance frameworks. A key issue identified across the case studies is the question of whether 
a particular government creates a symmetric or asymmetric incentive structure for online 
intermediaries to take down content or leave it up in order to avoid liability. In the U.S., for 
instance, Section 230 CDA provides a symmetric incentive structure in the sense that Courts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Park, Kyung-Sin. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability – Not Just Backward but 
Going Back”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015). 
41 Nguyen, Thuy. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Roles and Liabilities of Online Intermediaries in 
Vietnam – Regulations in the Mixture of Hope and Fear”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research 
Centers (2015), 3.  
42 See Holland, Adam, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, and Nick 
Decoster. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015); and Ramasoota, Pirongrong. “Online Intermediaries Case 
Studies Series: Online Intermediary Liability in Thailand”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research 
Centers (2015). 
43 Park, Kyung-Sin. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability – Not Just Backward but 
Going Back”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015). 
44 Holland, Adam, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, and Nick 
Decoster. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 6.  
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have been consistent about immunizing online intermediaries from liability as long as they did 
not author the content in question – whether they take it down, leave it up, or even restore 
content that was taken down.45 In contrast, the governance models in India, Korea, and Thailand 
create asymmetric incentive structures, where intermediaries are incentivized to take down 
content in order to avoid liability, even if it results in over-compliance.46 
A second observation related to asymmetric incentives and resulting compliance levels concerns 
local versus international online intermediaries. The case studies indicate that instances in which 
licensing requirements apply de facto only to local but not to international intermediaries lead to 
more compliance, or arguably even over-compliance, with government requests among these 
local intermediaries. The case study from Thailand is the most prominent example that highlights 
this asymmetry between local and international players. !
Third, the case studies illustrate not only the different enforcement regimes and (e.g. ex post 
versus ex ante) strategies, including incentives and actors involved, but also indicate the range of 
enforcement techniques that can be utilized as part of the different governance models. The 
previous sections have already highlighted the role of licensing requirements as an enforcement 
tool, particularly in the cases of Turkey and Thailand.47 Another interesting theme emerging 
from the case study analysis relates to the role of algorithms in enforcement. The phenomenon of 
computational compliance has become most visible in the context of the U.S. case study, where 
software plays a key role in dealing with large-scale problems of copyright infringement over 
user-created content platforms, specifically YouTube.48 Algorithms not only play a role in 
“private ordering” a la YouTube, but also when it comes to government-imposed monitoring and 
filtering obligations, as the reports from Thailand, Turkey, and India demonstrate.49 !
Finally, and related to the previous issues, the case studies point out the importance of costs, in 
terms of both money or time, when it comes to compliance and enforcement. Again, the role of 
cost is multi-faceted and context-specific. For instance, the Turkish case study demonstrates that 
uncertainties surrounding the notice-and-take-down system and the fact that a criminal 
proceeding can be launched without costs leads to a preferred activation of the judicial system !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Holland, Adam, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, and Nick 
Decoster. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Center (2015), 5-7.  
46 See Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediaries in 
India”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015); and Ramasoota, Pirongrong. “Online 
Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediary Liability in Thailand”, The Global Network of Internet & 
Society Research Centers (2015).  
47 See Beceni, Yasin and Nilay Erdem. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Turkey (eBay Case)”, The 
Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers(2015); and Ramasoota, Pirongrong. “Online Intermediaries 
Case Studies Series: Online Intermediary Liability in Thailand”, The Global Network of Internet & Society 
Research Centers (2015).  
48 Holland, Adam, Chris Bavitz, Jeff Hermes, Andy Sellars, Ryan Budish, Michael Lambert, and Nick 
Decoster. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Intermediary Liability in the United States”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 31-34.  
49 See Ramasoota, Pirongrong. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Online Intermediary Liability in 
Thailand”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015); and Beceni, Yasin and Nilay 
Erdem. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Turkey (eBay Case)”, The Global Network of Internet & 
Society Research Centers (2015); and Arun, Chinmayi, and Sarvjeet Singh. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies 
Series: Online Intermediaries in India”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015). 
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over private mechanisms.50 The contrast between automated compliance and enforcement in 
response to copyright issues on YouTube, versus the human and labor-intense review of 
takedown requests that attempt to balance user interests under the CJEU’s right to be delisted, 
highlights yet another important dimension of the cost argument when it comes to online 
intermediary governance. !
V. General Observations 
A. Evolutionary Paths 
The analysis so far has focused on the governance structure and was therefore based on more of 
a static view. Another perspective from which intermediary governance can be analyzed is the 
process of development. A first and rather obvious observation is that the political discourse in 
the countries covered by this study recognized the relevance of intermediary governance at 
different points of time. So it may be fair to say that the systems are not equally mature. The U.S. 
appears to have been fast in addressing the issue, and as a result the system has been in force for 
several years and proven to be relatively stable. Other countries are still in the process of 
designing a system. !
A less obvious, but also significant aspect seems to be the cultural context. Protecting the honor 
of the king in Thailand, for example, is deeply rooted in Thai society and has to be guaranteed 
against defamation online and offline. Consequently the role of all actors, including operators of 
intermediaries, is addressed. Countries with an aspiration to govern society more strictly than a 
western democracy face the dilemma of finding a way to govern the Internet – including 
intermediaries – without tampering with innovation and the economic potential of the Internet. 
Vietnam51 can serve as an example of a country grappling with such a balance. The U.S., 
additionally, bases their regulation on a shared understanding on the importance of freedom of 
speech; thus the cultural context again is key. !
What we can see in the development of intermediary governance, as well as in other sectors of 
regulation, is that sometimes single events change the development path. A significant event has 
been the CJEU ruling on search engines, which has fuelled the debate on the responsibility of 
operators of intermediaries in Europe and beyond. This can even affect the construction of the 
relationship of whole bodies of law, like the right to private life on the one hand and data 
protection on the other, which has come into the spotlight as a result of the CJEU ruling. 
Furthermore, general political developments in a country, like the Coup in Thailand, can affect 
the regulations of intermediaries and lead to restrictions on free speech. !
Another driver of change might be developments in the international arena. While not 
necessarily visible in the present case studies, standards for intermediary liability in particular 
might be the subject of agreements between countries in the context of bi- or multilateral trade 
agreements. The negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement serve as a recent case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50Beceni, Yasin and Nilay Erdem. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Turkey (eBay Case)”, The Global 
Network of Internet & Society Research Centers (2015), 13.  
51 Nguyen, Thuy. “Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Roles and Liabilities of Online Intermediaries in 
Vietnam – Regulations in the Mixture of Hope and Fear”, The Global Network of Internet & Society Research 
Centers (2015).   
!! 15!
in point.52 Other important impulses at the international level might come from Human Rights 
frameworks (of particular importance in this context is the Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and also global multi-stakeholder efforts 
such as NETmundial.53 !
B. Interplay Between Constitutional Rights and Intermediary 
Liability 
The CJEU decision highlights another relevant aspect of intermediary governance systems, 
which is the relationship between intermediaries’ liability and constitutional rights. The ruling 
has been criticized for not sufficiently taking freedom of speech and freedom of information into 
consideration.54 It is not unlikely that cases triggered by the decision of the European Court will 
lead to lawsuits on which national constitutional Courts, as well as the European Court on 
Human Rights, will have to decide. At the same time, the liability regime in India has been 
challenged due to constitutional reasons, and the same is true for Korea. At least two aspects are 
noteworthy when it comes to the constitutional rights aspect of intermediary liability. !
The first is that liability systems cannot trust the publisher of a web page to stand up for his or 
her right to freedom of speech if he/she is not informed about the take-down, if it is costly to 
respond, or he/she is not interested in pursuing the matter. Furthermore, the general interest in 
easy access to information on the Internet is not protected under freedom of information clauses 
because it is framed as a subjective not objective right. However, some Courts have emphasized 
the role of the Internet in this respect.55 In terms of actors, there is an imbalance when there is a 
situation where there is a person highly interested in getting the content removed on one side and 
a potentially uncommitted person on the other – if any. !
Secondly, the role of the operator of an intermediary is under consideration. On one hand, the 
operator might be enjoying freedom of speech privileges itself56 – but the conditions under which 
this is the case are not easy to construe. On the other hand, the operator might be a powerful 
entity that decides the accessibility to a piece of information should be bound to respect freedom 
of speech vis-à-vis the users as well. The debate about the implication of these constitutional 
issues has just started.!
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52 On the role of intermediary liability in trade, see, e.g., “Harmonizing Intermediary Immunity for Modern Trade 
Policy,” The Internet Association, May 5, 2014. http://Internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/May-
2014-Section230.pdf. 
53 See “The Manila Principles On Intermediary Liability: Version 0.9,” Organization,, December 1, 2014, 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kAkqgt3cRb65d8ik6vWYgpk6DYpP8ABA43ljgDiGOf8/edit?usp=sharing 
54 “Google Starts Removing Search Results Under Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten.’” WSJ. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-starts-removing-search-results-under-europes-right-to-be-forgotten-
1403774023. 55!E.g. the ECtHR: “In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of 
information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the sharing 
and dissemination of information generally (accessible) (Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 
2), nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, ECHR 2009, and Ashby Donald and Others v. France, no. 36769/08, § 34, 10 
January 2013).!
56 ”Volokh, Eugene. “First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results.” The Volokh Conspiracy, May 




A review of online intermediary governance frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European 
Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam creates a picture 
full of nuance, whether looking at the genesis of intermediary frameworks, the reasons for 
intervention, or the specifics of the respective governance models, including strategies, 
institutions, modalities, and the effects of regulation, among other dimensions. The country case 
studies both highlight and illustrate the importance of cultural and political context, which is not 
only reflected in the respective legal norms aimed at regulating intermediaries, but also 
expressed through different views and perceptions regarding the social function of 
intermediaries. In some sense, the case studies and the way in which the authors tell the story 
themselves mirror the same context and diversity. Similarly, the importance of the socio-
economic context has become clearly visible. Many of the features of various intermediary 
governance models can hardly be understood without considering their economic context, in 
conjunction with demographic characteristics and shifts. !
Despite context-sensitivity, certain categories, clusters, and patterns can be distilled from the 
various case studies and analyzed. As suggested in this synthesis document, online intermediary 
frameworks can be grouped and mapped based on a number of core criteria and dimensions. 
Specifically, and from a conceptual angle, the synthesis shows that there are three basic groups 
of countries, i.e. countries that lack a specific intermediary governance framework, countries 
with existing and differentiated specific frameworks, and countries with emerging frameworks. 
The discussion also reveals patterns with respect to the key drivers and motivations for specific 
regulations or governance, including “bad headlines”, but also forces to be analyzed through the 
political economic methods. The analysis of the case studies further suggests that the governance 
models regulating online intermediaries are typically a case of context regulation, particularly 
when coming in the form of liability regimes. Against this backdrop, the analysis highlights the 
key role of incentives among the different actors that shape the intermediary landscape, and the 
interaction among them, when we seek to understand and evaluate the performance of alternative 
governance models or approaches. !
In addition, the case studies have revealed a series of crosscutting and highly dynamic issue-
specific challenges, including the problem of definition (what is an online intermediary?), the 
question of the different types of intermediaries, the design of notice-and-takedown systems, and 
the cost of compliance and enforcement, among other things. Zooming in on the role of 
governments, this case study analysis suggests three basic functions that governments can serve, 
i.e. an enabling, leveling, or constraining. With a view to the basic institutional set-up of the 
different governance regimes, the surveyed countries either follow a Court-based system or 
heavily rely on government agencies in the context of the different regulatory strategies and 
techniques – with lines between the two models often blurring, depending on the issues at stake. 
The question of incentives also plays a decisive role when it comes to the analysis of compliance 
and enforcement issues, including the problem of over-compliance in the case of asymmetric 
regulation. !
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B. Future Considerations 
Both with respect to the conceptual and issue-specific analysis, the mapping exercise 
summarized in this paper is initially mostly of descriptive value and does not immediately lead to 
firm normative conclusions or “best practices”. That said, a more robust description of the core 
elements of online intermediary governance frameworks and the various forces at play can lead 
not only to a deeper phenomenological understanding, but also highlight some of the key 
considerations and issues to be taken into account when designing, implementing, or reforming 
governance models for online intermediaries. Such a descriptive map can and must be enriched 
over time by a growing body of anecdotal, and in some instances even empirical, evidence 
regarding the performance of varying governance models and their impact on the digital 
economy and society at large.57 In that spirit, the synthesis paper and the underlying case studies 
seek to contribute to a stronger evidence-base that might inform debates about “best practices” 
regarding online intermediary governance systems by documenting some of the key feature of 
such regimes.58 !
With these caveats in mind, we would like to highlight the following points from the case study 
analysis for consideration and further deliberation in the debates about the present and future 
governance of online intermediaries:!
1. Understand the function and economics of intermediaries. Online intermediaries are a 
relatively recent phenomenon, and both a driver and mirror of structural changes in the 
information ecosystem. Functionally, online intermediaries challenge traditional notions 
of what qualifies as “intermediary”: though online intermediaries are still not the source 
of content creation, they are increasingly involved in its dissemination, combination, etc. 
Consequently, much emphasis in legal and policy debates is currently on definitions and 
categorizations of intermediaries vis-à-vis existing laws and other norms. In addition to 
these definitional questions, the analysis highlights the importance of a deeper functional 
understanding of the roles of online intermediaries when seeking adequate regulatory 
frameworks. The same applies with regard to the economics of intermediaries, given the 
presence of strong network effects and two sided markets. 
 
2. Emphasize the normative dimension of intermediary regulation. Recently, the interplay 
between intermediary liability and the digital economy has gained significant attention 
across jurisdictions. Even architects of systems with rather broad safe harbor regimes 
seem to be primarily focused on the economic benefit of lean intermediary regulation. 
While economic arguments are of course important in policy debates, one should equally 
emphasize the normative dimensions, especially the impact of different governance 
regimes on Human Rights. That the interest in access to information has no natural 
“guardian” marks a structural problem in that respect.  
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57 See, e.g., “Closing the Gap: Indian Online Intermediaries and a Liability System Not Yet Fit for Purpose.” 
Accessed December 10, 2014. p. 31-35 https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/content/closing-gap-indian-online-
intermediaries-and-liability-system-not-yet-fit-purpose. 
58 In this sense also see “The Manila Principles On Intermediary Liability: Version 0.9,” December 1, 2014. 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kAkqgt3cRb65d8ik6vWYgpk6DYpP8ABA43ljgDiGOf8/edit?usp=sharing. !
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3. Analyze and evaluate the full range of regulatory mechanisms. The case studies show that 
intermediaries are regulated by different mechanisms, directly and indirectly, ex ante and 
ex post, through “hard” as well as “soft” obligations. Different actors follow different 
approaches, have different types of resources at their disposal, and show different levels 
of expertise. In order to analyze, assess, and improve the state of regulation and its 
effects, it is key to take a holistic view and consider all of these elements as well as their 
interplay (or lack thereof). A governance perspective is a helpful lens for such an 
analysis.  
 
4. Consider the full costs of intermediary regulation. Given the complexity of the digital 
ecosystem, it is tempting for governments to target intermediaries. At the surface, 
interventions at the gateways of Internet communication seem to reduce the costs of 
regulation. The case studies suggest, however, that such a “window” comes with the risk 
of over-regulation, with a negative impact on users’ fundamental rights, as well as on 
innovation and the digital economy. Research also suggests the importance of taking into 
account less visible costs of interventions, such as the risk of empowering already 
powerful intermediaries by forcing them to make content related choices.  
 
5. Strengthen mechanisms of mutual learning. Despite all the nuances, the case studies also 
reveal commonalities and patterns among different governance regimes. In particular, the 
study highlights similar challenges among countries with notice-and-takedown systems, 
with problems like defining the requirements for notices, whether and how to inform the 
owner of the effected content, regulatory oversight, etc. At least with respect to public 
policy-makers, the analysis suggests a great potential for transnational learning, 
complementing the increased sophistication of the operators of intermediaries, who tend 
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This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
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digital age.2 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
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facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 
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Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the legal framework governing the 
liability of online intermediaries in the European Union (EU). The E-Commerce 
Directive undoubtedly constitutes the key legal instrument targeting online 
intermediaries on the EU-wide level. After outlining the key provisions in this 
Directive, the paper will analyze the Google Spain ruling as a case study.3 This 
ruling is particularly interesting for two reasons. First of all, it involves a type of 
intermediary (search engine) whose legal position is largely undefined at the EU 
level. Secondly, the Google Spain case concerns the position of search engines 
vis-à-vis the personal data they process. In this regard, it is an ideal case study 
with which to evaluate the interaction between the intermediary liability regime 
and data protection law. Additionally, it provides food for thought with regard to 
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After introducing the liability regime for online intermediaries in the EU, this working paper 
makes a deep-dive into the particular position of search engines. The Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) has recently issued a ruling obliging search engines to de-link certain results when 
person-names are used as search terms. The so-called Google Spain Case also highlights the 
important discussion on the interaction between data privacy laws and intermediary liability 
exemptions. Using this case as the thread throughout the second half of the paper, we identify the 
core issues that are relevant and need further research. !
II. EU Regime on Liability of Intermediaries – E-
Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC 
In the European Union, Directive 2000/31 regulates the liability of online intermediaries on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce in the 
Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive, ECD).4 !
The E-Commerce Directive was proposed by the European Commission in 1998, and signed by 
the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in June 2000. Member States had until 
January 2002 to implement the Directive into their national legal orders.5 !
As observed in the preamble to the Directive, the development of information society services 
within the Community is hindered by a number of legal obstacles that make the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services less attractive.6 Moreover, “these 
obstacles arise from divergences in legislation and from the legal uncertainty as to which 
national rules apply to such services.”7 The goal of the Directive, therefore, is to create a legal 
framework to ensure the free movement of information society services between Member States. 
The Directive aims to achieve this by realizing two main objectives. In the first instance, it seeks 
to remove certain legal obstacles hampering the development of electronic commerce within the 
internal market. At the same time, it is also aimed at providing legal certainty and ensuring 
consumer confidence towards electronic commerce. The development of electronic commerce 
was considered a crucial factor that would stimulate economic growth and investment in 
innovation by European companies, and which could also enhance the competitiveness of 
European industry.8 !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L 178, 17.07.2000, 1-16.!
5 See more in: First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on the Directive on Electronic Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21.11.2003;!
6 Freedom of establishment (articles 49 to 55 TFEU) and freedom to provide services (56 to 62 TFEU) are intended 
to guarantee the mobility of businesses and professionals within the EU (See: recital (5) to the E-Commerce 
Directive). See more at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.4.html; 
See the full text of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. !
7 Recital (5) to the E-Commerce Directive.!
8 Recital (2) to the E-Commerce Directive.!
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The Directive only partially succeeded in achieving its objectives. Since the introduction of the 
Directive, e-commerce in the EU has generally grown.9 However, it is still less advanced than in 
the United States and the Asia-Pacific.10 For a long time cross-border activity remained low,11 
although steady growth can be observed in the last few years.12 Nonetheless, the European 
Commission has expressed the view that more needs to be done in order to achieve the 
Directive’s full potential.13!
The E-Commerce Directive regulates several aspects of information society services, including 
freedom of services, the treatment of electronic contracts, and liability issues for third party 
content, among others. In this section we briefly present the scope of the Directive before 
focusing more extensively on the intermediary liability provisions. !
A. Scope 
The E-Commerce Directive applies to “information society services.” Such services are defined 
as ‘”…any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at 
the individual request of a recipient of services” (art. 2.a E-Commerce Directive). The notion of 
“information society services” covers a wide range of services. Many of the economic activities 
that take place online fall under the scope of the E-Commerce Directive. Examples of the 
services falling under this broad definition can be found in Recital (18) to the Directive. They 
may include (in so far as they represent an economic activity): online contracting, services 
providing transmission of information via communication networks, services providing access to 
a communication network, hosting of information, as well as services that do not give rise to on-
line contracting, e.g. those that offer online information or commercial communications or those 
that provide tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data.14 !
The key elements in determining whether or not a particular service can be qualified as an 
information society service are as follows:!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and 
The Committee of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 3.!
10 Ibid. p.3.!
11 5th Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, Consumers at home in the single market, European Commission, March!
2011, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/editions/cms6_en.htm!
12 9th Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, Consumers at home in the single market, European Commission, July 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/editions/docs/9th_edition_scoreboard_en.pdf !
13 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and 
The Committee of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 6. For the analysis of the 
remaining obstacles to the development of the e-commerce in the EU see also Commission Staff Working 
Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final!
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communication2012/SEC2011_1641_en.pdf; and Summary of 
the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and the 
implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf.!






● Individual request of a recipient16.!
The E-Commerce Directive also excludes a number of services and legal issues from its scope 
such as, for example, questions covered by the Data Protection Directive (art. 1(5).b).17!
B. Liability Exemptions for Intermediaries 
The E-Commerce Directive regulates the liability of intermediary service providers in Section 4. 
This part of the Directive contains provisions introducing liability exemptions for certain types 
of intermediary services. Only three types of services are covered, namely ‘mere conduit’ (article 
12), ‘caching’, (article 13) and ‘hosting’ (article 14). In order to benefit from these exemptions, 
providers of such services must comply with the conditions of each article. !
The liability provisions of the E-Commerce Directive reconciled two main arguments in the 
debate taking place between the Internet industry and EU policy makers at the time. On one 
hand, there was the concern that if intermediaries were to be held liable for third party content on 
similar grounds as ‘publishers,’ it could restrain service providers from entering the market.18 On 
the other hand, the European Commission recognized the role that online intermediaries could 
play in limiting illegal online content and, through that, improved public trust and confidence in 
the Internet as a safe space for economic activity.19 The balance that was reached was meant to 
stimulate growth and innovation of the newly born technology and provide positive incentives 
for further development, which would effectively contribute to reaching the goals delineated in 
the E-Commerce Directive.20 !
The scope of the liability exemptions in the E-Commerce Directive is horizontal. This means that 
the liability exemptions cover various types of illegal content and activities (infringements on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The element of remuneration does not necessarily refer to the specific way in which the service is financed. 
Rather than that, it refers to the existence of an economic activity or an activity for which an economic consideration 
is given in return. Information society services therefore extend to services which are not remunerated by those who 
receive them. This means that a service financed through advertising, such as for example social networking site or a 
search engine, would be classified as an information society service. !
16 The element of “individual request of a recipient of services” covers an activity of visiting a website. The 
transmission of data is initiated on demand, by an individual ‘requesting’ the URL or following a link.!
17 Additionally, the Directive does not apply to: issues related to taxation; questions relating to agreements or 
practices governed by cartel law; the activities of notaries or equivalent professions to the extent that they involve a 
direct and specific connection with the exercise of public authority. See article 5.1 E-Commerce Directive.!
18 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee for Information, Computer and 
Communication Policy, The Role of Internet Intermediaries In Advancing Public Policy Objectives, Forging 
partnerships for advancing public policy objectives for the Internet economy, Part II, 22.06.2011, p. 12.!
19 Ibid., p. 12.!
20 See Recitals 1-6 of the E-Commerce Directive.!
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copyright, defamation, content harmful to minors, unfair commercial practices, etc.) and 
different kinds of liability (criminal, civil, direct, indirect).21 !
If the conditions for being exempt from liability are not met, this does not mean that the 
intermediary is per se subject to liability. The effect is that the intermediary can no longer rely on 
the immunity provided by the Directive. The question of liability is then determined under the 
applicable material law specific for the type of infringing content in each Member State.22 !
1. Mere Conduit 
Art. 12 targets traditional Internet access providers and backbone operators. The liability 
exemption provided in this provision refers to providers of ‘mere conduit’ services, which are 
described as:!
● Services which consist of the transmission in a communication network of 
information provided by a recipient of the service (‘transmission services’); and!
● Services which consist of the provision of access to a communication network 
(‘access services’).!
Recital (42) further stipulates that the exemptions provided by the Directive apply only to cases 
“where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process 
of operating and giving access to a communication network (…).”23 It further elaborates that 
such activities are of a mere technical, automatic, and passive nature, which implies that the 
information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information it 
transmits or stores.24 The services described in art. 12 are sometimes compared to postal 
services, which are similarly not held liable for the illegal content of a letter.25!
The ‘mere conduit’ exemption of liability only applies on the condition that the service provider:!
● (a) Does not initiate the transfer of data ;!
● (b) Does not select the recipient of the data; and!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Helberger N., et al., ‘Legal Aspects of User Created Content’ in IDATE, TNO, IViR, User-Created Content: 
Supporting a Participative Information Society, Study for the European Commission (DG INFSO), December 2008, 
p. 220, available at: http://www.ivir.nl/publications/helberger/User_created_content.pdf.  !
22 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.10. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?doc_id=842. !
23 Recital (42) to the E-Commerce Directive. !
24 While recital (42) purports to address all of the exemptions of the Directive, one might argue that the scope of this 
part of the recital should be limited to the transmission and access services identified in articles 12 and 13. After all, 
the exemption for hosting identified in art. 14 does not limit its scope to either transmission or access services (see 
also Montéro, E., ‘Les responsabilités liées au web 2.0’, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2008, n° 
32, p. 367). However, the ECJ has held recital (42) equally applicable to hosting services: see European Court of 
Justice, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010 (Google France and Google v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
a.o.), paragraphs 113-114.!
25 Lodder A., ‘Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, in Lodder A. and Kasspersen (eds.), eDirectives: Guide to European Union Law 
on E-commerce – Article by Article Comments, Kluwer Law international, 2002, p. 87.!
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● (c) Does not select or modify the transmitted data. !
The liability exemption for mere conduits also extends to the automatic, intermediate, and 
transient storage of the information transmitted. This is the case if the storage takes place for the 
sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network. Moreover, the 
information cannot be stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the 
transmission (art. 12.2). !
Despite the lack of liability of the service provider (when the conditions are met), national courts 
and administrative authorities may direct prohibitory injunctions towards a provider of a ‘mere 
conduit’ service. Such injunction must be in accordance with the law of the Member State where 
the case is decided (Article 12.3).26!
2. Caching 
The second liability exemption provided by the E-Commerce Directive applies to the ‘caching’ 
of information. The provision is targeted at providers of so called ‘proxy-servers.’27 !
Caching is defined as “the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, 
performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information’s onward transmission 
to other recipients of the service upon their request.”28 This exemption covers only information 
society services which consist of the transmission in a communication network of information 
provided by a recipient of the service (‘transmission services’) (art. 13.1).29 Just as ‘mere 
conduits,’ providers of this type of service can only be exempted from liability if they are in no 
way involved with the information transmitted (recital (43)). In addition, the following five 
conditions must be met in order for a service provider to benefit from the caching exemption (art. 
13.1): !
● The (service) provider may not modify the information as it would deprive him of the 
position of the intermediary; !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The matter of injunction towards an Internet service provider was discussed recently by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in the UPC Telekabel. The case concerned an injunction for the Internet service provider 
(UPC Telekabel) to block access of its customers to a website making available to the public copyright infringing 
materials. The Court ruled that an injunction ordering blocking access to such website does not have to specify the 
measures to be taken by the ISP. As long as the ISP takes all reasonable measures to achieve the result defined in the 
injunction, it shall not be a subject to penalties for breach of the injunction. These measures should have the effect of 
preventing unauthorized access to the protected material or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously 
discouraging Internet users. At the same time such measures should appropriately balance other rights at stake. See 
par. 64 of the ruling. See: CJEU, Case C 314/12, 27 March 2014, (UPC Telekabel Wien). !
27 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.8.!
28 Article 13.1 to the E-Commerce Directive.!
29 When comparing the caching exemption with the exemption for transient storage under the ‘mere conduit’ rule of 
art. 12.2, the wording appears to be very similar. The key difference between the caching exemption for transient 
storage and the exemption for transient storage under the mere conduit provision therefore is the purpose for which 
the storage is taking place. See Lodder A., ‘Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, in Lodder A. and Kasspersen (eds.), eDirectives: 




● The provider has to comply with conditions on access to the information; !
● The provider must update the information regularly in accordance with the generally 
recognized rules and practices in this area; !
● The provider may not interfere with the lawful use of technology that is used to 
measure the use of information; !
● The provider must remove the cached information immediately upon obtaining actual 
knowledge that the initial source of the information is removed, access to it has been 
disabled, or that a court administrative authority has ordered such removal or 
disablement. !
The liability exemption for caching does not affect the power of courts or administrative 
authorities to issue prohibitory injunctions in accordance with the national legal system (art. 
13.2).!
3. Hosting 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive provides the third liability exemption for online 
intermediaries. This provision concerns information society services consisting of the storage of 
information provided by a recipient of the service at his request. Typically, it concerns 
webhosting services that provide web space to their users, where users can upload content to be 
published on a website (e.g. YouTube).30 !
The storage by the ‘hosting’ service providers differs from the storage carried out in the context 
of mere conduit or caching mainly in terms of the purposes for which the storage takes place. In 
contrast to mere conduit or caching services, such storage is not merely ‘incidental’ to the 
provision of the transmission or access services.31 Storage may be provided for a prolonged 
period of time, and may also be the primary object of the service.32 In comparison to mere-
conduit and caching services, the level of passivity required from the providers of the hosting 
service is different.33 The Court of Justice of the EU specified that in order to enjoy the benefit of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.9.!
31 I. Walden in: Bullesbach A., Poullet Y., Prins C. (eds.), Concise European IT Law, Kluwer Law International 
Alphen aan den Rijn, 2005, p. 253.!
32 It has been said that this exemption was originally aimed at ISP’s providing space on their Internet servers for 
third parties’ websites, or bulletin boards or chat room services provided by the ISP itself (where the ISP only 
provides technical means for the users’ communication without interfering with the content being communicated 
between the users) (see: S.S. Jakobsen, ‘Mobile Commerce and ISP Liability in the EU’, International Journal of 
Law and Information Technology 2010, vol. 19 no. 1, p. 44). However, the exemptions provided by the E-
Commerce Directive are defined in functional terms (i.e. in terms of the activity being performed), not in terms of 
the qualification of the actor. While the European legislator arguably only envisioned providers whose services 
consisted mainly, if not exclusively, in the performance of operations of a strictly technical nature, the scope of the 
exemption may also be applied to other entities (provided the conditions set forth by art. 14 are met). As a result, the 
exemption may in principle benefit any type of service provider who stores content at the request of the recipient; 
including so-called ‘web 2.0’ service providers (see E. Montéro, ‘Les responsabilités liées au web 2.0’, Revue du 
Droit des Technologies de l’Information 2008, n° 32, 369-373).!
33 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p.9.!
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the liability exemption, a service provider’s conduct must be neutral. The Court further defined 
neutrality as a conduct that is “technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge 
or control of the data which it stores.”34!
Such service provider shall not be liable for the information stored, on the condition that:!
● The provider is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent – with regard to civil claims for damages, and he does not have 
actual knowledge of illegal activity or information – with regard to other claims (art. 
14.1.a); or!
● The provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove 
or to disable access to the information (art. 14.1.b).!
Interestingly, the Directive introduces different levels of knowledge with regard to criminal and 
civil liability. For the former, ‘actual knowledge’ is required, while for the latter it is enough to 
establish ‘constructive knowledge’ of the service provider. It is not entirely clear, however, what 
the boundary is between these types of knowledge. For example, the interpretations of ‘actual 
knowledge’ range among the EU countries from knowledge obtained through a court order, to 
informal notice by a user, which, however, should be sufficiently substantiated.35 Divergent case 
law across the EU shows that there is a lack of consistency in the interpretation of these terms 
and the following requirements for a valid notice.36 !
The exemption of article 14 does not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the 
authority or the control of the provider (art. 14.2). For example, if the service provider is acting 
as an employer or supervisor of the service recipient, it will not qualify for the exemption if the 
content was introduced pursuant to its instructions.  !
Similarly, as in the case of the ‘mere-conduit’ and caching services, the liability exemption does 
not affect the possibility of a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member 
States' regulations, requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement (art. 
14.3). !
Article 14.3, additionally, creates for Member States the possibility of establishing specific 
procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. The Directive does not 
provide any details for taking down or blocking access to content from article 14.1.b. In 
consequence, there are no procedures on how such processes should be handled by service 
providers, nor safeguards to ensure proportionality or due process of the removal or blocking. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Court of Justice of the European Union, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010 (Google France and 
Google v. Louis Vuitton Malletier a.o.), paragraphs 113-114. The European Court of Justice addressed the issue of 
neutrality of hosting service providers also in the L’Oréal eBay case. The Court ruled that art. 14 of the Directive 
applies to hosting providers if they don’t play an active role that would allow them to have knowledge or control of 
the stored data. Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C 324/09, 12 July 2011 (L’Oréal v. eBay), 
paragraphs 112 - 116.!
35 European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), C 324/09, 12 July 2011, (L’Oréal SA and others).!
36 See for example: BGH, 23/09/2003, VI ZR 335/02; Dutch Supreme Court 25 November 2005, LJN Number 
AU4019, case number C04/234HR; M. Turner(ed.) & J. Llevat, “The Spanish Supreme Court clarifies the concept 
of actual knowledge in connection with ISP’s liability”, Comp LSR 2010, volume 26, issue 4, 440-441.!
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Procedural aspects were left entirely to the discretion of the Member States.37 Some of the EU 
countries provided a more detailed regulation for the hosting exemption by introducing formal 
notification procedures (‘Notice-and-Take Down procedures’). Many, however, opted for a 
verbatim transposition of the Directive, leaving this matter unattended.38 !
4. No General Obligation to Monitor 
Member States may not impose on providers of services covered by articles 12, 13, and 14 (i.e. 
mere conduit, caching or hosting) a general obligation to monitor information they transmit or 
store (art. 15). The same provision states that they cannot introduce a general obligation to 
actively look for facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.!
An obligation to conduct general monitoring of content, if permitted, would counteract the 
limited liability paradigm.39 This is because intermediary service providers actively seeking 
illegal activities would no longer be neutral and passive in nature. Moreover, a general 
monitoring obligation could lead to censorship and consequently have a negative impact on 
freedom of expression.40  !
The prohibition towards monitoring obligations refers solely to monitoring of a general nature. It 
does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case, nor does it affect orders by national 
authorities in line with national legislation (Recital (47)).41 The Directive also allows Member 
States to require hosting providers to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected 
from them (Recital (48)). Such duties of care, however, should only be introduced to detect and 
prevent certain types of illegal activities, foreseen by national law.42 To the confusion of many, 
the Directive does not specify what exactly such duties of care entail. As a result, the boundary 
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37 Also in recital 46, the Directive stipulates that the removal or disabling of access should be undertaken in 
observance of this right and of procedures established for this purpose at national level.!
38 First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on the Directive on Electronic Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21.11.2003;!
39 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee for Information, Computer and 
Communication Policy, The Role of Internet Intermediaries In Advancing Public Policy Objectives, Forging 
partnerships for advancing public policy objectives for the Internet economy, Part II, 22.06.2011, p. 15.!
40 Ibid. p. 36. See also Council of Europe, Human rights guidelines for Internet Service Providers – Developed by 
the Council of Europe in co-operation with the European Internet Service Providers Association (EuroISPA), July 
2008, p.3, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf(2008)009_en.pdf!
41 Application of art. 15 differs across the EU in case of injunctions. For example, in Germany a host may still be 
required to actively monitor his platform for further infringing activity. See more in T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., 
Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007, p. 85.!
42 Prohibition of the general monitoring obligation was addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
two cases, Scarlet v. Sabam and Sabam v. Netlog. Both cases concerned an obligation to install a filtering system in 
order to prevent sharing of copyright infringing files. Such request was initiated by the Belgian authors’ association 
(Sabam) with regard to an Internet Service Provider (Scarlet), and to a Belgian social networking site (Netlog). The 
Court decided, in both cases, that an injunction requiring to install a filtering system for all information which is 
passing via its services or stored on its servers by its users would constitute a general monitoring obligation if it 
applies indiscriminately to all of the users; as a preventative measure; exclusively at the provider’s expense; and for 
an unlimited period, and if it is capable of identifying electronic files containing musical, cinematographic or audio-
visual work of which the applicant holds intellectual property rights, with a view to preventing those works from 
being made available to the public in breach of copyright. Court of Justice of the European Union, C-70/10, 24 




between such duties and general monitoring is not clear. Recital (48), for this reason, can be seen 
as contradictory to art. 15.43 !
The prohibition of article 15 is addressed to the Member States’ legislators. They are not allowed 
to introduce regulations that would require providers of the specified services to monitor the 
information they store or transmit. This does not mean that service providers cannot take up such 
activities on their own. The prohibition should not be read as a prohibition against service 
providers monitoring information. Most of the service providers in the EU do perform certain 
monitoring activities to maintain a ‘civilized’ environment on their service. Voluntary 
monitoring, however, can prove detrimental. Exercising too much control could compromise the 
neutral status of the intermediary and, in consequence, deprive them of the safe harbor 
protection. The EU intermediary regime does not contain a ‘Good Samaritan-like’ clause.44 
There is no provision which explicitly protects intermediaries from liability should their 
voluntary monitoring prove imperfect. As a result, service providers are careful not to shoot their 
own foot by being overzealous. !
Article 15 (2) defines two additional obligations that Member States may impose upon 
information society service providers. The first provides Member States the possibility to require 
service providers to inform authorities about any alleged illegal activities of their users. Such 
notification would need to be given as soon as the provider becomes aware of the illegal activity. 
Secondly, Member States may also establish obligations on providers to disclose the identity of 
users with whom they have storage agreements. Establishing these obligations is not a 
requirement and is left to the discretion of the Member States.45 !
The regime laid out by the E-Commerce Directive has been in place for over two decades now, 
without any update or amendment. During this time, a number of issues have been identified 
with regard to its functions.46 The review process of the Directive was, therefore, long awaited. !
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43 Barceló R. J. and Koelman, K., ‘Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It's 
Not Enough’, Computer Law & Security Report 2000, vol. 4, pp. 231-239, p. 232.!
44 Such as, for example the one offered by the US CDA, Section 230 (c)(2).!
45 The possibility of introducing an obligation to disclose the identity of recipients was questioned in the Promusicae 
case (CJEU, C 275/06, 29 January 2008, Promusicae v. Telefonica de Espana). The request for preliminary ruling 
concerned questions whether Member States were required to introduce such an obligation in order to effectively 
protect copyrights. Moreover, a question was asked whether such obligation could pose a risk of infringement of a 
right to respect for private life of the users. The Court ruled that the Member States are not required to lay down an 
obligation to communicate personal data in order to ensure effective protection of copyright. Moreover, the Court 
stated that when transposing directives into national legal system a fair balance needs to be struck between the 
various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order. In this case, the rights to protection of property, 
including intellectual property and the right to effective remedy with the right to protection of personal data, hence 
to private life. No guidelines how to struck such balance were provided by the Court. See more: F. Coudert, E. 
Werkers, In The Aftermath of the Promusicae Case: How to Strike the Balance?, Int. Jnl. of Law and Info. 
Technology, 2010, Volume 18, Issue 1, Pp. 50-71.!
46 T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, 
Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007, p.15; OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, April 2010, 
p. 20; Barceló R. J. and Koelman, K., ‘Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But 
It's Not Enough’, Computer Law & Security Report 2000, vol. 4, p. 231; Commission Communication to the 
European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of Regions, A 
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III. Review of the E-Commerce Directive47  
Despite the repeated criticism, the European Commission only started the process of reviewing 
the E-Commerce Directive in 2010.48 The goal was to establish whether a revision was required. 
Following a stakeholder consultation, the European Commission released a report documenting 
the most often expressed complaints of the Directive in general, and the intermediary liability 
regime in particular.49 The bulk of the latter concerned fragmentation and legal uncertainty.50 
Additionally, some specific problems regarding the hosting regime were described. A more 
thorough analysis of the identified issues was conducted in the Commission Staff Working 
Document on Online services.51!
A. Criticism  
The Commission Staff Working Document on Online Services expands on the problematic 
issues identified during the 2010 consultation. It mainly focused on the still pending questions 
with regard to legal uncertainty and fragmentation. Attention was also given to the specific 
issues of the hosting regime and the notice-and-takedown mechanism.!
1. Legal Fragmentation  
Legal fragmentation constitutes one of the greatest obstacles for the development of e-commerce 
in the EU. Despite the guarantees offered by the Directive, online intermediaries struggle with 
the fragmentation of rules that apply once they are aware of illegal content or activity on their 
websites.52 It has been observed that the costs and risks arising from the coexistence of 28 
national legal systems constrain innovation.53 This factor discourages potential new players in 
the market and hampers development of online business.54 !
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coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services {SEC(2011) 
1640 final} http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 41;!
47 This section is based on: A. Kuczerawy, Intermediary Liability & Freedom of expression: Recent developments in 
the EU Notice & Action Initiative, Computer Law and Security Review, Vol 31. Issue 1 2015, pages 46-56. 
48 Public consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the internal market and the implementation of the 
Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/e-
commerce_en.htm!
49 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and 
the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf!
50 Ibid., p. 10 – 15.!
51 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final!
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communication2012/SEC2011_1641_en.pdf;!
52 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and 
The Committee of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 14.!
53 Ibid. p. 6.!
54 Ibid. p. 14.!
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2. Legal Uncertainty  
The most common criticism of the Directive refers to the unclear scope of the definitions of 
intermediaries.55 As a result, it is often problematic to establish whether some services can 
benefit from the safe harbors offered by the ECD. This is particularly the case with ‘new’ types 
of services (e.g. video-sharing sites or social networking sites). Other criticisms mention the 
unclear position of search engines in the E-Commerce Directive. Opinions on the qualifications 
of this type of service differ across the EU.56 Further, respondents to the consultation complained 
about the unclear conditions for exoneration.57 Terms such as “expeditiously” or “actual 
knowledge” are defined in a way that leads to different interpretations in various countries by 
different stakeholders.58 This makes the functioning of the internal EU market problematic for 
the providers of the online cross-border services, as well as for their users.!
3. Notice and Takedown  
Another issue is a lack of uniform rules implementing liability exemption procedures, such as a 
notice-and-takedown system, across the EU.59 This is considered to be one of the major obstacles 
for intermediary service providers, as well as for victims of illegal content, to exercising their 
rights.60 As mentioned above, the Directive left establishing specific procedures governing the 
removal or disabling of access to information to the discretion of the Member States. This 
possibility is delineated in art. 14.3, while art. 16 (and recital (40)) encourages self-regulation in 
this aspect. This however proved to be inefficient – only some countries introduced formal 
takedown procedures.61 The procedures that were introduced are not harmonized with each 
other.62 This leads to significant costs for all stakeholders in terms of both human and financial 
resources.63!
!
The differences between the existing procedures can be quite substantial. Only a few countries 
foresaw any defense mechanism for the content provider (‘counter-notice’).64 Very often a user 
has no means of defending what is a rightful use of the content. Moreover, the user might not 
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55 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final, p. 32 -39.!
56 Ibid., p. 26.!
57 Ibid., p. 43.!
58 Ibid., p. 32 -39.!
59 Ibid., p. 39 – 47.!
60 Ibid., p. 24 – 26.!
61 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p. 19.!
62 See more in the First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, at 13, COM (03) 0702, (November 21, 2003), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive/index_en.htm#maincontentSec3 !
63 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and 
the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 11.!
64 In particular Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Spain and UK. See more in: First Report on the Application of 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on the Directive on Electronic 
Commerce, COM(2003) 702 final, Brussels, 21.11.2003.!
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even be aware that a third party objected to the use of the content, and which was, as a 
consequence, removed from the website in question. In most EU countries there is no 
requirement for hosting providers to inform content providers of any actions taken against their 
content.65 These aspects of notice-and-take-down have been criticized on numerous occasions.66 !
!
These examples point out another weakness of the European intermediary liability regime. The 
E-Commerce Directive currently lacks any firm safeguards that would ensure the proper balance 
of the fundamental rights at stake.67 No guidelines were advanced with regard to the 
implementation of takedown mechanisms implied in art. 14. Most EU countries did not foresee 
any procedural safeguards to ensure compatibility of notice-and-take-down regimes with the 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression, right to conduct business, due process, as well as 
the principle of proportionality.68!
!
Hosting service providers can benefit from the liability exemption only if they ‘act 
expeditiously’ to remove or disable access to content upon obtaining notification about its illegal 
character. The decision to remove or disable has to be swift in order to exonerate the service 
provider from the potential liability. This often leads to ‘over-compliance’ with takedown 
requests. Specifically, it has been argued that this provision creates “an incentive to 
systematically take down material, without hearing from the party whose material is removed.”69 
This is because any thorough assessment of the illicit character of content is not in the interest of 
the service provider. Moreover, the current legal situation is described as an “inappropriate 
transfer of juridical authority to the private sector.”70 These two factors may lead to private or 
corporate censorship.71 Concern about a possible ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression in 
this process was expressed by a number of organizations, including the Council of Europe.72 The 
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65 T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, 
Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007!
66 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final, p. 45; Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic 
commerce in the Internal Market and the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 
12,available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_report_en.pdf!
67 Commission Staff Working Document Online services, including e-commerce, in the Single Market, Brussels, 
11.1.2012 SEC(2011) 1641 final, p. 43 - 47.!
68 Horten M., The Copyright Enforcement Enigma – Internet Politics and the ‘Telecoms Package’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 22 Nov 2011, p. 48-50;, T. Verbiest, Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – 
General trends in Europe, Markt/2006/09/E, 12.11.2007.!
69 Barceló R. J. and Koelman, K., ‘Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It's 
Not Enough’, Computer Law & Security Report 2000, vol. 4, p. 231;!
70 Summary of the results of the Public Consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the Internal Market and 
the implementation of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC), p. 12!
71 Barceló R. J., On-line intermediary liability issues: comparing EU and US legal frameworks, E.I.P.R. 2000, 111; 
The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe and Reporters Sans Frontiers, Joint declaration on 
guaranteeing media freedom on the Internet, 17-18.06.2005, available at: http://www.osce.org/fom/15657.!
72 Council of Europe (Council of Ministers), Declaration on freedom of communications on the Internet, 
28.05.2003, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/informationsociety/documents/Freedom%20of%20communication%20on%20the%20Internet_
en.pdf; Council of Europe, Human rights guidelines for Internet Service Providers – Developed by the Council of 
Europe in co-operation with the European Internet Service Providers Association (EuroISPA), July 2008, available 
at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf(2008)009_en.pdf, paras 16 and 24; T. Verbiest, 
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ongoing review of the Directive is aimed at tackling all identified issues, but it has proved to be 
very challenging. !
B. Notice and Action Initiative 
The 2010 consultation revealed that the majority of respondents did not see the need for a 
revision of the Directive at that stage. Many of them, however, expressed the need to clarify 
certain aspects of the Directive, particularly with regard to intermediaries’ liability for third party 
content.!
!
The European Commission also concluded that procedures aimed at eliminating illegal online 
content should lead to a quicker takedown, but at the same time should better respect 
fundamental rights (in particular freedom of expression) and should increase legal certainty for 
online intermediaries.73 Based on these findings, the Commission decided to focus specifically 
on these aspects and direct its efforts to developing a new European framework for combating 
illicit online content.74!
In January 2012, the European Commission announced a new initiative on ‘Notice-and-Action’ 
procedures.75 The goal of this initiative is to set up a horizontal European framework for notice-
and-action procedures, to combat illegality on the Internet, and to ensure the transparency, 
effectiveness, and proportionality of N&A procedures, as well as compliance with fundamental 
rights.76 In order to combat illicit content more effectively, the Commission also announced a 
parallel revision of the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.77!
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Spindler G, et al., Study on the liability of Internet Intermediaries – General trends in Europe, Markt/2006/09/E, 
12.11.2007, p.15; OECD, The Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, April 2010, pp. 9-14; !
73 European Commission on Notice and Action Procedures, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/notice-
and-action/index_en.htm; !
74 Commission Communication to the European Parliament A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital 
Single Market for e-commerce and online services {SEC(2011) 1640 final} ;!
75 The main difference with Notice-and-Take Down is that in Notice-and-Action a broader range of actions against 
the content can be taken, providing a possibility for a tailored response (e.g. ‘notice-and-notice’ or ‘notice-and-stay 
down’); ‘The notice and action procedures are those followed by the intermediary Internet providers for the purpose 
of combating illegal content upon receipt of notification. The intermediary may, for example, take down illegal 
content, block it, or request that it be voluntarily taken down by the persons who posted it online’. Commission 
Communication to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee 
of Regions, A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online 
services {SEC(2011) 1640 final}, p. 13, ft. 49, !
  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF; !
76 Ibid., p.14;!
77 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of!
intellectual property rights. OJ L 195, 2.6.2004. Commission Communication to the European Parliament A 
coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services {SEC(2011) 
1640 final}, p. 15. See more on the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/directive/index_en.htm; Action Plan on the enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/action-plan/index_en.htm#140701.!
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Following this announcement, the EC launched a new public consultation, this time dedicated 
entirely to N&A procedures.78 In response, the EC received a great number of contributions from 
a wide range of stakeholders. They included businesses and business associations representing 
different types of intermediaries, as well as public authorities, lawyers, individual citizens, and 
members of the copyright industry and civil society. So far, the EC has not provided a formal 
response to the consultation and its results, even though a response was expected in 2013. As 
briefly summarized in the 2013 Action Plan, “the Commission services are working on an impact 
assessment of the notice-and-action procedures.”79 !
According to Brussels insiders, the works are actually more intense that the official sources 
suggest. After the 2012 consultation, the EC was preparing a proposal for a new Notice-and-
Action Directive. Such a Directive would address the problem of online intermediaries’ 
uncertainty without the need to amend the whole E-Commerce Directive. The proposal, 
however, has not yet officially surfaced.80 It seems however that the works have currently slowed 
down. Several commentators suggested that, in the light of the 2014 European elections, the 
proposal was (at least temporarily) withdrawn due to a heavy industry lobbying effort and 
general sensitivity to the issue.81 There are indications that the topic has not been abandoned and 
it will return onto the EU policy agenda after the 2014 European elections.82!
IV. Situation of Search Engines  
A. Relevance of Search Engines / Information Location Tool 
Services 
Search engines are a type of selection intermediary, also called information location tool services 
or referencing services. Their role is to map, order, select, validate, and valuate online 
information. By doing this, they can help users to navigate the Web with its abundance of 
information. By providing a way to overcome ‘information overload,’ search engines guarantee 
the free flow of information and deliver a crucial service to society. It could be said that by 
providing access to information and diverse opinions they participate in ensuring freedom of 
expression, as delineated in art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights.83  !
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78 A clean and open Internet: Public consultation on procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content hosted by 
online intermediaries, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/clean-and-open-Internet_en.htm!
79 Commission Staff Working Document E-commerce Action plan 2012-2015 - State of play 2013, Brussels, 
23.4.2013 SWD(2013) 153 final, p. 19, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-
commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf!
80 See: Open Letter to Commissioner Barnier, 
https://ameliaandersdotter.eu/sites/default/files/letter_commissioner_barnier_notice_and_takedown.pdf .!
81 Monica Horten, 2013, Notice and action directive to be blocked as EU backs down, 28 July 2013. Available at: 
http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/ipred/893-notice-and-action-directive-to-be-blocked-as-eu-backs-down. !
82 Recently, Commissioner Barnier indicated that the works on the N&A initiative shall continue when speaking to 
the European Parliament. See more at: Monica Horten, 2014, Notice of Action! Barnier to resurrect take-down 
directive, in Iptegrity.com 6 February 2014. Available at: http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/ipred/945-notice-of-
action-eu-commission-to-revive-take-down-directive;!
83 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 005, 
04.11.1950, Rome, retrieved from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. See also 
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Information location tool services, or search engines, are covered by the definition of the 
Information Society Service from the E-Commerce Directive. In Recital 18 it is stated that:  
“[I]nformation society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to online 
contracting but also, in so far as they represent an economic activity, extend to services 
which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as those offering on-line 
information or commercial communications, or those providing tools allowing for search, 
access and retrieval of data…”84 !
However, this type of service is not covered by any of the three definitions of the services 
described in Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive. They are, strictly speaking, neither a mere-
conduit service, nor caching or hosting service. This would mean that the intermediary liability 
regime of art. 12-15 ECD does not cover, at least nominally, search engines (or hyperlinks). The 
Directive, therefore, leaves this issue unattended.85 Only in the Final Provisions of the Directive 
is the problem mentioned, as it appears on the list of topics that should be analyzed in future, 
during the re-examination of the document. In Article 21 the Directive specifies that: “In 
examining the need for an adaptation of this Directive, the report shall in particular analyze the 
need for proposals concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool 
services…”86 !
This means that, until now, the E-Commerce Directive had not specifically addressed the legal 
situation of search engines with regard to liability for third party content. As can be seen in 
numerous examples of cases at both the national and the EU level, this approach creates a certain 
amount of confusion.87 !
Some of the most active search engines in Europe try to deal with this obstacle (at least partially) 
through different, and possibly combined, strategies. In some cases, search engine providers look 
for a solution by providing localized versions of their services.88 This practice is especially 
common in the case of highly sensitive content, such as Nazi glorification – prohibited by some 
European countries. In the majority of the cases, non-European search engines design their 
policies in accordance with the national laws of their countries of origin. Given the fact that most 
of them are based in the US, this has led to a de facto application of the US regime, especially 
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Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of human 
rights with regard to search engines, (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 4 April 2012 at the 1139th meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies).!
84 Directive 2000/31, Recital (18).!
85 Van Eecke P., Truyens M., Legal analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, New rules for a new 
age? a study commissioned by the European Commission's Information Society and Media Directorate-General, 
November 2009. Chapter 6: Liability of Online Intermediaries, p. 25.!
86 Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 21(2).!
87 Spain: Miguel v. Google Inc., Spanish Supreme Court [STS (Civil Chamber) of 4 March 2013 no. 144/2013]; 
Spanish Supreme Court, Civil Chamber, ruling of 9 December 2009, no. 773/2009; Spanish Supreme Court, Civil 
Chamber, ruling of 4 March 2013 no. 144/2013; UK: R v Rock and Overton, Crown Court, Gloucester, 06.02.2010, 
ref. no. T20097013; Belgium, Brussels Court of First Instance, 15.02.2007, ref. no. 7964; Germany: Deutscher 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), 29.04.2010, ref. no. I ZR 69/08;!
88 W. Seltzer, “The Politics of Internet Control and Delegated Censorship”, American Society of International Law, 
April 10, 2008, p. 3, accessible at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1496056. !
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with regard to copyright infringements (cfr. Section 230, DMCA).89 As a result, the search 
engines governance debate in Europe is strongly influenced by the US approach (which also 
became clear in the Google Spain Case).90 !
B. Search Engines Regulation Across the EU 
The E-Commerce Directive declined to address the situation of search engines with regard to 
third party’s content. This issue was left entirely to the discretion of the Member States. Some 
countries have taken advantage of this opportunity, according to the EC’s first report on the 
application of the E-Commerce Directive.91 The result is a variety of approaches across the EU. !
Some countries extended the legislation transposing the E-Commerce Directive in order to cover 
search engines (and hyperlinks). This result was achieved mostly by adding an additional 
provision that targets these types of services. Among those Member States, two trends arise. !
In Austria and Liechtenstein, for example, search engine services were classified as providers of 
‘access services.’ As a result, they were provided with a liability exemption similar to that of the 
providers of mere conduit services. The argument behind this classification was that “search 
engines generally do not edit the content they show in the results, are not the source of the 
information they link to, and are not in the position to remove it from the Web.”92 !
Other Member States, such as Hungary93, Portugal,94 and Spain95 have opted for the hosting 
model for both search engines and hyperlinks. This means that providers of these services are 
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89 The most popular search engines like Google, Bing and Yahoo! are US based companies. For Google’s policy see 
the Transparency Report FAQ: "It is our policy to respond to clear and specific notices of alleged copyright 
infringement. The form of notice we specify in our web form is consistent with the DMCA and provides a simple 
and efficient mechanism for copyright owners from countries around the world." 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#other_copyright_laws !
90 J. Van Hoboken, Search engine freedom. On the implications of the right to freedom of expression for the legal 
governance of Web search engines, Academisch Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, defended on 23 March 2012, p. 70.!
91 First Report on the Application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal 
Market, at 13, COM (03) 0702, (November 21, 2003), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2003/0702/COM_CO
M(2003)0702_EN.pdf. !
92 See footnote 30 in: Van Hoboken J., Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: on the need to update selection 
intermediary liability in the EU, International Journal of Communications Law & Policy, Issue 13, Winter 2009!
93 See 2001. évi CVIII Törvény az elektronikus kereskedelmi szolgáltatások, valamint az információs társadalommal 
összefüggő szolgáltatások egyes kérdéseiről [Act CVIII of 2001 on Electronic Commercial Services and Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services] (promulgated 24 Dec., 2001), MAGYAR KÖZLÖNY 
[HUNGARIAN GAZETTE] 2001/153, translated in http://www.nhh.hu/dokumentum.php?cid=11961. !
94 See Decreto- Lei n.º 7/2004, de 7 de Janeiro, que transpõe para a ordem jurídica nacional a Directiva n.º 
2000/31/CE, do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 8 de Junho, relativa a certos aspectos legais dos serviços da 
sociedade de informação, em especial do comércio electrónico, no mercado interno; Decreto-Lei 62/2009; Official 
Journal: Diaro da Republica I, number: 48, Publication date: 10/03/2009, p. 01602-01602 (MNE(2009)51108) 
http://www.cnpd.pt/bin/legis/nacional/DL62-2009-SPAM.pdf !
95 See art. 17 of Law 34/2002 on Information Society Services and Electronic Commerce (Ley 34/2002 de Servicios 
de la Sociedad de la Información y de Comercio Electronicó) of 12 July 2002 (B.O.E. 2002, 166). For a short a 
discussion see R. Julia- Barceló, ‘Spanish Implementation of the E-Commerce Directive. Main features of the 
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exempted from liability if they do not have knowledge of the illegal nature of the information 
they are linking to. They must also act expeditiously in case they obtain such knowledge, for 
example upon a notification from an individual, administrative body, or a court. !
The third group of the EU countries left this issue unregulated, choosing instead to apply the 
general rules of existing law. The best example here is the U.K., which is waiting for the 
European Commission to deal with this issue.96 A similar situation can be found in Germany and 
the Netherlands, where the general rules of law, particularly tort law, are applied.97 Very often, 
this results in complex rulings of the respective courts on the subject matter.98 !
The situation of search engines with regard to third party content is therefore far from 
harmonized at the EU level. The level of complexity of the underlying issues and the varying 
national approaches create a situation of legal uncertainty that is problematic for the providers of 
these services. This can be illustrated with the variety of decisions of different European courts 
with regard to the legal situation of the biggest player on the European search market: Google.99 !
This climate of legal uncertainty and fragmentation could also pose considerable difficulties for 
new, smaller market players that very often cannot afford elaborate legal services to determine 
the liabilities of their particular business models.100 This could be considered an obstacle to 
entering the field and, as a result, could hamper innovation and competition in the European 
market.101 It has already been observed that the major multinational selection intermediaries tend 
to choose compliance with the US law, which provides them with liability exemptions necessary 
to ensure their lawful operation.102 Applicability of the EU legislation to the US based services, 
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Implementation of the Ecommerce directive in Spain’, Computer und Recht International 2002, p. 112. See also 
Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD), Statement on Internet Search Engines, p. 2 et seq., available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/statement_aepd_search_engines_/Statement_AE
PD_Search_Engines_en.pdf. !
96 DTI Consultation Document on the Electronic Commerce Directive: The Liability of Hyperlinkers, Location Tool 
Services and Content Aggregators - Government Response and Summary of Responses 6 (December 2006), 
available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file35905.pdf.!
97 See Sieber U., Liesching M., Die Verantwortlichkeit der Suchmaschinenbetreiber nach dem Telemediengesetz 
[The Liability of Search Engine Operators after the Telemedia Act], MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR], Issue 
8/2007; Peter Ruess, ‘Just Google it?’ – Neuigkeiten und Gedanken zur Haftung der Suchmaschinenanbieter für 
Markenverletzungen in Deutschland und den USA [‘Just Google it?’ – Novelties and Thoughts on the Liability of 
Search Engine Operators for Trademark Infringement in Germany and the USA], 2007 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 198 – 203. !
98 Germany: Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Jul 17, 2003, I ZR 259/00; Oberlandesgericht 
[OLG] Hamburg [Court of Appeals Hamburg], February 20, 2007, AZ. 7 U 126/06; Landesgericht [LG] Berlin 
[Trial Court Berlin], February 22, 2005, AZ 27 O 45/05; Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam, 15 June 2006, Stichting 
BREIN vs. Techno Design Internet Programming BV, case LJ number AX7579‘.!
99 E.g. European Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010 (Google France and Google 
v. Louis Vuitton Malletier a.o.); Court of Appeal, Case no. 08/13423, 26 January 2011 (Socie´te´ des Auteurs des 
Arts visuels et de l’Image fixe (SAIF) v Google France/Google inc.); The Court of Appeal of Brussels, Case no. 
2007/AR/1730, 5 May 2011 (Copiepresse v. Google); Court of Milan, Case no. 1972/2010, 24 February 2010.!
100 Van Hoboken J., Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: on the need to update selection intermediary liability in 
the EU, International Journal of Communications Law & Policy, Issue 13, Winter 2009.!
101 Ibid. !
102 J. Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007); U. Gasser, Regulating 
Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 124 (2006).!
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including search engines, has been debated extensively over the last few years.103 This issue has 
been addressed in a recent high-profile case at the CJEU Google Spain, which will be presented 
below. !
V. Google Spain Case  
The so-called Google Spain Case (recently before the Court of Justice of the European Union (C-
131/12)) constitutes an excellent example of the issues mentioned in the previous pages.104 The 
case raises crucial questions lying at the intersection of the legal regimes concerning 
intermediary liability, freedom of expression, privacy, and data protection.105 Interestingly 
enough, the Court’s decision hinged entirely upon the European data protection framework. In 
other words, the Court barely mentioned the right to freedom of expression and made no 
reference whatsoever to intermediary liability exemptions.106 The following section will give a 
brief overview of the main issues in this case when looked at from an intermediary liability 
angle. But before that, we briefly recall the main facts of the case. !
A. The Ruling107 
1. Facts 
In the late 1990’s a Spanish citizen was subjected to insolvency proceedings, which in turn 
resulted in a public auction of some of his property. Information about this public auction was 
published in a local newspaper (LaVanguardia), in accordance with an order issued by the 
Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.108 By 1998, all debts were successfully settled.!
In 2009, the Spanish citizen discovered references to the above-mentioned LaVanguardia article 
when entering his name into Google’s search engine. Disturbed, he asked the newspaper to 
remove the content in question. This request was denied, as the newspaper had a legal obligation 
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103 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law’, WP 179, 16 December 2010, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf; L. Moerel, ‘The long arm 
of EU data protection law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to processing of personal data of EU citizens by 
websites worldwide?’, International Data Privacy Law 2011, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 34-35; C. Kuner, F.H. Cate, C. 
Millard and D.J.B. Svantesson, ‘The extraterritoriality of data privacy laws – an explosive issue yet to detonate’, 
International Data Privacy Law 2013, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 147-148; A. Kuczerawy, Facebook and its EU users - 
applicability of the EU data protection law to US based SNS, in M. Bezzi et al. (Eds.): Privacy and Identity, IFIP 
AICT 320, 2010, pp. 75–85.!
104 Court of Justice of the European Union, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, C-131/12, 13 May 2014.!
105 For an elaborate discussion on all theses issues, see: Alsenoy, Van, Brendan, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef 
Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?. ICRI Research Paper. 
Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494.!
106 This is in sharp contrast to the Advocate General’s Opinion of June 2013. REFERENCE!
107 This section is largely based on a similar section in another paper the authors co-wrote: Van Alsenoy, Brendan, 
Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril? 
ICRI Research Paper. Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494, 6.!
108 Audiencia Nacional. Sala de lo Contencioso, Google Spain SL y Google Inc., S.L. c. Agencia de Protección de 





to publish this information. Unsuccessful vis-à-vis the newspaper itself, the individual then 
requested Google’s Spanish subsidiary (hereafter: ‘Google Es.’) to stop including this article in 
search results when someone enters his name as a search term.109 Google Es. referred this request 
to Google Inc., arguing that this is the entity responsible for the development of search results.!
In March of 2010, the individual asked the Spanish Data Protection Authority (Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos, AEPD) to issue an administrative decision which would (a) order 
LaVanguardia to eliminate or modify the publication so his personal data would no longer 
appear in search results; and (b) order Google to stop referring to the contentious publication in 
its search results.110 In July of the same year, the AEPD ordered Google Es. and Google Inc. to 
take “all reasonable steps to remove the disputed personal data from its index and preclude 
further access.”111 The request against La Vanguardia was denied, because – according to the 
AEPD – the newspaper still had a legitimate reason to process the data at issue.112 One year later, 
Google launched an appeal against the AEPD’s decision before the Spanish National Court 
(Audiencia Nacional) in Madrid. In March 2012, this court referred the case to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling.113!
2. Decision 
The Court of Justice issued its ruling on May 13th 2014. To the surprise of many, the decision 
entirely countered the Advocate General’s Opinion of June 2013.114 Put briefly, the Court 
decided that Google – and ‘search engine operators’ more broadly – do fall within the scope of 
application of European data protection law. After all, the Court declared, by (autonomously) 
retrieving, recording, and organizing personal data from third party websites, search engines can 
be considered ‘data controllers’ within the meaning of the data protection directive (95/46).115 
The Court also resolutely decided that Google falls within the Directive’s territorial scope of 
application.116 Following this first category of questions (regarding the scope of application of 
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109 Ibid, paragraph 1.3. !
110 Ibid, paragraph 2.1!
111 Ibid, paragraph 2.3.!
112 i.e. order issued by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Ibid, paragraph 6.2.!
113 At the risk of generalizing too much, the request for a preliminary ruling contained two categories of questions: 
(a) the scope of application of European data protection law; and (b) the existence of a right to be forgotten/erasure 
vis-à-vis search engines directly.!
114 In this non-binding, advisory document to the Court, the Advocate General argued that search engines do not fall 
within the scope of application of the data protection framework with regard to the content they refer to. Moreover, 
he claimed that the current EU data protection directive does not provide for a general ‘right to be forgotten’ vis-a-
vis search engines. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) Mario Costeja González, Case C 131/12, 25 June 2013, in particular paras. 100; 108.!
115 For the Court’s reasoning, see Ruling paras. 21-32 on the Material Scope Determination (‘processing’ and 
‘personal data’) and paras.32-41 on the Personal Scope Determination (‘data controller’). For a detailed academic 
analysis, see: Alsenoy, Van, Brendan, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google 
Spain”: Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril? ICRI Research Paper. Leuven, Belgium: ICRI, September 6, 2013. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494, 9-19.!
116 See Paras.42-60 of the Ruling.!
From a practical perspective, this means non-EU intermediaries (or Internet service providers more broadly) will not 
be able to escape the territorial reach of the data protection framework when they are processing EU citizens’ 
personal data and have an establishment in the Union.!
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European data protection law), the Court dealt with the more controversial questions regarding 
the so-called ‘Right to be Forgotten’. In short, it decided that data subjects can indeed ask search 
engines to remove a reference to a webpage when their name is used as a search term.117 The 
lawfulness of the source material is not a condition,118 nor does the data subject have to prove 
harm.119 The Court did specify, however, that the right to erasure is not absolute, and a balance 
of rights and interests needs to be made.120 These rights and interests include, on the one hand, 
the economic interests of the search engine operator, as well as the legitimate interests of Internet 
users in accessing information and, on the other hand, data subject’s rights. According to the 
Court of Justice, the search engine’s economic interests alone cannot be a justification to 
interfere with the data subject’s rights. With regard to the balancing of fundamental rights and 
interests of Internet users versus those of the data subject, the Court did state that the latter 
override all others by default.121 In other words, the burden of proof seems to be on the search 
engine to establish that the interests/rights of its users weigh more than those of the data subject. 
The Court did provide some guidance on what criteria might influence the balancing exercise in 
casu: nature or sensitivity of the information; public interest; role of data subject in public life; 
time elapsed; etc.122 In any situation, it is important to emphasize that the data subject will still 
have to fulfill the conditions for exercising his/her right to object/erase123 and the search engine 
is only subject to data protection rules “within the framework of its responsibilities, powers, and 
capabilities.”124!
B. Particularities 
Even though entirely ruled under the data protection framework, the Google Spain (or ‘Right to 
be Forgotten’) case125 bears a lot of resemblance to the notice-and-takedown procedures that 
people are more familiar with under the intermediary liability regime (supra). After all, an 
individual – with certain rights vis-à-vis the information – demands an entity that is not at the 
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Following the ruling, Google has clarified that it will only comply with potential erasure requests when the search 
queries originate in the EU. Put differently, the takedowns will not be implemented globally (see: Sam Schechner, 
“Google Starts Removing Search Results under Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 
2014, sec. Technology, http://online.wsj.com/articles/google-starts-removing-search-results-under-europes-right-to-
be-forgotten-1403774023. This article also explains at least one regulator has expressed displeasure in this regard). 
Whether or not Member-States will deem this an appropriate reaction still has to be seen.!
117 Such a right would be based on the rights to object (14) and to erasure (12(b)) in the Data Protection Directive.!
118 Paragraph 88; 93-94.!
119 Paragraph 96; 99.!
120 Paragraphs 74 et seq.!
121 Paragraph 81; 97.!
122 Paragraph 81; 93.!
123 In order to exercise one’s right to object, the data subject will have to put forward ‘compelling legitimate grounds 
relating to his/her particular situation to the processing of data relating to him/her’ (article 14 Directive 95/46). The 
right to erasure can be exercised when the processing in question ‘does not comply with the provisions of [the] 
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data’ (article 12(b)).!
124 Paragraph 83.!
125 For a comprehensive overview of the possibility to request the removal of (links to) personal data by search 
engines, see: Van Alsenoy , Brendan, Aleksandra Kuczerawy, and Jef Ausloos. Search Engines after “Google 




source of the information, to remove it. Nevertheless, there are some important questions that 
distinguish this particular case from traditional N&T procedures.!
1. Notification 
As has been described supra, search engines are not explicitly included in the intermediary 
liability exemption regime in the E-Commerce Directive. !
However, Spanish law explicitly provides for a search engine liability exemption, similar to that 
for hosting providers.126 In the Google Spain Case, however, the Court put emphasis on the 
search engine’s own activities vis-à-vis the (personal) data and not the activities of the original 
publisher. The latter, after all, were legal.!
Once notified of a certain processing activity (i.e. the referral to a certain website upon searching 
for someone’s name), it was argued, Google cannot deny its responsibility with regard to that 
processing. It is therefore worth highlighting that in Google Spain, the rights holder (i.e. the data 
subject) did notify the search engine. When the company did not react, the individual eventually 
obtained a court order to have the respective information taken down. Therefore, when looked at 
from an intermediary liability perspective, Google would still have had to remove the 
information upon notification (cfr. the hosting regime). In casu, they did not even remove it after 
receiving a court order (cfr. mere conduit regime, where information has to be removed 
following such an order).127!
2. Taking Down Legitimate Information? 
One of the elements making the Google Spain Case so interesting and controversial is the fact 
that the underlying information – which is referred to by Google – is published lawfully. In other 
words, the information at its source is legitimate and the original publisher does not have an 
obligation to take it down.128 It is in this context the analogy with the notice-and-takedown 
regime falls apart. The exemption regime under the E-Commerce Directive focuses on the 
(illegal) nature of the content or the activities of the originator. The Data Protection Directive, on 
the other hand, focuses on the activities of the controller itself (in casu the search engine), 
regardless of those of the entity at the source of the information. This approach goes back to the 
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126 Supra, Section 3.2; Recently, Google was explicitly ruled not to have actual knowledge in a case where a victim 
of defamation had issued a takedown request and even obtained a judgment declaring the original content to be 
illegal. See more: C. A. Rigaudias, “Miguel v. Google Inc. Spanish Supreme Court [STS (Civil Chamber) of 4 
March 2013 no. 144/2013] – “The recent judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court addressed the liability of 
intermediary information services providers for defamatory content and sheds light on the so-called ‘right to be 
forgotten’ case being heard by the ECJ”, E-Commerce Law Reports - volume 13 issue 04, p. 11!
127 Clearly, it was a deliberate and strategic decision on Google’s part not to comply with this specific injunction. 
Besides wanting to obtain a more definitive and authoritative answer on whether or not these kind of erasure 
requests should be possible in the first place, Google was probably interested in being elucidated on who will bear 
the costs of compliance. Do search engines (exclusively) bear the burden of assessing removal requests? Or can they 
just defer to the authorities (DPA or Court) to make the appropriate balance? The CJEU seems to suggest a middle-
way, in which search engines can be asked to make a balance, but can easily defer the requester to the relevant 
national authority in more problematic cases (without risking liability).!




Court of Justice’s Lindqvist129 and Satamedia130 cases. In these cases, the Court emphasized that 
personal data that has been published is still protected by data protection law. Each use of the 
relevant personal data should hence be assessed against data protection law separately. To put 
this differently, the data protection framework – and right to erasure in particular – starts from a 
different paradigm than the liability exemptions in the E-Commerce Directive. The latter is 
hinged upon traditional tort law principles where an individual is subject to (potential) harm 
caused by the publication of certain information. Data protection simply puts certain 
responsibilities on the shoulders of whoever processes personal data. In order to exercise one’s 
rights under the data protection framework, it is not necessary to demonstrate (potential) harm.131!
3. Autonomy 
Contrary to the intermediaries mentioned in Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive (e.g. 
caching, mere conduit and hosting providers), search engines do not remain purely passive with 
regard to the information they facilitate access to.132 In fact, they do a great deal with this data 
independent from gathering it from its source.133 Based on their algorithmic analysis of the 
information, they refer to certain web pages when entering a particular search term/phrase. A 
strong argument can be made that search engines bear responsibility for this specific activity. 
After all, it determines – entirely autonomously – how and why the information is presented in a 
certain way. But, one could counter-argue that search engines only offer a tool to their users and 
should not be held responsible for the queries these users make.!
In any situation, it is hard to deny the importance of search engines in giving visibility/publicity 
to the information they refer to. In Google Spain, the Court emphasized that search results 
constitute “a structured overview of the information [...] that can be found on the Internet [...] 
and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been 
only with great difficulty – and thereby to establish a more or less detailed profile...”.134 While 
this is – of course – one of the main reasons people use search engines in the first place, it is also 
the reason why a search engine has such a potentially important impact on users’ perception of 
the search term. In other words, the harm or impact on the individual might not have occurred (to 
the same extent) if the information had not been accessible through search engines.135 Put briefly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Court of Justice of the European Union , Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, 6 November 2003,!
130 Court of Justice of the European Union, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia 
Oy, C 73/07, 16 December 2008!
131 Article 23 of the Directive does provide for the possibility to obtain damages in case one is actually harmed.!
132 Intermediary liability exemptions are based on the premise that the ‘sole purpose’ of their activities is to make 
“the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies 
that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored.” (recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive).!
133 For a comprehensive overview, see: Van Alsenoy et al., 11 et seq.This is probably also one of the reasons why 
search engines are not explicitly included in the E-Commerce Directive’s exemption regime in the first place. The 
legislator specifically introduced an article spurring the European Commission to analyse “the need for proposals 
concerning the liability of providers of hyperlinks and location tool services.” (article 21.2).In the Google Spain 
Case, the Court of Justice emphasized the distinction between the search engine’s and the original publisher’s 
activities at several occasions: Paragraph 80; 84-85; 86-87.!
134 Paragraph 80.!
135 This line of arguments was already put forward by the Spanish DPA in a Statement dating back from December 
2007. Spanish Data Protection Agency, Statement on Internet Search Engines (Madrid, Spain, December 1, 2007), 
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one could draw a direct causal relationship between the search engine’s activities and the impact 
on the individual. Hence, it is not surprising to see the Council of the EU also emphasize that the 
required balancing exercise differs depending on whether it relates to taking down the source or 
a search link.136!
The above is well-illustrated by two Australian cases involving Yahoo!137 and Google.138 In 
these (defamation) cases, the plaintiff successfully established that the search engines’ result 
pages caused him reputational harm. The links, snippets, and photos that were shown when 
searching for the plaintiff’s name – and which were all legal/legitimate on their own – gave the 
impression Mr. Trkulja was a criminal.139 In the same vein, several European courts have 
recognized that – under certain circumstances – Google’s ‘auto-complete’ functionality can 
cause harm to the relevant individual. For example, a German Federal Court recently ruled that 
Google should remove offensive word-combinations upon notification (in casu ‘scientology’).140 
In a comparable and ongoing case, Bettina Wulff (the former First Lady of Germany) has 
demanded that Google cease auto-completion with words such as ‘escort’ and ‘red light district’ 
when entering her name.141 Similarly, an Italian court has ruled Google to be responsible for the 
auto-complete terms ‘truffatore’ (con man, swindler) and ‘truffa’ (scam, fraud).142 Other cases 
against Google’s auto-complete functionality were introduced by companies, seeing their name 
being associated with terms such as ‘receivership’143; ‘crook’144; ‘scam’145; etc.!
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9–10. The DPA stated inter alia that “Although the initial incorporation of this personal information on the web 
‘may be legitimate at source, its universal and secular conservation on the Internet may be disproportionate.’ 
People must have at their disposal reaction instruments in order to avoid, on their own initiative, to be subject to a 
global exhibition.”!
136 Council of the European Union - Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX). “Note 
on the Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation - the Right to Be Forgotten and the Google Judgment,” 
July 3, 2014. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011289%202014%20INIT, 5-6.!
137 Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc LLC & Anor (VSC 2012).!
138 Trkulja v Google Inc LLC & Anor (No 5) (VSC 2012).!
139 More specifically, when looking for the plaintiff’s name, search engine users were presented with pictures of 
criminals with the plaintiff’s name underneath. The results pages also contained a link to an article titled ‘Shooting 
probe urged ...’ aside a big picture of the plaintiff and underneath the heading ‘Melbourne Crime’.!
140 BGH, judgment of 14 May 2013, ref. VI ZR 269/12, available at http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2013&nr=64071&pos=0&anz=86. Also see: 
EDRi. “Germany: Google Must Remove Autocomplete Harmful Searches If Notified,” May 22, 2013. 
edri.org/edrigram/number11.10/autocomplete-harmful-searches-google-germany; “German Federal Court Raps 
Google on the Knuckles over Autocomplete Function | Technology | DW.DE | 15.05.2013,” DW.DE, accessed June 
25, 2013, http://www.dw.de/german-federal-court-raps-google-on-the-knuckles-over-autocomplete-function/a-
16813363.!
141 “Bettina Wulff Will Weiter Gegen Google Vorgehen,” Welt Online, May 20, 2013, sec. Wirtschaft, 
http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article116355211/Bettina-Wulff-will-weiter-gegen-Google-vorgehen.html; “German 
Federal Court Raps Google on the Knuckles over Autocomplete Function | Technology | DW.DE | 15.05.2013.”!
142 EDRi, “Italian Court Found Google Responsible For Search Suggestions To Users,” April 20, 2011, 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.8/italian-case-google-suggest.!
143 In 2011, an Irish hotel sued Google over the search term suggestion ‘receivership’ (“the legal state of having 
forfeited control of a business or estate to a receiver to allow for the attempted recovery of a debt”). The case was 
later dropped by the Hotel for unclear reasons. See: Rob Young, “Irish Hotel Drops Autocomplete Defamation Case 




In any situation, the above clearly illustrates the difficulties of categorizing search engines or 
even defining the nature of their activities. It is clear that, on the one hand, they do perform 
autonomous and independent activities on the information, while on the other hand acting as a 
mere intermediary facilitating access to third party content. But it is much less clear whether this 
conceptual distinction can – or even should – be translated into practice.!
C. Aftermath  
Only two weeks after the CJEU’s decision, Google had already put in place an online form, 
allowing individuals to request the removal of links from the results that were produced by a 
search of their name.146 At the same time, the search engine company also announced it would 
create a hand-picked team of experts.147 This ‘advisory council’ will help them define a strategy 
on how to deal with the multitude of requests that they receive, and includes academics, 
policymakers, business people, and journalists.148 More recently, Google also invited the public 
at large to give them feedback on how to implement the ruling.149 Some national data protection 
authorities have issued official reactions to the ruling already150 and the Article 29 Working 
Party151 has already had an internal meeting on the Court’s ruling,152 and sat together with 
several search engines at the end of July.153!
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144 In France, a Court of Appeals confirmed an earlier decision, requiring Google to remove the auto-suggestion, pay 
€50.000 in damages and publish the decision on its homepage. See: “Google Suggest Condamné En Appel Pour 
Injure - LeMonde.fr,” accessed December 29, 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2011/12/28/google-
suggest-condamne-en-appel-pour-injure_1623293_651865.html.!
145 Marc Rees, “Google Condamné Pour Avoir Suggéré La Requête,” January 6, 2010, pcinpact.com/news/54815-
google-suggest-arnaque-requete-moteur.htm.!
146 https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en!
147 Alistair Barr and Rolfe Winkler, “Google Offers ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Form in Europe,” Wall Street Journal, 




150 For example: The Spanish DPA being generally positive but emphasizing the need for a thorough impact 
assessment (AEPD, Press Release - The Court of Justice of the European Union supports the thesis of the Spanish 
DPA on search engines and the right to be forgotten online, 13 May 2014, 
http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/revista_prensa/revista_prensa/2014/notas_prensa/common/may_14/Press_rele
ase_EU_Court_judgement_right_to_be_forgotten1.pdf); the UK’s information Commissioner declared there is an 
important role to be played by national regulators (David Smith (Deputy Commissioner and Director of Data 
Protection, ICO), Four things we learned from the EU Google judgment, 20 May 2014, 
http://iconewsblog.wordpress.com/2014/05/20/four-things-weve-learned-from-the-eu-google-judgment.).!
151 Umbrella organization including the data protection authorities from all EU member states. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/!





For a complete list of the concrete questions the Working Party asked the search engines, see: Article 29 Working 





Twenty-four hours after putting the form online where individuals can ask Google to remove 
certain links, the search engine already reported receiving over 12,000 requests. This number 
climbed to 41,000 by early June154 and over 70,000 one month after that.155156 Most requests 
emanated from France, than Germany, Great Britain, and Spain.157 Google declared to regulators 
that it approved over 50% of the requests, asked for more information in about 15%, and rejected 
over 30%.!
At first, the search engine intended to notify its users when their search query would have been 
the subject of an erasure request under the data protection framework (similarly to what it does 
with regard to takedowns in the context of copyright).158 Instead, however, Google now puts a 
disclaimer on the bottom of every search it identifies as a ‘name search’, stating, “Some results 
may have been removed under data protection law in Europe,” with a link to more information 
on the CJEU case. It seems, though, that Google will try to notify the relevant source in certain 
cases. This was clearly illustrated when the Guardian159 and BBC160 published reports that some 
of their articles on corrupt politicians, dodgy bankers, and pedophiles had been de-indexed by 
Google.161 Finally, it should be said that all of the above only occurs within the context of the 
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154 Jennifer Baker, “Google Has Received over 41,000 Requests to ‘Forget’ Personal Information,” Tech Blog, IT 
World, (June 4, 2014), http://www.itworld.com/networking/421740/google-has-received-over-41000-requests-
forget-personal-information.!
155 Op-Ed by Google’s Chief Legal Officer D. Drummond: http://googleblog.blogspot.be/2014/07/searching-for-
right-balance.html. By the end of July, Google reported to have received over 91.000 requests. See: David Lee, 
“Google Quizzed over Deleted Links,” BBC News, July 24, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/technology-28458194.!
156 These numbers seem to indicate a progressive decline of requests. Anecdotally, it is worth mentioning that Bing 
(Microsoft’s search engine) only received around 20 requests the day after Google released its erasure-form 
(see:Mark Scott, “Microsoft Taking Steps to Comply With the Right to Be Forgotten,” New York Times, July 9, 
2014, sec. Bits Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/microsoft-to-wade-into-complying-with-the-right-to-
be-forgotten/.)!
157 Lee, “Google Quizzed over Deleted Links.”!
158 Josh Halliday, “Google Search Results May Indicate ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Censorship,” The Guardian, June 8, 
2014, sec. Technology, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/08/google-search-results-indicate-right-
to-be-forgotten-censorship.!
159 James Ball, “EU’s Right to Be Forgotten: Guardian Articles Have Been Hidden by Google,” The Guardian, July 
2, 2014, sec. Comment is free, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-
guardian-google.!
160 Robert Peston, “Why Has Google Cast Me into Oblivion?,” BBC News, July 2, 2014, 
www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581.!
161 These takedowns were seen by some as a deliberate media strategy by Google. Intentional or not, after receiving 
a lot of criticism for these takedowns, the company quickly reinstated the references. For more information, see: 
Chris Moran, “Things to Remember about Google and the Right to Be Forgotten,” The Guardian, July 3, 2014, sec. 
Technology, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/03/google-remember-right-to-be-forgotten; Paul 
Bernal, “Facebook, Google and the Little People....,” Paul Bernal’s Blog, July 4, 2014, 
http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/07/04/facebook-google-and-the-little-people/; David Meyer, “Why Is Google 
Really Removing Links to News Articles in Europe?,” July 3, 2014, http://gigaom.com/2014/07/03/why-is-google-
really-removing-links-to-news-articles-in-europe/; Andrew Orlowski, “Google de-Listing of BBC Article ‘Broke 




EU. In other words, the form is not available outside the EU and search results are not filtered 
when queries are made on top-level domain names outside of the EU (e.g. .com; .sn).162!
D. Looking ahead 
It is still too early to draw conclusions about the eventual impact of the Google Spain ruling. 
Further observations and research should make a distinction between first and second order 
effects. First order effects relate to the implementation of the judgment in the EU. Second order 
effects relate to the broader consequences and implications (e.g. on innovation, freedom of 
expression, or the effect of this judgment outside of the EU).!
Data protection regulators – both at the national and pan-European level – are arduously working 
on developing a ‘dashboard’ or ‘platform’ that should ensure a proper balancing between all 
interests at stake.163 A critical element in this exercise is the development of objective criteria 
that could be applied the same across the EU (in order to harmonies the implementation of the 
ruling).164 At this stage, it is worth noting that at least some official organizations (e.g. the 
French data protection authority, CNIL165; and the Council of the EU166) suggest a 
gradual/subsidiary approach where the data subject should first approach the source page before 
being able to go to the search engine.!
Currently, there is still insufficient information to predict the second order effects. For example, 
there is not enough data on specific cases and corresponding compliance rates167 to evaluate the 
impact on the right to freedom of expression, or innovation. As mentioned before, we should be 
prudent in predicting the possible impact of the judgment on the right to freedom of expression. 
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162 This has also enabled some to compare search results (based on name-searches) in different jurisdictions and 
create a list of those results that have been the subject of an erasure request. See: Kevin Rawlinson, “‘Hidden From 
Google’ Lists Pages Blocked by Search Engine,” BBC News, July 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
28311217; Julia Powles and Luciano Floridi, “A Manifesto for the Future of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Debate,” 
The Guardian, July 22, 2014, sec. Technology, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/22/a-manifesto-
for-the-future-of-the-right-to-be-forgotten-debate.!
163Article 29 Working Party. “Press Release: Follow-up to the Ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU of 13 May 




164 A concrete example of such a criterion would be the admission of a removal request when the requestor’s 
criminal record is expunged. Arguably, the societal goal of allowing people to start afresh after certain periods of 




166 Council of the European Union - Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX). “Note 
on the Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation - the Right to Be Forgotten and the Google Judgment,” 
July 3, 2014. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011289%202014%20INIT, 7.!
167 The only data available at the time of writing are the numbers communicated by Google to the Article 29 
Working Party on July 31st, 2014. In this document, the search engine said to allow just over half of the removal 
requests it had received. See: Fleischer, Peter. “Questionnaire Addressed to Search Engines by the Article 29 




First of all, a search engine’s search results are very dynamic in nature and change constantly 
based on a plethora of factors (of legal,168 economic,169 or technical170 nature) already. Secondly, 
the relevant webpage will still be findable through other – more specific – search terms (not 
including the name) and via other routes (e.g. different search engines, social networks, direct 
access, etc.). After all, we should not (over-)rely on one tool or service to constitute our (sole) 
window to all online information. At the same time, the judgment might encourage certain 
governments outside the EU to introduce more content control. !
Finally, the CJEU’s ruling in Google Spain will undoubtedly have an impact on the currently on-
going legislative reform of the European data protection framework.171 The Court seems to 
prompt legislators to be clearer in defining the distribution of responsibilities among different 
online actors, as well as providing better guidance on the potential conflict with freedom of 
expression (and other fundamental) rights and interests. This was also echoed in the Council of 
the EU’s report on the Google Spain Ruling, specifically calling for the legislator’s attention to 
“(1) the scope of the right [to be forgotten], (2) the grounds on which this right can be exercised, 
(3) the need to balance this right with the freedom of expression, and (4) whether there is still a 
need to impose an effort obligation on initial controllers to inform second controllers of the 
request for erasure of data.”172!
VI. Conclusion 
The EU regime regarding liability of online intermediaries is in need of reform. The planned 
Notice and Action Directive failed to reach the EU Parliament before the 2014 elections. It is to 
be seen whether the review of the intermediary liability regime remains on the agenda of the new 
Commission. !
This working paper made a deep dive into the situation of search engines in the European 
intermediary liability regime, with a particular focus on their position vis-à-vis data protection 
laws. From this analysis it became clear that the situation is far from resolved. First of all, the 
position, role, and scope of activities of search engines is very hard to categorize. Given their 
inherently editorial functions on the content they refer to, they cannot just be compared to more 
‘traditional’ online intermediaries that remain more ‘neutral’ with regard to the content on their 
platforms/networks. The uncertainty about their position is also reflected in the widely diverging 
regulation of these online service providers throughout the EU. This complexity is only 
amplified by the fact that most (of the biggest) search engines are actually U.S. businesses. The 
Google Spain ruling in particular – although focusing specifically on data protection issues – 
highlights the need for a pan-European approach to the regulation of search engines.!
!
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168 E.g. Child pornography, intellectual property protection.!
169 E.g. Public image of the company, advertisement, business model.!
170 E.g. Optimalisation, fraud/spam prevention.!
171 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/review/index_en.htm.!
172 Council of the European Union - Working Group on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX). “Note 
on the Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation - the Right to Be Forgotten and the Google Judgment,” 
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Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
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analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.1 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
contribute to a more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, 
facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 








                                                 
1 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 















Abstract: This case study maps and analyzes online intermediary liability in 
India. It begins with the landscape of online intermediaries in India, highlighting 
intermediaries of special interest. This includes, for instance, platforms used to 
arrange marriages, which are much more popular in India than dating platforms 
because of Indian social norms. The second section of the paper attempts to map 
in detail the governance mechanisms applicable to online intermediaries in India – 
this includes the licensing system used for internet service providers, the 
Information Technology Act, and the Copyright Act. The likelihood of generally 
applicable criminal law in India (such as the Indian Penal Code) as a potential 
source of intermediary liability is also discussed briefly. The final part of the 
paper assesses the impact of the governance framework, ties together its different 
themes of content blocking, interception of data, and notice and takedown of 
content. It analyzes the law under which these activities take place, from the 
perspective of good governance principles such as transparency and 
accountability. It also considers whether the governance framework for online 
intermediaries treats online speech in a manner that is consistent with the Indian 
constitution. The serious flaws in the systems followed in India are apparent 
through this assessment – the lack of transparency and accountability suggest that 
over-regulation of constitutionally protected speech is likely to result in very little 
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I. Introduction 
The intermediary eco-system in India is still evolving. At a glance, it is apparent that the major 
online intermediaries in India are familiar global names. This is not surprising given the 
demographic that is currently accessing the Internet in India: digital access is concentrated in 
urban areas, and among literate people who are familiar with the languages used by international 
online platforms. 
This paper begins with an attempt to outline the significant online intermediaries operating in 
India and the market share held by each. It also highlights some interesting online intermediaries, 
like CGNet Swara, that are significant for reasons other than market share. CGNet Swara is a 
hybrid platform catering to parts of rural India, allowing tribal people to create news reports 
using a simple voice mobile phone connection. Indian social norms also generate their own 
versions of global online platforms. While dating websites are ubiquitous globally, their Indian 
counterparts focus on ‘arranging’ marriages using criteria like caste, religion and skin-color, 
which are significant factors in what is referred to popularly as the ‘marriage market’.  
The second part of the paper discusses the regulatory framework that governs intermediary 
liability in India. It outlines very briefly the constitutional framework within which 
intermediaries operate. It then proceeds to offer an indication of the criminal and civil liability 
that might apply to intermediaries without safe harbor protection. This safe harbor protection 
comes from the Information Technology Act, which offers conditional immunity to 
intermediaries. This immunity and the conditions attached to it – including intermediaries’ 
obligations in the context of content blocking, interception of information, and notice and 
takedown – are discussed in some detail in this part. Also discussed is the Copyright Act’s 
different safe harbor framework and the ex parte court copyright-infringement related orders that 
are increasingly prevalent in India.  
The third part of this paper builds on the facts set out in the second part by offering an analysis, 
supported with data wherever possible, of the impact that the regulatory framework has on online 
intermediaries and the content that they are willing to host. This part of the paper considers the 
transparency and accessibility of the legal rules, in order to assess whether intermediaries are 
easily able to understand what they need to do to comply. It examines the framework’s 
incentives to see whether a chilling effect is created. It also considers the transparency and 
accountability of government ordered blocking and interception to evaluate whether this liability 
regime offers any safeguards from censorship or surveillance by proxy.  
The notice and takedown process set up under the Information Technology Act (IT Act) and the 
Copyright Act are controversial especially in terms of the chilling effect that they have on 
speech. Also of concern are several petitions currently before the Supreme Court of India. While 
some of these petitions seek to strike down the notice and takedown regime set up by the IT Act 
on grounds that it violates constitutional rights, others seek to reinstate a strict liability regime for 
obscene content online. The Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases will shape the future of 
intermediary liability law in India. They are introduced at the end of this piece.   
  2 
India currently has the world's third largest Internet consumer base after China and the United 
States,2 with a total of 238.71 million subscribers as of December 20133 and 205 million users as 
of October 2013.4 However, the number of active Internet users (i.e. users accessing the Internet 
at least once a month) was a much lower 149 million as of June 2013.5 The users’ engagement 
with the online space is also low, with Internet users in India spending only 20 to 25 hours on 
average online per month.6 
A. Top Websites in India 
The top websites in India, according to commercial web traffic data collected by Alexa, an 
analytical website, are as follows:7 













                                                 
2Moulishree Srivastava, Internet base in India crosses 200 million mark, MINT (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/9pWsphmYL2YjdisfO7bGLM/Internet-base-in-India-crosses-200-million-
mark.html.s 
3Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, The Indian Telecom Services Performance Indicators: April - June, 2013, 
xii, 27 (Dec. 2013), available at 
http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/PIRReport/Documents/Indicator%20Reports%20-%20Jun-02122013.pdf. 
4Internet Users in India Crosses 200 Million Mark, IAMAI (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3222&NMonth=11&NYear=2013. 
5IAMAI Internet in India 2013, Internet and Mobile Association of India, 2 (2013). 
6 Chandra Gnanasambandam and Anu Madgavkar, Online and upcoming: The Internet’s impact on India, 
MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Dec.  2012), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_Internet/indias_Internet_opportunity. 
7Top sites in India, ALEXA (July 24, 2014), available at http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/IN. 




Figure 1. Top Websites in India 
This data indicates that thirteen of the top fifteen websites are based outside India. The two 
exceptions are flipkart.com (an online retailer that reaches markets similar to those targeted by 
Amazon) and indiatimes.com (a content portal owned by Indian media company Bennett, 
Coleman and Co. Ltd.).  
1. Search Engines 
S. No. Name of Search Engine Market Share (%)8 
1.  Google 97.03 
2.  Yahoo! 1.12 
3.  Bing 0.77 
Figure 2. Search Engines (Data from StatCounter) 
2. Social Media Websites: 
S. No. Name of Social Media Site9 Market Share 
(%)10 
1.  Facebook 81.16 
2.  YouTube 5.68 
3.  Twitter 4.77 
4.  StumbleUpon 2.36 
5.  Tumblr 1.84 
6.  Pinterest 1.51 
7.  NowPublic 0.78 
8.  LinkedIn 0.71 
                                                 
8Top 5 Search Engines in India from June 2013 to June 2014, available at http://gs.statcounter.com/#all-
search_engine-IN-monthly-201306-201406. 
9 The data combines Micro blogs, Social media; User generated content platforms types of intermediaries as 
provided in the guiding questions document. 
10Top 7 Social Media sites in India from June 2013 to June 2014, available at http://gs.statcounter.com/#all-
social_media-IN-monthly-201306-201406. 
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9.  Google+ 0.63 
10.  Reddit 0.46 
Figure 3. Social Media Websites (Data from StatCounter) 
Facebook has the largest user base in India with 93 million users, followed by Twitter with its 
estimated 33 million accounts,11 and LinkedIn, which has 24 million users.12 According to the 
Comscore India Digital Future in Focus Report 2013, Facebook is the most popular social media 
site in India, capturing the maximum screen time with access to 86% of the user base in India 
and 59,642,000 unique visitors in 2012-2013.13 The report suggests that Facebook is followed by 
LinkedIn, which is the next most popular, with 11,127,000 visitors, followed by Twitter, which 
had 3,884,000 unique visitors.14 An IAMAI report suggests that 96% of the total number of 
social media users use Facebook, while 57% use Google plus, and 49% use Orkut.15 The video-
sharing platform YouTube has over 55 million unique users a month in India,16 and is used by 
58% of 137 million Internet users in the country.17 
B. Intermediaries of Interest in India 
There are many intermediaries in India that were created in response to Indian social norms and 
markets. These include online matrimonial portals, which resemble online dating services in 
some ways, but have other design choices and actual functions that cater to Indian social norms.  
The first of these matrimonial portals began operation in 1996 and was called sagaai.com 
(subsequently shaadi.com),18 owned by People Group. The online matrimony market is currently 
valued at around $83,000,00019 and is expected to touch $250,000,000 by 2017.20 In deference to 
widespread Indian practices about marrying within particular sub-groups, these portals enable 
                                                 
11Atish Patel, India's social media election battle, BBC NEWS INDIA (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-26762391. 
12LinkedIn India user base crosses 24 million; 277 million members worldwide, NDTV (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://gadgets.ndtv.com/social-networking/news/linkedin-india-user-base-crosses-24-million-277-million-members-
worldwide-482512. 
13India Digital Future in 2013, COMSCORE, 24 (Aug. 22 2013), available at 
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations_and_Whitepapers/2013/2013_India_Digital_Future_in_Focus. 
14India Digital Future in 2013, COMSCORE, 24 (Aug. 22 2013), available at 
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations_and_Whitepapers/2013/2013_India_Digital_Future_in_Focus. 
15 Social Media in India – 2013, INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA, 6 (Oct. 2013). 
16N Madhavan and Vivek Sinha, We have 10,000 full-length Indian movies on YouTube: Google India chief, HINDUSTAN TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/we-have-10-000-full-length-indian-movies-on-youtube-google-india-
chief/article1 1123030.aspx. 
17Rohin Dharmakumar, Is Google Gobbling Up the Indian Internet Space?, FORBES INDIA (Jul. 22, 2013), 
http://forbesindia.com/article/real-issue/is-google-gobbling-up-the-indian-Internet-space/35641/0#ixzz38Kf8IuNP. 
18Satrajit Sen, Arranged marriages over the Internet were a laughable idea when Shaadi.com started, INDIA 
DIGITAL REVIEW (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.indiadigitalreview.com/interviews/arranged-marriages-over-Internet-
were-laughable-idea-when-shaadicom-started-anupam-g-mitt. 
19Harsimran Julka & Apurva Vishwanath, Matrimony portals making serious efforts to counter rising tide of 
divorces, ensure lasting unions, ECONOMIC TIMES (June 26, 2013), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-26/news/40206906_1_portals-online-bharatmatrimony-com. 
20Online marriage business may touch Rs.1,500 crore by 2017: Assocham, INDIA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/online-marriage-business-may-touch-rs-1500-crore-by-2017-
assocham/1/331691.html. 
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users to search for matches based on religion, caste, mother tongue, horoscope, skin tone, 
vegetarianism, alcohol consumption, and smoking habits. They enable parents to set up profiles 
for their offspring, allowing for the fact that many families ‘arrange’ marriages for young people 
and see the choice of partner as a family decision rather than an individual one. The consequence 
of this can be a violation of privacy and professional embarrassment for people who find that a 
wedding profile has been created for them without their consent. However, it is difficult to find 
lawsuits or complaints about these incidents since they take place between close family members 
and are usually handled informally. A more serious and fairly common problem in the context of 
matrimonial websites is fraud. News reports suggest that there are multiple cases of women and 
their families being duped by men who use these platforms to extort money by misrepresentation 
or blackmail.21  The Government has issued a press release reminding these intermediaries of 
their obligation to disable harmful and unlawful information when it is reported, and to appoint 
Grievance Officers to assist with this process.22 The press release also mentions the Indian 
Computer Emergency Response team works with social networking websites to disable fake 
accounts, and that this is more easily achieved for social networking websites with offices in 
India. 23 
In non-urban India, new platforms are being set up to bridge the digital divide even though 
broadband connectivity is still not available in these regions. 24  These platforms include 
initiatives like CGNet Swara, Kanoon Swara, and Graam Vani. CGNet Swara allows people in 
rural areas of central India with majorities of tribal populations to submit and listen to audio 
news reports regarding the area. The initiative receives an average of 200 calls per day and is 
driving the emergence of online reports on local issues.25 The Gram Vaani26 operates a Mobile 
Vaani initiative that connects reports from mobile phone users to stakeholders including 
governments and NGOs using an interactive voice response system. In the state of Jharkhand, it 
has over 100,000 users that call 2000 times a day.27 
                                                 
21 Sadaf Aman, Frauds and Cheats Rule Matrimonial Sites, New Indian Express, 
http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/hyderabad/2014/11/24/Fraud-and-Cheats-Rule-Matrimonial-
Sites/article2537595.ece, last visited on 8th January 2015. 
22 Steps to Prevent Frauds by Social Networking Sites and Matrimonial Sites, PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU (21 
Feb., 2014) http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=104142. 
23 Steps to Prevent Frauds by Social Networking Sites and Matrimonial Sites, PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU (21 
Feb., 2014) http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=104142. 
24 As of 2013 only 60 million of the 190 million total Internet users were from rural India: IAMAI Internet in India 
2013, Internet and Mobile Association of India, 2 (2013); The teledensity in rural areas is approximately 43 percent 
as compared to 140 percent teledensity in urban areas: TRAI, Highlights on Telecom Subscription Data as on 30th 
April, 2014, Press Release No. 35/2014 (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/PressRealease/Document/PR-TSD-Apr,14.pdf. 
25India: Use Mobile Technology to Bring News to Isolated Tribal Communities, International Centre for Journalists, 
http://www.icfj.org/knight-international-journalism-fellowships/fellowships/india-using-mobile-technology-bring-
news-is-0. 
26Graam Vaani: About Us, http://www.gramvaani.org/?page_id=76. 
27How Mobile Vaani Works”, http://www.gramvaani.org/?page_id=15. 
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Online recruitment websites such as ‘naukri.com’ and ‘monster.com’ have also gained immense 
popularity in India.28 
II. Governance Mechanisms and Legal Frameworks for 
Intermediary Liability in India 
Online intermediaries are subject to a fairly complex regulatory framework in India, which 
leaves them open to civil and criminal liability. The most significant laws governing 
intermediaries may be found in the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Copyright Act, 
1957. However there are circumstances in which more generally applicable legislation, such as 
the Indian Penal Code (1860), the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act (1989), the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (2012), as well as 
the law of torts, may apply. If an online intermediary is not eligible for immunity from liability 
offered by the IT Act, 29  it could incur civil or criminal penalties for offences such as 
defamation,30 obscenity,31 sedition,32 and/or copyright claims.33 
The regulatory approach thus far is largely command and control, as is typical of the Indian legal 
system. However, this seems to be changing gradually as the architectural constraints of the 
Internet become more apparent. Online intermediaries, unlike Internet service providers (ISPs), 
cannot be subject to the domestic licensing regime, given that several of them do not have offices 
in India and are therefore out of the physical jurisdiction within which the Indian Government is 
easily able to implement its laws. Therefore, although ISPs are subject to several obligations 
through their licenses (discussed below in 2.1), international online intermediaries remain free of 
these constraints.   
A. Licensing System for Internet Service Providers 
Internet service providers are required to get licenses in India, and are subject to several 
obligations through their license terms. Content intermediaries, however, do not have to get 
licenses for operation, and one of the reasons for this might be that it would be very difficult to 
enforce such a requirement on intermediaries located in other jurisdictions. Of the various types 
of Internet intermediaries, it is telecommunication service providers, network service providers, 
and Internet service providers that require a license to offer services in India. 
The regulatory framework for intermediaries originates in the Indian Telegraph Act,34 which 
empowers the Central Government to issue licenses to establish, maintain, or work a telegraph.35 
The Department of Telecommunication acts as a licensor on behalf of the Central Government, 
                                                 
28 Rebirth of e-Commerce in India, Ernst and Young (2013), available at  
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Rebirth_of_e-Commerce_in_India/$FILE/EY_RE-
BIRTH_OF_ECOMMERCE.pdf. 
29The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79 (prior to the Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008). 
30The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 499; Khushwant Singh and Anr. v. Maneka Gandhi, A.I.R. 2002 Delhi 58 (India); 
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Torts 279 (26th ed. 2013). 
31The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 292, The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 67. 
32The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 124A. 
33 The Copyright Act, 1957, § 51. 
34 The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, § 4 
35 The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, § 3 (1AA) 
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and enters into agreements with companies for the provision of telecommunications and Internet 
Services. 
There are three types of licenses for communication providers in India: 
• The License Agreement for Provision of Internet Services (‘ISP License’)36 
• The License Agreement For Provision Of Unified Access Services after Migration 
from CMTS (‘UAS License’)37 
• The License Agreement for Unified License  (‘Unified License’)38 
The Government has taken to issuing only Unified Licenses since 2012. This might be an effort 
to consolidate and simplify the licensing process, since the Unified License covers various 
telecom services such as access, Internet, and long distance within a single license.39 It contains a 
separate chapter for Internet services. 
The licenses obligate licensee-intermediaries to block Internet sites, Uniform Resource Locators 
(URLs), Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), and/or individual subscribers, as identified and 
directed by the government in the interest of national security or public interest from time to 
time.40 The licenses also declare that carriage of objectionable, obscene, unauthorized, or any 
other content, messages, or communications infringing copyright and intellectual property rights 
etc., in any form, is not permitted, and obligates licensees to prevent such carriage when specific 
instances are reported.41 
The license agreements contain a number of provisions concerning data retention, disclosure, and 
the provision of services to enable surveillance.42 They require ISPs to put in place systems that 
enable lawful monitoring and interception of communications by the Indian Government.43 ISPs 
are also required to trace or monitor content such as communications that are obnoxious, 
malicious, or a nuisance,44 and ‘objectionable’ communications.45 
                                                 
36 Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
37Licence Agreement for Provision of Unified Access Services after Migration from CMTS , 
http://www.auspi.in/policies/UASL.pdf. 
38License Agreement for Unified License , http://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Unified%20Licence_0.pdf. 
39 Department of Telecommunications, Unified License, http://www.dot.gov.in/licensing/unified-license 
40 Chapter IX clause 7.12, License Agreement for Unified License, 
http://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Unified%20Licence_0.pdf clause 7.12, Licence Agreement for Provision of 
Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
41 Chapter V clause 38.1, License Agreement for Unified License, 
http://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Unified%20Licence_0.pdf clause 33.6, Licence Agreement for Provision of 
Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
42 Chinmayi Arun and Ujwala Uppaluri, Research Memorandum Concerning The Indian Surveillance Framework 
for iProbono (2014).  
43 Chapter IX clause 8.1.1, License Agreement for Unified License, 
http://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Unified%20Licence_0.pdf. 
44Clause 33.4, Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
45 Clause 33.6, Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf.; 
Chinmayi Arun and Ujwala Uppaluri, Research Memorandum Concerning The Indian Surveillance Framework for 
iProbono (2014). 
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At every international gateway or node having an outbound capacity of more than 2 MB/s, ISPs 
are required to set up monitoring centers equipped with appropriate monitoring systems in 
accordance with government specifications,46 office space,47 telephone lines,48 and be accessible 
to monitoring agencies at all times.49 ISPs must also facilitate Government access to various 
equipment, leased lines, record files, and logbooks of the ISPs. 50  Additionally, periodic 
inspections of Internet leased line customers at their premise are to be performed by the ISP 
within 15 days of commissioning an Internet line to check for possible misuse.51 
The UAS & Unified Licenses require licensee service providers to provide the ‘necessary 
facilities’ to the Government to “counteract espionage, subversive acts, sabotage, or any other 
unlawful activity.”52 All three licenses obligate licensees to ‘facilitate’ the application of Section 
5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, which deals with interception of communication.53  
B. The Information Technology Act, 2000 
The Information Technology Act, 2000 (referred to as ‘IT Act’) came into force on October 17th, 
2010 and was meant to provide legal recognition of electronic commerce.54 It was also meant to 
give effect to a UN General Assembly resolution on Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.55 The IT Act was 
amended in 200856 in a manner that expanded the safe harbor protection significantly, thereby 
changing the intermediary liability regime substantially. The amendment emerged after the 
Report of the Expert Committee on the Proposed Amendments to the IT Act, 2000 suggested 
certain reforms, which would also ensure that the law relating to intermediary liability had more 
clarity and was closer to the framework in the EU E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC,57 which 
was used to guide the revision of the IT Act.58 
                                                 
46 Clause 34.27(a)(i), Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
34.27(a)(i) 
47 Clause 34.27(a)(ii), Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
48 Clause 34.27(a)(iii), Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
49 Clause 34.27, Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf 
50 Clause 30.1, Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
51 Clause 34.17, Licence Agreement for Provision of Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf. 
52 Clause 41.1, Licence Agreement for Provision of Unified Access Services after Migration from CMTS , 
http://www.auspi.in/policies/UASL.pdf 
53  Clause 40.1, License Agreement for Unified License, 
http://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Unified%20Licence_0.pdf; clause 35.1, Licence Agreement for Provision of 
Internet Services, http://cca.ap.nic.in/i_agreement.pdf; clause 42.1 Licence Agreement for Provision of Unified 
Access Services after Migration from CMTS , http://www.auspi.in/policies/UASL.pdf. 
54The Information Technology Act, 2000, preamble (prior to the Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008). 
55 G.A. Res. 51/162, Model Law on Electronic Commerce, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/162 (Jan. 30, 1997). 
56The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008. 
57Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (June 8, 2000), available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:En:HTML. 
58Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology, Government of 
India, Report of the Expert Committee on Proposed Amendments to Information Technology Act 2000, 46 (Aug. 
2005), available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Information%20Technology%20/bill93_2008122693_Report_of_Expert_Co
mmittee.pdf; Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information TECHNOLOGY, 
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The IT Act, prior to amendment, protected intermediaries from liability59 in a very limited 
manner. The immunity extended to a narrow set of intermediaries: it was provided only to a 
‘network service provider' which was defined as an intermediary, which in turn was defined as 
“any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that message or 
provides any service with respect to that message.’’60 Additionally, protection was offered only 
with respect to offences committed under the IT Act, leaving intermediaries open to liability 
under other legislation for content that they hosted.   
One of the concerns raised was that offering only ‘network service providers’ protection from 
liability might leave out a range of online intermediaries,61 including the ones that provide online 
credit validation services.62 It has also been argued that ‘messages’ were the only kind of content 
to which the safe harbor liability protection applied, and depending on how the term ‘message’ is 
interpreted, this may have narrowed the scope of the protection offered.63 However, these 
concerns do not apply anymore, since the IT Act has been amended to expand both the immunity 
and the definition of the intermediaries that may claim this immunity. 
Intermediaries with respect to electronic records are defined under the amended Section 2(w) of 
the Information Technology Act as “any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores, 
or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes telecom 
service providers, network service providers, Internet service providers, web-hosting service 
providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-marketplaces, and 
cyber cafes.” 64  
This was hailed by some commentators for its wider and clearer definition of intermediaries, 
which unambiguously included online intermediaries within its purview.65 Others have pointed 
out that that although this new definition expands the number of entities that can claim safe 
harbor protection under the IT Act, it fails to make allowances for the functional differences 
between the different kinds of intermediaries.66 
Section 2(w) includes a variety of very different intermediaries, such as telecom service 
providers, network service providers, Internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Government of India, Summary of the Report of the Expert Committee on Proposed Amendments to Information 
Technology Act 2000, ¶ 17 (Aug. 2005), available at http://deity.gov.in/content/report-expert-committee-
amendments-it-act-2000-3. 
59The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79 (prior to the Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008). 
60The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 2, cl. w (prior to the Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008). 
61Apar Gupta, Commentary on Information Technology Act 295 (2nd ed. 2011); Thilini Kahandawaarachchi, 
Liability of Internet Service Providers for Third Party Online Copyright Infringement: A Study of US and Indian 
laws, 12 J. I.P.R. 553, 559 (2007); Priyambada Mishra and Angsuman Dutta, Striking a Balance between Liability of 
Internet Service Providers and Protection of Copyright over the Internet: A Need of the Hour, 14 J. I.P.R. 321, 324 
(2009); Pritika Rai Advani, Intermediary Liability in India, XLVIII (50) EPW 120 (Dec. 2013); See generally 
Aditya Gupta, The Scope of Online Service Providers' Liability for Copyright Infringing Third Party Content under 
the Indian Laws- The Road Ahead, 15 J. I.P.R. 35, 37 (2010). 
62Apar Gupta, Commentary on Information Technology Act 295 (2nd ed. 2011). 
63Apar Gupta, Commentary on Information Technology Act 295 (2nd ed. 2011). 
64 The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 2, cl. w. 
65Aditya Gupta, The Scope of Online Service Providers' Liability for Copyright Infringing Third Party Content 
under the Indian Laws- The Road Ahead, 15 J. I.P.R. 35, 37 (2010). 
66Pritika Rai Advani, Intermediary Liability in India, XLVIII (50) EPW 120, 122 (Dec. 2013). 
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search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-marketplaces or cyber cafes, in 
its scope. The obligations under the IT Act are such that all these intermediaries, online or 
offline, are subject to exactly the same legal regime.  
Differential obligations may apply to different kinds of intermediaries owing to regulations that 
may be specific to their particular function, such as licenses for ISPs or banking regulations for 
financial intermediaries. However, the safe harbor protection for intermediaries includes 
immunity from liability under other legislations, and therefore intermediaries that meet the 
conditions for immunity in section 79 of the IT Act all get immunity and find themselves in a 
similar position regardless of their specific role or nature. It has been argued that by not taking 
into account the functional differences of the intermediaries, the efficacy of the immunity may be 
compromised.67 
1. Safe Harbor, ‘Due Diligence,’ and Editorial Control 
The amended safe harbor provision under Section 79 allows a wide spectrum of intermediaries to 
seek safe harbor protection from liability for any third party information, data, or communication 
link hosted by the third party. Section 79 ensures that the intermediaries’ immunity from liability 
prevails over all other laws in force,68 except for the Copyright Act and the Patents’ Act.69 
To be granted immunity under section 79, the intermediary must:  
• Merely provide access to a communication system over which information made 
available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hosted;70 or not 
initiate the transmission, select its receiver, or select or modify the information 
contained in the transmission;71 and 
• Observe due diligence72 as provided by rules promulgated by the government in 
2011.73  
The use of the word “or” between the first two conditions stated above means that they are 
disjunctive in nature and only one needs to be satisfied in order for the intermediary to be 
granted immunity, along with fulfilling the third condition.74 
Some commentators suggest that section 79 uses both the “mere conduit” and the “caching” 
principles, borrowed from the EU E-commerce Directive,75 whereas others point out that the 
                                                 
67Pritika Rai Advani, Intermediary Liability in India, XLVIII (50) EPW 120, 122 (Dec. 2013). 
68The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 1. 
69The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 81. 
70The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 2(a). 
71The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 2(b). 
72The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 2(c). 
73The Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011. 
74 Super Cassettes Industries Ltd v. MyspaceInc, M.I.P.R. 2011 (2) 303 (India). 
75 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in  the Internal Market (June 8, 2000), available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:En:HTML; Pritika Rai Advani, 
Intermediary Liability in India, XLVIII (50) EPW 120, 121-22 (Dec. 2013). 
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language explicitly only discusses the mere conduit principle.76  What is clear upon examination 
of section 79 is that to be eligible for immunity, the intermediary has to confine itself to 
transmission of information and not initiate transmission, select the receiver, or modify the 
information.77 Services that would clearly be covered here because of their conduit function 
include telecommunications carriers, ISPs, and other backbone services.78 However, caching 
services should also be included since they do fall within the definition of an intermediary under 
the amended IT Act (which includes those who store and host information),79 and the immunity 
under section 79 seems to extend to all intermediaries with no specific exclusion of caching 
services. There is no reason why service providers who offer hosting services and do not fall 
afoul of the preconditions to the safe harbor protection should not qualify for immunity under 
section 79.  
Wielding editorial control would almost certainly cause an intermediary to be excluded from the 
safe harbor protection. For one thing, it would amount to selection of information, such that the 
intermediary will fail one of the pre-requisites listed in Section 79(2).80 
Controversially, the immunity from liability granted by section 79 is contingent upon 
intermediaries observing ‘due diligence’.81 This standard has been outlined in multiple cases, and 
the obligations that it entails are listed in detail in the Information Technology (Intermediaries 
                                                 
76Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, CENTRE FOR 
INTERNET & SOCIETY 20-23 (Apr. 10, 2012), available at http://cis-india.org/Internet-governance/intermediary-
liability-in-india. 
77See also Pritika Rai Advani, Intermediary Liability in India, XLVIII (50) EPW 120, 122 (Dec. 2013). 
78Rajendra Kumar and Latha R. Nair, Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Copyright Act, 1957: Searching for 
the Safest Harbor?, 5 NUJS L. REV. 554, 562 (2012). 
79S. 79. Exemption from liability of intermediary in certain cases.—(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any 
law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and (3), an intermediary shall not be 
liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by him. 
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if— 
(a)the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system over which information 
made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hosted; or 
(b)the intermediary does not— 
(i)initiate the transmission, 
(ii)select the receiver of the transmission, and 
(iii)select or modify the information contained in the transmission; 
(c)the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other 
guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf. 
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply if— 
(a)the intermediary has conspired or abetted or aided or induced, whether by threats or promise or otherwise in the 
commission of the unlawful act; 
(b)upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate Government or its agency that any 
information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the 
intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act, the intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable 
access to that material on that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner. 
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, the expression “third party information” means any information dealt 
with by an intermediary in his capacity as an intermediary. 
80Aditya Gupta, The Scope of Online Service Providers' Liability for Copyright Infringing Third Party Content 
under the Indian Laws- The Road Ahead, 15 J. I.P.R. 35, 38 (2010). 
81The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 2(c). 
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guidelines) Rules, 2011. The implications of this standard are discussed in more detail in the 
section on Intermediaries Guidelines below. 
However, there are other ways in which even intermediaries that perform purely conduit or 
hosting services might find themselves liable, despite section 79. Section 79(3) limits the 
immunity offered by section 79, by outlining the circumstances under which an intermediary will 
be forbidden from claiming immunity: 
• If the intermediary has conspired or abetted in the commission of the unlawful act.82 
This means that if the intermediary is involved in the commission of offence in any 
way then it cannot claim exemption from liability; 
• Or upon receiving actual knowledge about any unlawful content the intermediary 
fails to remove the content alleged to be infringing.83 
The precise meaning of ‘actual knowledge’ is unclear upon a bare reading of the statute – it is 
not defined in the IT Act,84 and it remains unclear, for example, whether a notice from any 
private party would automatically imply that the intermediary under question now has ‘actual 
knowledge’ of the unlawful content. This is a standard discussed in more detail in the 
Intermediaries Guidelines, which also uses the ‘actual knowledge’ standard.  
2. Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 
The Central Government notified the Intermediary Guidelines on April 11th, 2011, in exercise of 
the powers conferred by Section 87(2)(zg) read with Section 79(2) of the Information 
Technology Act, 2000. The most significant part of these rules is their definition of the term ‘due 
diligence’ as used within section 79(2) (c) of the IT Act.   
The ‘due diligence’ obligations of intermediaries under the Intermediary Guidelines85 include 
three broad categories of requirements that are relevant: (a) the publication of certain rules, 
policies and user agreements; (b) the obligation not to knowingly host, publish, or transmit 
infringing information; and (c) the obligation to take down infringing information upon receiving 
actual knowledge of it.   
i. Publication of Rules, Policies, and Terms and Conditions 
Intermediaries are required to publish rules and regulations, privacy policies, and user 
agreements, 86  which appears to be enforced through self-regulation. 87  The Intermediary 
Guidelines do, however, set out fairly detailed broad terms that need to be a part of the 
intermediaries’ private agreement with users. The user agreements, rules, and policies must 
forbid the user from hosting, publishing, displaying, transmitting, or sharing any information:88  
                                                 
82The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 3(a). 
83The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, cl. 3(a). 
84Pritika Rai Advani, Intermediary Liability in India, XLVIII (50) EPW 120, 125 (Dec. 2013). 
85The Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, r. 3. 
86The Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, r. 3, cl. 1. 
87John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control,80(7) MICH. L. REV. 
1466 (1982). 
88The Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, r. 3, cl. 2. 
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• That is grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, 
pedophilic, libelous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful or racially, ethnically 
objectionable, disparaging, or relating to or encouraging money laundering or 
gambling,  
• Harms minors in any way; 
• Impersonates another person; 
• Belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right; 
• Infringes any patent, trademark, copyright, or other proprietary rights; 
• Violates any law, among other things; or, 
• Threatens the unity, integrity, defense, security, or sovereignty of India, friendly 
relations with foreign states, or a public order, or causes incitement to the commission 
of any cognizable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting to 
any other nation. 
ii. Hosting, Publishing, Transmitting, or Modifying Infringing Information  
The intermediary is also required to refrain from knowingly hosting, publishing, transmitting, or 
modifying any information prohibited under Rule 3(2)89 (as listed in ‘a’ above).  
Concerns were raised about the ambiguity of these terms, since none of them are defined in the 
IT Act or in the Intermediary Guidelines. In response, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Subordinate legislation has already asked the Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology to incorporate definitions of all these terms within the Intermediary Guidelines, and 
to ensure that the Guidelines do not end up creating any new category of offence.90 
iii. Disabling Prohibited Information Upon ‘Actual Knowledge’ 
The intermediary, upon receiving actual knowledge, whether on its own or whether through a 
written communication from an affected person that infringing information is being stored, 
hosted, or published on its computer system, is obligated to ‘disable’ such information within 36 
hours of obtaining such knowledge.91 
This last requirement effectively creates a notice and takedown regime. Although the Ministry 
insists that this is a self-regulatory regime,92 a study conducted by the Centre for Internet and 
Society, Bangalore has demonstrated that intermediaries over-comply and tend to take down 
even legitimate information when they are sent a notice.93 
The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology argued before the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee that the requirement to ‘act’ within 36 hours means that intermediaries have 
                                                 
89The Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, r. 3, , cl. 3. 
90Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Thirty First Report on The Information Technology Rules 
(March 21, 2013), ¶ 25-26, available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/IT%20Rules/IT%20Rules%20Subordinate%20committee%20Report.pdf. 
91The Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011, r. 3, cl. 4. 
92Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Thirty First Report on The Information Technology Rules 
(March 21, 2013), ¶ 49, 55, available at 
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/IT%20Rules/IT%20Rules%20Subordinate%20committee%20Report.pdf. 
93Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, Centre for 
Internet & Society (Apr. 10, 2012), available at http://cis-india.org/Internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-
india. 
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to respond to and acknowledge the complaint within 36 hours of receiving it, and initiate 
appropriate action. Upon the Parliamentary committee’s insistence that this position should be 
clarified in the rules, the ministry issued an official clarification that states this position.94 It said 
that while the Grievance Officer acting on behalf of the intermediary must act on the complaint 
expeditiously, the maximum time for redress is one month from the date on which the complaint 
was received, in accordance with Rule 3(11). 
Subsequently, on March 23rd, 2012, a motion to annul guidelines was moved in the Rajya Sabha 
(Upper House of the Parliament). The annulment was defeated.95 However, the rules have been 
challenged before the Supreme Court of India. 
3. Blocking Orders Under the IT Act 
Section 69A of the IT Act empowers the Central Government to direct the blocking of access to 
online information, and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for 
Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 contain the procedure to be followed96 for 
blocking access to information. As will be apparent from reading the procedure below, there are 
few external checks and balances in this process: the different stages of review of blocking 
orders are all conducted by committees or individuals who are a part of the executive branch of 
the government, and since there is a prohibition on disseminating information about the blocking 
orders,97 the entire process is very opaque.   
These blocking orders may be directed at any government agency or intermediary. Although 
these orders can, in theory, be directed at any intermediary (including ISPs and online 
intermediaries), sources tell us that they are typically directed at telecommunication companies 
and ISPs. However, this is not exclusively so, since it appears that the government has issued 
section 69A blocking orders to online intermediaries.98  
The language used in the IT Act does not permit blocking orders to be issued arbitrarily. Under 
section 69A, it is only when the Government is of the view that it is “necessary or expedient” so 
to do in the interest of “sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, 
friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the 
commission of any cognizable offence relating to above”,99 that it can direct blocking access to 
information generated, transmitted, received, stored, or hosted in any computer resource.100 
                                                 
94Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology, 
Government of India, Clarification on The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 under 
section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (March 18, 2013), available at 
http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Clarification%2079rules(1).pdf. 
95Anupam Saxena, Motion For Annulment of India’s IT Rules Defeated In Rajya Sabha; IT Minister Promises 
Consultation, Medianama (May 18, 2012), http://www.medianama.com/2012/05/223-motion-for-annulment-of-
india%E2%80%99s-it-rules-defeated-in-rajya-sabha-it-minister-promises-consultation/. 
96The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69A, cl. 2. 
97The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 16; Verizon Releases Transparency Report (Jan, 22, 2014), http://newscenter.verizon.com/corporate/news-
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99The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69A, cl. 1. 
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The reasons for the blocking must be recorded in writing.101 Intermediaries who do not comply 
with the requests can be punished with imprisonment of up to seven years and are also liable to 
pay a fine.102 
Individuals cannot directly request the blocking of access to any content103 and need to send their 
complaints to the “nodal officers” of the organizations in question.104 The term “organizations” 
in India means ministries and departments of the Central Government, or any of the State, Union 
Territory, or other Central Government agency that may be notified.105 After examining the 
complaint and being satisfied with the need to block access, the organization may forward the 
complaint through its nodal officer to the “Designated officer,”106 who is appointed by the 
Central Government and is the only person under the act who can issue directions for blocking 
(apart from the courts). 
All the requests received by the Designated Officer are to be examined by a committee107 
(referred to as ‘Blocking Order Committee’ in this paper) consisting of the designated officer and 
representatives from the ministries of Law and Justice, Home Affairs, Information and 
Broadcasting, and the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In)108 within seven 
days.109 The committee is required to examine the request and determine whether it is covered 
under the grounds mentioned in Section 69A and should give specific recommendations on the 
request received.110 The designated officer is required to make an effort to identify the person to 
whom the information in the complaint belongs or the intermediary who has hosted the 
information, and give this individual or entity the opportunity to be heard 111  The 
recommendations of the Blocking Order Committee are presented to the Secretary of the 
Department of Technology for approval.112 This process may be bypassed in the event of an 
emergency, in which case the designated officer is authorized to examine the request and submit 
                                                 
101The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69A, cl. 1. 
102The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69A, cl. 3. 
103The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 6. 
104The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 4. 
105 The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) 
Rules, 2009, r. 2, cl. g. “Organisation” means – (i) Ministries/Departments of Government of India; (ii) State 
Governments and Union Territories; (iii) Any other entity as may be notified in Official Gazette by the Central 
Government. 
106The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 3. 
107The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 7. 
108Constituted under the Information Technology Act, 2000, § 70B. 
109The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 11. 
110The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 8. 
111The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 8, cl. 1, cl. 2 and cl. 3. 
112The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 8, cl. 5 and cl. 6. 
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his recommendations to the Secretary,113 who, if satisfied, can pass an interim decision to block 
access through a written and reasoned order.114 However, this request has to be brought before 
the Blocking Order Committee within 48 hours of the blocking order by the Secretary115 and on 
the basis of the recommendations of the committee, the Secretary may revoke his/her approval 
and ask for the blocked content to be unblocked.116 It is important to note that by the time 
blocking orders come before the Review Committee, the content under question is already 
blocked in India. This raises questions about how the committee is able to view the actual 
content, which may include videos, blocked during its review. 
The rules also provide separately for a Review Committee,117 which is mandated to meet at least 
once in every two months to review whether the directions issued for blocking are in accordance 
with Section 69A(1).118 If the Review Committee is of the opinion that the orders issued are not 
in conformity with Section 69A(1), it may set aside the blocking order and ask for the 
information to be unblocked.119 It is important to note that by the time blocking orders come 
before the Review Committee, the content under question is already blocked in India. This raises 
questions about how the committee is able to view the actual content, which may include videos, 
blocked during its review.    
The Review Committee for blocking orders does not have to review orders from Indian courts 
asking for the blocking of any information. In these situations, the designated officer is required 
to submit a certified copy of the court order to the Secretary and initiate action as directed by the 
court.120 
4. Interception Under the IT Act 
Section 69 of the Information Technology Act requires intermediaries to extend all facilities and 
technical assistance to intercept, monitor or decrypt information, provide information stored in a 
computer or provide access to a computer resource, when called upon to do so by the agency of 
the appropriate government as contemplated in Section 69. This clearly extends to online 
intermediaries. As stated above, intermediaries that fail to meet these obligations may be 
punished with imprisonment of up to seven years.121 
                                                 
113The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 9, cl. 1. 
114The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 9, cl. 2. 
115The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 9, cl. 3. 
116The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
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117 The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) 
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118The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 14. 
119The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 14. 
120The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 
2009, r. 10. 
121The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69, cl. 4. 
  17 
The power to order interception rests with both the Central Government and the State 
Governments. Officers specially authorized have the power to order interception, monitoring, or 
decryption of data under specified circumstances. An interception order can be passed if it is 
necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of India, the defense of 
India, the security of State, friendly relations with foreign states, a public order, for preventing 
incitement to the commission of a cognizable offence relating to the above, or for investigation 
of any offence.122 Interception of online communication is subject to the Information Technology 
(Procedures and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules 
2009, and has to follow the process detailed in the legislation. 
The order for interception must be issued by a competent authority123 designated as the Secretary 
in charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs for Central Government,124 or the Home department 
for States or Union Territories125 as may be applicable. The competent authority is required to 
consider whether it is possible to acquire the necessary information by other means and to order 
interception only if this is not possible.126 An interception order may only remain in force for up 
to a period of 60 days and cannot be extended beyond a total of 180 days.127 
Interception orders are conveyed to intermediaries by a designated nodal officer who 
authenticates them and conveys them to the designated person within the intermediary128 along 
with a written request to facilitate the interception.129 The designated officer of the intermediary 
or person in charge130 must acknowledge the interception order within two hours of receipt and 
has to facilitate interception.131 Intermediaries need to send interception requests every 15 days 
for authentication to the nodal officer of government agency.132 
                                                 
122The Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69, cl. 1. 
123The Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of 
Information) Rules, 2009, r. 3. 
124The Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of 
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Intermediaries are required to destroy all the records within a period of two months following the 
discontinuance of interception or monitoring, unless they are required for any ongoing 
investigation, criminal complaint, or legal proceedings.133 
Section 69B of the IT Act empowers the Central Government to authorize a government agency 
to monitor and collect attributes of the content, such as the time and date of its sending, size, 
duration, route (including the location and identities of the points of origin and destination),134 
and the type of underlying service (“traffic data”) in order to enhance cyber security or for 
identification analysis and the prevention of intrusion or spread of computer containment in 
India.135 Intermediaries are obligated to provide technical assistance and extend all facilities to 
the authorized agency, 136  or risk imprisonment for up to seven years. 137  These detailed 
procedures and other safeguards for such orders are listed in the Information Technology 
(Procedures and Safeguards for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules 
2009. 
Like the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and 
Decryption of Information) Rules 2009, these rules require an order from a competent authority. 
This order may however be issued for a range of cyber security purposes including, tracking 
cyber security breaches or incidents, identifying or tracking any person who has breached, or 
who is suspected of having breached or being likely to breach, cyber security,138 and must 
contain the reasons issuing such direction.139 A nodal officer has to receive the order and send it 
to the designated officer of the intermediary.140 These safeguards are very similar to the 
safeguards outlined above for interception of information. 
These rules also place obligations on the intermediary or the person in charge to put in place 
adequate checks to ensure that unauthorized monitoring does not take place141 and make the 
intermediary liable for the actions of its employees in the case of unauthorized monitoring or the 
collection of data.142 
C. The Copyright Act, 1957 
The safe harbor protection provided to intermediaries under the IT Act is subject to section 81 of 
the IT Act which states that nothing contained in the IT Act shall restrict any person from 
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exercising any right conferred under the Copyright Act.143 If not for the safe harbor protection 
contained within the Copyright Act, intermediaries could be held liable under Section 51(a)(ii) 
for secondary copyright infringement: under this, any person who provides any place to be used 
for communication of work to the public for profit, where such communication constitutes a 
copyright infringement, may be held liable for the infringement.144 This would ordinarily open 
intermediaries to liability in cases where they store information on their servers and/or transmit it 
onwards, particularly when the profit from advertising in relation to infringing content.145 
However, a safe harbor has been included via section 52 of the Copyright Act, which states that 
“transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of 
electronic transmission or communication to the public” shall not amount to copyright 
infringement; and that “transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose 
of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has 
not been expressly prohibited by the right holder” is also not infringement, unless the 
intermediary has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy. It 
has been made clear that the immunity offered under section 52 is not meant to extend to 
deliberate storage of infringing information.146 However the problem here is the interpretation of 
what amounts to reasonable grounds for belief that an intermediary is storing infringing content; 
the judiciary has, in the past, seen the insertion of algorithm-generated advertisements as an 
indication of knowledge of infringement.147 Commentators point out that this standard will need 
to be discarded since it confuses physical space with the manner in which the Internet works.148 
Like the IT Act, the Copyright Act makes its immunity for intermediaries conditional: the 
proviso to Section 52(1)(c) requires intermediaries to refrain from facilitating access to 
potentially infringing content for 21 days upon receiving a written complaint from the copyright 
owner about infringement that is taking place the transient or incidental storage that constitutes 
infringement. However, access to the content may be restored after 21 days unless a court order 
requiring the take down is received within a period of 21 days. This creates a notice and 
takedown regime where content needs to be removed at the behest of individual complaints. 
Unlike the IT Act, however, the Copyright Act explicitly authorizes the restoration of content in 
cases where a court has not endorsed the complaint. 
This notice and takedown regime is mapped out more clearly in Rule 75 of the Copyright Rules 
of 2013. The rights holder has to give written notice149 to the intermediary, including details 
about the description of work for identification,150 proof of ownership of original work,151 proof 
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of infringement by work sought to be removed,152, the location of the work153 (which would be 
the specific URL), and details of the person who is responsible for uploading the potentially 
infringing work (if available).154 Upon receiving such a notice, the intermediary has to disable 
access to such content within 36 hours.155 In a departure from the Intermediaries Guidelines, and 
in a positive move for transparency, intermediaries that host content are required to display 
reasons for disabling access to anyone trying to access the content.156 The intermediary is 
permitted, but not required, to restore the content after 21 days if no court order is received to 
endorse its removal.157 It is then not required to respond to further notices from the same 
complainant about the same content at the same location.158 
However, the regime under the Copyright Act is also not without its problems. Critics have 
objected to the narrowness of “transient or incidental storage,” which is necessary to claim 
immunity from liability under the safe harbor provision. They have also objected to the process 
under Rule 75, pointing out that it should have required the intermediary to notify the person 
who uploaded or created the content, creating an opportunity for a response that will enable the 
intermediary to let the content remain as is.159  
Also of concern are the vaguely worded court orders increasingly issued in the context of 
copyright issues. These “John Doe” orders – or “Ashok Kumar” orders as they are called in India 
– are used by copyright owners to get ex parte injunctions against unknown parties.160 There was 
a point at which these orders were so broad that they could be interpreted as creating a positive 
obligation on all intermediaries to proactively remove the questionable content. An example of 
the language used is, “For the forgoing reasons, defendants, their partners, proprietors…servants, 
agents, representatives…other unnamed and undisclosed persons, are restrained from 
communicating without license or displaying, releasing, showing, uploading, downloading, 
exhibiting, playing, and/or defraying the movie "DEPARTMENT" in any manner without a 
proper license from the plaintiff.”161  
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The Madras High Court in M/s. R.K. Productions Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & 
19 others,162 clarified in June 2012 that an earlier interim injunction was granted only in relation 
to a particular URL where the infringing movie is hosted, and not to of the entire website 
(addressing the overbroad blocking that was taking place by ISPs in response to such 
injunctions). Further, the applicant is directed to inform the respondents/defendants about the 
particulars of URL where the infringing movie is kept. On such receipt of the particulars of the 
URL in question from the plaintiff/applicant, the defendants shall take necessary steps to block 
such URLs within 48 hours.  The following year, in December 2013, the Delhi High Court 
passed an Ashok Kumar order, an ad interim ex parte injunction that applied to “unnamed and 
undisclosed persons” in relation to the display, duplication, and distribution of the film ‘Dhoom 
3.’163 Recently, the Delhi High Court issued such an injunction prohibiting 472 websites164 and 
other unknown ones from broadcasting 2014 FIFA World Cup matches, which it then reduced to 
a list of 219 upon an objection that several of the websites on the list did not belong there.165  
III.  Impact Assessment 
The legal framework governing the liability of Internet intermediaries in India has to remain 
consistent with the Indian Constitution.166 This means that the statutory framework under which 
intermediaries are liable to block, take down, intercept, and monitor content may be challenged if 
it violates the right to the freedom of speech and expression,167 or the right to privacy (as read 
into the right to life and personal liberty,168 the right to the freedom of speech, and expression by 
the judiciary169) granted by the Constitution. The regulatory framework is also subject to 
administrative law principles, derived largely from common law; meaning rules, notifications, 
and actions arising from legislations must remain within the scope of their parent statute and the 
constitution170 and cannot usurp any function that rightfully belongs to the legislature.171 
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The technology actually used by intermediaries has had visible effects on speech,172 and has 
resulted in over-blocking in the past. It does, however, appear that regulators take into account 
market concerns – these concerns are increasingly reflected in reports that discuss the 
formulation of the regulatory regime and in arguments made by the Government of India before 
the Supreme Court of India.173 
The narrative in the earlier parts of this paper mapped out the different kinds of liability to which 
online intermediaries are subject in India. This includes criminal liability for several kinds of 
content, including content that is defamatory,174 obscene,175 or amounts to contempt of court.176  
The Indian Penal Code uses gatekeeper liability to regulate unlawful speech,177 and this can 
make operations risky for intermediaries without immunity from liability under section 79 of the 
IT Act. Recent interpretations of the law by the Indian Supreme Court indicate that 
intermediaries may find themselves at risk despite the immunity offered by the IT Act. In 
January 2015, the Supreme Court passed an interim order in an ongoing case, requiring Google, 
Yahoo, and Microsoft to refrain from advertising or sponsoring any advertisement which would 
violate Section 22 of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, 1994.178 This 
interpretation seems to accept the argument made by the Ministry of Information and 
Communications that search engines, as intermediaries under the IT Act, owing to their ‘due 
diligence’ obligations, must block all content that breaches Indian laws. However since this is 
merely an interim order, there remains some chance that the Supreme Court will change its mind 
on the subject by the time the final judgment is delivered. 
If the interim order represents the Supreme Court’s stand on this subject, it may undo the 
beneficial effects of safe harbor protection for search engines. Intermediaries may have very little 
clarity about the kinds of content they need to weed out, given the different kinds of speech 
criminalized by multiple Indian statutes (indicative list in the table in Annexure 1). This makes 
intermediaries who exercise editorial control particularly vulnerable. The IT Act adds to the list 
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of criminalized speech, creating new categories of offences punishable with imprisonment 
(‘grossly offensive’ information,179 for example).   
Online intermediaries with no editorial control are also in a precarious position, despite their 
greater access to immunity from liability. The safe harbor protection granted to them under the 
IT Act is conditional upon the intermediaries observing “due diligence,”180  and on their 
removing unlawful content upon receiving “actual knowledge” of such content.181 Interestingly, 
one outcome of section 79 has been that online intermediaries are immune from liability in 
contexts in which bookstores, traditional media, and publishing houses would have been found to 
be liable (such as hosting obscene content).182 Even online intermediaries with immunity are 
required to refrain from knowingly hosting, publishing, transmitting, or modifying any 
information prohibited under Rule 3(2).183 This list of prohibited information consists of a very 
wide range of content including content that is “grossly harmful,” “harassing,” “pornographic,” 
“pedophilic,” “libelous,” “invasive of another's privacy,” “hateful,” “racially, ethnically 
objectionable,” and “disparaging.”184 Many of these are categories of content that are not defined 
in Indian law at all.  
Terms like ‘defamatory’ and ‘obscene’,185 which are actually defined in other pieces of Indian 
legislation, are not defined in the Intermediary Guidelines. While this might not be a hardship for 
large online intermediaries like Google or Facebook that have the resources to hire a legal team, 
a start-up or small online intermediary may struggle to acquire the legal expertise to ascertain 
what is meant by all the terms listed in Rule 3. This makes Rule 3 an opaque and inaccessible 
rule from the intermediaries’ perspective. Compliance with such an unclear standard is difficult. 
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on subordinate legislation has recommended that all 
these terms which are not defined in the IT Act be defined in the Intermediary Guidelines for the 
convenience of the intermediaries and the general public.186 If this recommendation were 
executed, it would make for a more transparent rule.  
Intermediaries that are subject to the licensing system in India have to contend with the added 
burden of onerous requirements that cover blocking, interception, and monitoring. 
The architectural constraints of the Internet are becoming apparent to the government, which has 
moved from its command-control approach to the position that comprehensive and guaranteed 
blocking of information is impossible. 187  The current regulatory regime tries to leverage 
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intermediaries’ existing capabilities by requiring them to make reasonable efforts to develop 
terms and conditions, as well as technological filters to regulate user-behavior. This looks like 
the beginnings of enforced self-regulation since it leaves the choice of technology and user 
agreements to the intermediaries after specifying the minimum terms or standards that need to be 
incorporated.  However, it is not clear whether and how compliance is monitored in this context.  
As it stands, under-resourced start-up companies may not be able to put in place a complex 
system to meet these standards, and making it risky to enter the market.188 A Global Network 
Initiative study concluded that online intermediaries are burdened by costs and risks associated 
with the current legal regime in India, and that this regime has had a detrimental impact on 
established businesses and new ventures.189 
There is very little transparency, and therefore limited accountability, in the process followed 
while blocking, intercepting, or monitoring content. This is detailed in the sections below. 
A. Government-Ordered Blocking of Content 
The Blocking Rules permit government agencies to ask for content to be blocked. Although 
these requests are most frequently directed at telecommunication companies and Internet service 
providers, they are also sent to online intermediaries from time to time. For example, social 
networking sites were asked to comply with court orders by blocking 8 URLS in 2010, 21 URLS 
in 2011, 352 URLs in 2012, and 1299 URLS from January 2013-2014.190 
The government-ordered blocking process under the Blocking Rules is shrouded in secrecy – 
Rule 16 of the Blocking Rules requires that blocking requests and implementation be kept 
confidential. The effect is that the government is able to refuse to give out information about 
blocking,191 and companies are restricted from making disclosures in this context. This is the 
reason that the January 2014 Verizon transparency report did not disclose the number of 
blocking requests from the Indian government, and explained that Indian law did not permit 
Verizon to make this disclosure.192 
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Since the system is opaque and does not require judicial or third party review or oversight at any 
point, it is reasonable to deduce that this may lead to reduced accountability. Government 
agencies ask for online content blocking through a process that is authorized, executed, and 
reviewed by the executive. Information about this blocking is not proactively disclosed by the 
government and cannot be disclosed by the intermediaries owing to Rule 16. The only 
mechanism to obtain the figures appears to be if a Member of Parliament asks for them in 
Question Hour.193 Even the author or creator of the content, who might in theory have contested 
a blocking order on grounds of his/her constitutional free speech rights, has no way of contesting 
it since no reasons or notifications about the blocking of content need to be given to the creators 
or the audience of content.  
In addition to the blocking requests that come from government agencies, court-ordered blocking 
of content also takes place under the IT Act. There is a Delhi High Court judgment confirming 
that 69A-blocking orders were sent to Google India Private Ltd. over the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ 
videos on YouTube. 194  190 URLS were blocked over the videos as the Department of 
Electronics & Information Technology implemented orders from courts in Budagam, Ganderbal, 
Baramula, Srinagar, Anantnag in Jammu & Kashmir and courts at Akola, Bhiwadi, Mumbai, and 
Delhi.195 52 URLS of these videos were blocked under the Blocking Rules.196  
Even the court orders, which are public documents in theory, are inaccessible in practice since 
many of them are obtained from remote regional courts. This also raises questions about how an 
intermediary might find the resources to travel to these locations and challenge any unreasonable 
blocking requests. Finally, since there is no mechanism to verify that each of the blocked URLS 
do in fact contain the content complained of, there is extensive potential for misuse of the 
blocking process.  
At a meeting of the Cyber Regulation Advisory Committee, the Minister of Communications and 
Information Technology asked the Internet and Mobile Association of India, which is an industry 
association, to monitor and prepare a list of pornographic sites for blocking by the ISPs. The 
minister has suggested the need to understand United Kingdom system of installation of filtering 
software on home computers so that this may be replicated in India with modifications for the 
“Indian context.”197  
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This inclination towards blocking content is not, however, uniform within the Government. 
There are those who argue that filtering and blocking of content is a problematic solution. For 
example, a Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Justice stated in a Cyber Regulation Advisory 
Committee meeting198 that, “it is not desirable to submit the plea to Supreme Court that it is 
difficult to filter or block pornography sites and we must try to evolve a solution.”199 Similarly, 
the Government has, in the past, told the Supreme Court that it is not technically feasible to 
block pornographic sites200 and that doing so will be violation of Article 19 and 21 of the Indian 
Constitution.201 It is, however, important to remember that this is not a consistent position and it 
is possible that the government will reverse its stance in the very same case once it comes up for 
hearing in February 2015. 
B. Notice and Takedown 
The safe harbor protection under section 79 of the IT Act is subject to the intermediary’s removal 
of unlawful content immediately after receiving “actual knowledge” of it. The Intermediary 
Guidelines attempt to clarify what this phrase means, explaining that the intermediary could 
obtain such knowledge by itself or have such knowledge communicated to it by “an affected 
party in writing” or through an email signed by an electronic signature. After this, the 
intermediary is expected to “act within thirty six hours” to disable such information as it falls 
within the list of (undefined) prohibited content given in the Intermediary Guidelines. This has 
effectively created a notice and takedown regime for content.  
The impact of these guidelines on intermediaries was demonstrated in a study conducted by the 
Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore,202 which tried sending frivolous notices to multiple 
intermediaries about perfectly legitimate content. The study found that intermediaries tend to 
remove even legitimate content in response to notices from private parties. A researcher sent take 
down notices to seven major intermediaries and found that six of these intermediaries over-
complied. This offers some evidence to support the argument that the Intermediaries Guidelines 
might result in suppression of legitimate expression, since there is a visible chilling effect created 
by these guidelines. However the sample size for this study may be seen as problematic, and a 
larger investigation using the same method might be welcome. 
The fact that intermediaries over-comply, disabling legitimate and legal content under the 
Intermediaries Guidelines is not surprising given the incentives created by the rules. Any failure 
to take down content places the intermediary at the risk of expensive litigation, but the rules do 
not require the intermediary to notify the author or user whose content has been taken down, or 
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offer this speaker the right to defend his/her content or modify it such that it may legitimately 
stay online. The rules also do not contain any mechanism requiring intermediaries to make it 
clear to the audience that content has been taken down, making the entire system very opaque. 
Bringing all these elements together, it is clear that the system for taking down content under the 
IT Act in India is very problematic because it (a) permits horizontal censorship by requiring 
intermediaries to respond quickly to any private citizen who may care to send them notice 
without any countervailing obligations towards authors or audiences; (b) obligates private 
intermediaries to make decisions about speech even when they are not performing an editorial 
function, and may lack the resources to make such determinations; and (c) ensures that there is 
no transparency at all about decisions to take down content, leading to a lack of accountability of 
private intermediaries for over-broad blocking and a lack of information based on which citizens 
may challenge particular instances of blocking. 
The notice and takedown system under the Copyright Act might be marginally better in terms of 
transparency, since intermediaries are required to display a notice about why it was taken 
down.203 The statute also permits (although it does not obligate) the intermediary to reinstate any 
content for which a court order is not received in 21 days.204 This could, in theory, reduce the 
abuse of the notice and takedown system by private parties.  
However this process is undermined to a great degree by the judiciary’s practice of issuing ex 
parte ‘John Doe’ or ‘Ashok Kumar’ orders to disable allegedly infringing content. These orders 
would imply that the limitation on the period of the takedown would cease to apply. Critics point 
out that cases like Multi Screen Media Pvt Ltd v. Sunit Singh205 indicate that the courts do not 
pay sufficient attention to the actual URLs that they are asked to block (the list of URLs had to 
be revised substantially; websites obviously wrongly named included Google Documents, which 
had to be removed from the original list).206 Court-ordered blocks are only the tip of the iceberg. 
This is apparent when one considers for instance that Multi Screen Media Pvt Ltd v.  Sunit 
Singh207 is not Multi Screen Media’s first sojourn into the realm content blocking. Google’s 
transparency report for 2014 indicates that between February and July 2014, this company has 
made 77 removal requests to Google, covering a total of 27,624 URLs.208 Out of these, 16,309 
URLs were actually removed. In December 2014, 32 websites, including dailymotion.com, 
vimeo.com, and github.com were blocked as a result of a court order.209 This led to controversy 
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owing to the apparent over-blocking of content.210 After extensive negative publicity, the 
websites were unblocked.211 The incident is a good illustration of the flaws of the court-ordered 
blocking system. The over broad blocking suggests that the judiciary may not have examined the 
contents of each URL and website on the list compiled for blocking. 
Generally, in the period between July-December 2013, Google received 21 court orders for 
taking down content, affecting 118 items. It complied with 52% of these requests. It also 
received 133 requests affecting 422 items from other agencies (executive, police etc.) and 
complied with 23% of those requests. 212  These requests included one from an election 
candidate’s representative for the removal of a YouTube video that allegedly connected the 
candidate with corrupt financial practices – Google denied this request since it not go through 
proper legal channels. Another such content removal request came from the local police and 
sought the removal of a blog post that contained content and pictures about a politician's sex 
scandal. This request was also denied, this time on grounds of the subjects of the blog post not 
being identifiable.213 
During January-June 2014, Facebook restricted 4,960 pieces of content based on requests 
primarily by law enforcement officials and the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team.214 
During the same period, Twitter received no court orders and 5 requests from other agencies 
(executive, police etc.) to remove content. It complied with none of these requests, which 
involved 9 accounts.215 
C. Interception of Information by Intermediaries 
Section 69 of the Information Technology Act requires online intermediaries to extend all 
facilities and technical assistance to intercept, monitor or decrypt information, provide 
information stored in a computer, or provide access to a computer resource when called upon to 
do so by the government.  
The interception of information under the IT Act follows a very detailed process in which 
attempts are made at various safeguards, such as designating senior officials for decision-
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making, creating review committees, and requiring intermediaries to check and only follow 
legitimately issued orders. However, at no point does it provide for third party oversight or 
transparency. The latter, in particular, may be far more effective in ensuring that no misuse of the 
system takes place than in relying on a busy senior official who may not have the time to 
properly judge the interception request, and are not accountable if they should end up authorizing 
an interception that they should not have.216 Although the IT Act asks that interceptions not be 
authorized unless the information under question cannot be obtained by other means, it does not 
contain any procedural enforcement of this principle.  
Online intermediaries are required to intercept information on the threat of imprisonment,217 and 
they have to designate officers to meet the IT Act’s detailed and cumbersome safeguards.218 This 
process of designating a person and then ensuring that all the interception orders are received, are 
in the proper form, and are signed by the right parties may prove very difficult for new entrants.  
Yahoo was actually fined 1.1 million Rupees (about US $22,000) when the company refused to 
hand over information related to about a dozen Yahoo IDs and IP addresses that the government 
wanted because it suspected these IDs were being used by Islamic terrorists or Maoists.219 Yahoo 
refused the request, arguing that it was not made through the channels required by law, and that 
the fine was imposed by an entity (Controller of Certifying Authorities)220 without any authority 
to impose it. 221  The fine was eventually retracted, but Yahoo was made to provide the 
information.222 
Google received 2,513 user data requests regarding 4,401 accounts from the Indian Government 
between January and June 2013. Google handed over the information in 66% of the cases.223 
Facebook received a total of 3,598 requests regarding 4,711 accounts between July to December 
2013 and it provided information in 53.56% of cases.224 Twitter received 19 account information 
requests regarding 27 accounts and complied with 32% of these.225 
In the absence of transparency, it is impossible for citizens to discover whether their information 
has been intercepted. As a result, they have no means at all of holding the state accountable for 
illegal interception of information. 
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IV. Cases currently before the Supreme Court226 
A. Rajeev Chandrasekhar227  
Rajeev Chandrasekhar, a member of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of the Parliament of 
India) has filed a petition in the Indian Supreme Court challenging Section 66A of the 
Information Technology Act, 2000 and Rules 3(2), 3(3), 3(4) and 3(7) of the Information 
Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 as violating Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the 
Indian Constitution. 
1. Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 
The petition states that Rule 3(2) lists the various types of information that should not to be 
carried. This violates Article 14 of the Constitution, as these categories are arbitrary and overly 
broad. Moreover, the rules grant the private intermediary the right to subjectively assess 
objectionable content and create categories outside of the restrictions provided under Article 19.  
Rule 3(4) of the guidelines provides the intermediary 36 hours to disable the information that is 
in contravention of Rule 3(2) when it receives such information on its own, or on the basis of 
information received. The petition argues that the period of 36 hours for removal of content is 
impractical and infeasible for intermediaries that process enormous quantities of data. The rules 
also require the intermediary to keep the offending information and associated records for at least 
90 days, while Rule 3(7) calls upon the intermediary to provide any information or assistance to 
a Government agency seeking such information in writing. Both these rules violate the privacy 
under Article 21 of the constitution. 
B. Common Cause228 
Common Cause, an NGO along with senior Aam Aadmi Party leader and former Law Minister 
of Delhi Somnath Bharti has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India arguing that 
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, Section 69A of the IT Act and the 
Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by 
Public) Rules, 2009 and Section 80 of the IT Act are in violation of Article 14, 19, and 21 of the 
Indian Constitution.  
1. Section 69A and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for 
Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 
The petition puts forth various administrative law arguments that Section 69A of the IT Act and 
the 2009 rules framed under it violate the Constitution. It argues that the rules do not offer the 
creator or author of the content with a reasonable opportunity to be heard before blocking the 
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content. Additionally, there is no scope for a post-decision hearing, nor is there any provision to 
appeal the blocking order under the rules. 
C. Moutshut.com229 
Moutshut.com, a user review website, has filed a petition before the Supreme Court of India 
challenging the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, claiming that 
it violates Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
The petition argues that sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the guidelines mandates intermediaries to place 
restrictions on the kinds of content that a user can post with a broad list of information that is 
highly subjective and can result in wide interpretation. Additionally, most of these terms are 
outside the reasonable restrictions provided under Article 19(2) of the constitution. The 
impugned rules result in the removal of any content that is disliked by any person or is not in 
his/her interest. The rules empower private parties to censor content over the Internet and places 
on them the burden to decide the lawfulness of the content, which should normally be a judicial 
function. The decision to take down content does not provide any opportunity to the owner of 
content to appeal, nor is the person informed. 
D. Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties230 
Peoples’ Union for Civil Liberties, a human rights organization has filed a writ petition in the 
Supreme Court of India arguing that Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the 
Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by 
Public) Rules, 2009 and the Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011 are 
in violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
1. Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access 
of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 
The petition makes a number of arguments while arguing that the 2009 rules violate the 
Constitution. It argues that the rules do not offer the creator or author of the content a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard before blocking the content. The creator is not even informed about the 
content being blocked. There is no provision for a post decision hearing, or to appeal the 
blocking order under the rules. Additionally, there are no safeguards or guidelines provided, 
which need to be followed while making a decision. 
2. Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011 
The petition argues that none of the terms under rule 3(2) of the intermediary rules are defined, 
and most of these terms are incompatible with Article 19(2). The rules are vague and ambiguous 
and do not provide the user reasonable opportunity to know what is permitted so that he/she may 
act according to law. The rules empower private entities to censor content over the Internet and 
place on them the burden to decide the lawfulness of the content without any legislative 
guidance, thereby forcing an adjudicatory role on an intermediary. The decision to take down 
                                                 
229 Mouthshut.Com (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Ors., W.P. (C) No. 217 (2013) (India), available at 
http://www.mouthshut.com/pdf/main_pitition.pdf. 
230 Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. U.O.I. & Ors., W.P. (Crl.) No. 199 (2013) (India), available at 
https://drive.google.com/a/nludelhi.ac.in/file/d/0B_-V5K_jBhEXcmd1SmdVVFFGNDQ/edit. 
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content is made by the intermediary without hearing the party whose content is affected and 
without even notifying them of the removal. 
Under these rules, similar content is treated differently across online and offline spaces. The 
rules also state that the intermediary has to take action upon a complaint by any affected person, 
however, who qualifies as an “affected person” has not be defined anywhere. 
The petition also argues that the intermediary rules are ultra vires the parent statute as the 
guidelines formed under section 79 of the IT Act can only be related to 'due diligence' and the 
rules in their current form go a step further and legislate on various issues, including the 
information that can be posted online by a user, whereas the parent provision does not intend any 
prohibition. 
E. Internet and Mobile Association of India231 
Internet and Mobile Association of India, an industry body representing Internet platforms and 
businesses, has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India arguing that Section 79(3)(b) 
of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is inconsistent with Articles 14 and 19 of the 
Constitution, and that the Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011 are in 
violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
The petition states that the peremptory obligation on intermediaries under Section 79(3)(b) to 
disable or take down content is in violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 
According to the petition, Section 79(3)(b) deprives intermediaries of access to judicial recourse 
before removing material since intermediaries are required to take down unlawful material upon 
being notified by a private party or the Government. This violates the freedom of expression of 
the users and has a chilling effect on speech. 
1. Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011 
The petition argues that the terms under rule 3(2) of the intermediary rules are vague and 
ambiguous and do not provide the user with reasonable opportunity to ascertain what is lawful 
content he/she may conform with the law. The petition also states that Rule 3(2)(b) is ultra vires 
Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act since the rule goes beyond the legislative mandate of requiring 
intermediaries to disable content which is ‘unlawful’ and creates new categories of substantive 
ban. With respect to Rule 3(2)(f), the petition takes the view that it is ultra vires since it goes 
beyond the legislative mandate of requiring intermediaries to disable content that is ‘unlawful’. It 
argues that this rule creates new categories of substantive proscriptions of speech that are not 
defined anywhere in Indian law.  
The petition also argues that Rule 3(4) of the Intermediary Guidelines is in conflict with Section 
79(3)(b), which requires an intermediary to act when allegedly unlawful information is brought 
to the “actual knowledge” of the intermediary. Rule 3(4) exceeds the limits of Section 79(3)(b) 
by making reference to the intermediary “obtaining knowledge by itself.” The petition says that 
this language implies pro-active monitoring by an intermediary although Section 79(3)(b) of the 
IT Act does not obligate intermediaries to pro-actively monitor data/information unless it is 
                                                 
231 Internet and Mobile Association of India & Anr. v. U.O.I. & Anr., W.P. (C) No. 758 (2014) (India), available at 
https://drive.google.com/a/nludelhi.ac.in/file/d/0B3Do3-9ZtwCrNnQzQTg5QmJFRjA/view. 
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brought to their attention by a third party or the Government. This rule is therefore seen as going 
beyond the scope of the parent provision and as an unreasonable requirement that is practically 
impossible to comply with given the volumes of data handled by intermediaries. Finally, the 
petition states that Rule 3(7) has the effect of circumventing the limitation placed on the State’s 
power by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
F. Kamlesh Vaswani232 
Kamlesh Vaswani, an Indian advocate has filed a petition before the Indian Supreme Court, 
which seeks to declare sections 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 79, 80 and 85 of the Information 
Technology Act, 2000 as unconstitutional. It also asks the Government to frame a specific law 
and a national policy on pornography, to make viewing pornography an offence, and to direct 
intermediaries to proactively monitor and block all pornographic content on the Internet.  
G. Sabu Mathew George  
Sabu Mathew George,233 a member of the National Inspection and Monitoring Committee 
constituted under the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PCPNDT) Act, 
1994, and his Non Governmental Organisation co-petitioner, Voluntary Health Association of 
Punjab, have filed a petition before the Supreme Court of India. The petition states that, the 
provisions of the PCPNDT Act, are being violated by various search engines as advertisements 
related to sex determination techniques and products are being displayed in India by these search 
engines.234 It further asks that the Department of Electronics and Information Technology at the 
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and the competent authority of 
Department of Health and Family Welfare work harmoniously to implement the provisions of 
the Act.235 The petition is not publicly available and it is possible that it seeks other remedies that 
have not been reported in the media. 
 
 
                                                 
232 Kamlesh Vaswani v. U.O.I & Ors., W.P. (C) 177 (2013), available at 
https://docs.google.com/a/nludelhi.ac.in/document/d/1ZyBevXbdC-
FXzkSNA9itU5oFjhwO7CNSmZ7_H0Ji_B0/edit.  
233!Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 341 (2008) (India)!
234!Shreeja Sen, Nothing contrary to Indian laws should be advertised online: SC, MINT (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/5fGedpkVoAlvMQHd6nEopL/Nothing-contrary-to-Indian-laws-should-be-
advertised-online.html.!
235!Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 341/2008, interim order (Dec. 4, 2014), Supreme Court of 
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Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.2 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
contribute to a more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, 
facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 




                                                 
1 The author has adapted significant portions of his argument from, “Unconstitutionality of Korea`s Temporary 
Blinds on Internet -"Thou Shall Not Speak for 30 days What Others Do Not Like", Joongang Law Review, Vol.11 
No.3 Pages 7-51 [2009], for the purposes of this case study. As a result, this study reflects both the essence of, and 
author’s opinions from, the original piece.   
http://m.riss.kr/search/detail/DetailView.do?p_mat_type=1a0202e37d52c72d&control_no=446c374bd83dd689ffe0b
dc3ef48d419  
2 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 
















Abstract: This paper provides an analysis of the Korean “Act Regarding 
Promotion of Use of Information Communication Networks and Protection of 
Information” that governs intermediary liability in Korea for defamatory or 
otherwise rights infringing content. This study makes the case that the Act’s 
Article 44, 2, which should have created protection from liability like other 
intermediary liability regimes around the world, has become instead a way to 
impose intermediary liability in Korea. The paper also gives an overview of 
relevant court cases, the latest (2009) of which, in author’s analysis, has had a 
“crushing” effect on protections from liability because it imposed liability for 
content that the intermediary was not aware of and was not given any notice of. 
This supports the argument that Article 44, 2 is unconstitutional because it 
imposes on intermediaries a de jure or de facto obligation to take down lawful 
content. Citing statistics on compliance with take down requests by the three 
major intermediaries in the country, the author observes that as a result of such 
liability-imposing regime the sheer volume of censorship has become 
problematic, and that politicians use requests to take down legal content that is 
critical of their policy decisions. This case also illustrates how intermediary 
liability rules that might seem benign are not necessarily so. To preserve the 
future of the Internet, rules that hold intermediaries responsible for removing 
unlawful content should be carefully considered before they are implemented. 
This case illustrates how Korea is a country where the special characteristics of 
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This paper surveys South Korea’s landscape for intermediaries, and analyzes the regulations 
thereon and their impact on society in general in response to the Network of Center’s Guiding 
Questions on the Online Intermediaries research project. The author provides an overview of the 
country in section 2; discusses Korea’s intermediary liability regime in section 3; presents their 
impact on the industry and society in section 4; follows how law and industry have dynamically 
interacted in section 5; and finally concludes with suggestions for the future.  
II. Landscape for Korean Intermediaries  
A. Market Survey 
As of 2013, Korea had a total population of about 48 million people (83% urban) with an 
Internet penetration rate of 84%, mobile penetration rate of 110%,1 mobile Internet penetration 
rate of 75%, and Facebook penetration of 27%.3 See below for comparison to Japan, U.S., and 
the world average. 
 Korea Japan US World average 
Population 48 million  127 
million 
312 million  
Internet penetration 84% 79% 80% 52% 
Mobile penetration 110% 109% 103% 93% 
Internet mobile 
penetration 
75% 48% 60% 21% 
Facebook penetration  27% 17% 56%  
Figure 1. Comparison of Internet use statistics. 
Korea’s major intermediaries in each are as follows:  
• Search engines: Naver, the local portal, has maintained 73% market share. Daum, 
the second largest local portal has roughly 21%, with Google covering the small 
remainder 3% (December 2012).4  
 
• Micro-blogging: Twitter almost monopolizes the market, but if you include non-
micro blogging, Naver still covers 80% of domestic bloggers.5 In 2007, Naver already 
topped user visits per month6 and its dominance grew over time ever since.  
                                                 
3 We Are Social Singapore, “Global Digital Statistics 2014”, January 2014 
http://www.slideshare.net/wearesocialsg/social-digital-mobile-around-the-world-january-2014, page 146-146 (cited 
sources: ITU, Facebook, U.S. Census Bureau, Global Webindex). 
4 Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning and Korea Internet & Security Agency, 2013 Korea Internet White 
Paper, http://isis.kisa.or.kr/mobile/ebook2/2013/download/service.pdf, p. 180. 
5 There does not seem to be statistics tracking blogging or micro-blogging separately. “80%” is usually tossed 
around by Internet pundits who seem to derive that number from the search engine market share for the reason that 
bloggers are likely to expect search engines to promote the blogs on their own services and therefore likely to use 
the blog platform affiliated with the most popular search engine Naver.  




• Social Media: 31.3% of all people use SNS (increase by 7.8% in 2013, fast-growing). 
Kakao Story7 accounts for 55.4% of users, Facebook for 23.4%, Twitter for 13.1%, 
and Cyworld8 (SK Communications) for 5.5% as of January 2014.9 However, it is the 
author’s opinion that Kakao Story numbers are exaggerated by the users who were 
given Story accounts by default due to their membership with Kakao Talk, the 
dominant private messaging service, which not really a social “networking” service. 
Weighing the time spent using the services, it seems to this author that Facebook is by 
far the most widely used social networking service in Korea. This is quite a change 
since 2010 when Cyworld accounted for 50% of social media users.10 Leaving out the 
messaging services, the rankings are as follows:  
o South Korea SNS 2014: Own an Account (Monthly Active User) 
! Any SNS 84% (48%) 
! Facebook 75% (36%) 
! Twitter  56% (22%) 
! Google+ 38% (7%) 
! Me2Day 33% (7%)11 
• Private messaging: Kakao Talk almost monopolizes the market.12 
• User Created Content: YouTube has 75% but only in video content.13  
• Platform: Google Play 75.2%, due to the dominance of Samsung (100% Android) in 
phone markets (Apple 17.9%, Blackberry and Windows each 4%).14  
As part of the overall Internet economy, the mobile Internet is most often used for search 
(96.8%), then for SNS (50.4%), shopping (36.4%), banking (33.1%), etc. Time-weighted, it is 
used most for chatting (81.2%), phone calls (visual incl, 69.7%), texting (69.%), and searches 
(42.8%).15  
                                                 
7 An Instagram-like SNS launched by Kakao Talk, the dominant private messaging service, opened 
8 A My Space-like service launched by the SK conglomerate. This remains the only non-telco intermediary founded 
by Korean chaebols.  
9 Korea Information Society Development Institute, KISDI Stat Report “SNS Usage Analysis” (2013.12.26) 
http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/publication/selectResearch.do?cmd=fpSelectResearch&curPage=1&sMenuType=
3&controlNoSer=43&controlNo=13270&langdiv=1&searchKey=TITLE&searchValue=sns&sSDate=&sEDate=  
10 Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 
http://m.korea.kr/newsWeb/ml/policyView.do?newsDataId=148703840&currPage=61.  
11 We Are Social Singapore, infra., p. 148 
12 Newsis, “Kakao Talk’s Market Share at 92%. . Bandwagon Effects in Mobile Messenger Service, Twice That of 
Mobile Telecom”, September 23, 2014, 
http://www.newsis.com/ar_detail/view.html?ar_id=NISX20140923_0013187317&cID=10402&pID=10400  
13 Newsis, “YouTube, Clearing the Video Market Thanks to Mandatory Identification Rule”, October 9, 2013, 
http://www.newsis.com/ar_detail/view.html?ar_id=NISX20131009_0012419136&cID=10301&pID=10300.  
14 2013 Korea Internet White Paper, infra, p. 29, http://isis.kisa.or.kr/ebook/WhitePaper2013.pdf.  
15 Korea Internet and Security Agency, “Year 2013 Mobile Internet Usage Survey”, January 15, 2014. 
http://isis.kisa.or.kr/board/index.jsp?pageId=040000&bbsId=7&itemId=801&pageIndex=1. 
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As expected, the top uses of mobile Internet are not typical revenue-generators. Below are the 
revenues of top 10 Internet companies in Korea:  
• Top 10 Internet companies (by revenue) 
o Naver (2.3 billion USD) 
o Nexon (1.6 B USD) 
o NCSoft (750 million USD) 
o NHN Entertainment (640 M USD) 
o eBay(640 M USD) 
o Daum (530 M USD) 
o Net Marle (497 M USD) 
o Neo Wiz (443 M USD) 
o Smilegate (360 M USD) 
o Wemade (227 M USD)16 
Notice, out of 10 companies, the majority are game companies. Only Naver and Daum are 
portals. Facebook, Twitter (SNS), Kakao are not major revenue-generators. Google Play 
revenues are not significant, either.  
B. Social Significance of Different Intermediaries 
In non-economic terms, certain intermediaries are more relevant than others – e.g. in terms of 
market share, popularity, usage patterns, and their impact on society. Naver and Daum curate and 
present other agencies’ news in their own pages, host original user-created discussion pages, 
blogs (Naver), and cafe pages (Daum), which have become major platforms for political debates.  
Facebook has become the socializing platform of choice for both conservative and progressive 
circles. Twitter, which had become the main battleground for political discussions even prior to 
2012, has become even more famous as it was revealed that National Intelligence Services – the 
country’s intelligence agency – had conducted major public-opinion-manipulation campaigns 
using Twitter before and during the Presidential election in 2012.17  
In late 2014, the Korean intermediary Kakao Talk, the dominant messenger service provider, 
became the center of public attention when the Prosecutors’ Office announced a new campaign 
to track down and indict the postings “causing division in national unity and skepticism of the 
government” for criminal defamation, and in doing so, mentioned Kakao Talk as a possible 
target for such search and seizure. This shocked the entire nation, 90% of who use Kakao Talk, 
because it has been a private messenger service connecting only those who knew each other. As 
a result, many ‘migrated’ to a foreign service, Telegram, whose server is located overseas, 
apparently safe from Korean authorities’ search and seizure.18  
                                                 
16 Blog ‘Under the Radar’, “2013 Internet Industry, Top 10 Revenue Generators”, March 7, 2014, 
http://undertheradar.co.kr/2014/03/07/114-2013-
%EC%9D%B8%ED%84%B0%EB%84%B7%EC%97%85%EA%B3%84-%EB%A7%A4%EC%B6%9C-top10/. 
17 New York Times, “Prosecutors Detail Attempt to Sway South Koran Election”, November 21, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/world/asia/prosecutors-detail-bid-to-sway-south-korean-election.html?_r=0.  
18 BBC “Why South Koreans are Fleeing the Country’s Biggest Social Network”, October 10, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-29555331. 
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C. State Paternalism 
Indeed, one significant factor affecting online intermediaries is state paternalism, which pervades 
the country’s industrial institutions and practices. For instance, all Internet companies with 
capital larger than about USD 100K are required to register and are given a “value-added 
telecommunication business” number, which can be taken away if they do not operate in 
compliance with the government’s laws and regulations or if their operation “significantly hurts 
consumers’ interests.”19 This environment creates a cloud under which the domestic companies 
feel the pressure to comply with even extra-legal guidance of the government. For instance, as 
you will read below, the “temporary take-down” regulation can be read as optional but 
effectively works as if it is mandatory, as do several other “optional” regulations, like the Korea 
Communication Standards Commission’s “correction requests (to take down contents)”20 and 
warrantless subscriber data requests. The compliance rates of these regulations were near 100% 
until a huge judgment came down on the latter in October 2012 in a consumer lawsuit filed by 
PSPD Law Center.21  
D. Foreign Companies 
The regulations, hard and soft, apply equally to Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Microsoft, 
which all have local offices but whose servers are located overseas, exempting the owners 
from local income tax liabilities. The extraterritoriality of the servers has also provided a 
rationalization for the fact that the government has not applied various intermediary 
regulations to these overseas providers, creating what domestic competitors decry as “reverse-
discrimination.”22 The most infamous domestic-only regulation was a mandatory identity 
verification rule, which was snubbed only by overseas providers before it was struck down in 
2012 in a constitutional challenge filed by PSPD Law Center.23  
III. Korea’s Intermediary Liability Regime 
A. Intermediary Liability In General  
What defines the Internet? The defining feature of the Internet is its structure as an extremely 
distributed communication platform, so distributed that it allows almost all individuals to 
participate in mass scale communication. All individuals are allowed to post individual views 
and opinions without anyone’s approval, and all individuals are allowed to view and download 
all other individuals’ postings.  
How some people react to questionable material found online shows how they have not 
accustomed themselves to this freedom of the Internet. They think that Internet companies 
                                                 
19 Article 27 Paragraph 2 of the Telecommunications Business Act. 
20 See K.S. Park, “Administrative Censorship on Internet in Korea”, http://opennetkorea.org/en/wp/administrative-
censorship.  
21 See K.S. Park, “Internet Surveillance in Korea 2014”, http://opennetkorea.org/en/wp/main-privacy/Internet-
surveillance-korea-2014 I myself had the fortune of initiating and directing the legal campaign for the lawsuit, which 
is now pending in the Supreme Court.  
22 Business Korea, “Korean ICT Companies Suffering from Reverse Discrimination due to Governmental 
Regulations”, http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/article/2274/%E2%80%9Creverse-discrimination%E2%80%9D-
korean-ict-companies-suffering-reverse-discrimination-due. 
23 Constitutional Court's Decision 2010 Hunma 47, 252 (consolidated) announced August 28, 2012. K.S. Park, 
“Korean Internet Identity Verification Rule Struck Down” http://m.blog.naver.com/kyungsinpark/110145810944.  
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should be responsible for the content on their services. It is true that illegal activities such as 
defamation and copyright infringement that abuse the power of the Internet should be combated. 
However, unless society wants to paralyze the freedom of unapproved uploading and viewing – 
and therefore the power of the Internet – an intermediary should not be expected to know who 
posts what content and should not be held responsible for defamation or copyright infringements 
committed by content on its services. If intermediaries are held liable for this content, the 
intermediaries will have to protect themselves by constantly monitoring what gets posted on their 
services. If this happens, when a posting remains online it will appear to do so with the tacit 
consent of the intermediary in question. The power of the Internet – the freedom to post and 
download unapproved – will be dead.  
For the same reason, no country imposes – for instance – content liability on broadband 
providers.24 No common carrier would be in business if it were held liable for all the criminal 
conspiracies and deals taking place over its network. The same reasoning should be extended to 
the providers of web applications that greatly facilitate the exchange of ideas and contents, i.e. 
“portals” and “search engines.” The only difference with the common carriers is that the Internet 
companies carry the unlawful content on their servers, while the telecoms serve the contents en 
route. While some will surely abuse the free space created by these intermediaries, holding 
intermediaries liable merely for creating this space would be too threatening to the future of the 
Internet. Along this line of thought, on non-copyright-related matters the U.S. went further by 
claiming that no “interactive computer service” shall be considered a speaker or a publisher of 
such content.25 
However, in other areas, many believe that there must be a limit on the exemption that 
intermediaries enjoy: the intermediary should not be immunized for the infringing content that it 
is aware of, or is given notice of and yet refuses to remove. Yet this idea of a limited liability 
regime is not satisfactory because intermediaries always face a stronger incentive to take down 
content than to keep it up. The reason for this is that, first, intermediaries are massive content 
processors whose interest in individual pieces of content is small and, secondly, tort liability 
regimes around the world are usually such that the legal implications for keeping a posting up (a 
malfeasance) is always greater than the legal implications for removing it (a nonfeasance).   
Therefore, many countries have decided to set up “safe-harbor” regimes where intermediaries are 
exempt from liability if they follow certain clearly defined procedures aimed at unlawful content. 
The most widely popular of such regimes is the notice-and-takedown regime,26 whereby an 
intermediary is given an exemption from liability as long as it removes content when it is it is 
given notice of the content’s infringing nature by the rights holder. Importantly, the notice-and-
takedown safe harbor is not applicable to illegal content that the intermediaries have actual 
knowledge of before and/or without a notice provided by a rights holder or another person.  
B. Korean Law: Liability-Exemption or Liability-Imposition?  
In Korea, the idea that the intermediaries must be given exemption from liability in the way of 
                                                 
24 Section 512 (a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
25 Communications Decency Act of 1996: 47 USC 230 “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” 
26 DMCA section 512 (c) and (g). 
 6 
safe harbors appears to have been misinterpreted: what Korea has is not an intermediary liability 
exemption regime but intermediary liability imposition regime. The relevant provisions of the 
‘Act Regarding Promotion of Use of Information Communication Networks and Protection of 
Information, Article 44-2 (Request to Delete Information)’ are as follows:     
• Paragraph 1. Anyone whose rights have been violated through invasion of privacy, 
defamation, etc., by information offered for disclosure to the general public through 
an information communication network may request the information communication 
service provider handling that information to delete the information or publish a 
rebuttal thereto by certifying the fact of the violations.  
• Paragraph 2. The information communication service provider, upon receiving the 
request set forth in Section 1 shall immediately delete or temporarily blind, or take 
other necessary measures on the information and immediately inform the author of 
the information and the applicant for deleting that information. The service provider 
shall inform the users of the fact of having taken the necessary measures by posting 
on the related bulletin board.  
• Paragraph 4. In spite of the request set forth in Section 1, if the service provider finds 
it difficult to decide whether the rights have been violated or anticipates a dispute 
among the interested parties, the service provider may take a measure temporarily 
blocking access to the information (“temporary measure”, hereinafter), which may 
last up to 30 days 
• Paragraph 6. The service provider may reduce or be exempted from liability by taking 
necessary actions set forth in Paragraph 2. 
As is immediately apparent, the provision is structured not with such phrases as “the service 
provider shall not be liable when it removes . . .” but starts out with a phrase “the service 
provider shall remove …” Paragraph 6, referring to the “exemption from or reduction of liability 
in event of compliance with the aforesaid duties,” makes a feeble attempt to turn the provisions 
into an exemption provision like the notice-and-takedown of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act. However, the exemption here is not mandatory, but is dependent on the Courts because the 
law states that the intermediary “may be reduced or exempted,” rather than “shall be exempted.” 
In fact, none of the service providers interpret Article 44-2 as an exemption provision that they 
are allowed to deviate from on the simple penalty of foregoing a safe-harbor. All of them 
interpret it as an obligatory provision that they must comply with.  
Indeed, historically, the predecessors of Article 44-2 (Article 44 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
Network Act enacted 2001.7.16, Law No. 6360)27 simply required the service provider to take 
down content upon the request of a party injured by that content and did not provide any 
exemption. Article 44 began as a simple idea that the service provider shall at least be 
responsible for content that is infringing if someone had complained about that content 
previously. Then, many service providers complained that they were not capable of determining 
                                                 





whether certain content was infringing or not. In response, the law was amended in 2007 
(Enacted 2007.7.27 Law No. 8289) into Article 44-2 to create a “temporary (blind) measure” for 
“border-line” content, so the service provider can now fulfill their responsibility under the 
previous law. 28  Together with that amendment, the noncommittal reference to possible 
“reduction or exemption” found its way into the law. The central idea that remained in each 
version was that the intermediary must remove infringing content upon demand.  
The general idea of holding the intermediaries liable for identified infringing content seems 
innocuous, but the Korean case compellingly illustrates below why this should be abandoned.  
C. On-Demand Takedown Obligations 
As explained below, Article 44-2 Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the Act Regarding Promotion of Use 
of Information Communication Network and Protection of Information ("Network Act") states 
that service providers are required to take at least a "temporary measure" on all content upon 
which a takedown request has been made, regardless of the legality of the content.  
The first possible interpretation is that the statute sets up such on-demand takedown obligations 
explicitly. Although it speaks of an obligation to remove only when someone “whose rights have 
been violated” makes such request, it is impossible to know ex ante whether a rights 
infringement has taken place. So the only feasible interpretation is that such obligation arises 
whenever someone thinks and proposes that his/her rights have been violated. Going further on 
this line of interpretation, this obligation can be filled by “temporary measure,” but this is the 
minimum: the intermediary must take some abatement action. Now, the statute thus interpreted is 
in conflict with all known constitutions and international human rights treaties which allow 
freedom of speech to be violated only in favor of other protected rights or values. 
Another more generous interpretation is possible: As you can immediately see from Paragraph 1 
and 2, if someone complains of their infringed rights, the provider must take down the content if 
it is infringing. Now, there will be no problem if the takedown obligation applies only to that 
content that actually injures others. Indeed, Paragraph 1 limits its application only to “anyone 
whose rights have been violated.” However, even if this is the case, the service providers will 
have a strong incentive to remove the content regardless, because otherwise the provider must 
risk being found in the wrong by courts and therefore being liable as a contributor to the 
dissemination of the infringing content. Usually, the service providers retain editorial control 
over the content through their Terms of Service so that they will not be held liable by the authors 
of the content for removing the content. Article 44-3 of the Network Act even codifies this rule.29 
On balance, the service provider always has a stronger incentive to take down content than to 
keep it up.  
Now, Paragraph 4 states, in paraphrase, “the service provider may take a temporary measure 
(instead of permanent removal) if it is difficult to know whether the contents are infringing or 
when a dispute is expected between the parties.” This should mean that, even if the content is 
                                                 
28“National Legal Information Center,” n.d. 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=2&query=%EC%A0%95%EB%B3%B4%ED%86%B5%EC%
8B%A0%EB%A7%9D#liBgcolor31. 
29 Article 44-3 The service provider may take a temporary measure voluntarily if it is recognized that the 
information circulated through the network operated and managed by the provider is infringing another’s rights.  
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later found to be infringing, the service provider will not be held liable for the content if it has 
taken a temporary measure. While this seems to soften the de facto censorship effects of 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 by providing a less drastic alternative to a permanent removal, it does exactly 
the opposite. What is diabolical is that the permissive “may” in Paragraph 4 will encourage the 
intermediaries further to remove perfectly lawful content. This further aggravates the imbalance 
of incentives in favor of restricting content rather than keeping it up.  
Make no mistake about it: under this second interpretation, the failure to take abatement action 
will result in liability only if the content is later found to be actually infringing. However, the 
intermediaries, not knowing for sure what content is infringing, will have strong incentives to 
take down even lawful content instead of risking being found liable later. Maybe a better 
expression of the dilemma is that the providers will be “chilled” into doing so, not because the 
concept “rights-infringing” is vague all the time, but because it is vague ex ante. On top of that, 
Paragraph 4 provides yet another incentive in favor of removing content by providing exemption 
from any liability for doing so.  
Initially, the service providers were expected to gravitate away from permanent removals, for 
which there is no ex ante exemption, and toward temporary measures, for which there is ex ante 
exemption. This prediction turned out to be true. Naver, the number one content host, has often 
responded to all takedown requests with only temporary measures; Daum, the number two 
content host, eventually caught up in 2010.  
In sum, contrary to the spirit of intermediary liability regimes around the world aimed at 
shielding the creators of online spaces from liability for what goes on in that space, Korean law 
ends up imposing de facto obligations on the intermediaries to censor lawful material, an 
obligation that did not exist before Article 44 or 44-2. The next section examines how courts 
dealt with intermediary liability before  the current Article 44/44-2 regime.  
D. Intermediary Liability in Court30  
The Korean Supreme Court has ruled three times significantly on intermediary liability.  In 2001, 
the Court held an electronic bulletin board provider liable for refusing, even upon demands both 
by the injury claimant and a government censorship body, to take down for a period of 5-6 
months postings deprecating a pop singer’s fan. The Court ruled that the intermediary had “a 
duty to take adequate measures when it knew or had reason to know of a defamatory posting.”31 
This was a fairly typical case.   
In 2003, when the Court was asked to find an intermediary liable for postings defaming a local 
politician, the Court took that as an opportunity to further limit when the duty to take adequate 
measures arises. 32 The Court held that an intermediary, even if it knew or had reason to know of 
the defamatory material for 52 days, should not be held responsible unless a comprehensive 
analysis of the following factors point to such responsibility: the posting’s purpose, content, 
duration and method, the damages it has caused, the relationship between the speaker and the 
                                                 
30 Woo Ji-Suk, “A Critical Analysis of the Practical Applicability and Implication of the 
Korean Supreme Court Case on the ISP Liability of Defamation” LAW & TECHNOLOGY, Vol.5, No.4: pp78-98. 
July 2009 http://plan2work.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/ebaa85ec9888ed9bbcec8690ec9790-eb8c80ed959c-
ec9db8ed84b0eb84b7ec849cebb984ec8aa4eca09ceab3b5ec9e90isp-ecb185ec9e84-ec9ab0eca780ec8899.pdf. 
31 Supreme Court, 2001.9.7 Judgment, 2001Da36801  
32 Supreme Court 2003.6.27 Judgment, 2002Da72194 
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injury-claimant, the claimant’s attitude, including whether rebuttal or takedown was requested, 
the size and nature of the site posted, the degree of for-profit nature of the site, when the operator 
knew or could have known the posting’s content, and the technological and pecuniary difficulty 
in taking down, etc.33 Having said so, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision that 
imposed liability for pre-takedown exposure. The Supreme Court’s rather terse ruling sounds 
very generous, refusing to impose liability even upon knowledge of some indiscretion, especially 
given that this was before the exemption provision was added to Article 44-2. However, the 
ruling stands on the narrow fact that the intermediary here did comply immediately with the 
takedown request. Some said it made sense to require knowledge of the illegal character of the 
content.34  
Then in 2009, a crushing judgment35 came out where the Korean Supreme Court issued a 
decision holding web portal sites Naver, Daum, SK Communications, and Yahoo Korea liable 
for the defamation of the plaintiff when user postings on those sites accused him of deserting a 
girlfriend upon her second pregnancy after he had he talked her into aborting the first, after 
which the girlfriend committed suicide. The court upheld judgments of 10 million won, 7 million 
won, 8 million won, and 5 million won, respectively, against these services.  
Specifically, the court held that (in paraphrase):  
Barring special circumstances, the intermediary shall be liable for illegal content to the 
same extent as a news agency and therefore shall be liable when (1) the illegality of the 
content is clear; (2) the provider was aware of the content; and (3) it is technically and 
financially possible to control the contents. On top of the duty to take down such content 
immediately, the intermediary has a duty to block similar postings later on. The Court 
will find the provider’s requisite awareness under (2) above:  
a) When the victim has requested specifically and individually for the takedown of the 
content;  
b) When, even without such request, the provider was concretely aware of how and why 
the content was posted OR  
c) When, even without request, it was apparently clear that the provider could have been 
aware of that content.   
The end result is that the intermediary will be absolutely liable for a posting later found to be 
“clearly” defamatory if “it was apparently clear that the provider could have been aware of that 
content” even if the victim did not notify the intermediary of the existence of the content.  
This sets up what is probably one of the most strict intermediary liability regimes because it 
imposes liability for situations where content is “unknown but could-have-[been]-known.” 
                                                 
33 Supreme Court, 2003.6.27 Judgment, 2002Da72194. 
34 Hwang Sung-Gi, 
http://m.riss.kr/search/detail/DetailView.do?p_mat_type=1a0202e37d52c72d&control_no=12cb6a3625533040ffe0b
dc3ef48d419.  
35 Please review a foreign scholar’s response to this ruling. Anupam Chander, “How Law Made Silicon Valley” 
EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:639 (2014), 
http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/elj/63/63.3/Chander.pdf . 
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Anupam Chander plainly describes this ruling as stating that a web service “must delete 
slanderous posts or block searches of offending posts, even if not requested to do so by the 
victim.”36 It is true that the intermediary may be held liable for the content that looks clearly 
illegal ex ante, but should this liability exist even when the intermediary did not know?  
True, DMCA notice-and-takedown immunity37 does not apply to content that OSP had “actual 
knowledge” of the infringing nature of, or “awareness of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent.” However, the DMCA is a safe harbor provision. It merely says 
that the safe harbor will not apply in case of “actual knowledge” or “awareness.” It does not say 
that the OSP will be held liable in cases of such knowledge or awareness.  
Furthermore, there is a world of difference between possible awareness – encompassed by the 
phrase “could have been aware” in the Korean ruling – on one hand, and “actual knowledge” or 
“awareness” on the other. The intermediaries, when facing such a liability regime, will have 
strong incentives to monitor all the content in order to make sure that there are no unknown 
clearly defamatory postings that it “could have been aware” of, but that they did not remove. 
This sets up a general monitoring obligation that kills the power of the Internet. Indeed, the Court 
does state that “[if the three conditions are met], the intermediary has a duty to take down such 
contents immediately AND block similar postings later.”  
What is more, this was not even a case interpreting the Article 44/44-2 regime because the cases 
here are concerned the intermediary’s role when the victim did not make a takedown request, or 
before such a request was made. The Court was already ready to impose a publisher-like liability 
on the intermediary and a monitoring obligation.   
IV. Result: Private Censorship 
In summary, Article 44-2 states that all content should be taken down upon demand even if 
lawful. The Supreme Court decisions state that all unlawful content should be taken down even if 
unknown to the intermediaries. Together, the Court decisions encourage private censorship by 
intermediaries. On top of the censorship system triggered by private notices, Korean law 
provides for the Korean Communication Standards Commission which issues “correction 
requests” to all intermediaries, including telecoms, to take down or block domestically the 
content the Commission finds to be illegal. What is significant for now is that these injunctive 
functions, together with monetary damages, anticipated by the above-described liability regime, 
will provide stronger incentives to the intermediaries to take a heavy-handed approach toward 
censorship.38 We will now look at some numbers and cases for illustration. 
We will not look at copyright-related takedown notices, which may make up more than 90% of 
takedown requests in other countries, because the Korean Copyright Act sets up a different 
liability scheme for copyright-related takedown requests. The Network Act’s liability scheme 
affects only takedown requests related to defamation, privacy, interference with business, etc. 
Although the Network Act’s liability scheme on its face covers copyright as well, the Copyright 
                                                 
36 Supreme Court, 2008Da53812, Apr. 16, 2009 (S. Kor.).. 
37 Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), 512(d)(1)(A). 
38 Park, Ahran. "Internet Service Provider’s Liability for Defamation: South Korea’s Balancing of Free Speech with 
Reputation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Communication, The Denver Sheraton, Denver, CO, Aug 04  
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Act’s scheme takes precedence in copyright issues in accordance with the principle of generalia 
specialibus non derogant. Although there will be issues with copyright-related on-demand 
takedowns, the Copyright Act’s liability scheme was quite similar to the American DMCA and is 
now more so under the KORUS FTA-triggered amendment that closed the final loophole by 
making the liability exemption mandatory.  
There is nothing similar to the Transparency Reports of U.S. OSP’s that are published by Korean 
intermediaries. There are only statistics occasionally obtained through private sources along with 
legislators who exercise their clout with agencies, which can in turn make various disclosure 
demands to the intermediaries licensed or registered with them. MP Choi Moon-Soon obtained 
the relevant data from the top three top content host intermediaries though the Korea 
Communications Commission and made the following disclosure in November 2010.39 
Operators 
Years 
Naver Daum NATE Total 
2008 31,953 27,454 691 60,098 
2009 37,342 57,712 1,449 96,503 

















Figure 2. Non-copyright related takedowns pursuant to Article 44-2 
 
After learning that the number of takedowns executed by the top two content hosts exceeded that 
of other hosts greatly, MP Nam Kyung-pil obtained similar data on the two content hosts in 




2008 70,401 21,546 
2009 83,548 50,860 
2010 85,573 58,168 
2011 123,079 86,431 
                                                 
39 http://moonsoonc.tistory.com/attachment/cfile23.uf@133D7F0F4CE1EF660D3B87.hwp 




2012 until July 104,578 40,538 
Figure 3. Non-copyright related takedowns pursuant to Article 44-2 
 
Although the differences in the two tables need some explanations,41 the following facts are 
uncontested:  
• The number of URL takedowns privately requested under Article 44-2 of the 
Network Act for non-copyright purposes has increased over time.  
• The annual number of URLs taken down by Naver hovers above 100,000 and for 
Daum is about 50-70% of Navers’ number.  
How serious is this? There is nothing here that we can compare to the situation in the U.S. 
because Section 230 of CDA insulates the intermediaries from liability for defamation and other 
non-copyright related laws. However, we can compare these Korean numbers to government-
originating takedowns in other countries. Google received only about 4,000 takedown requests in 
2012 from the whole world, only about half of which Google complied with.42 So, 100,000 in 
Korea vs. 2,000 the whole world vis-à-vis Google! As another example, the Korean 
government’s censorship body – the Korean Communication Standards Commission – issued 
54,385 takedown requests to various intermediaries in 2011, out of which only 668 were related 
to defamation and other rights infringement.43 Although the number of URLs is usually greater 
than the number of requests – for each request may cover more than one URL – the rights-
infringement category of KCSC activities usually covers less than 10 URLs. This means that 
private censorship takedowns through Article 44-2 is more than 10 times the number of rights-
infringement takedowns executed by the Korean government.   
It is not just the volume of censorship that is problematic. Politicians and government officials 
often make takedown requests on postings critical of their policy decisions that are clearly 
lawful, as illustrated below. Takedown requests were made for the following: 
• A posting44 critical of a Seoul City mayor’s ban on assemblies in the Seoul Square;  
• A posting45 critical of a legislator’s drinking habits and introducing his social media 
account;  
• Clips of a television news report on the Seoul Police Chief’s brother who allegedly 
runs an illegal brothel-hotel;46 
• A posting critical of politicians’ pejorative remarks on the recent deaths of squatters 
                                                 
41 Naver’s numbers in the first table represent the number of requests, which can cover more than one URL, while 
the Naver numbers in the second table represent the number of URLs taken down. Daum’s numbers in the first table 
include both permanent removals and temporary measures, i.e., blinds while Daum’s numbers in the second include 
only temporary measures. Daum’s numbers in the second table more and more came to represent the total number of 
takedowns as Daum cancelled its policy of undoing the blinds after 30 days, i.e., all temporary measures became 
permanent.  
42 “Government Requests to Remove Content.” https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/. 
43https://www.kocsc.or.kr/02_infoCenter/info_Communition_View.php?ko_board=info_Communition&ba_id=4909  
44 http://blog.ohmynews.com/savenature/199381 
45 The original posting now taken down is shown here. http://wnsgud313.tistory.com/156  
46 “Police Arbitrarily Issue ‘Defamation Judgement’. Even Foreign Carriers Face Censorshop.” Accessed February 
17, 2015. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/300688.html. 
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and police officers in a redevelopment dispute;47 
• A posting calling for immunity from criminal prosecutions and civil damage suits on 
labor strikes;48 and 
• A posting by an opposition party legislator questioning a conservative media 
executive’s involvement in a sex exploitation scandal related to an actress and her 
suicide.49  
V. People’s Response: Constitutional Challenge 
It is okay not to institute intermediary immunity regimes such as the United States’ CDA Section 
230 or DMCA Section 512 that shield intermediaries from liability for even unlawful content. 
However, Korea does much worse: it chills the intermediaries into taking down even lawful 
content, as evidenced by the examples above. The PSPD Public Interest Law Center and others 
filed a constitutional challenge against Article 44-2 of the Network Act on the theory that the 
total result of the aforesaid provisions is that “Thou Shall Delay Saying What Others Dislike, As 
Long As 30 days.”50 The Korean Constitution does not authorize suppressing speech that does 
not violate others' rights, the aforesaid provisions de facto require even lawful content to be 
removed for up to 30 days therefore are unconstitutional.  
Under the current statutory scheme, the temporary removal can be up to 30 days. Daum set it at 
the maximum of 30 days, while Naver set a period lasting until the publisher requests reposting. 
Naver's system looks a lot like a notice-and-takedown without mandatory exemption. However, 
the statute requires even Naver to take down content that is clearly lawful at least once. The rule 
"Thou Shall Not Say What Others Dislike Unless Thou Have Courage to Say Twice" is equally 
unconstitutional. 
In 2012, the Constitutional Court rejected the challenges as follows:51  
“The instant provisions are purported to prevent indiscriminate circulation of the 
information defaming or infringing privacy and other rights of another, and therefore 
have a legitimate purpose . . .Temporary blocking of the circulation or diffusion of the 
information that has the possibility of such infringement is an appropriate means to 
accomplish the purpose… 
Freedom of speech requires absence of restriction in form, method, and timing of speech. 
Especially, in relation to publishing one’s opinions on a certain issue or event, the 
‘temporal pertinence’ i.e. making a remark appropriate to the event in a time proximately 
related to the subject of that opinion is an important component of free speech and should 
be maximally guaranteed. This is an important function of freedom of speech that calls 
for self-correction through rebuttal and discussions about that speech, conducted at ‘the 
marketplace of ideas.’ Therefore, the instant provisions’ ‘temporary measure’ depriving 
                                                 
47 http://blog.jinbo.net/gimche/?pid=668  
48 http://blog.jinbo.net/gimche/?pid=492 
49 http://bbs1.agora.media.daum.net/gaia/do/debate/read?bbsId=D115&articleId=610524 
50 Park Kyung-sin, “Unconstitutionality of Korea's Temporary Blinds on Internet - "Thou Shall Not Speak for 30 
days What Others Do Not Like", Chung-Ang-Bub-Hak (Korean) 
<http://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART001387
276> 
51 Constitutional Court 2012.5.31 Decision 2010 Hun-ma 88 
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the speech of the temporal pertinence by blocking access through information 
communication network presents a grave restriction on free speech… 
However, . . .when another’s personal rights such as privacy or reputation are infringed or 
are anticipated to be infringed, a need to temporarily block the infringing information is 
greater than the need to guarantee the temporal pertinence of the information. The fact 
that the content was disclosed may be further propagated through other means, and may 
cause privacy-infringement and defamation to an equal extent. In such situation, 
publishing a rebuttal by the infringement complainant, blocking of the links, search 
restrictions, expeditious dispute resolution, etc., cannot be effective alternatives to 
accomplish the legislative purpose… 
When a temporary measure is taken for the reason that “it is difficult to judge whether the 
rights have been infringed or when a dispute between the interested parties is anticipated”, 
the degree of restriction on the poster’s freedom of speech becomes greater. . . .However, 
in this situation, such measure has the effect of preventing frivolous improvised attacks or 
the spreading of information that as a result infringe on another’s rights in anonymous 
cyberspace . . .” 
What was encouraging was that the Constitutional Court saw through to the practical effects of 
the provisions and recognized that the provisions are in fact tantamount to requiring the 
takedown of content that is not illegal. The Court itself states: “if the prerequisites are met, the 
service provider must without hesitation take the temporary measure.” 
However, the opinion takes a curious turn and rationalizes the blocking of content on the basis of 
the mere “anticipation” of infringement. That speech can be banned on the basis of a possible 
illegality is a far departure from the established rules of free speech, such as a clear and present 
doctrine, void-for-vagueness, prior restraint ban, etc. The reason for such leniency is found in the 
earlier portions of the decision emphasizing how fast, far, and wide defamatory information 
travels through the Internet. However, the decision does not mention how fast, far, and wide 
corrective information can travel. Sure, the Internet’s self-corrective nature cannot be the basis 
for exempting all unlawful activities on the Internet. However, communicative efficiency of a 
medium cannot be a justification for taking down content that is lawful on that medium.  
In all other types of media, only proven illegality can form the basis of liability, intermediary or 
primary. The Korean intermediary liability regime will impose liability for only provisional 
illegality if it takes place on the Internet. This constitutes discrimination against the Internet as a 
medium. It is not a frivolous question how humanity should deal with the special characteristics 
of the Internet, which calls for more research.  
VI. Conclusion and Impact Assessment 
The Korean liability regime starts out with an innocent-sounding rule that an intermediary shall 
remove any user-created content infringing on the rights of another. The regime adds yet another 
innocent-sounding rule that an intermediary is free to remove a UCC temporarily as long as the 
intermediary anticipates a dispute or faces difficulty in deciding on the lawfulness. Such a 
regime, exempting not posting but only the removal of a post, has caused in Korea rampant 
private censorship, and the removal a significant amount of content duly informative to the 
public on civic affairs. The courts have not behaved better, imposing liabilities on the 
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intermediaries for not taking down unknown content for which a takedown request did not even 
exist. Civil society has responded with a constitutional challenge, which ended with a surprising 
decision by the Constitutional Court that the Internet, due to its hyper-efficient mediating power, 
must be discriminated against so that even lawful content is subject to temporary removal if there 
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Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.1 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
contribute to a more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, 
facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 






                                                 
1 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 










Abstract: This paper discusses the treatment of online intermediary liability by 
Brazilian Courts both before and after the establishment of the Marco Civil. It 
first provides an overview of the three most common approaches to intermediary 
liability applied by the Courts in the decades prior to the Marco Civil. The paper 
then describes the drafting and passage of the Marco Civil – “The Brazilian 
Internet Bill of Rights” – as well as the system of civil liability for online 
intermediaries established by this document. While the Marco Civil has both 
clarified the position of online intermediaries in Brazil in regards to third-party 
content and established more robust protections for these entities, it is still too 
early to tell what the full implications of the implementation of the Marco Civil 
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The Internet is a network that fosters freedoms, yet at the same time allows unprecedented 
control over individuals. It is an extraordinary platform for freedom of expression and – perhaps 
for the very same reason – can generate large-scale damage to one’s reputation and privacy.  
This multitude of paradoxes guides the way to a deeper understanding of the dilemmas that must 
be addressed in order to reach a balance between the various interests of companies involved in 
the provision of access to the internet, and others services throughout this network. 
Who is liable for damages caused online? The individual who posts a photo, a video, or a text 
that damages others, or the provider that, through its own activities, may provide the platform for 
that offense to occur?  
This report focus on the current state of this discussion in Brazil, analyzing solutions created by a 
decade of judicial decisions on the topic of online intermediaries’ liability and the newly 
established regulatory framework as set forth in the so-called Marco Civil.  
II. Who is the Provider?  
Before exploring the debate around the framework for the civil liability regime for online 
intermediaries, it is necessary to identify exactly who an intermediary is in the Brazilian context.  
Several authors have suggested different categories to identify intermediaries based on the 
activities they undertake. The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (STJ), in assessing frequent 
cases involving damage over the Internet, has adopted the following classification:  
"Internet service providers are those that offer several services related to the operation of 
the network. There are several categories of Internet service providers: (i) backbone 
providers, which hold the infrastructure capable of processing large volumes of 
information. They are responsible for Internet connectivity, offering its infrastructure to 
third parties, which end up contracting with end users to allow access to the network; (ii) 
access providers, which acquire access to the infrastructure through backbone providers 
and resell to end users, enabling them to have access to the Internet; (iii) hosting 
providers, responsible for the storage of third party’s data, allowing them remote access 
to it; (iv) information providers, which actually create the information available on the 
Internet; and (v) content providers, who make available the information created by 
information providers or by Internet users."2 
Law No. 12965/2014 (known as "Marco Civil da Internet", or simply “Marco Civil”), deals in 
particular with two types of intermediaries: those dedicated to providing Internet access 
(“connection providers” or “access providers”) and those that provide the most diverse services 
to the network (“application providers”). Article 5 of this Law defines the activities performed 
by each of these providers.  
Article 5. For the purposes of this Act, the following concepts apply:  
                                                 
2 STJ, Resp no. 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.12. 
 2 
V - Internet connection: the enabling of a terminal for sending and receiving data packets 
over the Internet through the assigning or authentication of an IP address; (...)  
VII - Internet applications: the set of functionalities that can be accessed through a 
terminal connected to the Internet.  
Understanding which activities the providers and their respective technical features perform is 
paramount to assessing the corresponding liability regime. In this regard, it is especially relevant 
to analyze the activities developed by their users and the extent to which the intermediary 
intervenes in these activities.  
The question is thus how to create a liability regime that – on the one hand – does not harm the 
victim of any damage sustained online though the perpetuation of the illicit content, but which 
also does not encourage the intermediary to simply remove the photo, video, or text as soon as a 
notification is received, thus affecting the freedom of expression and diversity of online speech.   
Is it up to the intermediary to judge the legality of the content displayed and to decide on its 
maintenance or removal? How do these questions impact the degree of innovation and future 
business models that may be affected by the way in which the law encourages prevention and 
imposes liabilities for damages caused online?  
III. Brazilian Case Law on Liability of Online 
Intermediaries  
After a decade of judicial decisions on the liability of online intermediaries in Brazil, one of 
three understandings were typically applied by national Courts. The first understanding exempts 
the provider from any liability for a third party’s behavior. The second enforces a strict liability 
regime for the Internet providers, grounded in the concept of the risk of the activity or in the 
recognition that a service was defectively rendered. A third and final understanding would link 
the liability of the provider to the existence of fault on its part. Some consider the provider liable 
simply for the non-removal of the content after the provider becomes aware of its existence 
(usually through a notification sent by the victim), while some understand liability as arising 
from non-compliance with a Court decision ordering the removal of the offending material. The 
latter was the understanding adopted in the recently enacted Marco Civil.  
More than simply categorizing the understandings shared by national Courts, it is necessary to 
understand what the grounds are for supporting each position adopted by the Courts and which 
factual circumstances may have been relevant for the outcome of these decisions.  
A. The Provider Is Not Liable for the Conduct of Its Users  
The first understanding – according to which the provider would not be held liable for the acts of 
its users – is frequent in cases that identify the provider as a mere intermediary between the user 
(the offender) and the victim. In general there would be no conduct by the provider that would 
make it responsible for the acts of others. The provider’s only responsibility would be to help 
identify the offender.  
In the majority of judicial decisions enforcing this understanding, it was very clear that the 
intermediary, in providing a specific service, was already informed that it would not be held 
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responsible for content generated by its users, whether they are members of a social network or 
users of a webhosting platform.  
In the beginning of the last decade, some Courts adopted this understanding, usually excluding 
the provider as a possible defendant in compensation claims filed by the victims of damages 
caused by users of the intermediary. 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Paraná, analyzing a case involving offenses to the 
reputation of a victim made available on a website hosted by the intermediary, stated that:  
"In the hosting agreement, the provider is only responsible for making an online space 
available. It must not interfere with the content that is published, except in cases of 
notorious illegality. The current Brazilian legal system does not allow the liability of the 
hosting provider, either strict or jointly, for moral damages arising out from the insertion 
of offensive material by the subscriber."3 
Around the same period, a case involving a couple of lawsuits brought by former soccer player 
Paulo Roberto Falcão against Terra (an access and application provider) received some press 
coverage. The lawsuits claimed damages for offensive material that have been published on the 
website of the “Isto É Gente” magazine, hosted by Terra. The Court of Appeals of the State of 
Rio Grande do Sul recognized that the hosting provider could not be sued for the contents of a 
webpage that it simply hosts.4 
B. Strict Liability 
The application of a strict liability regime for Internet providers is usually grounded in the notion 
of risk or defect in rendering a service to consumers. 
Regardless of the grounds adopted for its enforcement, the use of such an understanding in 
national case law leads to two relevant concerns.  
First, does the provider have the duty to inspect, monitor, and consequently filter out content that 
is submitted by its users? That would be the very first concern, since the discussion around the 
duty of monitoring is key to understanding the effects of strict liability for providers. In this 
sense, the provider could be held liable for the mere display of harmful content (either because it 
is an inherent risk of their activity, or because there were a defect in the rendered service).  
Second, should the provider be liable if, once aware of the reputedly harmful content – usually 
when notified by the victim – it does not remove it? This second concern takes into account the 
fact that providers should not be held liable for simply making the content available, but rather 
for the decision (active or passive) to not remove the challenged material.  
Analyzing the first concern, it is relevant to highlight how the concept of risk has been applied in 
national case law. The large amount of lawsuits over damages caused online, especially focused 
                                                 
3 TJPR, Civil Appeal nr. 130075-8, 19.11.2002. 
4 TJRS, Agravo de instrumento nr. 70003035078, Judge Paulo Antonio Kretzmann, 22.11.2001 
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on the use of social networks,5 has drawn attention from the Judiciary due to the frequency in 
which such services are used to infringe third parties’ rights.  
At the same time that access to the Internet in Brazil began to be widespread in the last decade, a 
new Civil Code was approved in 2002, providing for – in article 927 – strict liability for those 
who develop activities that, by their nature, involve risk to third party’s rights.  
Therefore, as the number of cases brought to Court grew in the last decade, case law ended up 
establishing the understanding that a number of agents – from companies that operate search 
engines to owners of Internet cafes – could be held liable for the risk assumed in the 
development of their respective activities.  
The Court of the State of São Paulo decided, in a lawsuit filed by the victim of defamatory 
messages sent our from an Internet café that the owner of such establishment should be liable as 
per "(...) the strict liability clause provided for in article 927, sole paragraph, of the Civil Code, 
as the development of its activity involves risk to the rights of others. (…) In this sense, whoever 
provides computer terminals or wireless network for Internet usage assumes the risk of misuse of 
the system to infringe third party’s rights, as it have happened in the present case."6 
In opposition to such an understanding, a number of scholars sought to investigate not only 
whether there is risk in the activity, present in everyday situations, but also whether the risk 
posed by the activity performed by the intermediary is greater than usual. In this regard, the strict 
liability provision should only be applicable in extraordinary cases. As Erica Barbagalo explains:  
"We understand that the activities undertaken by service providers on the Internet are not 
risk activities by their very nature, involving risks to rights greater than the one of any 
other commercial activity. Interpreting the law in the sense that any damage should be 
compensated regardless of culpability element would definitely burden the productive 
activities and therefore hinder development."7 
The strict liability understanding based on the notion of risk was a minority view in the Court 
system by the end of the decade. The STJ, on several occasions, rejected this understanding. As 
stated in Special Appeal nr. 1308830/RS:  
"The material damage resulting from messages with offensive content on the site 
uploaded by users does not constitute risk inherent to the activity of content providers, so 
that it does not apply to them the strict liability regime provided for in art. 927, sole 
paragraph, of the Civil Code."8 
A second ground for the liability of the providers then lies in the characterization of the legal 
relationship between the victim and the intermediary as a true consumer relationship, which 
                                                 
5 In May 2012, Justice Nancy Andrighi mentioned that around 200 lawsuits involving Google alone were pending 
decision in the STJ (STJ, Resp 1308830/RS, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 08.05.2012).  
6 TJSP, Process nr. 583.00.2006.243439-5, Judge Ulysses de Oliveira Gonçalves Junior; 06.03.2008. 
7 Erica B. Barbagalo. “Aspectos da Responsabilidade Civil”, in Ronaldo Lemos, Ivo Waisberg (orgs) Conflito de 
Nomes de Domínio e Outras Questões Jurídicas da Internet. São Paulo: RT, 2003; p. 361. See also STJ, Resp 
1067738/GO, Justice Sidnei Beneti, 26.05.2009. 
8 STJ, Resp 1308830, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 08.05.2012. See also STJ, RESP 1306066/MT, Justice Sidnei Beneti; 
17.04.2012. 
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therefore results in application of the strict liability regime under the Consumer’s Protection 
Code (CDC).  
After some debate in the late nineties on the enforcement of the CDC for online activities, it is 
worth noting that the main argument initially presented by providers when attempting to avoid 
liability was the non-essential nature of the service they were rendering. 
Although a large numbers of services are rendered through the Internet without charging a 
specific value, national Courts decided that there is a counterpart offered by the consumer, even 
if it is of indirect nature. According to such case law, instead of paying a certain amount of 
money to the provider, this entity it earns profits from its users in other ways, especially through 
the creation of a user’s profile, which contains personal information and browsing habits, and 
can be used to generate advertising revenues through customized marketing based on the user’s 
data.  
As explained by Professor Claudia Lima Marques:  
"The expression used by art. 3 of the Consumer Protection Code include all consumer 
services rendered in connection to a ‘remuneration’ of some sort. (...) It seems to me that 
the choice of the expression 'paid' creates an important opportunity to include consumer 
services paid indirectly, ie, when it is not the individual consumer who pays, but the 
collectivity or when he/she pays indirectly. The term 'compensation' allows you to add all 
those contracts in which it is possible to identify the hidden synallagma (hidden 
counterpart), an indirect remuneration for the service rendered to the consumer." 9 
The subject was addressed a number of times in Superior Court of Justice decisions. In one of the 
first cases to reach the STJ on the liability of Internet service providers, the Court stated that, "to 
characterize the consumer relationship, the service can be provided by the provider for 
remuneration obtained indirectly." 10 
More recently, the STJ reinforced this understanding, thus confirming the enforcement of the 
CDC in the relationship between the provider of a social network and the victim of offenses 
made available in a community created on Orkut:   
"Commercial use of the Internet is subjected to the regulation of consumer relations 
arising out from Law No. 8.078/90. 2. The fact that the service provided by the Internet 
service provider is to be free does not change the nature of the relationship as a consumer 
one, since the term remuneration, contained in art. 3, §2, of the CDC, should be 
interpreted broadly so as to include the indirect gain from the provider."11 
Once the relationship is subsumed under the Consumer Protection Code, it remains to ascertain 
whether the damage caused by the service can be framed as a defect in the service. The question 
of risk appears again to reveal the importance of the first concern mentioned above: if the 
provider has a duty to monitor the content that is made available on its pages, the mere display of 
harmful content implies a defect in the service rendered.  
                                                 
9 In Comentários ao Código de Defesa do Consumidor. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2003; p. 94. 
10 STJ, Resp 566468/RJ, Justice Jorge Scartezzini, 23.11.2004. 
11 STJ, Resp 1308830/RS, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 08.05.2012. 
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The STJ has already decided on several occasions that the service provider has no obligation to 
monitor the content of text, photos, videos, and codes entered by its users. As stated in the 
Special Appeal nr. 1308830/RS:  
"A prior inspection on the content of the information posted on the web for each user by 
the content provider is not intrinsic to the service, so it can not be deemed a defective 
activity under article 14 of the CDC, if the site does not examine and filter the data and 
images uploaded by its users."12 
Another opposing argument to the imposition of surveillance duties (and consequently to the 
strict liability understanding) is the assertion that, by requiring the inspection of the posted 
contents, a censorship regime would be implemented, hindering freedom of expression.  
This argument is represented by the Republic’s General Attorney in a currently ongoing case to 
be decided by the Supreme Court (STF) involving the creation of a community in the Orkut 
social network that was reputedly offensive. The community “I hate Aliandra” (“Eu odeio a 
Aliandra”) was created to mock a high school teacher in the State of Minas Gerais. The teacher 
then filed a suit against Google for the damages caused by this content.  
The lawsuit questions if the providers should monitor what is said in the community pages 
created on social networking sites as a way to prevent future damage. According to General 
Attorney:  
"...There is no interference from the provider in the content posted by users on the social 
networks, being incompatible with the constitutional framework to allow or even to 
require previous censorship of disseminated manifestations, under penalty of strict 
liability. It would amount to undue and severe embarrassment to the very freedom of 
expression."13 
The STJ, in support of this view, has even claimed that, "prior editorial control of the content of 
the information equates to a breach of confidentiality of correspondence and communications, 
prohibited by Art. 5, XII, of the Constitution."14  
The understanding of the STJ of service providers in general needs to be analyzed carefully 
because, on one hand, the Court recognizes that such relationships are subject to the Consumer 
Protection Code but, on the other, it does not impose a strict liability (as it would be the rule in 
the CDC).  
If there is a negative answer to the first concern raised (i.e. that "providers have no duty to 
monitor and are not liable simply by making a content available"), then there is a need to 
examine the second, which require an investigation regarding whether the provider would be 
liable if it fails to remove the infringing content once it has become aware of its existence.15  
                                                 
12 STJ, Resp 1308830/RS, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 08.05.2012. See also STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy 
Andrighi; 26.06.2012.  
13 Manifestação da Procuradoria Geral da República, RE nr. 660861/MG, 11.07.2012. 
14 STJ, Resp 1308830/RS, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 08.05.2012. 
15 See STJ, Resp 997993/MG, Justice Luis Felipe Salomão; 21.06.2012.  
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C. Fault-Based Liability  
The third understanding of intermediary liability is based on the existence of a fault by the 
provider, attaching to itself the responsibility for the conduct performed by its user. This 
understanding has two different grounds for application: the first states that the liability should 
result from noncompliance with a notification informing the provider of the infringing material; 
the second is based on noncompliance with a Court order requesting the removal of certain 
material. This last understanding is the one adopted by the Marco Civil.  
In its most recent decisions on the issue, the STJ affirmed the understanding that Internet service 
providers can be liable when they fail to remove illegal content of which they are aware by a 
notification sent by the victim. Such an understanding has been enforced for both cases in which 
the provider fails to respond to the notification of the victim, or actively responds to the 
notification stating that it sees no reason to remove the content. In such cases, the responsibility 
would be based on fault and jointly affirmed with the liability of the user that has directly 
uploaded the infringing material.  
On this topic it is worth mentioning some relevant excerpts from Special Appeal nr. 
1.193.764/SP, as decided by the STJ:  
"By offering a service through which it allows users to freely express their opinions, the 
content provider should take care to provide resources so that it can identify those users, 
curbing anonymity and assigning each event a certain authorship. From the perspective of 
the average diligence expected of the provider, it must adopt the measures which, 
according to the specific circumstances of each case, can individualize the website’s 
users, under penalty of being liable for fault (culpa in omittend)."16  
This debate was also reported in the decision of the STJ in the Regimental Appeal presented in 
the Special Appeal nr. 1.309.891/MG. In this case there is a deeper discussion over the 
expression "immediate" as to how quickly the provider should act to remove the infringing 
content:  
"In line with precedents of this Court, the Internet content provider is not liable according 
to a strict liability regime for the content created by the user in a website, as this is not an 
inherent risk to their activity. It is required, however, to immediately takedown the 
morally offensive content, otherwise it would be jointly responsible with the direct 
offender. Precedents.  
In the present case the Court held that there was no immediate exclusion of the fake 
profile because the victim, for more than once denounced the illegality perpetrated by 
electronic means provided for this purpose by the provider itself, without obtaining any 
result.  
Regimental Appeal dismissed."17 
The case above, as decided by the STJ, verified the decision of lower level Court that found 
Google – when exploring the social network Orkut – was not diligent in promoting the removal 
                                                 
16 STJ, Resp 1193764/SP, Justice Nany Andrighi; 14.12.2010. 
17 STJ, Agr. Reg. in Resp 1309891/MG, Justice Sidnei Beneti; 26.06.2012. 
 8 
of offensive material as it took eleven days to remove the content. Cases like this call into 
question the frequent use of the expressions "immediately" or even "energetic" by the STJ when 
it comes to damages caused through online intermediaries.  
1. General Effects of a Notice and Takedown Regime 
The liability of the provider for not removing the content once notified seems intuitive: if the 
provider is aware that someone claims to be suffering damages due to a content made available 
by your user, the one who stands in the best condition to cease the damages – other than the 
offender himself – would be the provider. However, this hides many harmful consequences for 
the operations of the Internet and for the protection of many fundamental rights. 
At first one must question whether the provider should promptly remove the content and thus 
prevent the ongoing damage. Would it be appropriate for the provider to analyze whether the 
content is or isn’t actually infringing? The danger of this alternative lies in empowering 
providers to decide what should and what should not be made available on criteria that go 
beyond those presented in their terms of service.  
The STJ has had the opportunity to express some concerns with this broad delegation of the 
power to control speech online to private actors. As mentioned by Justice Nancy Andrighi:  
"We must consider the impossibility to define a criteria that would authorize the veto or 
the disposal of given page. Given the subjectivity surrounding the psychological damage 
and/or the damage to one’s image, it would be impossible to define parameters that could 
allow the providers to rely on to define whether a content is potentially offensive. On the 
other hand, it would be reckless to delegate this judgment to the discretion of the 
providers."18 
The second point worth mentioning is precisely the intense subjectivity of the criteria that can be 
used to allow content to be removed. If it does not make sense to hold the providers liable just 
because content was made available and there is doubt on whether it is infringing or not, then a 
system that lacks transparency and that is highly subjective, removing content and jeopardizing 
the diversity and the degree of innovation on the Internet, should undoubtedly be rejected.  
The degree of innovation on the Internet is the third point that can be mentioned in opposition to 
a system of fault-based liability arising out from the failure to remove content after being 
notified. The development of all new activity involves questioning its adherence to the current 
legal regime and, in most cases, an investigation into potential judicial decisions on the subject. 
The removal of content in a very subjective way and by a mere notification creates serious 
obstacles to the development of new alternatives for exploration and communication on the 
Internet, dampened by fear of future claims that could be filed if notifications requiring the 
removal of contents are not "immediately" complied with.  
A fourth important point relates to judicial analysis of cases that could provide greater legal 
certainty for business developed on the Internet. If, for fear of liability, providers end up taking 
down massive amounts of content, the immediate result is a reduction in the number of cases on 
which the Judiciary could act to draw the limits of expression in the Internet. This could relegate 
                                                 
18 STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.2012. 
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the establishment of mechanism for content removal to private parties, resulting in processes that 
might not be in accordance with judicial standards for expression in other media, for instance. 
A notice and takedown regime that renders the provider liable for not taking down certain 
content after being notified creates two alternatives equally detrimental to the diversity of the 
discourse on the network. Either the provider takes down the content as soon as it receives the 
notification and thus gives rise to the whole range of abuses stemming from the ease of removing 
content that may be harmful to others (with strong impact on freedom of speech, of press), or the 
provider fights to maintain the content online, understanding that it has no reason to be removed 
and thus assuming the risk of being held legally responsible for that very content. This situation 
creates little incentive to protect freedom of expression for all providers and creates a strong 
disincentive for small providers that cannot bear the burden of mass litigation.  
Therefore, even if the application of liability based on fault offers superior results to that 
obtained by imposing strict liability, one must realize that to affirm liability arising from the 
failure to comply with a notification has a number of negative implications for the way in which 
the Internet operates. Thus, this system needs to give way to liability rooted in compliance with 
Court decisions, such as that provided by the Marco Civil.  
D. The Special Case of "Search Providers"  
Before dealing with the liability regime provided by the Marco Civil itself, it is worth noting that 
the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) has given different treatment with regards to liability to so-
called "search providers" than to other services and applications, such as social networking and 
webhosting. According to recent decisions by the STJ, when acting as a simple search engine 
Google will not be held liable for the content displayed as search results.  
The most famous case that affirms this understanding is a case involving the actress and TV host 
Xuxa Meneghel, which sought to compel Google to remove from the engine all results for the 
search term “pedophile xuxa” or even other result involving the name of the Plaintiff, partially or 
fully written, regardless of spelling, in connection to any criminal act."19 
The motivation for the lawsuit was the widespread availability on the Internet of an early 80s 
movie called “Love Strange Love” (“Amor Estranho Amor”),20 in which the actress is featured 
in two scenes having intimate relations with a 12-year old boy. Much of the actress’ concern is 
due to the fact that, shortly after the movie was released, she began a career on TV hosting a 
show focused on kids and teenagers. The availability of such material online could hamper the 
image she has created in recent decades.  
The STJ decided in favor of Google in this lawsuit. The decision is grounded in the relevance of 
search providers (part of the “application providers” category, in the language of Law nr. 
12695/14) in indexing the information found on the Internet. According to the leading vote of 
Justice Nancy Andrighi:  
“Search providers perform their searches within a virtual universe, whose access is public 
and unrestricted, ie, its role is limited to the identification of web pages where certain 
                                                 
19 STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.12. 
20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Love_Strange_Love  
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data or information, even if illegal, are being freely made available. Thus, although the 
search engine facilitate access and the consequent dissemination of pages whose content 
is potentially illegal, these pages are public as parts of the world wide web and therefore 
appear as results of the research sites.”21 
As a consequence of the role played by search providers on the Internet, they can not be required 
to overturn the indexing mechanism for addressing third parties’ pages; this would unduly 
interfere with the legitimate collective interests, such as access to information. According to the 
judgment:  
“Search providers should not be required to remove from their system the results derived 
from the search term or expression, nor the results that point to a specific photo or text, 
regardless of the indication of the URL of the page where it is inserted.  
It is not advisable, for the purposes of hindering the spread of illegal or offensive content 
on the web, to suppress the right to information. Balancing the rights involved and the 
potential risk of violation of each of them, the odds should favor the guarantee of 
freedom of information, as set forth in Art. 220, § 1, of the Constitution, especially 
considering that the Internet is today an important vehicle of mass media.”22 
Therefore, the decision from STJ indicates that the victim should seek to prosecute whoever is 
responsible for the damage, such as the person who actually published the illegal content, and 
refrain from prosecuting the search provider that only indexes the information freely found on 
the web.  
“If the conditions for the exclusion of a certain webpage are found, under the allegation 
of unlawful or offensive content - notably the identification of the URL of this page - the 
victim will lack interest to act against the search provider. If the victim identified though 
the URL the author of the illegal act, it has no reason to sue the one who merely 
facilitates access to this act, which has been so far publicly available on the network.”23 
Two comments seem especially relevant on cases involving search providers in the STJ. The first 
concerns to the difference in treatment accorded to the search engines compared to the liability 
regime typically adopted for social networks and video hosting sites. There are Court decisions 
that not only require providers to indemnify the content, but which also require these 
intermediaries to remove content in accordance with specific instructions from the Plaintiffs, 
creating a permanent channel for the exclusion of content based on the requirements authorized 
by the Court when a request is made.  
The STJ, in tackling the case of the search provider, explicitly rejected this possibility, as 
mentioned in the previous judgment by the Court of Appeals of the State of Rio de Janeiro 
(TJRJ). As the vote of Justice Nancy Andrighi details:  
"Finally, it is important to assess the feasibility of the solution adopted by TJRJ, creating 
a process for removal of a certain content, previously indicated by the victim.  
                                                 
21 STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.2012. 
22 STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.2012. 
23 STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.2012. 
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This form of restriction, if applicable, should always arise out from a judicial order, as it 
would be impossible for a simple extrajudicial notification to achieve such result. To 
have this process conducted through private notifications would end up delegating the 
judgment about the offensive potential of a given text or image to the discretion of the 
victim or the provider.  
At the same time, there are precedents from this Court involving similar cases - liability 
for the content of offensive messages on social networks – in which we have decided, in 
general terms, that "once notified that a certain text or image is unlawful, the provider 
must act energetically to remove the material immediately. Failing to do so would render 
the provider jointly liable with the direct offender" (Resp 1.186.616/MG, DJE 
31.08.2011. In the same direction, see: REsp 1.193.764/SP, DJE of 08.08.2011).  
In the specific case of social networks, the intermediary itself provides a system for 
complaints on its own platform, allowing users to report unlawful or offensive content. 
The respective term of use gives the provider the right to remove any page or content that 
is in breach of the Term of Service. 
Therefore there is a special agreement, which authorizes the provider to exercise a 
discretionary judgment, a circumstance that is absent in search engines. The use of such 
applications does not even require registration. It is essential, therefore, that the request 
for exclusion from the search results of a particular text or image is made in Court. "24 
The second comment relates to the targeting by the victim of a specific search provider, instead 
of others that could be used to find the exact same content. In this case, the market share of 
Google results in a situation in which the company finds itself as the defendant in the 
overwhelming majority of the lawsuits against search providers.  
This dilemma is no stranger to the STJ. Recent decisions highlighted the paradox and limitations 
of civil liability regimes when applied to the Internet. According to the vote of Justice Nancy 
Andrighi in Special Appeal No 1407271/SP:  
"...It must be noticed that [the victim] acted exclusively against Google when the video 
can be found through the use of several other search engines. Consulting CADÊ and 
BING sites, for example, held by MICROSOFT and YAHOO companies respectively, 
we have been able to find more than 100,000 results for the same term."25 
Would the victim then be obliged to file a suit against all, or at least against the most relevant 
search providers to show the seriousness of his/her complaints? If this seems a strange 
requirement to protect one's rights to reputation, image, and privacy, it shows how lawsuits 
against search providers may not serve the best interest of the victim. It is increasingly difficult 
to achieve the total removal of harmful material, especially in the current stage of technological 
progress, with the constant emergence of new ways to share pictures, videos, and text from 
mobile devices and the large availability of ways to play, download, store, and encrypt content.  
                                                 
24 STJ, Resp 1316921/RJ, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 26.06.2012. 
25 STJ, Resp 1407271/SP, Justice Nancy Andrighi; 21.11.2013. 
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IV. The Civil Liability of Online Intermediaries in the 
Marco Civil  
Law nr. 12965/2014 seeks to establish "principles, guarantees, rights and obligations for the use 
of the Internet in Brazil" according to its first article. This Law is the result of a pioneer 
initiative, led by the Brazilian government, to use the Internet as a pool for consultation on the 
actual content of forthcoming legislation. Even before arriving in the National Congress, during 
the online debate phase of the initiative the issue of intermediary liability was one of the most 
debated topics, along with net neutrality and data protection.  
The so-called Marco Civil (or “Brazilian Internet Bill of Rights”) was the first experience in 
Brazil with the use the Internet as a way to broaden the discussion of a Draft Bill of Law, 
ensuring that a much more significant number of participants could get involved in the debate of 
the legislation.  
Specifically concerning the civil liability regime for intermediaries, Law nr. 12965/14 provides 
two different treatments depending whether the intermediary falls into the category of 
connection/access provider or application provider.  
A.  Access Providers 
Holding the access provider liable for the acts of its users is a practice that has been rejected by 
national and international Courts since the late nineties.26 There are two common arguments for 
recognizing the non-liability of connection providers for the damages caused by third parties that 
are simply using their services to connect to the Internet.  
The first argument lies in the technical impossibility on the part of providers to avoid harmful 
behavior by its users. It is noteworthy that this preventive conduct by connection providers is not 
only impossible but also undesirable, since it would lead inevitably to an increase in mass 
surveillance practices of controversial legality.  
The second argument transcends the technological aspect by focusing on the rupture of any 
nexus (“nexo causal”) between the damage caused to a third party and the act of simply 
providing network access to a user. The simple Internet connection does not seem to be the direct 
and immediate cause of the damage suffered by a victim, rather the damage is caused by the 
behavior specifically played out by the user that generated the illegal content.  
Law nr. 12965/14 echoes such arguments in Article 18, as it exempts connection providers from 
liability for the actions of its users:  
Article 18. The provider of connection to Internet shall not be held liable for civil 
damages resulting from content generated by third parties.  
It is important to mention that the exemption set forth in Article 18 only applies to cases in which 
the provider would be held liable for third party conduct. Connection providers are still liable for 
the damages they cause directly through their own activities, as shown by a large pool of cases 
decided in the national Courts. Among the cases involving the liability of connection providers 
                                                 
26 See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc, 21.11.1995. In Brazil, among 
many decisons, see: TJRS, Ap. Civ. n° 70001582444, Judge Antônio Correa Palmeiro da Fontoura, 29.05.2002. 
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are situations involving damage to their own users, such as the failure to provide services dully 
contracted by their users or in the different conditions than the ones previously established by 
either contract or the relevant sectoral regulations.  
B. Application Providers  
The liability of application providers is provided in the Article 19 of the Marco Civil in the 
following terms:  
Art. 19.  In order to ensure freedom of expression and to prevent censorship, the provider 
of Internet applications can only be subject to civil liability for damages resulting from 
content generated by third parties if, after an specific Court order, it does not take any 
steps to, within the framework of their service and within the time stated in the order, 
make unavailable the content that was identified as being unlawful, unless otherwise 
provided by law. 
§ 1. The referred Court order must include, under penalty of being null, clear 
identification of the specific content identified as infringing, allowing the unquestionable 
location of the material. 
§ 2. The implementation of the provisions of this article for infringement of copyright or 
related rights is subject to a specific legal provision, which must respect freedom of 
speech and other guarantees provided for in art. 5o of the Federal Constitution. 
§ 3. The compensation disputes for damages arising from content made available on the 
Internet related to the honor, reputation or personality rights, as well as the removal of 
related contents by Internet application providers, can be presented to special small 
causes Courts. 
§ 4. The judge, including within the proceeding set forth in § 3º, can anticipate, partially 
or in full, the effects of the request contained in the initial petition, to the extent that 
undisputable proof exists of the fact, considering society’s collective interest in the 
availability of the content on the Internet, as long as the requisites of truthiness of the 
author’s claims, the reasonable concern of irreparable damage, or damage that is difficult 
to repair are met. 
As previously mentioned, the Marco Civil affirms that the general rule for intermediary liability 
in Brazil is based on the fault of the provider, denying the attempts to hold them liable in typical 
strict liability standards, either by the simple availability of harmful content based on the risk 
theory or based on the rendering of a defective service.  
At the same time that the Marco Civil evades strict liability, the approach it provides for liability 
based on fault is quite different from the usual liability arising out from the simple lack of action 
after being notified that damages are being caused by the availability a certain material.  
Here lies perhaps one of the most heated controversies of the Law: the Marco Civil provides that 
intermediaries are only held liable if they fail to fulfill a Court order requesting the removal of 
content. 
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One of the most frequent criticisms of this provision is that the Marco Civil only allows content 
to be removed by a Court order. This is not the best interpretation of the mentioned provision.  
What the Marco Civil sets forth is a safeguard for application providers in the sense that they 
will only be held liable if they do not comply with a Court order requesting the removal of the 
offensive material. This provision does not prevent intermediaries from determining their own 
requirements for removing content once notified by the alleged victims of damages arising out 
from materials made available through their platforms.  
The Marco Civil gives freedom of expression high importance in this debate, guaranteeing to the 
providers an immunity that neutralizes any concern that they would have of being held liable for 
a lack of content removal once notified.  
As mentioned by André Zonaro Giacchetta, analyzing the text while on debate in the National 
Congress:  
"The text of the Draft Bill clearly favors the guarantee of the rights of Internet users, 
instead of restricting their liberties. This is a standard created for the user in good faith. 
There is a clear choice for ensuring freedom of thought and expression, as well as the 
privacy of Internet users and the protection of personal data."27 
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the solution provided by Law nr. 12965/14 does not 
necessarily oblige the victim to file a lawsuit in order to have the content removed. Such removal 
will depend on the terms of service of the website, the nature of the infringing content, the 
persuasive language of the notification in evidencing the damages caused by the same material 
and etc. However, the Marco Civil directs the settlement of any dispute between the victim and 
the provider to the Judiciary, as it recognizes Judiciary Power as precisely the legitimate 
authority to solve the controversy.  
1. Judicialization and Its Effects  
The Marco Civil fosters the understanding that an intermediary should not be compelled to 
remove content simply because a notification has been received. The provision of Article 19, as 
mentioned above, creates incentives for the claim to be brought to the Judiciary.28  
One recurrent argument in this regard is the fact that the speed in which contents might be copied 
and shared through the Internet is not compatible with the time it takes for a lawsuit to be 
brought to the Judiciary. At the same time, it is important to stress that the Marco Civil expressly 
provides that a judge may order the removal by granting the victim an injunction in cases when it 
seems clear that the delay in taking the content down would worsen the victim’s situation.29 
In order to make this solution easier and faster for the victim of certain damages, the Marco Civil 
states that such cases can be brought to the Special Small Claims Courts. The provision in the 
                                                 
27 André Zonaro Giacchetta. “A Responsabilidade Civil dos Provedores de Serviços de Internet e o Anteprojeto de 
Reforma da Lei n 9610/98 (“Lei de Direitos Autorais”)”, In Revista da Associação Brasileira da Propriedade 
Intelectual, n. 117 (mar-abr/2012); p. 39. 
28 See Marcelo Thompson. “The Insensitive Internet – Brazil and the Judicialization of Pain“ 
(http://www.iposgoode.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Marcelo-Thompson-The-Insensitive-Internet-Final.pdf).  
29 See Marcel Leonardi. Responsabilidade Civil dos Provedores de Serviços na Internet. Brasília: Juarez de Oliveira; 
p.207. 
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third paragraph of Article 19 makes reference to cases of “compensation disputes for damages 
arising from content made available on the Internet related to the honor, reputation or personality 
rights, as well as the removal of related contents by Internet application providers.” 
The balance that the Marco Civil tries to achieve aims at accommodating all interests involved, 
protecting freedom of expression by clearly defining the role of the provider and ensuring that 
they must play a prominent role in the prevention and elimination of damage, while avoiding 
arbitrary judgments or fear of future liability. 
If the situation is brought to a Court, the Marco Civil recognizes the Judiciary as the most 
appropriate forum for the resolution of such cases. At the same time, an interesting side effect of 
the Marco Civil is that it fosters capacity building of judges on the evolution of modern 
technologies for information and communication, as such knowledge is crucial to the exercise of 
their functions.  
In affirming that application providers must only be held liable in cases in which fault is found, 
and not by simply failing to comply with a notification, the Marco Civil separates itself from the 
case law that has been created in the last decade in Brazil, especially by the Superior Court of 
Justice. 
2. Two Exceptions to the Liability Regime  
Law nr. 12965/14 has two important exceptions to the general liability regime, as described in 
the article 19: copyright infringement, as provided by the second paragraph of the article, and 
cases of so-called "revenge porn," provided by Article 21.  
For both cases the general rule that intermediaries may only be held liable if they fail to comply 
with a Court order demanding the removal of the content is not applicable. These two situations, 
for very different reasons, can trigger the liability of the provider if it is notified and fails to 
remove a specific content.  
i. Copyright  
The exception concerning copyright was due to a continuous demand, especially by radio and 
television broadcasters, for the Marco Civil not to change the established practice of sending out 
notifications for the removal of copyrighted material made available without proper 
authorization or in circumstances not protected by the exceptions and limitations regime as set 
forth by the Copyright Act (Law 9.610/98). Brazilian Courts have recognized several times the 
liability of the application provider when, once notified, it fails to remove the content.  
An additional circumstance that explains why such an exception was inserted in the review 
process of the original text of the Marco Civil in the National Congress was the fact that the 
Federal Government, through the Ministry of Culture, has been developing in recent years a 
process of consultations for the reform of the Copyright Act, dealing with topics such as liability 
for copyright infringements carried out online.  
In this regard, the removal of further considerations on liability through copyright infringement 
would prevent the existence of two different regimes for the very same issue in Brazil: the one in 
the Marco Civil and the other as provided by an eventual reform of the Copyright Act.  
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It is worth noting that the Marco Civil has not simply deferred the treatment of such matters to 
the Copyright Act. The second paragraph of Article 19 of Law No. 12965/14 states that the 
regulation of online copyright infringement should be tackled by the Copyright Act, but at the 
same time it states that treatment under this Act should "respect freedom of speech and other 
guarantees provided for in Article 5 of the Federal Constitution." 
The final part of this provision is quite revealing since one of the guidelines of the reform of the 
Copyright Act is to achieve a better balance between Copyright and other fundamental rights, 
such as access to knowledge and freedom of expression, and at the same time preventive abusive 
conduct in copyright enforcement. In this sense the Marco Civil advances some of the concerns 
of the Copyright Act reform, as envisioned by the Ministry of Culture, already providing an 
interpretive clause for whichever solution is adopted in the reform of the specific law.  
ii.  Revenge Porn  
The second exception to the rule in Article 19 of the Marco Civil is the provision of Article 21 
for cases of so-called "revenge porn"30 materials.  
The provision was inserted in one of the last rounds of editing on the text of the Bill and it was 
clearly motivated by the suicide of two Brazilian girls after intimate adult videos end up being 
shared through Whatsapp. A number of Congressmen have referred to this case as the trigger for 
creating an exception to the general rule on intermediaries’ liability.  
Art. 21. The Internet application provider that makes third party generated content 
available shall be held liable for the breach of privacy arising from the disclosure of 
images, videos and other materials containing nudity or sexual activities of a private 
nature, without the authorization of the participants, when, after receipt of notice by the 
participant or his/hers legal representative, refrains from removing, in a diligent manner, 
within its own technical limitations, such content. 
Sole Paragraph. The notice set forth above must contain sufficient elements that allow the 
specific identification of the material said to violate the right to privacy of the participant-
user and the confirmation of the legitimacy of the party presenting the request.  
Article 21 creates a different liability regime from the general rule of Article 19 for the cases in 
which the application provider fails to remove materials that fall into the category presented 
above. It is important to highlight that the final part of the provision makes this exceptional 
liability conditional on evidence that the provider(s) have not acted in a diligent manner. This 
condition – together with the addition of the expression “within its own technical limitations” – 
could provide an opportunity for discussion in the forthcoming lawsuits on what the standards 
should be for how providers should act when they are given notice that intimate material, such as 
the ones targeted by this provision, has been made available through their applications.31 
V. Conclusion  
After more than a decade of case law on the liability of online intermediaries, the enactment of 
Law nr. 12965/14 tries to balance all relevant interests in the development of several online 
                                                 
30 http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pornografia_de_vingan%C3%A7a. 
31 See STJ, Resp nº 1306157/SP, Justice Luis Felipe Salomão, 17.12.2013. 
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activities. The so-called “Marco Civil da Internet” has, since its origin, been intended to establish 
a human rights oriented perspective for the regulation of the Internet in Brazil.  
Whether such balance has been achieved is a debate that still depends on how Brazilian Courts 
will interpret its provisions, enforce fundamental rights such as privacy, data protection, and 
freedom of expression, all in connection with the need to respect such rights and – at the same 
time – create a fruitful environment for innovation and development online. 
Such an initiative is not entirely comprehended without knowledge of international and domestic 
politics around the negotiation of some of its most relevant provisions. In this case, the fallout 
from the Snowden revelations and a presidential election campaign had a great impact on how 
the text of the Marco Civil came to be. 
In regards to the intermediary liability provisions, the addition of two exceptions – for copyright 
and revenge porn – during the last year of negotiations in the National Congress offers a glimpse 
of how different stakeholders have organized themselves for the protection of their respective 
interests in this piece of regulation. 
As Brazil bridges the digital divide, the Marco Civil will serve as umbrella legislation, setting the 
principles for future regulation on matters concerning the Internet. As more and more people, 
especially from the peripheries of Brazil, connect to the network, it will be interesting to follow 
up on how practices and behaviors change.  
The influx of Brazilian users in platforms intended for global usage, such as Google’s Orkut, has 
not only resulted in very innovative uses by Brazilians, but also a significant opportunity for 
balancing different interests in Internet regulation. The immense pool of judicial decisions on 
damages caused by Orkut’s users is a complex and not entirely explored body of research 
material.  
Hopefully this report has covered the most relevant judicial decisions concerning online 
intermediary liability in Brazil and can serve as a guide to navigate the intriguing future of a 
country which, after a decade of debate, has finally enacted a human rights oriented piece of 
legislation that aims to promote the values that are inherent in the current stage of Internet 
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1 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 









Abstract: This paper discusses the instability of the Thai government and society, 
and how this affects the implementation and creation of laws and policies relevant 
to online intermediaries. It addresses related laws and cases, along with primary 
survey data from online intermediaries. The 7-year-old computer crime law, the 
centerpiece of intermediary liability provisions, does not make the distinction 
between different types of intermediaries – those that deal directly with content as 
opposed to those that are merely conduits for content. Additionally, while only 
one case has been prosecuted so far in association with the controversial lèse 
majesté law, there has been a visible chilling effect on Internet operators as a 
result of this law, substantiated by primary research. Although most surveyed 
intermediaries tend to accept the burden imposed by the provision, some members 
of this group – together with online activists – are mobilizing in support of an 
amendment to the computer crime law, particularly with respect to the 
differentiation of types of intermediaries, the proportionality of penalties to the 
offence, and the tendency of government agencies to ask for “cooperation” from 
intermediaries in monitoring Internet content. Under the current interim 
government, which was installed under a military coup, intermediaries are 
compelled to carry out more censorship and surveillance, while also passing on 
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Online intermediary liability is an emerging area for Internet studies in general and challenging 
terrain for research in Thailand, a country beset by chronic political instability and a media 
policy process uniquely rooted in the country’s political and economic circumstances. To attempt 
to provide a comprehensive understanding of intermediary liability in such a setting, this paper 
will delve into the background context surrounding online intermediaries, review key 
intermediary liability provisions together with relevant legal experiences, and provide empirical 
data from a first-hand survey of how different groups of online intermediaries in Thailand are 
coping with the liability scheme, and the consequences thereof.  
II. Background Context  
This section explores the political context, social developments, regimes of Internet content 
regulation, and the nature of Internet control related to online intermediaries before and after the 
2014 coup.  
A. Political Context 
Thailand is a country located in Southeast Asia, with a population of 67.44 million. Since 1932, 
the country has been governed by a constitutional monarchy. Democratic rule and general 
elections have been interspersed with military dictatorships and coups. The last coup, the 
sixteenth to date, was staged on May 22nd, 2014 by a military junta known as the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), following months of protests against the civilian 
government of the populist Pheu Thai Party due to allegations of corruption and attempts to pass 
an amnesty law2 that would provide blanket protection for wrongdoers in past political conflicts. 
Since November 2013, anti-government forces led by the so-called People Democratic Reform 
Committee (PDRC), composed of opposition politicians, urban elites, sympathizers of the 
palace, and conservative academics, as well as millions of supporters mainly from Bangkok and 
the Southern provinces, have staged rallies at major thoroughfares in the capital city, seizing the 
Government House and paralyzing many government offices. Their demand was the reform of 
Thai politics by removing the influence of the so-called Thaksin regime. Thaksin Shinawatra3 is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The final draft of the bill, passed by the House of Parliament at unusual hour (4 a.m.) on October 31, 2013, would 
have pardoned protesters involved in various incidents of political unrest since 2004, dismissed corruption 
convictions of powerful politicians and annulled the murder charges against past national leaders that might have 
been responsible for the deaths of protesters in anti-government rallies. 
3 Thaksin Shinawatra, founder of the deposed Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, was a famous telecommunications 
tycoon, having made his fortune from satellite and mobile phone concessions through his family business, Shin 
Corporation. Thaksin is also a popular political leader who led the longest democratic and civilian rule – six years – 
in contemporary Thai history. Thaksin’s popularity was largely attributed to populist policies that featured income 
redistribution, cheap health care, microcredit schemes, and many policy innovations in support of globalization and 
neoliberal economy. However, he is not well liked by a large number of urban or middle-class voters who are 
repulsed by his arrogance, authoritarian tendencies, and policy discrepancy that benefit only his cronies. He was also 
widely accused of disloyalty to the crown, an accusation that was largely used as a justification for the September 
19, 2006 coup. Even after he was deposed, Thaksin continued to be an influential figure in Thai politics. He 
reportedly masterminded several revolts including the red-shirt protest in 2010 which led to a House dissolution 
under then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and a violent clash with the armed forces that led to more than 90 in 
casualties, both military and civilian. 
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a former Thai leader who was ousted in another coup in 2006. He is also the older brother of then 
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, who led the Pheu Thai Party to an election’s victory in 
2011 and had been running the country’s administration ever since. 
After sustained protests, Yingluck dissolved parliament in December 2013 and called an 
election. However, opposition MPs from the Democrat Party, which formed the core of the 
PDRC, led mass movements to boycott the elections, which were eventually nullified by the 
Election Commission on grounds of inadequate participation. Nevertheless, the protesters, led by 
the PDRC, vowed to continue demonstrating, claiming that her brother, ousted leader Thaksin 
Shinawatra, controlled the Yingluck government and that Yingluck lacked legitimacy to rule due 
to many charges of corruption. As a result of the House dissolution, the Yingluck administration 
became a caretaker government. 
Meanwhile, Yingluck and members of the Cabinet were investigated by an anti-graft body and 
faced trial for a policy discrepancy related to the controversial rice mortgage scheme and abuse 
of power. In early May 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that Yingluck had acted illegally 
when she transferred her national security chief, and ordered her and nine other cabinet members 
to step down, resulting in the Commerce Minister being reinstated as acting Prime Minister and 
creating a political void. Many viewed the verdict as a judicial intervention. 
Amidst this impasse, the Army chief stepped in to resolve the situation by organizing talks 
between the different conflicting factions. The talk ended in another deadlock, prompting the 
army chief, who later became leader of the NCPO, to announce a seizure of power. It merits 
observation that the coup was announced a few days after the enforcement of martial law to curb 
sporadic violence in the capital city. 
To many, the bloodless coup in May was welcomed and seen as inevitable to end the stalemate 
between the conflicting factions, as well as the rising violence that accompanied the political 
conflict in many rally venues. Notably, the political conflict in Thailand in the last decade was 
often dubbed “color-coded politics” to describe the ideological clash between the yellow-shirts4 
and the red-shirts,5 who represent two opposing poles in the contemporary political divide. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The “yellow-shirts” is another name for the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a mass movement preceding 
the September 2006 coup that ousted Thaksin from the premiership. The PAD spent much of 2008 protesting against 
two successive Thaksin-nominated governments that arose from the December 2007 election. The PAD’s 190-day 
protest in 2008 was marked by the seizure of the Government House and the Suvarnabhumi International Airport in 
Bangkok. In 2009, leaders of the PAD entered electoral politics by establishing the New Politics Party. One of the 
PAD’s leaders, Sonthi Limthongkul, is a media mogul who has been instrumental in using his media corporation 
particularly a satellite television station called ASTV as a main tool to galvanize mass movements in support of the 
PAD. After the 2017 coup in May, ASTV was banned from airing signals. 
5 The “red shirts” is the informal name for the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), a major 
political organization in the post-coup period. Members of the UDD are known for wearing red clothes during anti-
government protests. Established in 2006 as Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship (DAAD), the main objective 
of the red shirts then was to fight against its arch rival -- the PAD -- and to support the ousted former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra. Supporters of the UDD are not only rural grassroots people who benefited from Thaksin’s 
populist welfare policy, but also include the urban middle class who admire Thaksin’s business-oriented 
administrative policy and action, and those who disapproved of the status quo that formed the core of the yellow-
shirts. 
! 3!
Media – big and small, online and offline – have been used to propagate and widen this political 
polarization, sometimes resorting to hate speech. 
After the coup, a series of coup notifications were released to the public, including about a dozen 
that put tight controls on communication, including online social media. Internet service 
operators were summoned to meet with the junta, who requested cooperation in reporting and 
dissemination of junta information, and barred these operators from instigating unrest and 
criticism of the junta and their work. There was also a brief period of inaccessibility to Facebook, 
which was suspected to be coup-related, although the NCPO denied any involvement 
B. Social Development Related to Online Intermediaries 
In terms of Internet statistics, there are 23.8 million Internet users in Thailand, representing 35% 
of the population.6 Mobile telephone users are numbered at around 120 million, based on the 
number of SIM cards distributed.7 Around 40% of mobile users access the Internet via their 
smart phones, which most use to view online social media like Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter.8 Bangkok has been ranked as the capital city with the highest number of Facebook users 
in the world.9 Meanwhile, “LINE,” a mobile chat app that was developed by Japan-based LINE 
Corporation, is also extremely popular in Thailand. The country has the most LINE users of any 
country outside of Japan, with 61.1% of social media users – about 18 million – said to be using 
the application.10  
Online intermediaries play a critical role in social development in Thailand, particularly in the 
protracted political conflict that the country has been embroiled in since 2005. In the latest 
political crisis that has developed since October 2013, social media became a key online channel 
for people to keep abreast of the current political climate, as well as to mobilize resources in 
support – as well as in defiance – of the protest movements.  
During the seven month-long protest against the popular but polarizing government of Yingluck 
Shinawatra, online media usage across services like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LINE, and 
Pantip.com (a popular online discussion form) in Thailand was very dynamic. In the first month 
after the protest began, for instance, Twitter was found to be the most used social media channel 
for protesting the controversial draft amnesty bill – the catalyst of the lengthy protest – with over 
800,000 messages sent in one peak day in November 2013. 
C. Regime of Internet Content Regulation 
As for Internet regulation in Thailand, a number of entities are involved. The Ministry of 
Information and Communication Technology (MICT), established in 2002, is the central 
organization that implements the Computer-related Offences Act B.E. 2550 (2007), better known 
as the computer crime law, along with the Technological Crime Suppression Division (TCSD) of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 2014 Asia-Pacific digital overview from http://wearesocial.sg/ 
7 Survey of Thailand’s communications market 2012-2013, Center for Telecommunications Economy Data and 
Research, National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission. 






the Office of National Police. The National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission 
(NBTC) regulates licenses for Internet services and International Internet Gateways. Therefore, 
all Internet service providers report to the NBTC under licensing obligations, while also being 
subject to the MICT’s Internet content filtering scheme. 
Apart from prosecuting offences under the computer crime law, the MICT has also conducted 
constant surveillance and censorship of online content through specially recruited cyber-scouts 
and URL blocking via ISPs. Since the arrival of the computer crime law in 2007, court orders to 
block Internet content have increased from two URLs in 2007 to over 74,000 in 2012.11 
Examples of content targeted for filtering include lèse majesté or defamation of the royal family, 
drug trafficking, gambling, and prostitution, which are not necessarily offences as stipulated in 
Section 14 of the computer crime law that addresses content offences.12  
According to a report published by iLaw, an online rights-based NGO, most of the offences 
prosecuted under the computer crime law are content-related.13 Since the law came into effect in 
2007, both the number of cases prosecuted and the number of websites that have had access 
blocked have increased, which coincided with the looming political conflict and polarization that 
has characterized Thai society in recent years. Cases involving lèse majesté, which is a serious 
crime in Thailand, were also on the rise in both online and offline communications during this 
period. 
D. Internet Control in Pre- and Post-2014 Coup 
During the highly volatile period under the Yingluck administration, the TCSD was pro-active in 
policing websites and online social media. In one instance in August 2013, the TCSD reportedly 
attempted to probe the conversations and comments posted on the highly popular social-media 
application, ‘Line’, to see if they violated the law or threatened national security. This incident 
was preceded by the summoning of four suspects for allegedly breaching Section 14 of the 
computer crime law and Section 116 of the Criminal Code by posting messages via social media, 
saying they anticipated a coup and urged people to stock up on food and water. These statements, 
according to the TCSD chief, could put people in a state of panic, and those who "liked" or 
"shared" the messages could be considered violators of the law as well. An open letter of 
opposition from four professional media organizations and an online rights-based group met the 
TCSD’s action. Meanwhile, the National Human Rights Commission also issued a statement 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Suksri, Sawatree, et al., Situational Report on Control and Censorship of Online Media through 
the Use of Laws and the Imposition of Thai State Policies (Bangkok: iLaw and Heinrich Böll Foundation Southeast 
Asia, 2010). 
12 Section 14 of the law provides for imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine of up to 100,000 baht 
(approximately US $3,000) for these content-related offences. These offences are referred to as “import into a 
computer system,” of the following: 1) false data in a manner likely to cause damage to a third party or the public; 2) 
false data in a manner likely to damage national security or to cause public panic; 3) data constituting an offence 
against national security under the Criminal Code; and 4) pornographic data that is publicly accessible. The 
dissemination or forwarding of computer data in the nature under 1), 2), 3), and 4) are also offences and subject to 
the same criminality. 
13 Suksri, Sawatree, et al., Situational Report on Control and Censorship of Online Media, p. 5. 
! 5!
warning police to exercise their authority carefully and not violate people's fundamental rights 
and freedoms.14 
Since the coup on May 22nd, 2014 that toppled the Yingluck government and ended the months-
long political crisis, the surprisingly popular junta known as the National Council for Peace and 
Order (NCPO) has taken steps to restrict the spread of anti-coup sentiment. First, an order known 
as the NCPO Announcement was released on the day of the coup that called on ISPs to monitor 
and deter the publication of online information that might incite unrest in the country.  
Then, another order was launched that summoned all 105 local ISPs to meet with the junta-
appointed Cyber Security Operation Center (CSOC), in addition to representatives from major 
online intermediary services in the country, including Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
Instagram, and LINE, to discuss “cooperation” on the issue. That meeting, however, did not 
materialize as the invited companies failed to show up. Another scheduled trip to Singapore of 
the CSOC staff to meet with Facebook, Google, and LINE was also called off after it was 
deemed unnecessary. 
Notably, Facebook was the first social media platform to experience blocking on May 28th, when 
it was inaccessible for about one hour. The outage was initially blamed on technical issues at the 
country’s gateway, but an MICT spokesperson later said that the action was intended to stop the 
spread of anti-coup messages. A Norwegian telecom firm, Telenor, which owns majority shares 
in the country’s second largest GSM mobile phone provider, later confirmed this.  
III. Laws, Past Prosecution, and Recommendations for 
Change 
This section reviews relevant legislations and measures that contain provision(s) related to online 
intermediary liability; a case study on intermediary liability prosecution; and recommendations 
by a key civil society stakeholder on ways to alleviate the impacts from Internet Thailand’s 
intermediary liability scheme. 
A. Computer-Related Offences Act B.E. 2550 (2007) 
This law (better known as the computer crime law), the first of its kind in Thailand, was enacted 
in 2007 by the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), an interim legislature that was installed by 
the military junta in the aftermath of the 2006 military coup that toppled the civilian government 
of Thaksin Shinawatra. Although there had been many versions of the draft law before, its 
passage immediately after the coup was seen by many as a direct effort to curb online dissent 
that formed largely in cyberspace since the conventional media sector – print and broadcasting – 
was tightly controlled by the coup-leaders. 
Apart from sections that address crimes to computer systems, such as hacking, viruses, and 
electronic sabotage, the law also has specific provisions that address content offences. Section 14 
of the law provides for imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine of up to 100,000 baht 
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14 Puengnetr, Pakorn, Asina Pornwasin, Chanikarn Phumhiran The Nation August 13, and 2013 1:00 Am. “Police 
Seek to Check Line Posts.” The Nation. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Police-seek-to-check-Line-posts-
30212462.html. 
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(approximately US $3,000) for these content-related offences. These offences are referred to as 
“import into a computer system,” of the following: 1) false data in a manner likely to cause 
damage to a third party or the public; 2) false data in a manner likely to damage national security 
or to cause public panic; 3) data constituting an offence against national security under the 
Criminal Code; and 4) pornographic data that is publicly accessible. The dissemination or 
forwarding of computer data under items 1-4 are also offences and subject to the same 
criminality.15  
Section 15 of the law is the centerpiece of the intermediary liability provision. It states that, “A 
service provider who intentionally supports or gives consent to the commission of the offences 
under section 14 to a computer system under his control shall be liable to the same criminality as 
the offender under section 14.”16 
While the two sections in the law deal exclusively with content offences, they do not make any 
distinction between the different types of intermediaries – those that deal directly with content – 
online service providers – and those that are merely conduits for the content – network and 
access providers. In other words, all online intermediaries are subject to the same liability for 
offences they do not commit, but take place within the network or communication space 
provided by them.  
In a related vein, critics have also attacked the lack of clarity in the definition and 
implementation of the law.17 Usually a public law would entail the subsequent issuance of a 
ministerial order that would provide more detail about how the law may be enforced. For 
instance, a ministerial order on the computer crime law might spell out what constitutes false 
information, or what the categories of information constitute causing harm to national security, 
or the reasonable period of time that an intermediary is provided to remove illegal content after 
having been given a notice before being considered negligent or giving consent to the offence. 
Unfortunately, such a ministerial order does not exist in this situation. 
Since the law came into effect, a few tangible impacts can be observed: the legalization of 
Internet blocking, indirect regulation via intermediary providers, and self-censorship of online 
content providers. Based on primary research findings,18 online intermediaries of all types have 
set up new measures to regulate content and, in the process, are passing regulatory constraints 
onto users. These measures include the following:  
• Keeping a log file of Internet traffic, including users’ IP addresses, for 90 days; 
• Identification and certification clearance requirements for users at institutional servers 
and for subscribers to online discussion forums; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Translation of the Computer-Related Offenses Act, Vol. 124, Section 27 KOR, Royal Gazette. 18 June 2007, p. 7. 
Available at http://www.itac.co.th/index.php?option=com_content & view 
=article & id=90. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Sinfah Tunsarawuth and Toby Mendel, Analysis of the Computer Crime Act of Thailand , http://www.law-
democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10.05.Thai_.Computer-Act-Analysis.pdf . 
18 See more in Pirongrong Ramasoota. Internet Politics in Thailand after the 2006 Coup: Regulation by Code and a 
Contested Ideological Terrain. In Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), 
Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace, pp. 83-114. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012. 
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• Installing filtering software at organizational servers to enable content filtering; 
• Setting up a 24-hour monitoring system for online discussion forums; and 
• Incorporation of provisions of the law into codes of ethics/practice and terms of 
services. 
Although the law has only been enforced for a few years, it has come under heavy criticism 
largely by Internet providers and online activists, both locally and internationally. Local rights-
based NGOs have been mobilizing for an amendment to the law but, with the chronic instability 
of Thai politics in recent years, this amendment has been pushed back. And in the current coup-
controlled environment in which free expression is the exception rather than the rule, it is 
unlikely the amended version of the law, if it proceeds, will reflect a more liberal tone than the 
existing law. 
B. National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)’s 
Announcements 
Historically, revolutionary decrees and coup announcements in Thailand have been seen as 
equivalent to laws and have had lasting effects. Because of the need for social control during 
such periods, many of these legal statutes are designed to specifically curb the right to free 
speech, particularly that of the media. Such a notion of control might have been understandable 
in the context of conventional media like newspapers or broadcasting, where centralized outlets 
of dissemination may be controlled during such problematic times. However, with the highly 
distributed nature of network technology like the Internet, particularly online social media that 
relies almost entirely on users to generate content, it is almost unthinkable to impose control 
upon these communication platforms.  
Nevertheless, such was the case with two of the NCPO’s Announcements that emerged on the 
day of the coup itself, May 22nd, 2014. In Announcement No. 17/2014 entitled “The 
Dissemination of information via the Internet,” all Internet service providers were instructed to 
comply with the following orders: 
• Monitor, investigate, and halt the dissemination of any information that may distort, 
incite, or instigate unrest in the kingdom or that might affect national security or 
public morality; 
• Appear at the 2nd floor meeting room of the Office of the National Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) on May 23rd 2014 at 10.30 hours.19 
As a result of the second provision in the above announcement, a total of 108 Internet service 
providers were summoned to meet with NCPO staff at the Office of the National Broadcasting 
and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) on the specified date.  
At the meeting, attending representatives of the ISPs were told to block public access to the 
Internet addresses of web pages or content deemed to be violating the coup orders, and to IPTV 
or live TV broadcasts relayed via Internet that were similarly in violation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 National Council for Peace and Order Announcement No. 17/2014. In Thai (Translated by author) 
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Based on news reports of the meeting, a working committee of the NCPO would inform the ISPs 
to block access to certain Internet addresses on a case by case basis, as the coup maker did not 
plan to block general online communications but rather wanted to block access only to content 
that violated the coup orders.20 
In another announcement, No. 18/2014 on the topic of “Dissemination of information to the 
public,” all operators of mass media – print, broadcasting (terrestrial, cable, and satellite), 
electronic, and online social media – were asked to refrain from presenting information in the 
following manner: 
• False information that may be defamatory, and foster hatred directed towards the 
royal family; 
• Information that may be harmful to national security, and defamatory to another 
person; 
• Criticism of the operations of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), its 
staff, and related persons; 
• Voice, picture, video that may be official secrets; 
• Information that may cause confusion, incitement, or instigation of unrest or division 
in society 
• Invitation to participate in or assembly that may lead to protest against the NCPO and 
its staff; 
• Threats to harm a person that may lead to public panic and fear.21 
According to this Announcement, it is also mandatory for all media to disseminate information 
issued by the NCPO. 
On July 19th, 2014, the NCPO issued another announcement which in effect merged the above 
two announcements into one, but with an added clause threatening sanctions. This controversial 
NCPO Announcement No. 97/2017 has the perceived “chilling effect” paragraph at the end, 
which says that, “failure to comply with orders in the announcement will result in an immediate 
ban of the media in question and, subsequently, legal action.”22 This order was widely frowned 
upon by members of the media and general media users, who viewed the announcement not only 
as curbing free expression, but also as limiting individuals’ right to knowledge. After a few days 
of negative feedback, the NCPO decided to issue another announcement in replacement – NCPO 
Announcement No.103/2017 – that did away with the media ban and legal action but replaced it 
with a provision that forwarded problematic cases to related professional media organizations for 
immediate action. Additionally, the problematic content must be! false and exhibit intent to 
discredit the NCPO to warrant action. 
C. Past Prosecution and Regulatory Measures on Online 
Intermediaries  
Thus far only one case has been prosecuted relating to intermediary liability in Thailand. This 
was the case of the moderator of a progressive online discussion forum who was prosecuted for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/ISPs-told-to-block-pages-content-seen-as-violating-30234447.html 
21 National Council for Peace and Order Announcement No. 18/2014. In Thai (Translated by author) 
22 National Council for Peace and Order Announcement No. 97/2014. In Thai (Translated by author) 
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intermediary liability under lèse majesté – defaming members of the royal family. A summary of 
her arrest and trial is provided below. 
1. Chiranuch Premchaiporn and Prachatai Case 
Chiranuch Premchaiporn was moderator of the online discussion forum attached to an online 
newspaper called Prachatai. In September 2010, Chiranuch was arrested and later charged with 
committing an offence under Section 15 of the computer crime law and with lèse majesté as a 
result of 10 comments posted in the forum’s board that were deemed royally defamatory. 
According to reports, the police had notified Prachatai staff to take down the illegal content and 
most of the content was deleted except for a few pieces that remained for several days.  
As Chiranuch recounted in some news reports, there were too many postings to keep pace with 
as the forum became very dynamic in the highly volatile context following the crackdown on 
red-shirt protesters in May 2010. Many red-shirt supporters were frustrated and vented their 
anger on the Prachatai web forum, which was known to be an alternative and rather left-wing 
space. Participants on this board were also known to be sympathetic towards the red-shirt 
movements. 
Chiranuch went to trial in 2011, facing criminal charges since lèse majesté is an offence against 
national security under Section 112 of the Criminal Code. One year after the beginning of the 
trail, which drew significant international attention but little local coverage, in 2012 the Criminal 
Court found Chiranuch to be guilty and handed down a one-year prison sentence, then reduced it 
to an 8-month suspended prison term and a 20,000 baht (about US$680) fine.  
The verdict stated that since the provision in the computer crime law did not specifically give a 
clear timeframe for taking down problematic content, it would be unfair to expect the web 
operator to preemptively delete the content. Yet, the court did not uphold the claim by the 
defendant (Chiranuch) that she had no knowledge of the defaming content being imported into 
the system because the police had notified Prachatai, yet one of the comments was left for more 
than 10 days before being deleted. As a web moderator, the defendant (Chiranuch) was expected 
to perform her duty by taking into account the intermediary liability provision. According to the 
verdict, illegal content that is left up for too long could lead to damages to related persons and – 
if disseminated irresponsibly – could cause adverse impacts to national security. 
The court pointed out that there was one posting that was left on the forum’s board for a total of 
20 days, which is an extensive period. The web moderator’s failure to act swiftly enough was 
construed as giving consent for the illegal content to remain, despite being notified. For this 
reason, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty as charged.  
Compared to previous lèse majesté cases, this court’s ruling reflected leniency for Chiranuch, 
who could have faced up to 20 years in prison. For international observers from rights-based 
groups, the case was seen as a test of free expression involving online intermediaries in Thailand. 
After the eight-month suspended sentence ended, Chiranuch lodged an appeal against the verdict 
in 2013 and is now awaiting the result. Meanwhile, the Prachatai web board has become 
defunct, as the organization could not bear the costs of around-the-clock monitoring with its 
limited funding and staff. 
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D. Recommendations From Civil Society on Alleviating Impacts 
from Intermediary Liability  
The Thai Netizen Network (TNN), a local NGO that advocates for Internet freedom and online 
communication rights, gave the following recommendations regarding online intermediary 
liability enforcement in Thailand: 
● Internet service providers and caretakers must be classified into two groups – content-
related and not content-related; 
● Those providers and caretakers that are not content-related must be exempt from 
liability; 
● A proper regulatory framework must place the liability of providers and caretakers of 
content-related entities in accordance with their proximity to the content; 
● Regulators and law enforcement agencies must minimize the scope of impact when 
issuing notifications for blocking content. Those with the most proximity to the 
problematic content should be notified first, followed by those with less proximity. 
This is so that those that are closest to the content can most effectively manage the 
situation, while minimizing the impacts on others that are not directly related; 
● Blocking access to content must be a temporary measure to alleviate the damage. 
Block orders can only be enforced in the presence of a court order, as a result of a 
charge or a lawsuit in trial. The block period must also be defined explicitly (although 
expandable within a time limit); 
● In blocking access to content, service providers must clearly show the number of the 
court order on the website for public verification; and 
● Content blocking must cease in cases where there is no arraignment or trial, or the 
lawsuit ends with a not guilty verdict. All details of the lawsuit and trial must also be 
publicized.23 
IV. Research on Local Intermediaries and Their Content 
Practices  
In order to explore first-hand how different intermediaries view the intermediary liability law 
and the ways that they are coping with the scheme, questionnaire-based interviews were carried 
out between April and June 2014 with 20 online intermediaries in Thailand. Of these, five were 
network providers, four were Internet service providers (ISPs) or access providers, and 12 were 
content providers.24 The last group was comprised of hosting services, online news websites, 
online discussion forums, social networking services, electronic commerce websites, specialty 
content providers, and web portals. Names of all interviewed organizations and the interviewees 
cannot be provided as they agreed to be participants provided that their personal information and 
information about their organizations be kept anonymous. For the sake of academics, however, it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 https://thainetizen.org/docs/netizen-report-2013/ 
24 Network providers here refer to those operators of Internet Gateway (IIGs) as well as National Information 
Exchange (NIX) which rent out their networks to ISPs or general users and the scale of their service can affect the 
public interest. Access providers are ISPs that do not have their own infrastructure but provide access to the Internet 
to organizations or entities or individual users. Content providers are those that provide a variable of content 
services to online users and do not need to own a network to provide the services. 
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may be useful to note that all the interviewed intermediaries were local operators. Effort was 
made to tap US-based providers of major online social networking services, but this was 
unsuccessful.  
The interviews were structured around many salient points as experienced by network, service, 
and online intermediaries on content regulation, burdens incurred from intermediary liability 
provisions, content-filtering practices, perceived impacts from the computer crime law, and the 
assessment of impacts from the current coup-controlled regime. 
The following is a summary of these important points and the opinions of interviewees that 
represent the Internet/online provider sector. 
• Burdens imposed on intermediaries; 
• Content filtering practices; 
• Types of content filtered; 
• Transparency and accountability in content regulation; 
• Impacts of intermediary liability provision; and 
• Impacts of Internet control under coup. 
A. Burdens Imposed on Intermediaries 
The interviewed intermediaries were asked to rate the perceived level of burden imposed on 
them as a result of intermediary liability provisions in two aspects – allocation of resources and 
legal responsibility.  
Most of those interviewed feel that the current burden being imposed on them regarding 
intermediary liability in ordinary periods is acceptable and only a few think that they are being 
overburdened. See Figure 1 for details. 
  
Figure 1: Level of intermediary liability burden as perceived by online intermediaries 
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However, a couple of ISPs made a critical note of the high and quite unproductive costs of 
having to keep traffic logs for 90 days, as well as having to install content filtering systems. In 
terms of human resources to patrol for content offences, at least five providers across several 
categories reported that specialized personnel were needed for this task. According to a couple of 
network and access providers, they needed to recruit new engineering staff and to develop new 
filtering tools to guard against problematic content. Meanwhile, operators of two online 
newspapers reported that they had to assign senior reporters/editors with sufficient legal 
knowledge to help supervise content. 
As for the legal responsibility compelled by the intermediary liability provision, all access 
providers interviewed feel that the law is quite unreasonable to impose such liability conditions. 
Considering that intermediaries are not the offenders and thus could not have the intent to the 
commit crime, to hold them liable is unfair, according to one access provider. Most of the 
interviewed content providers also hold this view. While operators are expected to be vigilant to 
guard against problematic content, it is quite impossible in practice for this monitoring to be 
completely foolproof. As with any reasonable deliberation in a criminal case, they strongly feel 
that “the intent to commit a crime” should be a necessary basis for judicial judgment.  
In addition, the interviewed providers feel that the penalties – imprisonment and fines – are not 
proportionate to the “offence,” which is oftentimes an unintentional error or oversight. Among 
the content providers, which are the category of intermediaries most apprehensive of the law, 
those that appear most antagonistic are those that deal with relatively sensitive content like 
investigative reporting and those ISPs or hosting services with online forums that thrive upon 
content generated by users. As reported by these interviewed content providers, most of the 
problematic intermediary cases they have faced are state-intermediary-user cases, rather than 
user-user conflicts. The latter is manifested more viably in online forums, and stems mostly from 
copyright infringements and defamatory remarks. However, most of these cases were sorted out 
or settled with the intervention of the forum moderator and very few progressed to litigation, 
though usually not on intermediary liability charges. 
B. Content Filtering Practices 
When asked about content filtering practices, it is interesting to find that network and access 
providers are the group that reports the highest frequency of content blocking in accordance with 
court orders. All the content providers interviewed said they have never blocked content from 
court orders because they have never been served with one. This is understandable given the 
structure of Internet regulation in Thailand, in which only network providers and access 
providers are licensees under the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission’s 
system and are thus identifiable to the authority.25 See Figure 2 for details. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Under the NBTC’s Internet providers licensing system, there are two types of licenses. Type 1 license refers to 
license for operators who do not have their own network infrastructure and must strictly concentrate on concentrate 
on providing only Internet access and related services to users who are individuals, organizations, or entities, both 
public and private. Type 2 license is subdivided into three classes: 1) license for operators of international Internet 
gateway (IIGs) and national information interchange (NIX) without their own network infrastructure that render 
services to specific groups of customers in such a way that may not affect the larger public interest; 2) license for 
operators of international Internet gateway (IIGs) and national information interchange (NIX) with their own 
network infrastructure that service specific groups of customers in such a way that may not affect the larger public 
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In any case, court orders are usually administered through the Ministry of ICT (MICT), which is 
in charge of content regulation in Thailand. But since MICT does not control the licensing 
system, they cooperate closely with the NBTC to whom ISPs directly report.  
 
Figure 2: Frequency in blocking websites according to court orders 
 
Another interesting finding is that the larger the scale of the provider, the higher the rate of 
website blocking in accordance with court orders. From the interview in which the operators 
were asked to rate the frequency of the blocking based on court orders, the country’s two largest 
network providers both give the highest score. This correlates with a revelation about the 
likelihood of being served with a notice and takedown request from the authorities. The larger 
the operator (in terms of customer base and popularity), the more likely they are to have received 
notification from the authorities. Many smaller and less known websites and operators reported 
never having been served with a notice and take down request. 
On the other hand, when asked about their content blocking and take down practices that stem 
from notification by officials or general users of content that is not illegal (but potentially 
harmful) in the absence of a court order, most of the providers in all categories (though 
principally in the network and access provider categories) reported that they never comply with 
such notifications. See Figure 3 for details. 
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interest; 3) license for large Internet Service Providers, that may perform as IIGs or NIXs, but have a large scale of 
customers and their services may affect the larger public interest or free and fair competition in the market. 
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Figure 3: Taking down problematic but not illegal content according to notification by users or 
officials in charge, without a court order 
However, some content providers that operate services with an extensive amount of user 
interaction, like online discussion forums, operators of the Facebook page of an online 
newspaper, or news blogs with readers’ comments, said that they occasionally remove content 
that is reported by their users who constitute a community of sorts. In this community, a certain 
form of self-regulation based on ethical guidelines and terms of use published by the website has 
taken shape, and played a role in guarding against unwanted content. 
Apart from blocking as a result of court orders and taking down content without court orders, the 
intermediaries were also questioned about whether they administer their own content filtering 




Figure 4: Frequency in self-administering of content filtering by intermediaries 
 
Eight out of nineteen interviewees reported that they frequently to always administer their own 
content filtering. This includes three online news website operators, two online discussion 
forums, one specialty website, and one electronic commerce website. Their most common reason 
for this content filtering was to minimize the risk of lawsuits, not only stemming from content 
crimes but also copyright infringement and defamation. 
As for network and access providers, all except one do not administer their own filtering or use 
their own judgment in blocking out content. This is because they feel that it is beyond their role 
and authority to make such decisions. The access provider that was the exception is a state 
enterprise, which installed a filtering system on their network many years ago. Yet, a 
representative from this organization reported that content is rarely blocked as a result of their 
independent filtering system.  
C. Types of Content Filtered 
The types of content – illegal or otherwise – which different types of intermediaries report to 
have filtered varies somewhat in accordance with the priorities of each operator. However, lèse 
majesté, which is a severe offence and deeply rooted in Thai society, topped the charts of all 
three types of intermediaries for takedowns, followed by national security. Overall, the block list 
of network and access providers is indicative of the content offences outlined in Section 14 of the 
computer crime law. See Figure 5 for details. 
 
Network providers Access providers Content providers 
1) lèse majesté 
2) national security 
1)lèse majesté 
2) national security 
1) lèse majesté 
2) doctored image that 
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3) false information that 




3) false information that 
could lead to public panic 
4) pornography 
5) gambling  
may be defamatory 
3) copyright 
4) gambling 
5) hate speech 
Figure 5: List of top content categories blocked or removed by different types of online 
intermediaries 
The similarities shared by network and access providers may be attributed to the fact that both 
function mainly as conduits for information and are governed under the licensing system, and are 
therefore in closer proximity to the government’s structural regulation of the Internet. Their 
forbidden content list is in effect derived from the block lists issued by MICT, with or without 
court orders.  
Meanwhile, the variation reported in the content providers’ list, with the exception of lèse 
majesté, can be accounted for by the specific content orientation of each website and the fact that 
they operate more closely to the content than network and access providers, while being more 
distant from the official structure of Internet regulation. In some cases, providers also take down 
content that is not illegal but may be harmful, such as hate speech or content related to drugs. An 
operator of a popular online discussion forum, for instance, gave high priority to hate speech, 
which has been a growing online phenomenon in Thailand despite the fact that this is not a crime 
under Thai law.  
Another interesting observation that emerged from this part of the survey is that other than 
following court orders, most network and access providers usually consult with the MICT in any 
dubious content take down decisions. Most content providers make such decisions 
independently, though the few that are big enough to host a legal unit will consult with their 
lawyers before making such decisions. 
D. Transparency and Accountability of Content Regulation 
Process  
Although most interviewed intermediaries assure that they operate their content handling with 
transparency, only about half of those surveyed publicize or make available their content 
regulation guidelines or filtering process to their users. Those that do have the information 
available claimed to have content guidelines incorporated into their terms of use, while only a 
couple provide the users with information about content filtering process.  
Interestingly, neither of the two network providers interviewed – a state enterprise and a private 
corporation – have such information available for their customers. Both justified this absence by 
the fact that all filtering protocols and practices are done as part of the working procedure of the 
Ministry of ICT. The intermediaries’ role is to just comply and render the sought co-operation. 
The same is true of all the interviewed access providers who claimed that all necessary 
information about blocking/filtering was publicly provided in the block pages of the MICT, and 
now the NCPO’s block page. 
Most of the intermediaries studied have many channels (e.g. telephone, mailing address, online 
social media, and website) for users to file a complaint about their services, including a notice for 
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content take down. However, very few provide a channel for complaints or petitions against 
blocked or removed content. For those network providers that do not provide such channels, they 
claim that the decision to block content is final as it is a legal action in accordance with court 
orders. If any complaint on such procedures is to be made, it must be directed to the authority 
that ordered the blocking, whether it is the court or the MICT-appointed officials. 
Similarly, the usual content filtering procedures carried out by these intermediaries do not 
include notification to users or websites in cases that their content may be blocked or removed. 
All network and access providers state that they do not have this policy and practice in place for 
the same reason as above. They also feel that since they have a large base of users, it would not 
be feasible to circulate such notifications and that this should be the duty of content provider, not 
the intermediary, to do this. 
Meanwhile, most content providers that do perform their own filtering also do not routinely give 
notification before taking down content. This is because they feel that the reason for their 
decision is already indicated in the terms of use and content guidelines. Of all the interviewed 
content providers, four claimed to occasionally notify their clients or users about content removal 
in cases where the offence is not legally conclusive. But in cases where the content falls clearly 
under the law, they will automatically remove without notifying.  
Notably, of all the studied intermediaries, only the operator of a famous online discussion forum 
website has a standard practice of notifying users before and after content removal. Prior notice 
is sent directly to the individual user, with an explanation as to why his or her posting is being 
removed. A notice after the content takedown is also sent to each individual user after a certain 
number of wrongdoings are committed. This is to remind the problematic user that his or her 
account may be revoked as a result of these wrongdoings.  
In addition, most intermediaries in the study also claimed they have in place preventive measures 
against business bullying or discrediting in cases of notice for content takedown from users. 
Some intermediaries require that the person(s) who lodged the complaint to press charges with 
the police to help verify the identification and credentials of the complaint filer. Others use an in-
house committee to help scrutinize the complaints more thoroughly. Some content providers also 
have their staff investigate into past use records of the complaint filer to check their reliability. 
But there are quite a significant number of intermediaries, mostly network and access types, that 
do not have such procedures in place as they do not respond to users’ takedown notice and act 
only under the instruction of the MICT or a related authority.  
When questioned about the integrity of their content regulation system, all intermediaries assured 
that they maintain good practice and good governance. While the studied network and access 
providers tend to emphasize data security, technological safeguards, and quality assurance 
systems, the content providers are more inclined to show that they adhere to professional ethics, 
particularly those in the online news sector. As for those non-journalistic content providers, they 
claim to have a transparent system that is open to scrutiny, both internally and externally. 
However, a couple of the intermediaries in the study feel that ensuring integrity of content 
regulation processes should be the duty of the regulator or the National Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commission (NBTC), while another intermediaries see compliance with 
court orders as already sufficient to show integrity in this regard. 
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E. Impacts of Intermediary Liability Provisions 
All intermediaries in the study admitted that the intermediary liability provision has had an 
impact on their work and the way they conduct their business. Apart from the increased burden 
mentioned earlier, many intermediaries also expressed frustration in complying with the law, 
which they feel is incongruous with the open and participatory nature of the Internet. According 
to one access provider, the main discrepancy in the law lies in holding intermediaries liable for 
content that is imported into the system under their care, but not giving access providers the right 
to filter the content independently. The authority to take down content is centralized under the 
court system.  
Meanwhile, another access provider objected to the idea of access providers having to monitor 
and filter content, as this would entail tremendous and unnecessary costs. If anyone in the supply 
chain of Internet content should be responsible, it should be the content providers who are closest 
to the content.  
Since the law came into effect seven years ago, at least three of the surveyed content providers 
said they had held regular training for their staff to educate them about provisions in the law, 
while a blog hosting service provider has had to assign a blog editor to supervise content within 
their hosting space. For online newspapers, 24-hour content monitoring became mandatory, 
particularly for the users’ comment section. Those who could not cope with the rising costs and 
burden would have to discontinue interactive functions like online forums, while others who did 
not have interactive features decided to maintain their online services’ one-way communication 
structure to minimize risks. 
Over all, most of the intermediaries studied object to having the intermediary liability provision 
in the computer crime law. This includes almost all the network and access providers, with the 
exception of two that feel holding intermediaries liable is fair and will lead to more responsible 
use of the widely diffused and all-encompassing Internet. Those who object to the law see 
intermediaries as messengers or conduits of information and, thus, believe they should naturally 
be exempted from legal responsibility. One of the network providers argued in support of an 
international principle imbued in the European Cybercrime Convention that protects 
intermediaries, and urged that this be adopted in the new and amended version of the computer 
crime law. 
Within the content providers’ segment, the view is split into two poles. There are those that 
disagree with holding intermediaries liable under any circumstances, and those that see 
intermediary liability as necessary, particularly for Internet applications and space that rely on 
user-generated content, like online public forum and comments sections. For the latter group, the 
malleability of the Internet, which makes it highly flexible to copy, share, and disseminate 
information to the widest audience, is a sufficient justification for imposing liability. For this 
group, a website operator is comparable to a landlord. The duty of the landlord is to make sure 
that all tenants take good care of their own space and do not break the law while in residence. 
F. Recommendations for Changes to Intermediary Liability 
Provisions 
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Most of the intermediaries propose that if the law is to be amended, it should adopt an approach 
that protects intermediaries. These are some such suggestions as proposed by members of the 
intermediaries interviewed in the survey: 
● Intermediaries should play a preventive role against content offences but should not 
be held liable; 
● There should be a systematic process in proving the intent of the intermediaries in 
giving consent or allowing content offences to take place; 
● A clarification should be made about the wording “intentionally” and “false 
information,” which overlap with Section 14 of the law; 
● A committee or taskforce should be set up to help protect online intermediaries in 
litigation; 
● If a trial takes place, there should be an injunction to protect intermediaries, possibly 
as witness; and 
● Adaption or partial emulation of substance and implementation procedure of the US 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is recommended. 
G. Impacts on Content Regulation After Announcement of 
Martial Law and the July 2014 Coup 
Since the staging of the coup on May 22nd, 2014 and the enforcement of martial law prior to that, 
the Thai political and communications sector have been markedly affected. Insofar as online 
intermediaries are concerned, the impacts can be analyzed from the vantage point of two groups 
of providers, based on first-hand assessment, as follows. 
1. Network and Access Providers  
Large network providers appear to be the ones suffering the least from the change in political 
regime. To them, the most evident impact is the increased burden in blocking websites. 
However, since this is carried out under an existing scheme of content filtering, the task has been 
quite manageable. Moreover, network providers that are state enterprises feel that they are 
obliged to support the policy of the coup makers, which, to them, signifies a much-needed 
intervention for the sake of the country. Likewise, the state-owned provider that has a content 
monitoring and filtering system in place has been cooperating fully with the new authority in 
surveillance and censorship of content offences or misdeeds against the NCPO in the online 
sphere. But for a privately owned network provider, the intervention of the coup means harder 
and more tedious work. With more rules and regulations, political content that was not classified 
as an offence before has become forbidden and has risen to top priority in the block list.  
As for access providers, the assessment of the post-coup impact is quite similar to network 
providers although with more misgivings, as most of the access providers are private enterprises. 
Apart from shouldering a bigger burden in blocking websites, these providers have been 
compelled to keep pace with new announcements of the NCPO that are related to their operation, 
assign more staff to do round-the-clock patrolling of the network, and attend meetings with 
different authorities, including the NBTC and MICT. A foreign-owned access provider voiced 
the opinion that, despite their objection to the NCPO’s blocking scheme that came in place of the 
court orders of the past, they are not in a position to defy it. Although they could clearly see the 
unfairness in blocking certain websites, they have had to comply and reserve their judgment. 
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2. Content Providers 
The situation is quite different for content providers, particularly those that deal with political 
content and user-generated content. Two online newspapers and one web portal had to close 
down an interactive section for readers’ comments, and the operator of an online discussion 
forum has been forced to remove an unprecedentedly high number of postings from the political 
discussion board. As a result, the scope of political discussions has become very limited and 
constrained. While the operator wishes to keep the forum open so that people would have space 
for exchange and release of political tension, people have become reluctant to participate because 
of the high level of censorship and the climate of fear. In addition, this operator has also 
tightened up the self-regulation scheme enforceable through the website’s online community to 
guard against objectionable materials. 
Meanwhile, the operator of a Facebook page for an online newspaper admitted that a much more 
meticulous process has been introduced to filter content prior to publication. All news, articles 
and commentaries must refrain from criticism of the NCPO to avoid being shut down. The basic 
rule is to stick to the facts, and avoid opinions and comments. Therefore, self-censorship has 
become the mantra of the day. 
For those content providers with no interactive function, the impact has been quite minimal but 
they still proceed with much care. Two online investigative reporting websites reported that their 
news production and workflow had not been much affected, but they had to exercise extreme 
caution in choosing topics for investigation and in wording political content. For those specialty 
websites, electronic commerce, and web portals that have no bearing on politics, the only 
tangible impact is that there are more users and greater traffic than ever before. This is attributed 
to the fact that the spaces for political exchange and dialogue have shrunk, so websites that 
appeal to human interest have taken over in prominence. 
V. Conclusion 
On the one hand, the wording in Section 15 of the Thai computer crime law may be enough to 
exercise a chilling effect on every online intermediary. On the other hand, one prosecution after 
seven years does sound like a track record of leniency on the part of law enforcement. 
Intermediary liability in Thailand is indeed more complex than it seems for many reasons.  
First, the structure of the Internet industry still contains viable remnants of state ownership and 
control from the past. While the survey data may not be all telling due to the need to comply with 
the interviewee’s anonymity requirements, major Internet service providers in Thailand largely 
comprises of state enterprises, private corporations that have thrived on government concessions 
since the 1990s, and new players that came after the frequency reform in the mid-2000s. Within 
this context, these dominant players have been well disciplined to cooperate with the state’s 
Internet regulation scheme that favors surveillance and censorship.  
Over the course of the past two decades, a culture of censorship has gradually been established in 
which the Ministry of ICT is highly instrumental. Since this culture has been breeding an air of 
control and co-optation with the state, the emergence of the computer crime law and the 
provision on intermediary liability did not seem to represent a major change or pose a major 
threat to these operators. So long as they are disciplined partners with the state on content-related 
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issues complying with the culture of surveillance and censorship, they will not be targets of 
intimidation and control under the new law. 
Unfortunately, such is not the case with the new wave of Internet content providers or online 
service providers that focus on providing content, as well as spaces where users can generate 
content on an open and participatory architecture of Web 2.0 Internet platforms – blogs, online 
forum, social networking services, among others. In the context of Web 2.0 communications, 
online content intermediaries have become important agents of control. So, governments – 
democratic and dictatorial – are passing on the censorship and surveillance role to these agents, 
whether they like it or not. The grave concern expressed and the real impacts felt by the studied 
content intermediaries after the May 2014 coup reflect the tremendous challenges facing this 
sector of intermediaries, who are generally smaller and less endowed with resources than the 
network and access providers to consistently cope with demands of the authority to guard against 
objectionable content.  
Secondly, laws and the market regulate the Internet consistent with prevailing norms in Thailand, 
particularly ones that are inherent and socially shaping, like reverence for the monarchy. This is 
clearly reflected in the only case of intermediary liability prosecution involving the Prachatai 
online discussion forum. Not only does Prachatai represent a new wave of online content 
intermediaries that are markedly different from the conventional network and access providers as 
mentioned above, but Prachatai also represents a dissident online medium, since much of the 
website’s content reflects progressive thinking and advocacy for changes from the status quo. 
And, perhaps it is for this reason that Prachatai was chosen to be an exemplar of the chilling 
effects of the computer crime law in the Thai Internet landscape.  
It must not be forgotten that the charges filed against Prachatai covered both intermediary 
liability and lèse majesté, which is a severe offense in Thailand. The lèse majesté offence is also 
indicative of the underlying norms and values in Thai society – reverence of the monarchy and 
intolerance of criticism. This largely explains why local media or critics have not been very 
vocal in advocating for the cause of free expression in the trial of Prachatai’s web forum 
moderator. While free speech is high on the priority list of mainstream media in Thailand, 
Prachatai was not viewed as part of the group warranting such protection. As an alternative 
online media accused of breaching a draconian law, the case has slipped from the public eye. In 
effect, intermediary liability was superseded and overshadowed by lèse majesté, and the 
conventional and dominant understanding about what constitutes the media.  
Nevertheless, the looming chilling effects caused by the intermediary liability provision are still 
real and made even more real by the recent change of political regime, and the unprecedented 
curbing of people’s free expression. To recap, NCPO issued a couple of announcements 
targeting dissemination of information via online social media.  
Overall, since the recent coup the mode of regulation for online intermediaries has shifted 
markedly from self-regulation to top-down sanction through an ad hoc body – the CSOC – that 
operates in a highly command and control fashion. The governance mechanism has also shifted 
from a criminal liability approach, as would be the case under the computer crime law, to upfront 
prior restraints associated with surveillance and censorship schemes. These constraining 
mechanisms appear to be more ex ante rather than ex post.  
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Under coup-shaped conditions, it is viable that coup announcements – which are equivalent to 
laws – have prevailed over other regulatory elements – market, code, or social norms – in the 
governance of Thai cyberspace. In this unusual and often regarded as temporary context, 
freedom of expression is not viewed necessarily as a crime, but more as something that needs to 
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Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
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Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.1 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research techniques, 
committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, actionable, and 
timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to contribute to a 
more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, facilitation and 
convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional information on the 







1 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 











Abstract: This case study provides an analysis and evaluation of the situation for 
online intermediaries in Turkey, with a focus on the problems faced by eBay after 
it acquired www.gittigidiyor.com, which was operating with a similar business 
model in Turkey. Within the scope of this case study, the online intermediary 
ecosystem and legislative environment in Turkey are first examined and then the 
above-mentioned eBay Case is analyzed in detail. The study concludes that basic 
problems for online intermediaries in Turkey are a result of the lack of proper 
legislation, and the government’s attempts to suppress and control the Internet and 
online intermediaries in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish courts’ lack of 
understanding of online intermediaries’ business models may cause those courts to 
render faulty decisions. However, despite these negative aspects, Internet usage 
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This case study examines the challenges of e-commerce platforms in Turkey with a focus on 
problems faced by eBay after its acquisition of the company that owns www.gittigidiyor.com 
(“Gitti Gidiyor”), which operates according to an identical business model in Turkey. Before the 
discussion of Gitti Gidiyor, this study will first explain the online intermediary ecosystem in 
Turkey, mapping the general intermediary landscape and its legislative environment. After that, 
the study will review the eBay case in detail.   
In 2011, eBay acquired Turkey’s leading third party e-commerce platform, Gitti Gidiyor. EBay 
operates in Turkey under Gitti Gidiyor and no separate eBay entity exists in the market. 
Therefore eBay does not directly face problems in Turkey, but experiences difficulties through 
Gitti Gidiyor. 
II. General Overview of the Online Intermediaries 
Ecosystem in Turkey 
A. Internet Usage 
Internet use in Turkey is increasing day by day. With its dynamic and young population of more 
than 76 million, and improved Internet infrastructure and mobile penetration, Turkey has one of 
the highest Internet usage rates in the world. According to the official statistics agency of Turkey 
(Turkish Statistical Institute),2 the 2013 Internet access rate for businesses was 90.8%, while the 
same rate in households was 49.1%. According to the data published by the World Bank3 in 
2013, 46.3% of the Turkish population has access to the Internet and Turkey is ranked 93rd in 
Internet access rates in the world. 
B. Ecosystem of Online Intermediaries  
When we look at the ecosystem of online intermediaries, the main actors seem to be social media 
platforms and e-commerce websites. The table below shows the main providers by intermediary 
type: 
Intermediary Type International National 
Internet Search Engines Google, Bing, Yahoo!, Yandex - 
Micro Blogs Twitter takiplen, democratus, peplr, freelyshout 
Application Platforms 
AppStore, iTunes, Google 
Play, Windows Store, 
Windows Phone Store, Nokia 
- 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 TurkStat, Use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in Enterprises, Use of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) in Households and Individuals (16-74 age group) 
3 The World Bank, based on the data gathered from the International Telecommunication Union, World 
Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and database, and World Bank estimates. 
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Instagram, Flickr, Google+, 
Vine, 
Hocam, quup, friendplans, 
feedfloyd, curbaa, esosyal, 
duube 





itusözlük, incisözlük, 59 
Saniye 
E-Commerce Platforms eBay, Amazon, asos, 
Gitti Gidiyor (EBay), Kliksa, 
hepsiburada, Sahibinden  
Markafoni, 
Figure 1. Main intermediaries in Turkey 
International and national intermediaries currently dominate the Turkish market, and national 
intermediaries are generally imitations of international entities and are often not as popular as 
their international counterparts.  
Currently, Turkey is witnessing an explosion in its citizens’ use of online social media networks. 
It ranks 7th globally in the usage of Facebook and 10th for Twitter.4 93% of Turkish Internet 
users have Facebook accounts. Twitter follows Facebook with a usage rate of 72%, Google+ 
with a rate of 70%, LinkedIn with a rate of 33%, and Instagram with a rate of 26%. Currently, 
there are approximately 32,500,000 Facebook users in Turkey, approximately 41.59% of the 
population.5 These rankings have made social media a powerful rival to the country’s 
mainstream media. “Facebook is the most popular social network in Turkey”, according to 
Social Bakers, “but recently Twitter and personal blogs have gained in popularity. Turkey’s 
mobile penetration is larger than Internet penetration, which means that people increasingly 
access their social networks from mobile phones.”6 Furthermore, social media is heavily used for 
advertising purposes both by companies and politicians, as well as in social responsibility 
projects.  
Within the context of e-commerce, Turkey’s e-commerce sector generated approximately 7 
billion USD per year as of 2012 and it is expected to grow 15.8% every year until 2017.7 Online 
shopping is very popular among Turkish people and it is expected to gain more popularity over 
time. Women and young people buy items online much more than other segments of society. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Common Ground of Digital Markets E-Commerce: Place of Turkey in the World, Current Situation and Steps for 
the Future, Turkish Industry and Business Association, July 2014, Accessible via: 
http://www.tusiad.org/__rsc/shared/file/eTicaretRaporu-062014.pdf  
5 Global Web Index Wave 11 
6 http://businessculture.org/southern-europe/business-culture-in-turkey/social-media-guide-for-turkey/ 03.12.2014 
7 Common Ground of Digital Markets E-Commerce: Place of Turkey in the World, Current Situation and Steps for 
the Future, Turkish Industry and Business Association, July 2014, page 35, Accessible via: 
http://www.tusiad.org/__rsc/shared/file/eTicaretRaporu-062014.pdf 
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Although Turkey’s e-commerce market is not as developed as the United States or the European 
Union, it has great potential to grow.  
Turkish society uses the Internet intensely; however, all services that are available in the US and 
the EU are not available in Turkey. For example, Turkish citizens cannot currently obtain e-
books from Google Play Store or the Apple App Store. The same situation exists for Google’s 
music and film services, as well as some of Google Maps’ features. 
Generally speaking, Turkish usage tendencies of social media are similar to the rest of the world 
considering that most Turkish users use social media to stay connected with friends, share 
comments and photos, and keep up with the news and current events. Furthermore, social media 
websites such as blogs, Facebook, and Instagram are also used for the sale of second hand things. 
However, there is a cultural difference when it comes to matchmaking websites. Many people 
who use dating websites are searching for “serious relationships” or “marriage,” rather than a 
causal relationship.  However, similar to the US, Turkish matchmaking websites target different 
demographics, with some tailored for religious people, lawyers, doctors, etc.  
Twitter is a controversial but extremely popular social network in Turkey; in recent years, it has 
been one of the most-used tools for political and social expression. For instance, the Gezi Park 
protests of May and June 2013 showed an unexpected and extraordinary face of Turkish youth, a 
generation largely raised during a period devoid of widespread protests. This protest was largely 
motivated by the distribution of photos on social media that demonstrated a disproportionate use 
of force by police. Photos of their peers resisting water cannons and tear gas further inspired 
young people to join the protest. A micro blogging web site (delilimvar.tumblr.com) specifically 
aimed at protesters enabled them to report any excessive use of force by police. While most 
individuals who joined the demonstrations were not members of any political or social 
organization, social media allowed these previously non-activist youth to connect with each 
other. Additionally, protestors used social media to access information about the current situation 
in specific areas of the city where protests were planned. Likewise, individuals spread the contact 
information of lawyers and doctors available for aid over Facebook and Twitter.  
The public reaction before the local election on March 30, 2014 is also illustrative of the use of 
Twitter for political and social expression. Before the election, an investigation into big 
corruption broke out in response to videos circulated on YouTube. The government immediately 
banned many YouTube links, but they couldn’t block the spreading of Twitter links, which 
provided a new way to reach the public. In particular, citizens have found Twitter’s “retweet” 
function to be especially useful to create public awareness during elections. After such 
developments, the ability of social media to allow people to express their opinion and organize 
for street protests was widely recognized by the government, academia, NGOs, and society 
itself.8 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Prof. Dr. B. Bahadır Erdem, Turkish Citizenship Law, 3rd  Edition, Beta Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2013, p. 76; An 
Examination of Gezi Park by Alternative Informatics Association, 
https://www.alternatifbilisim.org/wiki/Gezi_Park%C4%B1_De%C4%9Ferlendirmesi 26.09.2014  
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Turkish people often also use social network intermediaries like Facebook and Twitter to find 
blood and marrow for people who need them.9 Many Internet celebrities will retweet or share 
requests for blood or marrow donation to spread them. The use of social media in such a way 
both creates public awareness for people in need, and generally increases blood and marrow 
donation rates.  
LinkedIn, another international intermediary, has been popular in Turkish business life. Lots of 
people use LinkedIn to connect with business contacts and advance their career, find new job 
opportunities, as well as monitor friends and competitors.  
YouTube and video websites are popularly used for watching old episodes of TV series, among 
other uses. Additionally, some professionals organize live business meetings on YouTube using 
the live stream feature.  
As noted, some national intermediaries – imitations of international intermediaries such as 
Facebook and Twitter – are unsuccessful in Turkey. On the other hand, there are a couple of 
successful national intermediaries that have either copied an international concept by combining 
this concept with local cultural elements (such as underlying the privacy aspects of the site, 
providing additional payment options such as payment at the delivery, etc.); or have developed a 
fully national concept. In the field of e-commerce intermediaries, national intermediaries are 
more successful because of the trust relationship between website and user. The following 
paragraphs provide a couple of examples of successful national intermediaries in Turkey.  
C. National Intermediaries 
The most important of the successful Turkish intermediaries is “ekşisözlük”. The name means 
“sour dictionary,” but it is not a dictionary in the strict sense because, though the site defines 
words and/or terms, users are not required to write correct definitions. Ekşisözlük is not only 
utilized by thousands for information-sharing on various topics ranging from scientific subjects 
to lifestyle issues, but is also used as a virtual socio-political community to communicate 
disputed political content and to share personal views.  
Ekşisözlük is an open area to express opinions, but also it has strict rules for entries and selecting 
writers. Writers are selected based on their draft entries, so the site aims to achieve a high 
intellectual level. Despite this aim, ekşisözlük has been losing its intellectual capacity, and is 
becoming a more and more politicized platform. Most of the users are in the opposition against 
the government but there are also a high number of users that are pro-government. It is currently 
one of the biggest online communities in Turkey with over 400,000 registered users and about 
54,000 writers. However, the platform had only approximately 10,000 writers a couple of years 
ago, and therefore it was a much more of a boutique platform at that time, as it could be 
considered a more closed community because of stricter membership rules and content 
management.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Although most of announcements are made individually, some of the Facebook groups are as follows 
(announcements repeatedly takes place on trend topic list of Twitter also): 
https://www.facebook.com/kanhayattir?fref=nf https://www.facebook.com/groups/kanaraniyor/?ref=ts&fref=ts  
https://www.facebook.com/iliknakli?ref=ts&fref=ts 03.12.2014. 
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The founders of ekşisözlük do not allow “troll” users, banning fake users or users who do not 
follow the rules of platform. Because of this kind of “high intellectual level” perspective, some 
people found this platform pretentious, establishing another platform – “incisözlük” – as a 
reaction. After the popularity of ekşisözlük, many similar social media platforms popped up but 
have not became as popular as ekşisözlük or incisözlük. incisözlük is popular for its anarchic 
attitude and having no active administration to select and screen writers. However, while it still 
has a moderation system – like ekşisözlük – for the content, incisözlük allows the users to write 
about almost any type of content (e.g. pornographic, daily life, etc…), without any limitation or 
format restrictions. The website represents different sub-cultures that have grown in Turkey 
since the 2000s. Sarcasm, parodies of clichés, and hatred of intellectualism on ekşisözlük have 
made incisözlük nearly as popular as ekşisözlük.  
Turkish intermediaries such as ekşisözlük and incisözlük are similar with Wikipedia in the way 
that they are sources of information. However, while Wikipedia is much more like an 
encyclopedia and aims to provide objective information on historic or scientific facts, ekşisözlük 
and incisözlük are much more focused on daily events such as political issues, football games, or 
other such developments. In addition to those current events, ekşisözlük and incisözlük also 
contain information on historic and scientific facts, like Wikipedia. However, ekşisözlük and 
incisözlük are much more dynamic (new entries are provided by users nearly every minute of the 
day) than Wikipedia.  
Another successful national intermediary is Hocam, a social media platform like Facebook 
intended only for college students who live in Turkey. Students can share their videos or photos, 
as well as create social groups or events. Just as Facebook was structured at the beginning, 
Hocam users can only sign up if they are university students. Both Hocam and another Turkish 
social media platform, quup, are very similar to Facebook. However, while Hocam has achieved 
significant popularity, quup is not popular. Quup’s failure can be explained by its content 
management strategy. Quup is a social media platform, but it does not host content created by the 
users. Rather, it only hosts content created by the editors, fetched from newspapers, magazines, 
etc. Hocam’s success can be attributed to its unique theme and restricted member acceptance 
policies, explained above. 
59saniye is a user generated content platform on which users can share or broadcast every kind 
of video as long as it is less than 59 seconds. Such a duration cap makes the site attractive for 
people who do not have lots of time to watch long videos or who do not like long videos. The 
motto of the website is “’cause 1 minute is too much time,” further demonstrating this 
intermediary’s concept.  
Another rising trend that allows new national intermediaries to flourish is e-commerce. For 
Turkish citizens, trust in e-commerce platforms is rising constantly, thereby increasing the 
opportunity for online shopping. Many e-commerce websites popped up after reinforcing their 
security measures and the numbers of online shoppers is increasing constantly as a consequence. 
The most popular national intermediaries that host e-commerce platforms are Markafoni, 
Trendyol, hepsiburada, sahibinden, kliksa, and n11. 
III. Governance and Responsibility Mechanisms 
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A. Overview of Internet Governance in Turkey  
Online intermediaries in Turkey are not treated differently within the framework of Internet 
governance in Turkey. In other words, all online intermediaries, without any classification 
regarding sector or services provided, are accepted as hosting providers and thus are subject to 
the Law numbered 5651 on Regulating Broadcasting in the Internet and Fighting Against Crimes 
Committed through Internet Broadcasting (here after referred to as the “Internet Law”), which 
went into force on May 4th, 2007. Per the Internet Law, hosting providers are defined as real 
persons or legal entities that provide or run systems that contain services and content. Therefore, 
all online intermediaries running systems that contain services and content are considered 
hosting providers, and are not responsible for checking the hosted content or whether the content 
constitutes an unlawful activity, pursuant to the Internet Law. This being said, they shall remove 
illegal content, provided that they have been informed about the illegal content.   
With the increase in the volume of Internet users in Turkey, important amendments were made to 
the Internet Law in February 2014 in order to adapt the law to the latest changes in technology 
and compound the liabilities of content, hosting, and service providers. The amendments have 
been heavily criticized by academics, NGOs, and society and it is claimed that the amendments 
are aimed at suppressing and controlling the Internet, granting unlimited authority to 
administrative bodies, and violating individuals’ freedom of expression and right to privacy.10 
One of the amendments made to the Internet Law relates to the categorization of hosting 
providers. Accordingly, hosting providers, within the scope of the principles and procedures to 
be determined by secondary regulation, may be categorized based on the nature of their business 
and be differentiated in respect to their rights and liabilities. As seen in this clause, though, 
online intermediaries are not categorized based on the nature of their business in the present 
time, though they may be classified in that way in the future since the Internet Law leaves a 
space in this respect.  
Another important document that supports the categorization of hosting providers is the Draft 
2014-2018 Information Society Strategy and Action Plan of Turkey (“hereinafter referred to as 
Draft Action Plan”), which was formulated by the Ministry of Development and which 
designates the strategies and actions to be followed by 2018. One of the strategies determined in 
the Draft Action Plan is the “certification of e-commerce websites.” Being considered within the 
scope of the definition of hosting providers, e-commerce websites shall be subject to a 
certification process in order to provide secure shopping experiences for customers. As per the 
Draft Action Plan, the minimum standards for e-commerce websites must be determined by 2016 
and the certificates will be given to those e-commerce websites meeting the standards. In 
addition to that, the e-commerce websites that do not meet the minimum standards shall be 
sentenced to sanctions to be determined, and a dynamic accreditation infrastructure shall be 
established in order to regularly audit the activities of those sites. If the actions in the Draft 
Action Plan are realized, this may create positive results for online intermediaries because a 
certification system will prove that the website is safe to use, hence users may abandon their 
safety-based hesitations. Also, other goals stated in the Draft Action Plan, such as the 
generalization of Internet access, strengthening the Internet infrastructure, and enhancing the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Kerem Altıparmak, Yaman Akdeniz “An Examination of the Draft Amendments on Law No. 5651” http://cyber-
rights.org.tr/docs/5651_Tasari_Rapor.pdf 25.09.2014 
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quality of human resources can be very beneficial to online intermediaries both in their internal 
operation and their expansion in the Turkish market. Subject to the liability clauses of the 
Internet Law, the players in the telecommunications sector in Turkey are also subject to 
regulations prepared by the Information and Communications Technologies Authority, a 
technically independent organization still controlled by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. 
B. Regulations Effecting E-Commerce Ecosystem  
The effect of the Turkish Regulatory environment on online intermediaries can be grouped into 
two different categories, considering their method of application. These are: (i) regulations 
directly applicable to the online intermediaries, and (ii) general rules and regulations which are 
applied to online intermediaries in certain events.  
1. Regulations Directly Applicable to the Online Intermediaries 
The first group of the regulations, which are directly applicable to online intermediaries, consist 
of the above mentioned Internet Law,11 the Law Governing E-Commerce, the Framework on the 
Taxation of E-Commerce, the E-Archive Regulations, the Draft Law on Data Protection, the Law 
on the Payment and Securities Reconciliation Systems, the Payment Services and Electronic 
Money Institutions (the “E-Money Law”), and the Consumer Protection Law.  
i. The Law Governing E-Commerce 
The Law Governing E-Commerce numbered 6563 was reviewed and accepted by the General 
Assembly of Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 23rd, 2014 and published in the 
Official Gazette on November 5th, 2014, numbered 29166. According to the Law, its provisions 
are enforceable on May 1st, 2015. The Law Governing E-Commerce regulates the roles and 
responsibilities of e-commerce service providers, intermediary service providers, and electronic 
commercial communications. The E-Commerce Law explicitly states that intermediaries are not 
under any obligation to control the legality of the content or sales of goods provided by the users 
of the platform. The E-Commerce Law also stipulates that the application of the requirements 
regarding informing the users, sales, and electronic commercial communication will be 
determined by secondary regulations. The aforementioned provision has the potential to provide 
additional protection for intermediaries from secondary liability. 
The E-Commerce Law is expected to be beneficial for intermediaries since it will regulate 
specifically the non-liability of intermediaries. Therefore the E-Commerce Law may solve the 
problems of intermediaries in cases where the courts hold them liable.   
ii. Taxation of E-Commerce 
Taxation of e-commerce in Turkey is based on the OECD’s “Electronic Commerce: Taxation 
Framework Conditions” report, which was accepted by Council of Ministers in 1998. This report 
is significant, setting the basic principles for implementation of e-commerce taxation to 
international transactions. Many countries, including Turkey, are setting their national practices 
accordingly. Additionally, the Revenue Administration of the Ministry of Finance has published 
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11 Since the Internet Law is one of the main topics of this study and has been discussed in other sections. 
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a framework regarding the responsibilities of e-entrepreneurs in relation to the application of 
taxation rules to e-commerce activities12.   
Most recently, the Revenue Administration published the Communiqué of the Tax Procedural 
Law numbered 433 on December 30th, 2013 in order to provide an e-archive invoice application 
to enable the electronic storing of invoices issued electronically, as well as enable B2C e-
invoicing. According to the Communiqué, taxpayers that have garnered revenue of more than 5 
million Turkish Liras as of 2014 must start using the e-archive invoicing application before 
2016. The Communiqué of the Tax Procedural Law numbered 433 is very beneficial to online 
intermediaries because it allows digitalization in fiscal matters, which is a field with significant 
paper work.   
iii. Data Protection 
Turkey has no specific law governing the privacy of personal data. Nonetheless, there is a Draft 
Data Protection Law, and there are general provisions in relation to privacy and personal data 
protection in a number of pieces of legislations. There are some sector-based regulations in place 
for the telecommunications, banking, insurance, capital markets, and health sectors as well. 
According to the Constitution, the right to personal data protection shall ensure that the data 
subject has the right to be informed about the processing of his/her personal data, others’ access 
to that data, requests for the data’s correction and deletion, and if the data is being used for the 
related purpose or not. The same article also states that personal data may only be processed 
under circumstances stated by law or under the explicit consent of the data subject. There are 
also punitive provisions set forth in the Turkish Criminal Code. Additionally, there are 
provisions of the Turkish Civil Code that give individuals whose personal rights are unjustly 
violated the right to file a civil action.  
However, none of these regulations create a clear framework for the protection of personal data. 
The current Draft Data Protection Law is based on the EU 95/46/EC Data Protection Directive 
and requires explicit consent of the data subject both for processing personal data and for 
transferring the personal data to third parties and/or abroad, unless the processing falls under the 
scope of the Law’s exceptions. Absent a framework, data protection is causing problems in the 
data flow to Turkey, since Turkey is considered an unsecure country by EU data protection 
authorities. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to conduct data based activities in Turkey from 
abroad. 
Furthermore, companies often cannot sufficiently plan their path of operation because they 
cannot predict when the Draft Data Protection Law will be enacted. This uncertainty generally 
results in personal data programs being run in accordance with the Draft Data Protection Law. 
However, amendments to the Draft Data Protection Law and future regulations pursuant to the 
law will eventually require the modification of personal data compliance programs, which means 
additional costs for companies, including intermediaries. 
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12 Çağatay Pekyörür, Nilay Erdem, Selen Uğur, Tugrul Sevim, Yasin Beceni, “Electronic Commerce and Taxation”, 
published article on “Vergi Sorunları Dergisi” (“Peer-Review Taxation Issues Journal”), Issue 293, February 2013 
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Without a data protection law, personal data does not have sufficient protection, which creates 
doubts in the public about the usage of online intermediaries. Therefore, online intermediaries’ 
growth is jeopardized by the absence of a data protection law.    
iv. E-Money Law 
The E-Money Law was published in the Official Gazette dated June 27th, 2013, numbered 28690 
and became effective as of the date of its publication. The Law aims to regulate payment 
systems, payment services, and electronic money services, and sets forth the principles and 
procedures with regard to the establishment, authorization, and operation of the providers. 
According to the Law, payment service providers and e-money institutions should obtain 
licenses from the Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority in order to continue their 
activities in Turkey. One of the most challenging provisions for foreign players of such a law is 
the local information systems requirement. In order to obtain the necessary license, payment 
service providers and e-money institutions must keep their primary and secondary IT systems 
within the borders of Turkey.   
v. Law on Consumer Protection 
The new Law on Consumer Protection, which replaces the Law numbered 4077 on Consumer 
Protection, was enacted by the Turkish Parliament on November 7th, 2013 and will be effective 
six months after its publication in the Official Gazette. 
According to the Consumer Protection Law, in the case of a distance contract, the consumer has 
the right of withdrawal within 14 days without paying any kind of penalty and without stating a 
reason.  
Additionally, the Consumer Protection Law stipulates that the intermediaries with distance 
contracts should keep records of transactions between sellers and buyers, and should provide 
such information to the relevant institutions and customers when asked.  Such intermediaries are 
responsible to sellers and buyers in accordance with their contractual relationship. In this clause, 
intermediaries with distance contracts have limited liability under these contracts, and cannot be 
held liable for the execution of the distance contract itself because their role is limited to that of 
an intermediary, and therefore they are not a party to the distance contract. 
3. General Rules and Regulations Applied to Online Intermediaries in Certain 
Events 
Furthermore, a second group of regulations exist, consisting of real-world legislation, including 
customs regulations, the Draft Communiqué on V.A.T., the Regulation on Importation, 
Production, Process and Presentation to the Market of Food Supplements, and the Regulation on 
Debit and Credit Cards. In certain cases, such regulations have been applied directly to 
intermediary platforms or to the users of such platforms based on the type of marketed goods, the 
V.A.T applied to the sale, or fraudulent activity performed on the platform.  
The Ministry of Finance has been drafting a new Communiqué (the “Draft Communiqué”) to 
merge all communiqués regarding the VAT. The Draft Communiqué includes provisions that 
extend the application scope of the VAT at auction places by including bargains and other types 
of sales that shall cause VAT. Such a Communiqué may result in additional liability for the 
intermediaries that have business models based on auctions.  
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The Regulation on Importation, Production, Process, and Presentation on the Market of Food 
Supplements stipulates that food operators shall register websites and URL addresses to local 
offices of the Food and Control General Directorate of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and 
Livestock. Accordingly, the Regulation permits the sale of food supplements via registered 
URLs and stipulates fines for food operators who act against such provisions. Therefore, in order 
to market food supplements through intermediaries, sellers must register their URLs at 
intermediaries’ platforms in accordance with the Regulation. 
Additionally, according to the new amendments to the Regulation on Debit and Credit Cards, 
offering payments with installments through credit cards is limited to nine installments 
(including the period of deferral of payments) in general and such service cannot be offered for 
the purchases of food, fuel, or for expenses related to telecommunications or jewelry. This 
amendment put an additional burden on intermediaries to control the sales on their platform in 
order to categorize goods that may fall under the payment with installments prohibition.   
C. Main Governance Mechanisms  
Regulators use both ex ante and ex post mechanisms in order to regulate online intermediaries. 
The ex ante instrument used by the government to regulate online intermediaries is the operating 
certificate issued by the Telecommunications Authority. Per the Regulation Regarding Principles 
and Procedures for Granting Operating Certificate to Access and Hosting Providers by 
Telecommunications Authority, all types of access and hosting providers shall be required to 
obtain operating certificates. Since online intermediaries are considered hosting providers in 
Turkey, before providing services they must apply to the Telecommunications Authority and 
obtain operating certificates.13 Without such a certificate, the service provided by the online 
intermediaries shall be suspended. In other words, the operating certificate is the instrument 
enabling online intermediaries to provide services in accordance with the law. However, foreign 
online intermediaries that do not have a local entity in Turkey are excluded from the burden of 
obtaining the certificate because they are out of jurisdiction of Turkey.    
In addition to that, the ex post mechanism described in the Internet Law also regulates online 
intermediaries. The provisions under the Internet Law try to balance the rights of the users and 
those who claim that their rights have been violated through the websites. Considering the 
proportionality principle, the Internet Law allows for URL blocking rather than blocking entire 
websites (excluding exceptional cases).14 Accordingly, in a case where the right of a user is 
violated, only the web page containing the related content shall be removed; thus, the users will 
be able to continue their activities on the other pages of the related website. 
IV. Liability 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Regulation Regarding Principles and Procedures for Granting Operating Certificate to 
Access and Hosting Providers by Telecommunications Authority  
14 As per Article 8 paragraph 1 of the Internet Law, access to an entire website on the Internet may be blocked if 
there is sufficient suspicion that the content constitutes crimes which are provocation for committing suicide, sexual 
harassment of children, easing the usage of drugs, supplying drugs which are dangerous for health, obscenity, 
prostitution, providing place and opportunity for gambling; and crimes mentioned in the Law on Crimes Against 
Atatürk dated 25.07.1951 and numbered 5816. 
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A. Liability Framework 
Pursuant to the Internet Law, “hosting providers who do not make the hosting provider 
notification or do not fulfill the obligations determined by this Law shall pay an administrative 
fine anywhere from 10 thousand Turkish Liras to 100 thousand Turkish Liras by the 
Presidency.”15 In light of this clause, online intermediaries that do not remove illegal content 
from broadcast once they have been informed about that content shall be fined. 
Online intermediaries also become liable when they do not remove illegal content after being 
informed of its existence in the cases in which the content constitutes defamation, violation of 
trademark protection, or violation of copyright protection.  
1. Defamation 
As per the Turkish Criminal Code, any person who acts with the intention to harm the honor, 
reputation, or dignity of another person is sentenced to imprisonment from three months to two 
years, or forced to pay a punitive fine. The content can possibly be evaluated under article 125 of 
the Criminal Code and the person may be charged with committing a “defamation” crime. 
2. Personal Right Violations 
Additionally, Turkish Civil Code designates personal rights violations. Since the right to protect 
one’s honor and dignity is deemed a personal right, content violating honor and dignity may be 
deemed a personal rights violation as well. In the event of a personal rights violation, the 
complainant may file a lawsuit to request the termination of the violating material, the removal 
of the violating thread, the examination of the content, material indemnification, moral 
indemnification, and/or material compensation from the violator. In regards to violations over the 
Internet, in practice rights holders obtain preliminary injunctions from courts for blocking access 
to websites on which the violating content is available. Several courts decisions have led content 
to be blocked from a number of different websites. 
It also should be noted that the actual practice in Turkey with regards to Internet content is still 
vague and the application of it by different judicial authorities varies. Although blocking access 
is a procedure that is specifically designated for a limited number of circumstances, the authors 
of this case study have still observed in practice that some courts may grant blocking access 
decisions for content for which such decisions cannot be legally made accordance with the 
Internet Law. 
3. Crimes Against Ataturk 
Moreover, Turkey has a specific law on crimes against Ataturk (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
founder of modern Republic of Turkey) called the Law on Crimes against Ataturk, numbered 
5816 dated 25/7/1951. According to Law no 5651 on the Regulation of Broadcasts via the 
Internet and the Prevention of Crimes Committed through such Broadcasts, Internet sites that 
include content that can sufficiently be considered to constitute a crime under the Law on Crimes 
against Ataturk may be subject to blocking. As such, websites like Youtube can be blocked 
because of defamation against Ataturk. As sufficient suspicion of this crime can directly result in 
a blocking access decision, reports claiming defamation against Ataturk should be handled in a 
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15 Article 5, paragraph 6 of the Internet Law 
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careful and prompt manner. Since the matter is delicate in terms of national values and 
sensitivities, interpretation of was constitutes “defamation against Ataturk” is wide. For example, 
content showing Ataturk in make-up and as a woman; remarks about Ataturk’s sexuality; 
remarks about Ataturk being a womanizer or drunk all carry the risk of being deemed 
defamatory and therefore risk prompting a blocking access decision. 
The most well known case of blocking access to a website due Crimes against Atatürk was a 
series blockings to YouTube between March 2007 and October 2010. The first blocking was due 
a video on YouTube that insulted Atatürk. This ban was removed after the content was removed 
from the website. Between 2008 and 2010, YouTube was blocked continuously by a couple of 
court orders due to Crimes Against Ataturk.16  
4. Copyright Protection 
Copyright protection is granted under the Law no. 5846 on Intellectual and Artistic Works 
(“FSEK”). According to FSEK, in the case of a copyright violation over the Internet, natural or 
legal persons whose rights have been violated shall initially contact the content provider and 
request that the violation cease within three days. Should the violation continue, a request should 
next be made to the public prosecutor, who will require that the relevant ISP suspend the service 
provided to the content provider in question within three days. The service provided to the 
content provider shall be restored if the violation ceases. Please note that Law no 5846 does not 
define content provider. In practice, in addition to actual content providers, blocking access 
decisions against hosting providers can also be handed down pursuant to this provision. 
MySpace and Last FM are examples of websites that have been blocked pursuant to this 
provision.  
5. Additional Regulations 
In addition to these provisions that specifically set forth a blocking procedures, Turkish courts 
and judges have in the past the granted blocking-access decisions based on various other 
regulations, including: 
• Turkish Civil Law 
• The Law on Combat Against Terrorism 
• Actions that may constitute a crime in accordance with “Turkish Criminal Law” 
(especially for web sites which publish content about sensitive political issues in 
Turkey, such as Kurdish issue, Armenian issue, etc) 
Please note that those pieces of legislation do not designate a specific blocking procedure. 
However, the courts did grant blocking decisions pursuant to these regulations, as well as based 
on temporary measures such as preliminary injunctions for personal rights violations pursuant to 
Turkish Civil Law. In recent decisions of the Court of Cassation, the Internet Law is a specific 
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16 Alper Çelikel, Blocking Access to Youtube.com from Turkey and Its Consequences from the Perspective of 
Freedom of Expression, 2011, 
https://www.academia.edu/1937347/YOUTUBE.COM_WEB_SITESINE_TURKIYEDE_ERISIMIN_ENGELLEN
MESI_VE_IFADE_HURRIYETI_BAKIMINDAN_SONUCLARI 26.09.2014  
!! 13!
regulation compared to the Turkish Civil Law and is therefore applicable to personal rights 
violations on the Internet.17 After that decision, courts started to apply only the Internet Law. 
In addition to that, if online intermediaries do not maintain and update their indicative 
information accurately and completely on their own sites in a way that the users can access 
directly from the main page, they can pay an administrative fine of two thousand to ten thousand 
Turkish Liras. 
B. Safe Harbors 
According to the Internet Law, since online intermediaries are not responsible for checking 
hosted content or researching whether the content constitutes an unlawful activity, online 
intermediaries are not liable in cases where they are not informed of the infringing content. This 
being said, per the Internet Law, intermediaries can be “informed” via any channel considered to 
be contact information under the law. In other words, the Internet Law does not designate a 
specific channel to contact online intermediaries about such violations. 
Upon notification in accordance with the Internet Law, online intermediaries have to remove the 
content. Before the February 2014 amendments to the Internet Law, online intermediaries’ 
responsibility for removing the content was limited by technical possibilities (i.e. sufficient 
technologies to remove the content); however, the February 2014 amendments removed the 
technical possibilities limitation from the Internet Law. Online intermediaries will be punished 
with administrative fines in the amount of 10,000.00 TRY to 100,000.00 TRY if they do not 
remove content that they have been properly notified about.  
As explained above, the E-Commerce Law provides a safe harbor for online intermediaries by 
establishing that they are not liable for third party content. However, until the E-Commerce Law 
is enforceable, judicial and administrative bodies cannot apply it. 
C. Enforcement  
Before the amendment to the Internet Law, the users who claimed that their rights have been 
violated through websites were first obliged to apply to the online intermediary in question in 
order to ask for the removal of the content. The amendment to the Internet Law has changed this 
“notice and take down” procedure and gives two options to users. Accordingly, users whose 
rights have been violated may apply to the content/hosting provider for the removal of the 
content, or can directly bring a lawsuit against the content provider. In other words, with the 
amendments to the Internet Law the “notice and take down” procedure has been evolved to a 
procedure of “notice/no notice block.” This amendment weakened online intermediaries’ power 
to apply their terms of use or other policies and to consider disputes themselves. Most Turkish 
users prefer to apply to courts rather than intermediaries. Since the courts do not have a sufficient 
understanding of such disputes, online intermediaries sometimes have to remove the content or 
block access in Turkey unfairly. Furthermore, online intermediaries have to be very quick to 
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respond to such requests because the Internet Law establishes a period of only a couple of hours 
for trial and enforcement proceedings.  
According to the legal procedure stipulated in the Internet Law, any real person, legal entity, 
institution, or entity who claims that his/her personal rights have been violated may either: 
• Apply to the content/hosting provider for its removal. There is no specific limitation 
about the method of communicating with the content/hosting provider, so the user’s 
application to the intermediary by filling out the reporting form would constitute a 
“warning to the content/hosting provider” as per the Internet law, or 
• Go directly to the court and request for the URL blocking to the specific content. The 
court may also order blocking of the entire website if the violation cannot be stopped 
otherwise. 
D. Significant Cases 
On March 21st 2014, Twitter was banned in Turkey because of three court orders and a public 
prosecutor’s request regarding the removal of content. Since Twitter is one of the most popular 
social media websites in Turkey, the reactions against the blocking order spread on media in a 
very short time. Thus, in order restore access to Twitter, personal applications were made to the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey. On April 2nd, 2014, the Constitutional Court of Turkey stated 
that the TA should enforce the order immediately and ruled that such a general ban on Twitter 
was a violation of freedom of expression. The Constitutional Court also noted in its order that 
since the Internet Law provides for URL blocking, blocking access to the whole website violates 
the proportionality principle.18 After this order, the Twitter ban was removed.  
One week after the Twitter ban, on March 27th, 2014, YouTube was also banned due to the 
presence of a voice recording of a meeting of high officials, including the Foreign Affairs 
Minister, the Undersecretary of National Intelligence Service, and the Deputy Chief of Staff of 
Turkish Armed Forces. The decision stated that contents in 15 URL addresses would be removed 
unless access to YouTube was fully blocked. Following the blocking order, many applicants, 
including YouTube, applied to the Constitutional Court claiming that blocking access to the 
website violated their constitutional rights.  
On June 13th, 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that blocking access to YouTube constituted a 
violation of freedom of expression.19 The decision of the Constitutional Court first explained 
freedom of expression in the scope of the constitution and human rights. In addition, the court 
stated that the Internet has great value for the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
especially for freedom of expression. Social media is now indispensable for persons to express, 
share, and promulgate their knowledge and opinions. Therefore, per the Constitutional Court, it 
is explicitly clear that the government and administrative institutions have to act responsibly 
while regulating the Internet and social media instruments, which have become the most 
effective methods of self-expression. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ruled that there is 
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18 Constitutional Court, Application No. 2014/3986, Decision Date: 02.04.2014, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/04/20140403-18.pdf 26.09.2014 
19 Constitutional Court, Application No. 2014/4705, Decision Date: 29.05.2014 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/06/20140606-10.pdf 26.09.2014 
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nothing in the Internet Law that allows for blocking access to an entire website instead of 
conducting URL blocking or blocking with other methods that constitute a lighter-touch 
intervention. Therefore, the Telecommunications Authority did not have the authority to 
completely block access to YouTube, and the ban violated fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the applicants. 
V. eBay Case Study 
A. Information About eBay and Gitti Gidiyor  
eBay, founded in San Jose, California in 1995, is the world’s biggest online marketplace. It 
facilitates users buying and selling items in almost every country worldwide, and has made 
advances in digital marketing, multi-channel retail, and global e-commerce. In addition, eBay 
reaches millions of people through StubHub (the world’s biggest online marketplace for tickets) 
and job posting sites that cover more than 100 cities around the world. The company is based in 
the US and operates as a limited liability company listed in the NASDAQ stock exchange. eBay 
has 97 million users and, as of 2013, was worth $212 billion. 
eBay Inc. owns a series of third party e-commerce platforms worldwide, platforms where sellers 
exhibit their goods for sale online, as well as provide secure payment between the parties of such 
sales. eBay’s role is limited to providing a platform to bring together buyers and sellers; it does 
not engage at any point in online retail activity and does not make any legal transactions as a 
buyer or a seller.  
In 2011, eBay acquired 93% of the shares of Turkey’s leading third party e-commerce platform, 
Gitti Gidiyor, which operates an identical business model in Turkey. The deal followed eBay’s 
acquisition of a minority stake in Gitti Gidiyor in 2007.  
Gitti Gidiyor was established as a company with three partners in 2001. It has more than 10 
million registered users and more than 27 million visitors (with 12.5 unique visitors) per month. 
On average, 750,000 sales take place on the site each month, which corresponds to 1 sale every 3 
seconds. The total number of sales transactions that have taken place on the site is more than 30 
million.20  
Gitti Gidiyor is a platform that provides a secure payment and communication service to its users 
who are carrying out e-commerce transactions. The role of a third-party marketplace platform, 
such as the one operated by Gitti Gidiyor, is to create a trusted online environment where buyers 
and sellers can trade goods and services among themselves. Gitti Gidiyor is not an online 
retailer, but merely hosts content created by others. The users of Gitti Gidiyor, in addition to 
creating the content themselves, carry out transactions on the online platform without any 
involvement of the company itself. Users do not involve the company at any stage of the sales 
and, further, Gitti Gidiyor is not a party to the sales agreement. One of the main features of Gitti 
Gidiyor is its “Zero Risk” payment system. The “Zero Risk” payment system aims to provide a 
safe method of payment for online transactions, where the rights of both the sellers and 
purchasers are protected during the process of delivery and examination of the product. 
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20 These numbers are abstracted from the information on Gitti Gidiyor’s website at 
http://www.gittigidiyor.com/hakkimizda/tarihce.  
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B. Challenges for eBay as an Intermediary Operating in Turkey  
In certain cases, Gitti Gidiyor is deemed liable – just like the actual perpetrator of a crime or an 
infringer – for the unlawful acts conducted on the platform and/or in relation to the products sold 
on its platform.  Some examples of such liability problems are as follows.  
1. Challenges Related to Customs Issues  
Since it is not possible for Gitti Gidiyor as a hosting provider to see, know, or evaluate the exact 
nature or origin of the goods traded by its users, Gitti Gidiyor has no legal or criminal liability in 
relation to the goods that are sold or offered for sale on its platform. Gitti Gidiyor is recognized 
as a “hosting provider” under the Internet Law by the Information and Communication 
Technologies Authority’s (ICTA) Telecommunications Directorate. As explained above, 
according to the Internet Law hosting providers like Gitti Gidiyor have no responsibility to check 
the content that they are hosting or to proactively investigate whether their users are breaking the 
law.   
Despite the fact that Gitti Gidiyor as an intermediary has no control over or knowledge of the 
transactions carried out by buyers and sellers through its platform, certain Customs Enforcement 
Directorates have held Gitti Gidiyor liable for breaches of Anti-Smuggling Law No. 5607 (“Law 
No. 5607”) through an interpretation based on the assumption that Gitti Gidiyor acts as a 
mediator in the sale of smuggled products by users on its platform.  
Law no 5607 Article 3 includes an exhaustive list of acts deemed to be “Smuggling Acts,” which 
does not include “acting as a mediator in the sales of smuggled goods.” In addition to the fact 
that the law does not include such an act on its exhaustive list, it is not Gitti Gidiyor but the 
buyers and the sellers who carry out the transactions on the platform by reaching an agreement 
about the sale price, characteristics, and delivery conditions of the product. It is without a doubt 
that Gitti Gidiyor is not a party to such sales contracts between the related buyers and sellers. 
Therefore, Gitti Gidiyor should not be held liable under Law No. 5607. 
In a case regarding Law No. 5607, a customs enforcement directorate made a complaint to the 
public prosecutor and requested that he press charges against Gitti Gidiyor, claiming that Gitti 
Gidiyor was helping its users to commit smuggling crimes. After the investigation, the public 
prosecutor filed a case to a criminal court. These claims were rejected by the court21 for the 
reason of the non-liability of Gitti Gidiyor as an intermediary. However, the court did not 
specifically reference the Internet Law, which regulates the non-liability of the hosting providers. 
Instead, the court stated that it was impossible for Gitti Gidiyor to control all the products sold 
through its platform, and it therefore cannot be held liable from a criminal law perspective, since 
it did not commit a negligent act. 
2. Challenges Related to V.A.T. Liabilities  
The Ministry of Finance is drafting a new Communiqué (the “Draft Communiqué”) to merge all 
communiqués regarding the VAT. The Draft Communiqué includes provisions that extend the 
scope of the VAT at auction places by including bargains and other types of sales that shall cause 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Criminal Court of First Instance, Hatay, Case No: 2011/1030, Decision No: 2012/595, Decision Date: 18.04.2012, 
approved by the decision of the Court of Cassation, 7th Section of Criminal Department, Case No: 2013/21432, 
Decision No: 2014/12444, Decision Date: 18.06.2014 
!! 17!
VAT. It is not clear whether e-commerce intermediaries that provide financial and commercial 
activities to others will be deemed auction-style platforms, or whether such intermediaries will 
be deemed auction-holders.   
3. Challenges Related to Sales of Products  
The sale of products of a specific nature is another issue for platforms like Gitti Gidiyor. Such 
products of a specific nature are pharmaceutical products, tobacco and alcohol, food 
supplements, guns and firearms, historical artifacts, etc. E-Commerce platforms tend to ban the 
sale of such products and they also use technical tools to avoid such sales. However, because 
many people use such platforms and many transactions are realized on them, it is easy to miss 
single sales or offerings. Turkish authorities have the tendency to initiate actions against e-
commerce platforms in relation to such sales or offerings without first notifying the platform 
about the issue and asking for removal.  
C. Impact Assessment of the Challenges 
The problems of eBay-Gitti Gidiyor in Turkey have mainly resulted from the lack of 
understanding in Turkey about the principle of “non-liability of intermediaries” provided that 
they meet certain obligations. One of the other reasons for the problems is the fact that it is more 
difficult to find the actual the perpetrators of a crime if such a crime is committed online. As 
finding such actual perpetrators is difficult, the administrative and judicial authorities tend to 
hold Gitti Gidiyor liable for issues related to its platform. Be it customs, V.A.T., advertising, or 
distance sales, the main reason for problem is the fact that authorities in Turkey tend to deem 
hosting providers (or intermediaries, in international terminology) liable and/or try to sanction 
them for actions and/or content on the platform that they are providing.  
In addition to being contrary to the principle that a platform like Gitti Gidiyor cannot be held 
criminally or otherwise liable for the activities of the users, as laid down in European Union 
harmonized legislation, as well as the corresponding legislation in Turkey, the misinterpretation 
of the Law No. 5607 could have far-reaching negative consequences for the development of e-
commerce in Turkey, and for much-needed local and foreign investment in this field. Problems 
with the V.A.T. liabilities and sales of products are another example of how an e-commerce 
business model may be treated the same as the actual provider of a service and expected to meet 
the same requirements as such parties.  
The above problems caused by a lack of understanding of the non-liability principle hamper the 
growth of the online intermediaries in Turkey and damage the willingness of the foreign online 
intermediaries to enter into the Turkish market. Furthermore, these problems concern users, as it 
appears online intermediaries may be conducting illegal activities and therefore may be 
dangerous to use. As can be seen, this lack of understanding has many negative effects on online 
intermediaries. 
D. Recommendations/Solutions in Light of the eBay Case  
As mentioned, the above problems result from the fact that an intermediary non-liability regime 
is not clearly imposed in the judicial and administrative environment of Turkey. In light of this 
finding, our recommendations are: 
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• Turkey should closely follow the developments of policy, strategy, and action plans, 
as well as the legislation, of countries where e-commerce is developed and Turkish 
authorities should clearly understand the ratio legis (the reason of enacting the law) 
behind such documents, in particular regarding the non-liability of e-commerce 
platforms. 
• The regulations and policies to be implemented by the Ministry of Customs and 
Trade’s Internal Trade General Directorate (the organ given authority by the E-
Commerce Law) in relation to newly enacted E-Commerce Law, which clearly 
imposes the non-liability for e-commerce platforms, will be of high importance.  
A structure should be established where public authorities think and act in cooperation with 
private sector representatives and civil society when making or amending policies and 
legislation. 
Legislation on e-commerce may solve most of the problems intermediaries are facing, especially 
in the field of liability. The previously mentioned structure is a key element to monitoring 
international development, and therefore it may significantly effect e-commerce legislation. It 
appears that the above mentioned elements are connected and must be applied in combination to 
achieve success. 
VI. Conclusion 
Our studies of online intermediaries in Turkey show that Internet usage is spreading in the 
country and the society is at the beginning of exploring the potential of the Internet in the 
economy, politics, socialization, and charitable action. Within this exploration process, national 
intermediaries – both imitations of international online intermediaries such as Facebook and 
Twitter, and unique ones – are beginning to flourish in the country. Also, society is beginning to 
use online intermediaries in different ways and is eager to expand both the usage of the Internet 
and these platforms. It should also be stated that despite the government’s unsupportive 
statements towards social media, social media usage is continuing to rise due people’s need to 
communicate and express their opinions. Consequently, it is widely expected that Internet usage 
will continue to spread across the country, and therefore online intermediaries will gain more and 
more popularity in the future. This will cause inevitable changes in the economy, politics, and 
social life in the near future.  
Although people are generally willing and eager to use the Internet and online intermediaries, the 
legislative and administrative environments are somewhat hostile towards both the Internet and 
online intermediaries. Government efforts to control and suppress the Internet and online 
intermediaries have not been successful so far due people’s willingness, technical impossibilities, 
and court decisions. However, these efforts have caused a loss in prestige for the government 
internally and externally. Furthermore, the absence of data protection laws and e-commerce laws 
is an obstacle facing the development of online intermediaries in Turkey. The government’s 
unwillingness to enact the above mentioned laws – combined with its efforts to control and 
suppress of Internet – have been heavily criticized. Taxation problems and credit card installment 
limitations are other problems that online intermediaries are facing that are directly affecting 
them economically. Although these may be justified by referencing the public interest, such as 
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reducing the current deficit and increasing tax income, these problems are damaging the growth 
of online intermediaries in Turkey. 
An important aspect of the Internet Law is its requirement for online intermediaries to obtain 
operating certificates. Operating certificates allow the government to know who owns and 
controls the online intermediary, and apply the law (when necessary) directly to this owner, as 
well as conduct communications regarding the government’s requests through the provided 
contact information. However, while operating certificates may seem a tool of control for the 
government, they have a benefit for online intermediaries in that they prove the owner is a 
hosting provider and therefore not responsible for the content it hosts. Another control 
mechanism of the government is the ability to block access to websites. Although this is not a 
precise solution since a block can easily be circumvented, it allows the government to force 
intermediaries – especially foreign intermediaries – to obey Turkish law and court orders.  
The liability of online intermediaries is mainly regulated under the Internet Law and a couple of 
other laws that include relevant provisions. Although the Internet Law accepts that online 
intermediaries are not responsible for the content that is created by their users, there are problems 
with this aspect of the law, in that the courts do not always accept it. Furthermore, the access 
blocking mechanism causes damage to online intermediaries even though they are not 
responsible for the content. Therefore it can be said that the online intermediary is forced to 
control the content created by its users even though it cannot be punished pursuant to the law. 
Moreover, there is no obligation for the applicant to notify the online intermediary before 
removing content. The website of the online intermediary can be blocked even without the 
knowledge of the online intermediary.  
In the eBay-Gitti Gidiyor case, the effects of the unawareness of the principle of non-liability of 
online intermediaries can be easily seen. Challenges faced by Gitti Gidiyor in customs, product 
sales, and taxation clearly show that administrative and judicial authorities in Turkey are not 
applying the principle correctly. Given Turkey is a developing country with a young population 
– which means it is a huge market for online intermediaries – misconduct of administrative and 
judicial authorities affects society in many ways. This study recommends that the application and 
quality of the current legislation should be improved by cooperation of public institutions, the 
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Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.1 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
contribute to a more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, 
facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 






                                                 
1 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 











Abstract: This paper describes and assesses the intermediary liability landscape 
in the United States. It provides an overview of major US legal regimes that 
protect online intermediaries in cases where third-parties seek to hold them liable 
for the conduct of their users, addressing both the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act safe harbor enshrined in Section 512 of the United States Copyright Act and 
Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act. It then offers a series of case 
studies describing ways in which US-based companies and other organizations 
have structured their operations in compliance with and in response to US law. 
The paper describes Craiglist’s response to efforts to hold it responsible for sex 
trafficking that occurred on the site; the ContentID copyright and VERO 
trademark programs implemented by YouTube and eBay, respectively; and the 
reactions of intermediaries to allegations of wrongdoing by Wikileaks. It provides 
an assessment of the importance of transparency reporting for online 
intermediaries as they seek to address tensions between requirements of legal 
compliance and the need to secure users’ trust. And, it concludes with a detailed 
and thematically-organized literature review that summarizes the state of 
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I. Introduction  
The United States offers a unique and interesting case, from both a legal and policy perspective, 
for study of the governance landscape for online intermediaries. This is true for at least two 
major reasons.  
First, the US is the birthplace of, and home to, many major global Internet platforms that host 
content and make this content available to users. It is thus unsurprising that US law incorporates 
significant protections for such online intermediaries in cases where third parties seek to hold 
them liable for the conduct of their users. At the same time, the US is also home to a significant 
and robust content industry that has played a major role in shaping its intellectual property – 
particularly copyright – regimes. The tension between content owners (who place a premium on 
preventing infringement of the content that drives their traditional business models) and 
intermediaries (which require immunity from third-party claims in order to avoid crippling 
financial liability) raises fundamental questions about the role of government and the 
prioritization of business interests. 
Second, US law provides robust protections for speech, rooted in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Government-sanctioned restraints on speech – particularly prior 
restraints imposed without significant consideration to due process – are very strongly disfavored 
under US law. A court order requiring that a piece of content – e.g., a blog post or image or 
video – be removed from an online platform implicates the free speech rights of the person who 
created that content. State and federal legislatures crafting laws (and courts applying and 
interpreting them) must consider the rights of that speaker, along with the rights of the subject of 
the speech in question and the role of the intermediary, in crafting appropriate remedies. 
This paper offers a short legal primer describing the two major provisions of federal law – the 
“Digital Millennium Copyright Act” or “DMCA”, and the safe harbors embodied in Section 512 
of the United States Copyright Act and Section 230(c) of the “Communications Decency Act” or 
“CDA” – that govern liability and immunity of online intermediaries in the United States, and 
the common law provisions that fill gaps not addressed by these two statutory regimes. After 
mapping the landscape for intermediary liability in the US, the paper turns to a series of case 
studies that highlight how a range of actors in various sectors of the Internet ecosystem have 
grappled with intermediary liability concerns in addressing their business and related needs. 
These case studies demonstrate both the importance and the limitations of existing intermediary 
liability regimes and the creative ways in which companies and others have worked within (and 
around) existing law to allocate liability in ways that work for them. Finally, the paper turns to a 
discussion of the role of transparency for intermediaries attempting to balance the competing 
interests described above and the need to maintain positive relationships with both the public and 
their user base.  
II. Legal Landscape Primer  
A. General Content Liability  
1. Traditional Defamation Liability for Intermediaries 
Publishing a false factual statement about a person that harms their reputation can lead to a civil 
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(and, extremely rarely, criminal2) claim of defamation.3 Defamation has a complicated structure; 
the tort evolved from the common law of the individual states, with a series of United States 
Supreme Court cases adding some specific, nationwide carve-outs and requirements deemed to 
be necessary in light of the First Amendment.4 The law still varies considerably across each 
state, but to make out a claim of defamation today a plaintiff generally needs to show, among 
other things, (1) that a defendant published a statement; (2) that the statement was a false 
statement of fact (as opposed to true facts or an opinion); and (3) that the defendant acted with a 
certain level of fault (depending on the person involved, either negligence or “actual malice,” a 
term of art roughly meaning the defendant knew the statement was false at the time it was 
published).5 
Claims against content intermediaries need to satisfy these elements as well, but any party 
against whom all of the elements of a defamation claim exist is potentially liable.6 Prior to the 
advent of the Internet, courts limited the universe of possible defendants by requiring that an 
intermediary only be held liable if they “know[] or ha[ve] reason to know” of the statement’s 
defamatory character.7  
This leads to different results based on different intermediaries in the offline world. Newspapers 
and magazines tend to be held responsible for their content, even when the content clearly owes 
its origin to a third party – e.g., with a letter to the editor.8 The opposite result is usually reached 
when considering contract printing shops or “vanity presses.”9 Those who distribute or host 
physical copies of defamatory publications are usually protected for the same reason, and 
scholars openly question whether a library or bookseller could ever be held liable for distributing 
                                                 
2 See David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM. L. & POLICY 303, 313 (2009) 
(finding 2-9 prosecutions a year in the state of Wisconsin, but noting this to be significantly a significantly higher 
rate than commonly thought). The Media Law Resource Center reported no criminal defamation cases in 2013. See 
New Developments 2013, Media L. Resource Ctr. Bulletin 90 (December 2013). 
3 See generally http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/defamation. 
4 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundation of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 
(1986).  
5 Parties must also show that the statement was about the plaintiff and that the statement harmed the plaintiff’s 
reputation. Most states also require a plaintiff to show that they suffered “actual damages” based on the statement, or 
that the statement falls into one of several categories where damages are presumed. See Defamation, DIGITAL MEDIA 
LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/defamation (last updated Aug. 12, 2008). When discussing public 
officials and figures, the First Amendment case law requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with “actual 
malice,” a term of art meaning that the defendant knew the statement was false when they published it, or acted with 
reckless disregard of the truth. For more on private and public figures, see Proving Fault: Actual Malice and 
Negligence, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/proving-fault-actual-malice-and-
negligence (last updated Aug. 7, 2008). There are other overlapping claims that may be asserted in conjunction with 
defamation, but they are usually confined to the same general requirements as to falsity and fault. See Other Falsity-
Based Legal Claims, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/other-falsity-based-legal-
claims (last updated Aug. 15, 2008). 
6 Rodney Smolla, Law of Defamation § 4:87. 
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581. This scienter requirement has now spread to all claims of defamation 
through Supreme Court precedent, but nevertheless serves as a useful heuristic for separating parties traditionally 
liable for defamation from those who were not. See Smolla, supra note [[x]], at § 4:92. 
8 Sack on Defamation § 7.1; Marc A. Franklin, Libel and Letters to the Editor: Toward an Open Forum, 57 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 651 (1986). 
9 Sack on Defamation § 7.3.4. 
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defamatory books, even if they had reason to know of the book’s character.10 Telegraph and 
telephone companies have generally been protected against claims for transmitting defamatory 
statements, though often with a stated exception for when the company knew of the message’s 
defamatory nature.11 
Radio and television stations are generally held responsible for pre-recorded content, but live 
broadcasting presents a curious analytical challenge, as the station may not have the time to 
harbor any knowledge of a statement’s defamatory and false nature between when it is spoken 
and when it is aired.12 At least one court has held that open solicitation of content without a 
broadcast delay system could lead to liability under a recklessness standard,13 but most other 
courts take the opposite approach.14 
Even when an intermediary publisher or conduit is held responsible for the content it is 
disseminating, other doctrines in defamation law provide protection to avoid inappropriate 
results. States adopt variations on a “fair report privilege,” which allows for the fair and accurate 
republication of statements made in official public documents or proceedings.15 Many states also 
provide a “wire service defense,” which allows for the republication of defamatory content from 
a reputable news agency, provided the re-publisher did not know or have reason to know the 
information was defamatory and did not substantially alter the content.16 Some states have also 
adopted a “neutral reportage” defense, to protect the republication of statements that are worthy 
of public discussion because they were made, even if the re-publisher believes them to be false –
 e.g., a wild allegation made by one politician against another during an election.17 Such 
defenses, in particular cases, could extend to intermediaries hosting or republishing the content 
of others. 
                                                 
10 Sack on Defamation § 7.3.4 (“Suppose a person were to inform public libraries and news vendors that a book, 
newspaper, or newsmagazine they are distributing contains false and defamatory statements . . . . May the libraries 
or vendors then be held liable for continuing to sell or circulate the offending material? That is possible, although 
the potential for use of that tactic to turn financially vulnerable distributors into censors . . . argues strongly for a 
complete distributors’ immunity from suit.”); Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 113 (1984) (“It would be rather 
ridiculous, under most circumstances, to expect a bookseller or a library to withhold distribution of a good book 
because of a belief that a derogatory statement contained in the book was both false and defamatory . . . .”); Loftus 
E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22 Conn. L. 
Rev. 203, 227 (1989) (“[N]o one seems to have sued a library for defamation in this century.”). For an example of a 
case that held a bookseller liable based on this theory, see Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1988); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581 cmt. e (acknowledging possible liability for libraries and bookstores in 
exceptional cases). 
11 See Liability of Telegraph or Telephone Company for Transmitting or Permitting Transmission of Libelous or 
Slanderous Messages, 91 A.L.R.3d 1015 (1979) (citing numerous cases where courts applied the Restatement’s 
knowledge requirement or found categorical immunity for telegraph and telephone companies). Courts acknowledge 
the policy reasons for giving telegraph companies the leniency in deciding whether they should have known that a 
dispatch was defamatory. Gray v. W. Union Tel. Co., 13 S.E. 562 (Ga. 1891); but see Paton v. Great N.W. Tel. Co., 
170 N.W. 511 (Minn. 1919) (finding potential liability for telegraph company for transmission). 
12 See Sack on Defamation § 7.3.5.A.2. 
13 Snowden v. Pearl River Broad. Corp., 251 So. 2d 405 (La. Ct. App. 1971). 
14 Sack on Defamation § 7.3.5.A.2 n. 66 (gathering cases). 
15 See Fair Report Privilege, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/fair-report-privilege 
(last updated July 22, 2008).  
16 Wire Service Defense, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/wire-service-defense (last 
updated July 22, 2008). 
17 See Neutral Report Privilege, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/neutral-report-
privilege (last updated July 22, 2008); Sack on Defamation § 7.3.5.D. 
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In the early days of Internet’s widespread adoption, commentators and cases sought to analogize 
re-publisher and distributor liability when considering bulletin boards and other online content 
platforms.18 After one court assigned liability for the Internet service provider Prodigy Services 
Co. for content on one of its bulletin boards, based on the fact that Prodigy exercised general 
editorial control over the platform, Congress opted to define a different standard for online 
intermediary liability.19 
2. Traditional Privacy Liability for Intermediaries 
Privacy laws in the United States consist of a patchwork of common law torts and specific 
statutory enactments, overlaid with nationwide exceptions made in light of the First 
Amendment.20 Intermediaries primarily concern themselves with privacy law to the extent it 
impacts their own businesses operations and practices – for example, how they represent their 
data handling practices to the public, and how they handle their own data security.  
A second form of privacy liability for intermediaries stems instead from the actions taken on 
behalf of others, and whether the intermediary can ever be held liable for contributing (willingly 
or not) to those actions. The laws around such invasions of privacy can be generally clustered 
into two categories: those that address the unlawful gathering of information (e.g., intruding into 
one’s private spaces or unlawfully recording conversations), and those that address publishing 
private information (e.g., the “public disclosure of private facts” tort or publishing specific 
information proscribed by statute21). The First Amendment plays a role in this space by both 
limiting the universe of defendants for intrusion claims22 and by substantially limiting the types 
of claims that can be brought regarding the disclosure of private information.23 
With respect to information gathering, many states recognize a tort called “intrusion upon 
seclusion,” which punishes one who intrudes into the solitude or seclusion of another in a way 
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.24 Because the defendant’s conduct usually must 
be intentional for liability to attach, it is rare to see liability extend to disinterested 
intermediaries.25 At least one court has found secondary liability could attach to a newspaper for 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Becker, supra note [[x]].  
19 See David Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: an Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity 
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV., 373, 407-11 (2010) 
(chronicling the history of the lead-up to Section 230, including the Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)).  
20 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 77 (3d ed. 2009). 
21 For an example of this, see 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (governing when and how a customer’s video rental history may be 
disclosed). 
22 See notes [[x–y]], infra, and accompanying text. 
23 While the states that recognize a public disclosure tort include a definitional balance that precludes claims against 
newsworthy information, the Supreme Court has yet to directly consider a challenge to public disclosure torts in 
other cases. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 
(Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds. 2010). For more on the history of balancing between free speech and 
privacy has had a complicated century of history. See Geoffrey R. Stone, ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE 
THOUGHT THAT WE HATE 59-80 (2009). 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652B.  
25 See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecomm., Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 415 (2003) (defining intent for California’s 
intrusion tort). For examples of cases where parties were liable as aiders or abettors of another’s intrusion, see 
DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 2:9. 
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running a classified ad that facilitated intrusion of another, though in that case the plaintiff 
pleaded that the newspaper published the ad with the intent to invade the plaintiff’s privacy.26 
Some intrusion laws attempt to indirectly target intrusion by punishing those who later disclose 
or receive the information that was unlawfully acquired. But First Amendment doctrine prevents 
the application of such laws to those who did not actively participate in the unlawful acquisition, 
at least when the information is true and a matter of public concern.27 This would seem to 
preclude most information intermediaries from liability for transmitting content that was 
unlawfully acquired by others.  
Laws concerning the disclosure of private information directly can vary considerably, but most 
states have some form of the tort called “public disclosure of private facts,” which concerns the 
intentional disclosure to the public28 of non-newsworthy information about an individual that is 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.29 
Unlike defamation or intrusion, the specific mental state of defendants varies considerably 
between states, so the mens rea does not generally limit liability for disinterested intermediaries 
in the same way as other torts.30 That said, the few cases that consider a distributor’s liability 
tend to impart the same requirement from defamation cases that the distributor know the 
information to be tortious in order to be held liable.31 Also, information obtained from public 
sources are considered protected under the First Amendment,32 and republishing content 
originally published widely by others does not lead to liability in most cases, as the fact that the 
content was published previously means that the information is no longer considered private.33 
The traditional standards for intermediary liability in privacy are applied in a radically different 
manner online, in large part due to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which is 
discussed in the following section. 
3. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
As noted in the preceding sections, liability for offline content distributors or hosts largely turns 
on whether the host knows or has reason to know that they are hosting tortious content. In the 
                                                 
26 Vescovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582 (1976). 
27 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (The First Amendment prevents a radio broadcaster from 
being punished for disclosing the contents of an unlawfully-intercepted communication); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g 
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to 
escalate damages for breach of duty of loyalty based on subsequent disclosure of information); Doe v. Mills, 536 
N.W.2d 824 (Mich. 1995) (knowing receipt of information unlawfully obtained does not lead to intrusion claim for 
the recipient). Scholars have been mindful to point out that the exact meaning and scope of the “Daily Mail 
principle” is not entirely clear. Janelle Allen, Assessing the First Amendment as a Defense for Wikileaks and Other 
Publishers of Previously Undisclosed Government Information, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 798 (2012).  
28 This is deliberately made a wider audience than defamation, for which liability attaches when a statement is 
“published” to a single person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D cmt. a. 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652D. 
30 DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:7. 
31 See, e.g., Steinbuch v. Hachette Book Grp., 2009 WL 963588 at *3 (E.D. Ark. April 8, 2009); Lee v. Penthouse 
Int’l Ltd., 1997 WL 33384309 at *8 (C.D. Cal. March 19, 1997). 
32 See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
33 See, e.g., Ritzmann v. Weekly World News, 614 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Heath v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 
732 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fla. 1990); but see Michaels v. Internet Ent. Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(disclosure of more than the ways originally revealed in first publication can give rise to claim for republication). 
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earliest days of the Internet, courts used these standards to assess liability of online 
intermediaries, but found that the law created a perverse result. Online intermediaries possessed 
the technical ability to filter or screen content in the way an offline intermediary never could, but 
under existing standards this meant that the intermediary would assume liability for all the 
content over which they had supervisory control. In the most famous case on point, this included 
a service that was trying specifically to curate a family friendly environment, at a time when the 
public was greatly concerned about the adult content on the Internet.34 In order to “to promote 
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other 
interactive media [and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services,” Congress enacted Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.35 
Section 230 prevents online intermediaries from being treated as the publisher of content from 
users of the intermediaries. By the terms of the statute, “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.” 36 An “interactive computer service” under Section 230 is 
defined as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server . . . ”37 Online intermediaries of all sorts 
meet this definition, including Internet service providers, social media websites, blogging 
platforms, message boards, and search engines.38 An “information content provider” in turn is 
defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.”39 
Section 230 covers claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, tortious interference, civil liability 
for criminal law violations, and general negligence claims based on third-party content,40 but it 
expressly excludes federal criminal law, intellectual property law, and the federal Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act or any state analogues.41 Its terms also specify that the coverage is 
for “another’s” content, thus not protecting statements published by the interactive computer 
service directly.42 Thus, to apply Section 230’s protection, a defendant must show (1) that it is a 
provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) that it is being treated as the publisher of 
content (though not with respect to a federal crimes, intellectual property, or communications 
privacy law); and (3) that the content is provided by another information content provider. 
                                                 
34 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). See also 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 249-52 (2006) (discussing the Internet anti-pornography efforts happening around the 
time of the Communications Decency Act debate). 
35 47 U.S.C. § 230. The section was part of a greater law that sought to relegate the transmission of offensive content 
to minors, the majority of which was later struck by the Supreme Court. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
36 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
37 § 230(f)(2). 
38 See Ardia, supra note [[x]], at 387-89. 
39 § 230(f)(3).  
40 See Ardia, supra note [[x]], at 452. 
41 § 230(e)(1)–(4). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act governs the voluntary and compelled disclosure of 
electronic communications by electronic communications services.  
42 See § 230(c)(1). 
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The law was designed in part to foster curation of online content, and courts have found that a 
wide array of actions can be taken by “interactive computer services” over third-party content are 
covered by Section 230. These include basic editorial functions, such as deciding whether to 
publish, remove, or edit content;43 soliciting users to submit legal content;44 paying a third party 
to create or submit content;45 allowing users to respond to forms or drop-downs to submit 
content;46 and keeping content online even after being notified the material is unlawful.47 This 
applies to both claims rooted in defamation and those rooted in invasion of privacy.48 
On the other hand, if the intermediary creates actionable content itself, it will be liable for that 
content.49 Courts are also unlikely to find that Section 230 applies when an interactive computer 
service edits the content of a third party and materially altering its meaning to make it 
actionable;50 requires users to submit unlawful content;51 or if the service promises to remove 
material and then fails to do so.52 When an intermediary takes these actions, it is deemed to have 
“developed” the content by “materially contributing to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”53 
While stated very simply, the law upsets decades of precedent in the areas of content liability 
law, and radically alters the burdens on online services for claims based on user content.54 By 
limiting any assumed liability for a wide range of content-based claims (and given the other 
content areas discussed below), Section 230 effectively removes any duty for an interactive 
computer service to monitor content on its platforms, a tremendous boon for the development of 
new intermediaries and services.55 Virtually all liability for content-based torts is pushed from 
the service to others, often the user. In practical terms, however, this has yet to manifest a 
windfall for online services; many claims are still brought against online intermediaries, and the 
                                                 
43 See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005).  
44 See Corbis Corporation v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004); see also Global Royalties, 
Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that even though a website 
“encourages the publication of defamatory content,” the website is not responsible for the “creation or development” 
of the posts on the site).  
45 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).  
46 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).  
47 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). Promising to remove content and then declining 
to do so, however, can expose an interactive computer service to liability. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 
(9th Cir. 2009). For more examples of actions likely to be covered under Section 230, see Online Activities Covered 
by Section 230, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/online-activities-covered-section-
230 (last updated Nov. 10, 2011). 
48 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 2014 WL 2694184 (6th Cir. 2014) (defamation 
claim preempted by Section 230); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302–303 (D.N.H. 2008) 
(intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts claims preempted). 
49 See MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 2004 WL 833595, No. 3:02-CV-2727-G at *9 (N.D. Tex. April 
19, 2004) (the operator of a website may be liable when it is alleged that “the defendants themselves create, develop, 
and post original, defamatory information concerning” the plaintiff). 
50 See Online Activities Not Covered by Section 230, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-
guide/online-activities-not-covered-section-230 (last updated Nov. 10, 2011). 
51 See Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
52 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).  
53 See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 2014 WL 2694184 (6th Cir. 2014).  
54 See Ardia, supra note [[x]], at 411. 
55 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014) (“Section 
230 immunity . . . ha[s] been among the most important protections for free expression in the United States in the 
digital age. [It] has made possible the development of a wide range of telecommunications systems, search engines, 
platforms, and cloud services without fear of crippling liability.”). 
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question is often litigated extensively and at great expense before courts find that claims are 
invalid.56  
As noted above, Section 230 does not cover intellectual property laws, and thus different rules 
apply in these cases. These are now addressed. 
B. Copyright  
1. A General Overview of Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement 
In U.S. law, copyright liability comes in two main forms, “primary” or “direct” liability, and 
“secondary liability”.57 The first, direct liability, is the liability that attaches to an actual infringer 
of the copyright(s) in question, whether by copying without authorization or by violating any of 
the other rights that copyright owners possess, as described in 17 U.S.C. 106 of U.S. law. Direct 
liability, although it can become more complex depending on the facts surrounding an alleged 
infringement, is generally quite straightforward. Either copyright was infringed or it wasn’t. 
The second type of liability, secondary liability, is more nuanced, in large part because there is 
nothing in U.S. copyright statute that expressly provides for such liability. Secondary liability in 
the United States is therefore what is known as “judge-made” law, a set of rules and guidelines, 
rising out of other areas of liability law58, that have accumulated over time on a case-by-case 
basis, that then exist as binding precedent. This makes secondary liability more fact specific and 
also potentially more prone to evolve based on changes in technology and normative behaviors.59 
Within this framework, secondary liability is conceptualized as taking on one of two forms60: 
that resulting from “vicarious infringement” and that resulting from “contributory infringement.” 
Each version requires that there first be a direct infringement. The remaining differences are 
subtle but critical, especially with respect to the implicit incentives for potential secondary 
infringers, and address a potential secondary infringer’s “knowledge” of any direct infringement, 
the degree to which the infringer has the ability to control the direct infringement, and their 
financial benefit, if any. Each of these facets are critical to understanding the competing 
imperatives that online intermediaries (“OI”s) face, and it is with respect to OIs that this 
section’s further discussion will proceed. 
                                                 
56 Id. at 493. 
57 There are mentions in the literature and case law of a concept of “tertiary liability, “those who help the helpers”; 
see, e.g. Mark A. Lemley* & R. Anthony Reese “Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation” 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1345, 1345-54, 1373-1426 (2004); Benjamin H. Glatstein “Tertiary Copyright 
Liability” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 1605-1635, as well as Eric 
Goldman “Offering P2P File-Sharing Software for Downloading May Be Copyright Inducement–David v. CBS 
Interactive” http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/07/inducement_as_a.htm (discussing how courts may view 
P2P filesharing as a special case) but this theory of liability has typically been dismissed as representing too diffuse 
a chain of causality, and unsupported by case law. 
58 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), 930 (2005).: “[T]hese 
doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law.” (quoting 
Blackmun’s dissent in Sony). 
59 “[T]he lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn” 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435(1984). 
60 Pamela Samuelson has hypothesized that the “active inducement” theory laid out in the MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), case may amount to a new form of secondary liability. See Pamela Samuelson,  
Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. (2006). 
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i. Contributory Infringement  
For an OI to be liable for “contributory infringement,” the OI must have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the direct infringement61 and make a “material contribution” to the direct 
infringement as well.62 As can easily be imagined, cases on this turn on the nature of 
“knowledge” and what sort of contribution is “material”. For example, in Perfect 10 v. Visa 
International,63 the majority found that the role of credit card companies in processing payment 
transactions for infringing material was too attenuated from the infringing activity to be 
considered a "material contribution."64 With respect to knowledge, ignorance of the direct 
infringement does not necessarily immunize an OI to a claim of secondary liability, since courts 
have also introduced the idea of “willful blindness”65 for situations in which a defendant “should 
have” known about the direct infringement, but deliberately chose not to know about it, or at 
least chose to not take notice of or act upon facts or circumstances that pointed into the direction 
of infringement.  
Important cases addressing contributory infringement, especially with respect to online 
intermediaries, are Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., Metro–Goldwyn–
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., and the recently settled Viacom International, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc.66 Critically for OIs whose business model or technology may involve copyright 
infringement, but may also be used in non-infringing ways, the Sony case gave rise to the 
“substantial non-infringing uses” test, borrowed from patent law’s “staple article” doctrine, with 
respect to intermediary technologies that only make direct infringement possible rather than 
definite. 67  
The court in Sony held that in the case of an infringer selling a technology that makes 
infringement possible, (here, through copying) if a substantial non-infringing use for the 
technology exists, then the vendor of the technology cannot be found liable68 because 
constructive knowledge of the (potential) direct infringement cannot and should not be imputed 
to the OI. However, the Grokster case expanded on and modified this theory, holding that simply 
because an OI’s technology was merely capable of substantial non-infringing uses did not 
categorically immunize the OI from liability, and that contributory liability may still be found if 
there is clear evidence of an OI’s intent to induce and facilitate infringement.69 This has become 
known as the Grokster “inducement rule.”70 
                                                 
61 Compare the DMCA’s “actual knowledge” requirement 17 USC 512(c)(1)(A)(i) 
62 The classic case on this topic is Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996), although 
this does not have to do with OIs. The lodestar case for OIs is now Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), which also adopted the doctrine of “inducement” for copyright liability. 
63 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) 
64 “Copyright: Infringement Issues - Internet Law Treatise,” accessed June 18, 2014, 
https://ilt.eff.org/index.php/Copyright:_Infringement_Issues. 
65 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation 334 F.3d 643, 650 (C.A.7 (Ill.),2003) (“Willful blindness is knowledge, in 
copyright law (where indeed it may be enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement”) 
66 See: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/business/media/viacom-and-youtube-settle-lawsuit-over-copyright.html 
67 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) 
68 “The so-called “Sony safe harbor”. See (“the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”) 
69 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-935 (2005) ( “Thus, where evidence goes 
beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or 
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ii. Vicarious Infringement  
For an OI to be liable for vicarious infringement, it must benefit financially from the direct 
infringement and have both the right and ability to supervise the direct infringer,71 a concept 
rooted in the “respondeat superior” doctrine of agency law. Critically for OIs, especially those 
that are so large that they cannot monitor all the content that they host or is under their purview, 
actual knowledge of the infringing conduct is not a requirement.72 It is the OI’s ability to 
supervise the direct infringer that becomes dispositive.  
Whether or not an OI has benefitted financially from another’s direct infringement may seem 
like a clear dichotomy. There must be a “causal relationship between the infringing activity and 
any financial benefit [the] defendant reaps.”73 However, this question has become quite nuanced 
with respect to the many disparate revenue streams that attach to an OI. As just one example, if 
an OI hosts third party content, and typically serves advertisements next to that content, for 
which the OI receives payments, and the content in question proves to infringe copyright, the 
revenue from that advertising may well be enough to render the OI liable,74 whether those 
advertisements appear automatically or are curated. 
Whether an OI has the ability to supervise the direct infringer is a fact-specific question, focusing 
on the relationship between the direct infringer and the would-be secondary infringer. Key cases 
here are Fonovisa v Cherry Auction,75 where a flea market was held liable for a vendor’s 
infringing sales and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.76 So far, most definitions of 
“supervision” have been imported from non-Internet fact patterns77, and no online-specific 
variation of what it means to be able to “supervise” that might be uniquely applicable to OIs has 
emerged from the case law. Note, though, that the U.S. Supreme Court in Grokster described an 
                                                                                                                                                                   
actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”); See also 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) 
70 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 (2005) (“[O]ne who distributes a 
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”) 
71 Compare 47 U.S.C §230(f)(3)’s “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” as well as 47 U.S.C §230(f)(4); See 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930, for a variant of the definition. (“One ... infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”) 
72 3 Nimmer § 12.04[A][1]. 
73 “It may also be established by evidence showing that users are attracted to a defendant's product because it 
enables infringement, and that use of the product for infringement financially benefits the defendant. “Arista 
Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
74 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Gary Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (“Under these circumstances, we hold the connection 
between the infringing activity and Fung's income stream derived from advertising is sufficiently direct to meet the 
direct "financial benefit" prong of § 512(c)(1)(B).). but see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 730 
C.A.9 (Cal.), (2007) (Google’s ability to terminate an AdSense partnership did not amount to a right or ability to 
control an infringing AdSense participant.) 
75 Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F. 3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
76 “Fonovisa essentially viewed “supervision” in this context in terms of the swap meet operator's ability to control 
the activities of the vendors, 76 F.3d at 262, and Napster essentially viewed it in terms of Napster's ability to police 
activities of its users, 239 F.3d at 1023.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n 494 F.3d 788, 802 (C.A.9 
(Cal.),2007) 
77 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 380 F.3d 1154, 1164 -1165 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2004) (“A salient 
characteristic of that relationship often, though not always, is a formal licensing agreement between the defendant 
and the direct infringer”) (internal cites omitted) 
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OI’s failure to deploy “filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity 
using their software” as giving added significance to other evidence of unlawful objectives and 
"underscore[ing] Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their users' 
infringement.”78 
A final note on one of the most basic features of the modern Internet: linking.79 Whether an OI, 
such as a search engine, link aggregator, or some other variety of OI can be held secondarily 
liable for merely linking to directly infringing material is typically described as “unsettled” 
law.80 Certainly rights holders, especially large institutional ones, would like to be able to sue 
wealthy OIs rather than individuals for damages, and OIs who link to content would prefer to be 
shielded from liability if that content turns out to infringe, but courts have described both a 
“general principle that linking does not amount to copying,” and stated that “Although hyper-
linking per se does not constitute direct copyright infringement because there is no copying, in 
some instances there may be a tenable claim of contributory infringement or vicarious 
liability.”81 The Supreme Court has also, in a longer discussion of “inducement,” unfavorably 
mentioned providing links to known infringing content.82 Compare the 2014 European Court of 
Justice ruling that linking to publicly available material is not infringement, but that linking to 
restricted or unauthorized material may well be.83 
2. The DMCA’s Safe Harbor  
Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, “Limitations on liability relating to 
material online,” provides for four separate sets of circumstances in which a “service provider”84 
“shall not be liable for monetary relief.” This shield from liability has come to be known as the 
DMCA’s “safe harbor”, and these four circumstances are: transitory digital communications, 
system caching, information residing on systems or networks at direction of users, and 
                                                 
78 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781 
(2005) 
79 C.f. 17 U.S.C. 512(d)’s “information location tools”  
80 “Copyright: Infringement Issues - Internet Law Treatise.” 
81 Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1202 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ( referencing as notable the 
DMCA’s 512(d).) 
82 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1036-1038 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 624, 
187 L. Ed. 2d 398 (U.S. 2013) 
83http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=147847&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req
&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7778 (“On the other hand, where a clickable link makes it possible for users of the 
site on which that link appears to circumvent restrictions put in place by the site on which the protected work 
appears in order to restrict public access to that work to the latter site’s subscribers only, and the link accordingly 
constitutes an intervention without which those users would not be able to access the works transmitted, all those 
users must be deemed to be a new public, which was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they 
authorised the initial communication, and accordingly the holders’ authorisation is required for such a 
communication to the public. This is the case, in particular, where the work is no longer available to the public on 
the site on which it was initially communicated or where it is henceforth available on that site only to a restricted 
public, while being accessible on another Internet site without the copyright holders’ authorisation.”). 
84 17 U.S.C. 512(k) (“(1) Service provider. — (A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an 
entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or 
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the 
material as sent or received. 
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service provider” means a provider of online services 
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A).” 
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information location tools. Of these, the latter two are most germane to a discussion of online 
intermediaries. It is the “user” explicitly referenced in the “direction of users” that renders the 
service provider an intermediary, and “information location tools” involve a provider “referring 
or linking users to an online location”.  
In each case, the protection from liability that an OI can enjoy is predicated on meeting certain 
conditions. To enjoy 512(c) immunity regarding infringing “information residing on an OI’s 
system or network at the direction of a user”, it must be true that the OI:  
• (A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
• (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
• (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to the material; 
• (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, 
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity; and 
• (C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.  
Note the inclusion of the phrases that are similar to the requirements in the two forms of 
secondary liability. To summarize, an OI is not liable for monetary damages or for injunctive 
relief, except for the specific types of the latter outlined in 512(j), or for any (allegedly) 
infringing material on their systems or networks unless they know or have been told it is there 
and have failed to remove it. It is important to note that if the material in question is not 
removed, that does not render the OI liable, it simply means they could be found liable, whereas 
if the material in question is removed, there can be no liability regardless of the outcome of a suit 
against the user. 
The language describing the conditions for Section 512(d)’s safe harbor are virtually identical to 
those in 512(c), in fact using identical language to that of 512(c) regarding notifications, simply 
clarifying the new variety of information to which the notification refers.85 It is a DMCA notice 
submitted under 512(d) that leads to results being removed from Google Search. 
There are a also few further requirements described in 512(i) that apply to all of Section 512’s 
safe harbors. An OI should have a “repeat infringer policy” that aims to terminate users of the 
service that repeatedly infringe and an OI should also accommodate and not interfere with 
                                                 
85 512(d)(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity, 
except that, for purposes of this paragraph, the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be 
identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be removed or access 
to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that 
reference or link.” 
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“standard technical measures.” In short, an online intermediary can enjoy the Section 512(c) and 
(d) “safe harbor” and avoid all liability for any copyright infringement committed by its users as 
long as it expeditiously removes allegedly infringing material once notified of that material’s 
presence, and fulfills Section 512’s requirements that apply to all safe harbors. However, the OI 
may still be subject to the injunctions described in 512(j). 
The system’s general weighting is therefore toward easy and unquestioned removal. Section 
512(f)’s penalties for a sender’s misrepresentation in a notice apply only when the 
misrepresentation is material and knowing, and even then, the only available penalties are 
attorneys’ fees.86 Section 512(g) absolves the OI from any liability for mistakenly removing 
material as long as it was done in good faith; under 512(g)(3) a counter-notice sender must swear 
on penalty of perjury that the material was removed in error; and even in the event of a counter-
notice, restoring material that has been removed can happen only after a 10 day period. 
C. Other Intellectual Property Laws 
1. Trademark 
Trademarks are words, phrases, symbols, and other indicia used to identify the source or 
sponsorship of goods or services. The law allows trademark owners to prevent commercial uses 
by others that would likely cause customer confusion. Trademark law is recognized at the federal 
level in the Lanham Act, and every state has an analogous trademark or “unfair competition” 
law.87. To establish ownership of a mark, an aspiring trademark owner must use their trademark 
in commerce in connection with goods or services.88  
After ownership is established, the Lanham Act authorizes an owner to bring lawsuits to prevent 
others from using the mark in a manner that would confuse consumers, or, with respect to more 
famous marks, to “dilute” mark’s distinctiveness across all goods and services.89 Defenses to a 
claim of trademark infringement or dilution include that the defendant was selling the plaintiff’s 
genuine goods,90 that the defendant was using the words that make up the plaintiff’s trade name 
for their normal meaning,91 and that the defendant was using the plaintiff’s mark to refer to the 
plaintiff directly.92 
                                                 
86 The standard for misrepresentation is quite high as it requires “actual knowledge” of misrepresentation on the part 
of the copyright owner: Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), 1005 
(2004).: “A copyright owner cannot be liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright 
owner acted unreasonably in making the mistake.”” 
87 See State Trademark Information and Links, U.S.P.T.O., 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/State_Trademark_Links.jsp (last updated July 24, 2012). 
88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18. 
89 See What Trademark Covers, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/what-trademark-
covers (last updated April 30, 2008). A trademark owner can also bring a claim of dilution by “tarnishment,” or the 
use of a trade name that harms the reputation of a famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
90 See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
91 This is sometimes called a “descriptive fair use.” See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 
Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
92 This is called a “nominative fair use, and tends to also include the requirement that the mark at issue must not be 
readily identifiable without use of the mark’s name, the use of the mark must be limited to as much as is necessary 
to identify the mark, and the user must do nothing that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark 
owner. The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). Critics note that 
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Trademark law is unique in this study, as there is no equivalent to general content liability’s 
Section 230 or copyright’s Section 512 “safe harbor” to address online intermediary liabilities. 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act does not protect online intermediaries from 
trademark liability under the Lanham Act,93 and courts are split as to whether it protects against 
claims under state trademark laws.94 As a result, much of recent trademark law reflects a judicial 
attempt to reinterpret existing tests in light of online activity, which has led to less legal 
certainty. Because trademark draws from both state and federal laws, precedent in this area is 
especially complex.  
Existing Supreme Court precedent recognized secondary trademark liability for those who 
intentionally induce another to infringe a trademark, as well as those who manufacture or 
distribute supplies to another, knowing that person is engaging in trademark infringement.95 
Lower courts have extended that to cases where the defendant supplies a platform for the sale of 
trademark-infringing goods, such as the operator of a flea market, when a plaintiff can show that 
platform operator knew about infringing activity. These courts, however, have not imposed an 
affirmative duty to take precautions against counterfeits.96 
Applying these principles to the online context, courts generally agree that online intermediaries 
can be held liable for infringement, but establishing clear standards for that liability has been 
more divisive.97 In one early case, a court stated that an Internet company could be liable under a 
theory of contributory trademark infringement if it possessed “direct control and monitoring” 
over the infringing activity of third parties on the site, though it declined to extend that theory to 
the defendant, a domain name resolution service.98 In a prominent 2010 case, Tiffany v. eBay 
(discussed in the “Private Ordering to Respond to Trademark Concerns – eBay’s VERO 
Program” case study below) a federal appellate court upheld the infringement-management 
practices of the online auction website eBay, who took down infringements upon receipt of 
specific rights holder complaints.99 Critically, the court held that general knowledge that the 
defendant’s platform was being used for infringing activity on the platform was not sufficient; 
plaintiffs would have to show that a defendant has knowledge of specific infringing conduct.100  
For online auction sites, the holding in Tiffany likely means increased industry homogeneity as 
competitors attempt to craft their own business as in the mold of eBay’s judicially accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                   
this is, in effect, the same test as the general likelihood of confusion test. See William McGeveran, Rethinking 
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 90-97 (2008). 
93 See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc. 442 F. Supp. 2d 492, 502 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
94 Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (Section 230’s exception for 
“intellectual property” only covers federal intellectual property laws); with Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 
F. Supp. 2d 288, 298-302 (D.N.H. 2008) (extensively analyzing Perfect 10 and deciding that Section 230 does 
extend to state intellectual property laws). 
95 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).  
96 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992); Fonovisa Inc. 
v. Cherry Auction Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996). 
97 See e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999); Rescuecom Corp. 
v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Netscape Comm’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 
(9th Cir. 2004); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 
F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 2012). 
98 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999). 
99 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
100 Id. at 107. 
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model. For other online intermediaries, the lack of a legal standard means increased risk and 
wary innovation. For an enterprising online intermediary with a service susceptible to a claim of 
contributory trademark infringement, looking to the policies and standards underlying the CDA 
and DMCA are likely the best barometers of legal guidance.101  
2. Misappropriation and Right of Publicity Laws 
Two overlapping types of laws govern the use of a person’s name or likeness for commercial or 
exploitative purposes without the person’s consent: right of publicity laws and laws against 
misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness.102 While the two types of laws cover the same 
conduct, they are meant to remedy different harms: misappropriation is meant to remedy the 
damage to human dignity for unauthorized commercialization, while right of publicity is meant 
to compensate for commercial damage for lost licensing revenue.103 Like the privacy torts 
discussed above, knowing participation in another’s violation could lead to intermediary liability, 
though there are very few cases on point.104 
Courts unanimously agree that federal intellectual property claims are not covered by the CDA, 
but there is ongoing disagreement over whether the exception also extends to state intellectual 
property claims, particularly claims involving states’ right of publicity laws.105 Other courts have 
taken the middle path, noting the difficulty of the issue and refusing to consider whether state 
intellectual property rights are exempted by the CDA when other means of settling the claim 
exist.106 This echoes a concern articulated in the discussion of CDA 230 above: while Section 
230 by its terms provides a clear and direct means for foreclosing intermediary liability, courts 
have allowed extensive and costly litigation on the question, undercutting its positive effects for 
intermediaries.107 
                                                 
101 At present, the most considerable legal attention to intermediaries has come not for actions they take with respect 
to user content, but to their own direct liability. This is in contrast to earlier times, where direct liability was rarely 
found with online service providers. Emily Favre, Online Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect Brand 
Integrity Against Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 165, 179 (2007). Two recent federal appellate cases have taken 
issue with Google’s AdWords program, which allows companies to buy advertisement to display alongside searches 
for certain words, including the names of competing companies. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 
(2d Cir. 2009); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 2012). Both cases subsequently 
settled. 
102 See generally Using The Name or Likeness of Another, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, 
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/using-name-or-likeness-another (last updated July 30, 2008). 
103 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:6 (4th ed. 2014). 
104 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding a likelihood of 
success on an claim for aiding another’s right of publicity violation); but see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. 
Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to find authority for a credit card processor for aiding and 
abetting a right of publicity violation, “[e]ven if such liability is possible under California law – a proposition for 
which [plaintiff] has provided no clear authority”); Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 09-cv-1967, 2010 WL 
530108 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff’d on other grounds sub nom. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding no theory of liability for those who enable another’s 
right of publicity violation). 
105 Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (Section 230’s exception for 
“intellectual property” only covers federal intellectual property laws); with Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 
F. Supp. 2d 288, 298-302 (D.N.H. 2008) (extensively analyzing Perfect 10 and deciding that Section 230 does 
extend to state intellectual property laws). 
106 Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006). 
107 See generally Ardia, supra note [[x]]. 
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3. The Espionage Act 
Because of the considerable attention given toward the dissemination of classified government 
information through the documents released by Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, and the 
profound policy implications of both the information they conveyed and the treatment of those 
who handle and disseminate such documents to the public, special attention should be given to a 
particular federal crime that implicates the disclosure of classified information. The Espionage 
Act of 1917 contains many provisions intended to prohibit interference with military operations 
and protect national security.108 These include provisions that criminalize obtaining, collecting, 
or communicating information that would harm the harm the national defense of the United 
States.109 This section was used by the United States government to go after the New York 
Times and Washington Post for their publication of “The Pentagon Papers,” a classified and 
damning assessment of United States involvement in the Vietnam War.110 Most recently, it was 
used to convict former U.S. Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning for leaking classified 
documents to the organization WikiLeaks.111   
While all federal criminal law includes the possibility for a charge of aiding and abetting 
another’s violation of the law,112 the United States has never successfully prosecuted an 
information intermediary for disseminating classified information under the Espionage Act.113 
Such a theory would present profound First Amendment issues, and ultimately an intermediary 
may only be found liable if the intermediary bribed, coerced, or defrauded a government 
employee to disclose classified information.114  
4. Surveillance Law 
A patchwork of federal law enables both law enforcement and intelligence agencies to compel 
online intermediaries (as well as others) to disclose data about their users, sometimes including 
the content of their communications. The federal requirements for the disclosure of user data are 
mainly found in two places. The primary authority enabling the federal government to compel 
companies to surrender customer data in criminal investigations is found in the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA). The authority for intelligence investigations is found primarily in 
the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA) and related amendments to the SCA. The 
authority used to compel the data disclosure is important for several reasons: it determines the 
                                                 
108 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–798. 
109 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). 
110 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
111 Cora Currier, Charting Obama’s Crackdown on National Security Leaks, PRO PUBLICA, July 30, 2013, 
http://www.propublica.org/special/sealing-loose-lips-charting-obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks. Many 
others have been charged but not ultimately convicted for violating the Espionage Act or conspiracy to violate the 
Espionage Act.  
112 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also § 793(g) (“If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of 
this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to 
such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such 
conspiracy.”). 
113 See Emily Peterson, WikiLeaks and the Espionage Act of 1917: Can Congress Make It a Crime for Journalists to 
Publish Classified Information?, THE NEW MEDIA AND THE LAW VOL. 35 NO. 3, Summer 2011, available at 
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/wikileaks-and-espionage-act-1917.  
114 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 217. For 
more on the general First Amendment right to disclose true matters of public concern, see supra notes 21, 26 and 
accompanying text. 
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legal standard that must be used, the kind of data that can be collected, and even how companies 
can write their transparency reports. 
The SCA is an outdated law, enacted well before high-speed Internet or gigabytes of free cloud 
storage was the norm. The SCA gives law enforcement agencies the ability to collect substantial 
personal data, often with minimal court supervision. Under the framework of the SCA, there are 
three primary methods for compelling data collection: warrants, court orders, and subpoenas. 
The easiest form of legal process to obtain is a subpoena. Instead of going before a court or a 
judge, a law enforcement agent can directly issue a subpoena to a company if there is any 
reasonable possibility that the materials will produce information relevant to the general subject 
of the investigation. Because it is so easy to obtain a subpoena, the types of information that law 
enforcement can obtain subject to a subpoena are fairly circumscribed. Using a subpoena, law 
enforcement can obtain what is known as “basic subscriber information.” This includes the 
user’s name, address, connection records (including session times and durations), the date the 
user began using services, the types of services used, the IP address or other instrument number, 
and payment information (including credit card and bank account numbers). 
The next type of legal process, slightly more difficult to obtain, is a 2703(d) order, called that 
because it is described in section 2703(d) of the SCA. A “d order” is a court order, meaning that 
unlike a subpoena it requires a law enforcement agent to go before a court and show that there 
are “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
requested data is “relevant and material to an on-going criminal investigation.”115 The d order 
allows law enforcement to collect non-content information, which includes data such as e-mail 
headers, recipient e-mail addresses, and any other account logs that the provider may maintain. 
As described above, both subpoenas and d orders can be used to get data other than content. 
However, the data that law enforcement is most likely to be interested in would be classified as 
“content,” and includes things such as e-mail subject lines, e-mail content, and instant message 
text. Under the letter of the law, both subpoenas and d orders may be used in certain limited 
circumstances to also get content information. For instance, the law allows law enforcement to 
obtain opened e-mails or other stored files, or unopened e-mail in storage for more than 180 
days, using just a subpoena or a d order, as long as law enforcement provides notice to the 
user.116 
Although the text of the law enables law enforcement to obtain content information, in limited 
circumstances, with only a d order or a subpoena, in actuality, law enforcement generally needs 
to use a third type of process to get content information: a warrant. Despite the text of the SCA, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, with jurisdiction over the states of Ohio, Michigan, 
Kentucky, and Tennessee, held in United States v. Warshak that the government needs a warrant 
to obtain e-mail content.117 Although that holding is technically limited to the geographic region 
of the 6th Circuit, almost all the major Internet companies rely upon the Warshak decision to 
                                                 
115 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b). 
117 See 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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require a warrant before providing any content information, despite the fact that such a 
conclusion is seemingly inconsistent with the SCA itself.118  
Because a search warrant allows for the collection of content, and is therefore more invasive than 
subpoenas and d orders, it is also harder to obtain. To obtain a warrant, a law enforcement agent 
must demonstrate to a court that there is “probable cause” that information related to a crime is 
in the specific place to be searched. In addition to content information, warrants can obtain all 
the non-content data that a d order and subpoena can collect (and a d order can collect all the 
subscriber information that a subpoena can collect). 
For terrorism or national security related investigations, the government has three additional 
levers for the collection of data from online intermediaries. National Security Letters (NSLs) 
allow the FBI to obtain telephone and e-mail records (and associated billing records), “relevant 
to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities,” but not the content of the messages themselves.119 Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act amended FISA to enable secret court orders, approved by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), to require third parties, such as ISPs or telephone providers, to 
provide business records deemed relevant to terrorism or intelligence investigations. The 
government used the Section 215 authority, for example, to compel Verizon to provide all cell 
phone metadata.120 The third lever is Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, which allows 
the government to collect both the content and non-content information of targeted non-U.S. 
persons reasonably believed to be outside of the United States. 
Subpoenas, d orders, warrants, 215, and 702 orders represent just some of the wide array of legal 
tools at the disposal of American law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Additional tools 
include wiretaps and pen-registers, which enable law enforcement to obtain prospective, instead 
of retrospective, data. With this array of tools and the treasure trove of personal information that 
online intermediaries may store, it means that once intermediaries reach a sufficiently large size, 
it is only a matter of time before law enforcement or intelligence agencies will serve legal 
process. 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., Twitter Transparency Report at https://transparency.twitter.com/country/us (“ A properly executed 
warrant is required for the disclosure of the contents of communications (e.g., Tweets, DMs).”). 
119 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(2). 
120 Full text of Section 215 Order the government served on Verizon. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order 
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III. Case Studies 
A. Sex Trafficking in Online Classified Advertising –
 Craigslist.org and Backpage.com 
1. Introduction 
As discussed in the Legal Landscape Primer of this report, Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act enables a wide array of online intermediaries to operate within the United States 
without the burdens of either monitoring user-generated content or (except in the case of certain 
intellectual property claims) implementing a system for removal for such content. 
While this has facilitated the creation of many platforms for user-generated content, Section 
230’s protections are controversial. Many believe that the rule protects what is worst about the 
Internet and social media rather than what is best about it. Plaintiffs who legitimately claim to be 
harmed, as well as law enforcement officials attempting to protect the public, are often frustrated 
by their inability to stem unlawful online content at the obvious source, the intermediary. This 
frustration is particularly acute when the websites that provide access to such content seem to 
revel in (and profit from) their users posting content that is tawdry or mean-spirited, or even 
illegal under state laws.  
This case study examines a six-year effort by officials of state (rather than federal) government 
to hold intermediaries accountable for a specific activity: namely, the hosting of online 
advertisements alleged to facilitate prostitution and sex trafficking. A recurring theme throughout 
this case study is the barrier that Section 230 poses to efforts by state governments to shut down 
these advertisements, and the ways that these governments have attempted to circumvent Section 
230 through public pressure, judicial action, and legislation. 
This case study focuses on two websites in particular, Craigslist and Backpage.com: 
• Craigslist is a classified advertisements service that has been available via the 
Internet since 1996, and currently the largest such online service in the United States. 
Craigslist hosts separate sub-domains for separate geographic regions; more than 700 
regions in seventy countries currently have Craigslist sites, with content available in 
multiple languages. Listings on the site include advertisements and solicitations for 
jobs, housing, the sale of personal items, and various services. The listings for 
services originally included a section for “erotic services.” Craigslist’s terms of 
service expressly prohibit the use of the site to advertise illegal activities. 
 
• Backpage.com, launched in 2004, is the second largest online classified 
advertisements service in the United States after Craigslist. Like Craigslist, it offers 
listings for a wide range of proposed transactions and is available in multiple 
countries and languages. Backpage.com was originally owned by Village Voice 
Media. The site contains a section for “adult entertainment services,” but, like 
Craigslist, prohibits the use of the site to advertise illegal activities. 
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2. “Erotic” and “Adult” Advertisements on Craigslist – Negotiation Leads to 
Concession 
As a general classified advertising service, Craigslist had hosted a section of “erotic services” 
content on its service, created by its users and over which Craigslist could plausibly claim 
immunity for intermediary liability under Section 230. While Craigslist’s protection under 
Section 230 was never pierced and adult content had been on the site for years, a series of events 
taking place from March 2008 to September 2010 lead to the rapid shutdown of these listings on 
the site. 
The “erotic services” section on Craigslist attracted the attention of state and local law 
enforcement in the United States, after it was perceived that some users were using the section to 
advertise services that were illegal under state law. In March 2008, the attorney general of 
Connecticut, Richard Blumenthal, sent a letter to Craigslist on behalf of the attorneys general of 
40 states, demanding that Craigslist purge the site of ads for prostitution and illegal sex-oriented 
businesses and more effectively enforce its own terms of service, which prohibit illegal 
activity.121  
Craigslist first opted to respond to these demands through negotiation. In November 2008, 
Craigslist reached an agreement with these state attorneys general to take steps to curb – but not 
remove – its “erotic services” listings. These steps included requiring posters to provide valid 
telephone numbers and pay a small fee per ad using a credit card, in order to make posters easier 
for law enforcement to track.122 Jim Buckmaster, chief executive of Craigslist, stated that the 
attorneys general had “identified ads that were crossing the line,” and that the company “saw 
their point, and . . . resolved to see what [it] could do to get that stuff off the site.”123 Craigslist 
subsequently reported a 90% drop in erotic services listings.124 
Four months later, a sheriff for the county in Illinois that includes Chicago, Thomas Dart, sued 
Craigslist in federal court. Dart claimed that the site created a “public nuisance” under Illinois 
law, because its “conduct in creating erotic services, developing twenty-one categories, and 
providing a word search function causes a significant interference with the public's health, safety, 
peace, and welfare.”125 Craigslist moved for judgment on the pleadings in the case on the basis of 
Section 230, asserting that Dart was attempting to hold Craigslist liable as the “publisher or 
speaker” of content created by third party users.126 Craigslist would ultimately win that case on 
Section 230 grounds in October 2009.127  
While that litigation was pending, in April 2009, Philip Markoff (later dubbed the “Craigslist 
killer”) murdered one woman whose services he located through Craigslist and robbed two 
others; the case received national attention.128 The following month, the attorney generals of 
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127 Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp.2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Dart did not appeal the decision. 
128 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-craigslist-killing-case-overview/ 
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Illinois, Connecticut, and Missouri met with Craigslist executives again, seeking an end to ads 
alleged to be advertisements for illegal sexual activities.129 That same month the attorney general 
of South Carolina, Henry McMaster, sent Craigslist a letter accusing it of violating its November 
2008 agreement and threatening the company’s management with criminal investigation and 
prosecution; the letter stated that “[i]t appears that the management of craigslist has knowingly 
allowed the site to be used for illegal and unlawful activity after warnings from law enforcement 
officials and after an agreement with forty state attorneys general.”130 
While never found civilly or criminally liable, Craigslist subsequently removed its “erotic 
services” section and replaced it with an “adult services” section, in which employees would take 
an active role in reviewing postings for indications of activity that was illegal or otherwise 
violated the site’s guidelines.131 Jim Buckmaster, CEO of Craigslist, denied that this change was 
the result of legal pressure, instead stating that the change was “strictly voluntary,” that the site’s 
activities were always protected by Section 230, and that “[i]n striking this new balance we have 
sought to incorporate important feedback from all the groups that have expressed strongly held 
views on this subject, including some of the state A.G.’s, free speech advocates and legal 
businesses who are accustomed to being entitled to advertise.”132 New York Attorney General 
Andrew M. Cuomo criticized the move, stating that rather than work with his office “to prevent 
further abuses, in the middle of the night, Craigslist took unilateral action which we suspect will 
prove to be half-baked.”133 
At the same time, in an attempt to forestall the threat from the South Carolina Attorney General, 
Craigslist filed a declaratory judgment action against McMaster in federal district court in South 
Carolina, asserting that McMaster’s threats violated the First Amendment by chilling Craigslist’s 
speech and that the threatened prosecution would be blocked by the First Amendment and 
Section 230.134 McMaster consented to a preliminary injunction against prosecution of Craigslist 
while this lawsuit was pending.135 The court ultimately dismissed Craigslist’s complaint without 
reaching the Section 230 issue, holding that there was no actual case or controversy ripe for 
adjudication on that issue because no prosecution had been initiated.136 In May 2010, 
approximately one year after Craigslist’s “erotic services” section was closed and the new “adult 
services” section was launched, Connecticut and 38 additional states sent subpoenas to Craigslist 
asking for information about the site’s revenue from sex-related advertisements and its 
implementation of measures to stop the use of the site for prostitution. This move was believed 
to have resulted from the widespread perception that Craigslist’s “adult services” section had not 
reduced the use of the site for prostitution, but simply driven it into other sections of the site 
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using coded terminology for the services offered. Craigslist accused Connecticut’s attorney 
general of engaging in blatant political grandstanding. 137  
Public pressure on Craigslist came from a different direction two months later, when two teenage 
girls published an open letter to Craig Newmark, the founder of Craigslist, stating that they had 
been the victims of sex trafficking through the site.138 By August 2010, there were public calls 
for the “adult services” section to be shut down, both in the press139 and from state law 
enforcement.140 Buckmaster responded to these demands, saying: 
“[f]ortunately, most concerned parties seem to realize that declassifying adult services 
ads back into Craigslist personals, services, and other categories, and off site to venues 
that have no interest in combating trafficking and exploitation or in assisting law 
enforcement, would simply undo all the progress we have made, undermine our primary 
mission of evolving Craigslist community sites according to user feedback, set back the 
efforts of our partners in law enforcement and exacerbate the very societal epidemic we 
all seek to end.”141 
Less than a month later, however, Craigslist shuttered the “adult services” section in the United 
States. As of September 4, 2010, the link to the section on Craigslist was replaced with a black 
label reading “censored.”142 This label (and the dead link to the defunct section) was removed a 
few days later.143 Craigslist later removed the section from all of its sites worldwide.144 
Later that month Craigslist representatives appeared at a hearing of the House Judiciary 
Committee and testified that while the “adult services” section had been removed permanently 
from the United States, it was unrealistic to believe that this would end sex crimes. By pressuring 
Craigslist to close the section, they claimed, state governments had ended their ability to contain 
the illegal activity in one location and work with Craigslist to pursue offenders; now, this traffic 
would simply migrate to other sites. Craigslist’s representatives specifically pointed to a spike in 
traffic to Backpage.com following the shutdown of Craigslist’s section.145 
3. “Adult Content” on Backpage.com – State Legislation and Defiance 
Six days after Craigslist testified, twenty-one state Attorneys General sent a public letter to 
Backpage.com demanding that it close its “adult entertainment services” section, stating that the 
“volume of these ads will grow in light of Craigslist’s recent decision to eliminate the adult 
services section of its site. In our view, it is time for the company to follow craigslist’s lead and 
take immediate action to end the misery of the women and children who may be exploited and 
victimized by these ads.”146  











146 http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/sept_2010/Backpage_letter.pdf  
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Backpage.com publicly rejected the states’ demand that same day, writing:  
“Backpage.com respectfully declines the recent demand by a group of 21 state attorneys 
general that it close its adult classifieds website . . . Backpage.com is a legal business and 
operates its website in accordance with all applicable laws . . . Censorship will not create 
public safety nor will it rid the world of exploitation.”147  
Nevertheless, on October 18, 2010, Backpage.com announced that it would temporarily suspend 
certain aspects of its adult sections while implementing improved screening procedures for 
advertisements for illegal services.148 
The next several months saw relatively little government activity or public outcry against 
Backpage.com itself. There were, however, numerous media reports of arrests for illegal 
prostitution and human trafficking in various states, which were attributed to law enforcement’s 
identification of offenders via Backpage.com.149 
Beginning in July 2011, there were renewed demands from both local officials and private actors 
for Backpage.com to reform or remove its adult services section.150 That summer, forty-six state 
attorneys general sent a public letter to Backpage.com calling for information about how the site 
attempts to remove advertising for sex trafficking, especially ads that could involve minors. The 
letter pointed to more than fifty cases involving the trafficking or attempted trafficking of minors 
through Backpage.com.151 A petition signed by 80,000 people and spearheaded by John Buffalo 
Mailer, the son of Village Voice co-founder Norman Mailer, later demanded that the Village 
Voice shut down the adult services section.152 The Village Voice would subsequently divest 
itself of Backpage.com, which continued to operate independently.153 
At the Spring 2012 meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), 
Washington State Attorney General Rob McKenna gave a speech to attendees in which he made 
clear that the fundamental problem in dealing with Backpage.com was Section 230: 
“[M]embers of Congress may want to review section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act in order to make sure that when Backpage goes away, another operation 
based on exploitation doesn’t fill the void…Backpage executives see the CDA as a 
license to make money from prostitution ads without any accountability. I disagree with 
their assessment. The CDA does not immunize Web sites from criminal prosecutions 
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under federal law, though the states are currently hampered in their ability to take 
enforcement action. However, given that sites such as Backpage see this federal statute as 
an invitation to promote human trafficking without consequence, Congress should hold 
hearings about carefully revising the law to ensure that the knowing promotion of 
prostitution, for example, is more easily pursued by state authorities, in addition to their 
federal counterparts.”154 
That same month, the State of Washington passed Senate Bill 6251, a state law that criminalized 
commercial advertising for sexual abuse of a minor.155 The bill made it a felony to knowingly 
publish, disseminate, or display or to “directly or indirectly” cause content to be published, 
disseminated or displayed if it contains a depiction of a minor and any “explicit or implicit offer” 
of sex for something of value. Under the proposed law, it was not a valid defense that the 
defendant did not know the age of the person depicted. 
The State of Tennessee followed suit shortly thereafter by enacting Tennessee Public Charter No. 
1075, which criminalized selling advertisements involving commercial sex with anyone 
appearing to be a minor. As with the Washington law, the seller’s ignorance of the fact that a 
person depicted was a minor was not a defense to criminal liability; the only recognized defense 
was if the seller individually verified the age of anyone appearing in an advertisement via 
government-issued identification. To implement such a system on a website would be, in all 
likelihood, prohibitively expensive.  
These statutes were expressly targeted at Backpage.com’s advertising, notwithstanding the fact 
that Section 230 barred the imposition of such liability under state law. In June 2012, 
Backpage.com filed two separate lawsuits in federal courts in Washington and Tennessee to 
prevent the enforcement of these laws, arguing that they were preempted by Section 230 and 
violated the First Amendment by chilling a substantial amount of legal advertising to adults.156  
The cases were swiftly resolved in Backpage.com’s favor. In each case, the court granted a 
temporary restraining order against enforcement of the law on the basis of Section 230 and the 
First Amendment.157 Washington State settled with Backpage.com in December 2012, agreeing 
to pay $200,000 in attorneys’ fees and to work to repeal SB 6251.158 Meanwhile, the State of 
Tennessee did not oppose Backpage.com’s motion to convert the restraining order to a 
permanent injunction, ending the Tennessee case in March 2013.159 
4. Attention Turns to Section 230 Itself – The Current Legislative Debate 
The failure of these laws fueled a legislative attack on Section 230. On July 23, 2013, forty-nine 
state and territory attorneys general sent an open letter to four members of Congress citing the 
activities of Backpage.com and calling upon Congress to amend Section 230. The letter cited to 
the Washington and Tennessee cases, among others, as evidence that Section 230 was frustrating 
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attempts by state law enforcement to suppress sex trafficking, and accordingly asked that 
Congress amend Section 230 to include an exception for state criminal law, as it currently does 
for federal law.160  
This proposal was widely criticized by academics and advocates of online freedom, because it 
would effectively eviscerate Section 230; states could avoid federal preemption simply by 
criminalizing any conduct by intermediaries of which they disapproved. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation noted that the proposed amendment would grant states legislative authority over the 
Internet that was much broader than the sex trafficking issue that allegedly motivated the 
proposal, and would be dangerous to freedom of expression online.161 Professor Eric Goldman of 
Santa Clara University School of Law called the NAAG’s proposal “a terrible idea” and “one of 
the most serious threats to Section 230’s integrity that we’ve ever faced,” arguing that the 
amendment would subject Internet communication and commerce to the whims of vague, 
conflicting, and provincial state legislation.162 
The demand by the state attorneys general has not yet resulted in a movement within the U.S. 
Congress to amend Section 230; Congress has instead looked to expand federal sex trafficking 
law to cover advertising. On March 13, 2014, Rep. Ann Wagner introduced H.R. 4225, the “Stop 
Advertising Victims of Exploitation (SAVE) Act of 2014” in the U.S. House of 
Representatives.163 In its final form, H.R. 4225 seeks to amend the current federal law against 
sex trafficking. As currently enacted, the law punishes (among other things) anyone who 
“knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any 
means a person” knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that either (1) the person is a minor 
who will be engaged in a commercial sex act; or (2) the person is of any age, but will be so 
engaged through means of force, fraud, or coercion. A separate offense exists for someone who 
benefits financially from these activities, provided they also satisfy the same knowledge 
requirement.164  
The bill would add “advertises” to the list of prohibited behavior. It would require those who 
financially benefit from advertising sex trafficking have actual knowledge of such, but allows 
those doing the advertising to be liable if the only are “reckless[ly] disregard[ing] the fact” that 
such person is a victim of sex trafficking. The bill does not clarify whether a platform, like 
Backpage.com or Craigslist, would be considered as the advertiser or the financial beneficiary. If 
it is considered the advertiser, this would mean a platform could be liable without first showing 
specific knowledge of the activity, in stark contrast to most other forms of online intermediary 
liability. As it would be a federal criminal law, Section 230 would also offer no defense. 
Some members of the media and civil liberties organizations have expressed concerns with this 
legislation. The Association of Alternative Newsmedia published an editorial in April attacking 
H.R. 4225, raising First Amendment concerns similar to those previously raised by 
                                                 
160 https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/cda-ag-letter.pdf The proposed legislative amendment would add the words 
“or State” to 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), so it would read “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the 




163 http://aimgroup.com/2014/03/13/legislators-target-sex-trafficking-ads/  
164 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 
  26 
Backpage.com with respect to state statutes, and asserting that the statute would subject 
intermediaries to impossible monitoring and verification requirements of the sort that Section 
230 was intended to prevent.165 The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for 
Democracy & Technology have also come out in opposition to this bill.166  
Despite this, the bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 392-19, with twenty 
members not voting.167 Several related bills are pending in the Senate.168 Senate Bill 2536 – also 
called the “SAVE Act” but apparently not the Senate-introduced version of H.R. 4225 – is 
radically broader than the House bill, enacting strict record keeping requirements around all adult 
advertising, and expanding criminal liability for anyone hosting, selling, or promoting any ad 
that facilitates any state or federal sex trafficking, child sexual abuse, or assault on children 
statute.169 The bill excludes Internet access service providers, Internet browsers, “external” 
information location tools, and telecommunications carriers. This works to exclude some online 
intermediaries, but critically – and in all likelihood, intentionally – not websites like 
Backpage.com or Craigslist.170  
5. Conclusion 
As the circumstances of Craigslist and Backpage.com illustrate, the presence of Section 230 
concentrates criminal power for online activity to Congress, and leaves states with little ability to 
proscribe online behavior on their own. For all the public pressure that state authorities can bring 
to bear, Section 230 ultimately blocks their ability to suppress activity by using online 
intermediaries as a choke point. Calls by these intermediaries to instead cooperate to combat sex 
trafficking at the source, like those made by Craigslist during 2009 and 2010, have been rejected 
by state law enforcement. Accordingly, while image-conscious organizations such as Craigslist 
might decide to abandon such services, there are few alternatives available for states to take 
action against organizations like Backpage.com that refuse to succumb to that pressure.  
For issues outside of sex trafficking, this situation is likely to continue. It appears that there is a 
lack of interest in Congress to grant state authorities broad discretion to impose criminal 
penalties on intermediaries for the conduct of their users, making a substantial amendment to 
Section 230 unlikely. Case-by-case solutions might, however, be reached at the federal level; as 
is the case of the pending SAVE Act. Federal statutory solutions are nevertheless more difficult 
to enact than state laws, not least because of the far greater public scrutiny that federal bills 
receive. It is likely that many online media organizations will raise challenges to the passage of 
the SAVE Act given the law’s harsh criminal penalties and unclear boundaries, but as of yet only 
a few organizations have voiced opposition to the law. 
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168 See, e.g., Stop Exploitation Through Trafficking Act, S. 2599; End Trafficking Act of 2014, S. 2564; SAVE Act, 
S. 2536. 
169 See S. 2536 § 3. 
170 S. 2536 § 3. 
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B. Private Ordering to Respond to Copyright Concerns: 
YouTube’s Content ID Program 
As discussed at greater length in this document’s Legal Landscape Primer, Section 512 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) makes it possible for online intermediaries 
(“OI”s) to have user-generated content (“UGC”) on their platforms or networks that potentially 
infringes the copyrights of 3rd parties. However, unlike Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, which, with minor exceptions, completely shields OI’s from liability for 
defamatory UGC, and therefore eliminates for OIs the burden of either monitoring UGC or 
implementing a system for removal of such content with respect to defamation171, Section 512 of 
the DMCA implements a regime in which online intermediaries can only shield themselves from 
liability if they adhere to certain practices. Section 512’s criteria, in the aggregate, have become 
known as a “notice-and-takedown” regime, and the insulation from liability that the regime 
provides to intermediaries is the DMCA’s “safe harbor.” Online intermediaries who present or 
allow access to user-generated content that infringes copyright cannot be subjected to liability for 
that infringement as long as they comply with the tenets of Section 512.   
Whether Section 512 “works” or not is a matter of much debate,172 with some arguing that recent 
developments have proven that 512’s mechanisms are totally inadequate for protecting the 
interests of copyright holders,173 and others arguing that the balance Section 512 has struck errs 
too far on the side of protecting those same rights holders, at the expense of individuals and the 
public interest.174 OIs themselves are also affected; with large-scale rights holders arguing OIs 
aren’t doing enough to prevent infringement,175 individual users arguing OI’s treat those rights 
holders preferentially, on top of a recent explosion in the number of notices sent and acted on176 
and the attendant increased costs of compliance.177 The resolution of these arguments 
notwithstanding, some online intermediaries have taken it upon themselves to go beyond the 
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requirements of the DMCA and provide other mechanisms with which to manage and control 
content. It bears mentioning at the outset that these extra-legal mechanisms, while often modeled 
after the structures of the DMCA, are not part of it178, not required in any way by law or 
regulation, and at least in theory have no effect on the true legal liability of the online 
intermediaries using them, liabilities that remain external to the private orderings in question.179 
The question is therefore, what external pressures, legal, regulatory, social and economic, have 
led to the creation and use of these extra-legal mechanisms? 
This case study provides a short history of YouTube and then examines what is unquestionably 
the most elaborate, well-known, and (arguably) successful such private ordering mechanism for 
addressing copyright infringement: YouTube’s “Content ID” system. Content ID continually 
monitors the majority of the videos on YouTube and upon finding a match, allows rights holders 
to decide whether to take the video down, place advertisements next to it, or simply monitor 
traffic to it. A key thread running throughout YouTube’s history180 is the tension between 
YouTube’s reliance on arguably infringing copyrighted content to drive its success, its obvious 
need to avoid liability related to that same infringing content, and its need to maintain an 
adequately positive relationship both with its users, who upload the content that makes YouTube 
what it is, and with institutional copyright holders, whose intellectual property is interwoven 
with much of that content those users generate.  
1. YouTube Is Created 
YouTube was created in 2007 by several employees of PayPal. Within less than a year, it was 
popular enough to have 65,000 videos a day uploaded and to receive $12 million in venture 
capital funding from Sequoia.181 Google purchased the company only months later for $1.65 
billion.182 Despite the confidence in the long-term viability of the YouTube business model that 
an infusion of venture capital and the subsequent purchase of the company clearly represented, 
the possibility of being held liable as secondary183 copyright infringers loomed over the fledgling 
company from the first.184 Negotiations with institutional content holders, who held the copyright 
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in much of the content being uploaded to YouTube, began almost immediately. In 2006, 
YouTube was able to strike licensing deals with Warner Music, ABC, and NBC, three of the 
largest entities in the video media space,185 despite the licensing fees that could be demanded for 
digital distribution of copyrighted works being derided as “digital pennies” that took the place of 
“analog dollars.”186 187 188 Viacom, another enormous player in the content industry,189 also 
initially participated in negotiations, but ultimately refused to enter into any deal, and shortly 
thereafter asked YouTube to remove approximately 100,000 videos allegedly infringing its 
content from the site.190   
Notably, according to Viacom, YouTube’s business model at the time was predicated on 
providing access to copyrighted content. “They are saying we will only protect your content if 
you do a deal with us – if not, we will steal it.”191 Statements from Chad Hurley, one of 
YouTube’s founders, seemed to confirm this, at least in part, 192 although the statements were 
arguably taken out of context.193  
Unsurprisingly, YouTube officially took the opposite stance, specifically that it was both 
interested in licensing and willing to remove any infringing material upon being notified, 
according to the tenets of the DMCA’s section 512, that it was present on their site.194 In 2007 
the DMCA was almost ten years old, and courts had already tested Section 512’s provisions.195 
However, experts did not see existing law as clearly establishing Google/YouTube’s immunity to 
liability,196 identifying serious potential risks, at least with respect to the damages YouTube 
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might have to pay if found to have contributed to infringement.197 On the other hand, Viacom’s 
course of action was seen as having its own dangers, including alienating198 its customer base 
and missing an opportunity to be part of the burgeoning YouTube phenomenon. Both sides faced 
the burden of substantial legal fees,199 potentially with nothing to show for them. Alongside all 
of this, the various media companies, including Viacom, were experimenting with their own 
competing distribution architectures and media platforms,200 even as they licensed some or all of 
their material to YouTube and used the DMCA to take down other instances of it.201 YouTube 
complied with the original set of takedown requests from Viacom,202 but this was not enough to 
resolve things and, in early 2007, Viacom sued YouTube for $1 billion, alleging copyright 
infringement203 and describing YouTube’s activities as affecting “not just plaintiffs but the 
economic underpinnings of one of the most important sectors of the United States economy."204 
The suit came close on the heels of the United States Supreme Court’s Grokster decision,205 and 
the potential implications of a win for Viacom206 were immediately apparent.207 
It was against this backdrop, and with an eye toward heading off any future suits,208 that 
YouTube began to develop its internal content monitoring system as early as the beginning of 
2006.209 From the start, this system ran alongside and complemented the mechanisms of Section 
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512210, rather than taking their place. While the internal system had other names at the 
beginning211, it quickly became known as Content ID. It is important to note that with respect to 
whether or not user uploaded videos infringed copyright, and whether YouTube could be held 
secondarily liable for any infringement, YouTube could have, and still can, rely solely on the 
safe harbors of the DMCA. Although early in its history there may have been pressure on 
YouTube to create a monitoring system in order to show their willingness to cooperate with 
rights holders, at this point, YouTube is under no obligation to run the Content ID system. But 
they do, presumably because they have decided it is better business practice to do so.  
2. What Is Content ID?212 
A complete examination of how Content ID has evolved over time is beyond the scope of this 
case study, but at its most fundamental level, it is an automatic213 system with minimal human 
involvement,214 in which: 
• Content rights holders who qualify215 may upload to YouTube’s internal network 
copies of the material that they own and over which they wish to assert control. 
Rights holders indicate what they want to do with any content that matches their 
uploaded reference files. Options include: “block,” in which the video is removed 
automatically; “track,” in which the content owner can see how many views the video 
gets and from where; and critically, “monetize,” in which YouTube will serve ads 
next to the user’s video and the content owner will split the revenue from those ads 
55-45 percent with YouTube216;  
 
• Any new content uploaded to YouTube is matched against the rights holder-uploaded 
reference database. If a match is found, the system presumes that this is an example 
of the user who uploaded the content having done so without permission from the 
rights holder, and therefore a potential copyright infringement.217 Based on the rights 
holders’ choice of block218, track, or monetize, YouTube sends the uploading user a 
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notification that an upload of theirs has triggered the system, and what the 
consequences are. Repeat violators have their account terminated.219 At no point is a 
human being involved – to determine fair use, for example – although human 
reviewers may watch videos as part of other parts of YouTube’s video review 
processes, for example when users “flag” videos.220 
The Content ID process therefore owes much to the DMCA’s mechanisms of notice-and-
takedown followed by counter-notification. Rights holders (or their uploaded reference files) 
“notify” YouTube of a possible infringement, and YouTube acts on the material in question. The 
key differences between the two processes are: with Content ID, content owners do not have to 
proactively police YouTube for their content in order to notify YouTube, because the scanning 
for matches takes place automatically; rights holders have more choices available to them than 
just a takedown; and, at least in theory, the consequences for the content-posting users in 
question are less serious.221 Further, the DMCA and its mechanisms are always available as well, 
either during or after the ContentID process. At any point in the Content ID process, a copyright 
holder has the opportunity to file a DMCA notice to take the material down. Additionally, if a 
user challenges the Content ID outcome, it is possible that a DMCA notice will be a rights 
holder’s only remaining option. Therefore, the possibility of invoking Federal copyright law 
always hangs over any of Content ID’s disputes, but this is a blunt instrument, with none of the 
nuances or possible beneficial outcomes that Content ID offers. 
Initially, a YouTube user who received a Content ID notification had only one response, to 
“dispute” the claim.222 A dispute from a user originally resulted in a removed video being 
replaced or monetization being restored to the user, and the content owner being notified of the 
dispute. The owner would then have the binary option of allowing the video to remain up, or 
filing a DMCA notice to take it down. Later, the owner was given the ability to “reject” the 
dispute, which left the video down and the user with no further recourse for some claims.223 224 
In 2012, YouTube introduced the current – theoretically more user-friendly – appeals process, to 
mixed reaction.225 
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Currently, a user whose content triggers a Content ID warning may first “dispute” it.226 The 
relevant copyright owner may then release the claim, uphold the claim, or take the video down 
by submitting a DMCA notice. If the owner releases the claim, the video goes back up and the 
process ends. If the owner upholds the claim, the user’s dispute has been “rejected” and the user 
may then “appeal” that decision, placing the ball back in the copyright owner’s court.227 
However, a user can appeal only three rejections at once, and that requires that the user’s account 
be in good standing.228 A user with even a moderate number of videos on YouTube, to say 
nothing of hundreds, could easily and quickly receive more Content ID claims than they could 
appeal. There is therefore a clear incentive on the part of complaining rights holders to use 
Content ID over the DMCA, since an un-appealed notification essentially ends the process in a 
way that favors the rights holder, while a DMCA notice can be counter-noticed, etc. 
After an appeal, the owner has thirty days to respond by either releasing the video as above, or 
issuing a formal DMCA request, thereby taking the alleged infringement out of YouTube’s 
private ordering and into the actual tenets of federal copyright law. However, Content ID may 
remain involved, albeit for other user content. Notably, if a user receives a DMCA notice, they 
receive a “strike” on their account.229 Having a “strike” means that the user cannot appeal a 
Content ID rejection, and three strikes can result in the loss of an account, with no way to regain 
it or its content.230 Strikes can be removed by waiting for six months, attending YouTube’s 
somewhat ridiculous231 “copyright school”232 or by successfully submitting a counter notice. 
Notably, and apropos the balancing of interests that copyright law and the DMCA are meant to 
accomplish, there does not appear to be any corresponding set of accumulating penalties for 
owners whose Content ID claims are eventually dropped.233 However, YouTube does assert that 
it will remove owners from the Content ID partner system for systematic misuse or abuse.234   
It is quite easy to make a list of high-profile failures of the Content ID system, failures that have 
serious consequences for culture,235 236 237 civic participation,238 239 240 an educated public,241 and 
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more. Some false positives are simply ridiculous,242 but some threaten the public domain.243 It 
can be argued that the very fact that failures like this make the news is because they are 
proportionately rare, although hard data on ContentID’s true error rate is lacking, perhaps 
because what counts as an “error” is not universally agreed upon. On the other hand, the 
seemingly low occurrence of error may be because the majority of users whose legitimate 
content is adversely affected by Content ID simply allow it to remain down because they are 
reluctant to engage with the process for whatever reason or because they don’t know that 
processes for redress exist at all. It’s equally simple to make a list of Content ID-related 
successes244, even not including the astonishing economic success of YouTube itself.245 But 
whether positive, negative, or more complex, the implications of, and outcomes associated with, 
a vast automatic private ordering system like Content ID are both far-reaching and multi-faceted. 
This case study will examine some of them through a variety of different interpretive lenses. 
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3. What Can An Examination Of YouTube And Content ID Tell Us About 
Online Intermediaries And Private Ordering? 
YouTube is, at its root, constructed by the content of its users, and therefore has an almost 
Protean246 nature. YouTube is an extremely powerful platform and tool, in part because of its 
audio-visual nature247 and has arguably evolved to become what its users need it to be, though of 
course in some tension with what YouTube itself is willing and able to allow itself to be.248 
However, because it actively occupies the space between content owners and users, YouTube is 
arguably much more than a simple UGC platform. The overwhelming market share,249 ubiquity, 
and ease of use of the YouTube platform have made it an essential tool for not only private or 
recreational communication and uses, but public ones as well.250 YouTube is a paradigmatic 
example of a “social media” OI.251 Videos on YouTube can be breaking news,252 and also 
provide the raw material underlying many articles and broadcasts, but clearly YouTube is not a 
traditional journalistic medium.253 Is YouTube a search engine? As a “simple” database of 
videos, it may not appear to be at first, but it is unquestionably used and thought of as one, and 
an enormous one at that.254 Although not a traditional “blogging” site by most meanings of that 
word, “vlogging” is a burgeoning trend,255 and more and more popular users and channels on 
YouTube are simply users sharing their thoughts and ideas, rather than “constructed” 
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entertainment.256 It has even become possible to purchase content on YouTube.257 The platform’s 
identity as an intermediary is therefore one that blurs category lines, making the way in which it 
negotiates the potential liability for its content all the more illuminating. 
The presence of ContentID means that YouTube’s liability for, and handling of, the user-
generated content that gives the site its unique qualities is subject to more pressures than just the 
largely ex post law of the DMCA. Other influences include the markets, in the form of 
YouTube’s need to succeed as a business and the normative pressures of its users258 and also the 
algorithmic decisions that underlie Content ID’s computer code and produce its outcomes. 
From a liability perspective, YouTube is subject only to the DMCA and, if appropriate, CDA 
230. YouTube could choose to rely solely on the DMCA’s mechanisms to police its content.259 
The DMCA is for the most part an “enabling” ex post regime. In contrast, Content ID is an ex 
ante regime that, at first glance, places additional net restrictions and costs on YouTube. But 
Content ID is a voluntary addition. Why then has YouTube chosen to invest substantial resources 
in Content ID if it is under no obligation to do so?   
Content ID has been part of YouTube since nearly the beginning. Arguably, YouTube started 
Content ID as a direct response to the threat of the then-ongoing Viacom litigation,260 and it 
seems reasonable to suggest that if there had been no lawsuit and no looming copyright liability 
(for example, if the DMCA somehow completely immunized OSPs for all user postings under all 
circumstances) that YouTube would have had little incentive to innovate or investigate new ways 
to monitor and police its content. Professor Terry Fisher261 has described Content ID as a way 
that YouTube could show both the court and the public that it was trying to do the right thing 
regarding its legal obligations, as part of a larger strategy that would enable it to survive.262 But 
Content ID quickly became much more than just reputation management, especially as YouTube 
continued to grow and to gain an audience.263 In contrast to the blunt (but arguably more fair) 
instrument that was the DMCA, Content ID’s “block/track/monetize” gave rights holders more 
nuanced choices than “up”, “down” or “lawsuit”, which in turn made it possible for users and 
rights holders to innovate into the new spaces provided along a variety of axes. Although in 
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some ways it may seem more restrictive, and may well be, from a given individual user’s 
perspective, Content ID is, broadly, a more enabling regulatory regime than the DMCA. Other 
UGC platforms, such as SoundCloud, have recognized Content ID’s success and have emulated 
it, sometimes for exactly the same reasons,264 and unsurprisingly, with many of the same 
controversies.265 However, many of Content ID’s affordances also have a negative side, a side 
that almost always has to do with the difficulty of how to effectively scale individual problem-
solving and fact-specific inquiry that a user needs to the exigencies of YouTube’s immense size 
and volume.  
4. What Has Content ID Made Possible? 
i. Social and Cultural Impacts 
Remix culture thrives on YouTube, although there is a great deal of “original” content as well. 
Content ID gives rights holders the ability to curate which remixes of their material they are 
willing to tolerate, a new form of (indirect) brand management.266 267 Some rights holders don’t 
attempt to curate at all, seeing each reuse of their material as free publicity, facilitating greater 
popularity for the material in question.268 In parallel, users have access to a much wider range of 
copyrighted materials with which to remix and create new content, materials that the use of 
which would previously have caused their videos to be removed under the DMCA. When user-
generated content that arguably infringes copyright remains available to digital bricoleurs, there 
is more freedom to use the raw materials of popular culture to make commentary, have fun, or 
simply to participate, and works that incorporate those materials can remain public and reach a 
much wider audience. On the other hand, many uses of content would, if challenged in court, be 
ultimately deemed fair use, and therefore not infringement. Relying on Content ID and its 
automatic processes means that the fair use analysis never takes place, and that a great deal of 
content that should actually remain online is blocked under Content ID.269 
However, the democratization of access that the YouTube platform and medium represent – the 
lack of traditional obstacles and gatekeepers – has been a boon to those who might otherwise 
have struggled to get their voices heard.270 In addition, it has facilitated the formation of new 
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bonds of community and organization, both social271 272 and commercial,273 groups whose 
fortunes may in part rise and fall with YouTube’s.274 YouTube is increasingly a space in which 
political discourse takes place, albeit still in parallel to more traditional channels. 275 276 277 278 
Conversely, the same size and breadth that makes YouTube such a powerful platform means that 
as it deploys Content ID and responds to the DMCA, it must balance the interests of a much 
wider spectrum of users, interests of whom may often inadvertently come into conflict. Speech 
on YouTube may be censored279 deliberately280 for personal,281 commercial282, and political283 
reasons. Perhaps even more importantly, accidental censorship may occur as a result of poorly 
targeted Content ID matching, or creating a collision with unknowing and likely indifferent 
commercial interests.284 As an example of how the application of Content ID can have far-
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reaching and substantial effects on an entire subculture, business model, and economic 
ecosystem, see the extensive coverage of the December 2013 “multichannel network” 
controversy,285 wherein thousands of users simultaneously received numerous Content ID 
notices virtually overnight, many of which were from seemingly unrelated third party content 
holders.286 See also more recent controversies having to do with YouTube’s introduction of 
YouTube Music Key - “essentially a cosmetically enhanced YouTube reinvented as a free and 
paid subscription service like Spotify.”287 
  
ii. Legal and Regulatory Innovation 
One clear difference between what is possible with a private ordering system like Content ID, as 
compared to federal legislation like the DMCA, is the potential speed of adaptation. YouTube 
itself has only been in existence for seven years, but Content ID has already gone through several 
major iterations.288 In contrast, the DMCA, the most recent major change to copyright law, is 
fifteen years old, and the U.S. Congress is only just now under massive pressure from a variety 
of constituencies, acknowledging that current copyright law – and especially the DMCA – are 
perhaps not the best fit for the realities of the networked digital age.289 Being able to change as 
needed may be more work for YouTube, in contrast to standing on the floor of the DMCA’s safe 
harbors, but it makes YouTube more nimble, and less reliant on government to protect its 
existing business model.290 
With a private schema, OIs like YouTube at least have the opportunity to do a better job of 
managing the evolving needs of their users, whether individual or institutional. YouTube will 
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obviously never be able to satisfy all of its constituencies all of the time,291 but even when they 
get it wrong, a fix can be implemented292 far more rapidly than a new law can be passed. 
YouTube’s success with Content ID is already being emulated by other OIs who must balance 
their users’ interests against those of the content industry, and who have previously faced similar 
lawsuits as they while engaging in licensing talks.293 The outstanding questions then become the 
extent to which the voices of individual users can be heard over those of powerful business 
interests, and the extent to which YouTube will make its private ordering transparent. Ideally, all 
of the involved parties should agree to the rules under which they will interact,294 and, for now, 
YouTube users seem to be something of an afterthought.295 It may still prove to be the case that 
the public interest is best served through law’s public ordering. 
Somewhat more speculatively, it seems that adding the private layer of Content ID may mean a 
reduction in the number of infringement-based conflicts that actually make it to court. Why 
would a rights holder file suit, or even threaten, if the material in question can be easily blocked 
or monetized through Content ID with minimal effort? This should in theory result in a smaller 
workload for federal courts, at least with respect to copyright lawsuits. Or it may mean less 
DMCA-related case law, and the stagnation of jurisprudence in that area. Regardless, this is a 
worthy topic for future research. Compare the massive copyright litigation campaign of Malibu 
Media, a rights holder that during one year was responsible for filing nearly 40% of all U.S. 
copyright lawsuits.296 
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iii. Financial and Economic Innovation 
The “monetization” choice that Content ID offers to rights holders is perhaps its most 
noteworthy feature, and other than errors and false positives, the focus of the most attention 
surrounding the program. Diverting the ad revenue stream on a video to the rights holders 
arguably functions like a compulsory licensing regime, or a sort of private copying levy,297 but 
one in which there are zero transaction costs from the user’s perspective. Even notoriously 
protective rights holders, such as Disney,298 have realized that there is more to be gained by 
tolerating, and even profiting from, the public’s “unlicensed” uses of their intellectual property. 
Nintendo has gone so far as to offer to split its ad revenue with the users who incorporate its 
content.299 The “Nintendo Creator Program” debuted recently to mixed reviews.300 Looking 
further into the future, some have even speculated that not only do YouTube and other similar 
streaming platforms represent a new consumption paradigm301 that will disrupt existing business 
models, but also that “views” may actually form the basis of new metrics for success.302 303 The 
distribution of advertising revenue304 associated with consuming content takes the place of 
selling a “thing,” digital or real. The flexibility that Content ID provides, or more cynically, the 
liminal zones that it creates, means that YouTube and its constituencies have more niches to 
fill305 and surplus to exploit.306 Hollywood may have seen the writing on the wall, and is taking 
the YouTube platform very seriously.307 It’s hard to believe that it would have done so without 
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being first convinced by the sheer scale of content, viewers, and dollars available on YouTube 
that Content ID made possible. 
 As just one example of such a new niche, YouTube is uniquely poised to effectively curate its 
massive store of content,308 a role becoming ever more vital as data grows beyond human 
capacity to make sense of it.309As the U.S. Congress holds a series of hearings on the future of 
copyright law in 2014, it is reasonable to speculate that future iterations of copyright law may 
mandate a similar content monitoring and revenue sharing system, as a way of cutting the current 
system’s Gordian knot.310 311 However, from the perspective of start-up businesses and would-be 
disrupters and innovators, creating or buying a Content ID-like system costs a lot of money, 
likely far more than having a DMCA-notification procedure in place. The costs associated with 
such a requirement would effectively raise the barrier to market entry, stifling innovation. 
The revenue stream associated with Content ID also represents a new business model for 
performers and a new, or replacement revenue stream for existing types of artists. Whether the 
new ways to make money are as lucrative312 as previous ones is a matter of opinion,313 but the 
mere fact that a robust debate as to the viability of the YouTube model exists, and that there are 
those positioning themselves as guides to the new territory314 speaks volumes. 
5. Negative Outcomes 
As will come as no surprise, the most obvious and commonly occurring problem with a vast and 
impersonal system like Content ID is that it makes mistakes.315 False positives are probably an 
unavoidable consequence of any classification system, and are a problem with DMCA notices316 
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as well as with Content ID,317 but the issue with Content ID is the scale on which it must operate 
in order to be effective.318 With one hundred hours of video uploaded to YouTube every minute, 
if even one in a million is incorrectly flagged as infringing, that adds up rapidly.319And while 
some errors may be relatively minor, some can have far-reaching and lasting consequences.320 
Relying on big data and automation means that when errors need human attention to resolve, or 
to avoid in the first place, problem solving doesn’t scale. There’s simply no way for YouTube to 
give human attention to every video, even if that attention is outsourced to rights holders.321 
What percentage of errors is “acceptable” is a difficult – if not impossible – question to answer, 
especially when some errors are so egregious.322 The nature of the problem by necessity means 
that the interest of those actors who operate at scale, whether by volume or wealth, will always 
be better served, while an individual’s will not. YouTube has little incentive (or ability) to tailor 
Content ID to meet the idiosyncratic needs of a single user, but when that user’s videos are 
affected, the impact on him or her is quite real.323 The nature of copyright may even mean that 
the actors the public sees as “responsible” for copyright conflicts may not actually be the ones 
behind a removal.324 325  
Layered on top of the problem with errors is that when user rights are completely defined in the 
Terms of Service, a user has little recourse, either procedural or substantive, when there is an 
error.326 The downside of relying on Content ID instead of the DMCA is that YouTube’s Terms 
of Service and Content ID’s internal procedures become de facto law.327 328 The First 
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Amendment329 doesn’t apply to YouTube, nor is there any fundamental right to use a private 
service. Some critics have gone so far as to say that a user’s mere knowledge that any uploaded 
content will be impersonally reviewed will itself have a chilling effect on public discourse. 330 
There is no obvious solution to these problems, at least not one that will please rights holders as 
well as those afflicted by erroneous takedowns. Solving the false positive issue also requires 
addressing “correct” content matches that would nevertheless be determined to be a fair use, the 
Achilles heel of any automatic content review system.331 Of course, there is no penalty for 
YouTube if Content ID fails to consider fair use, the way there theoretically is within the 
DMCA.332 Finally, with so much power given to YouTube and Content ID, it could easily be 
said that YouTube is no longer just an intermediary, but a third, equally powerful participant in 
the relationship between content and consumer, with its own interests at stake, both separate 
from and intercalated with those of others. 
One possible silver lining in this cloud is that the same inability to avoid false positives and the 
lack of recourse333 for clear errors by Content ID is incentivizing users to innovate and create 
their own solutions, including alternative platforms,334 new types of business organization335 and 
revenue sharing336, and even suggestions for YouTube-centered organized labor.337 To perhaps 
stretch the point, Content ID’s false positives are acting as a kind of selection pressure on the 
UGC (video) ecosystem, though it remains to be seen what will survive as “fit.” 
6. Conclusion 
It’s likely that as users and rights holders’ relationship with YouTube and each other continues to 
evolve, so will Content ID, as it did following the MCN controversy. A comprehensive private 
ordering like Content ID, may therefore serve as a “laboratory”338 for regulation and law with 
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respect to liability and may provide templates or cognitive anchors for future legislation. 
However, more avenues for success mean more possible lines along which to make mistakes. 
Policy makers will need to recognize that a particular OI’s internal schema will, by necessity, 
suit its own needs, and that a legal or regulatory regime modeled on that of a powerful and 
successful OI like YouTube will likely favor the existence and survival of similar OIs. Any 
system will prefer some uses to others, with the inevitable “pruning” and possible chilling effect 
on innovation along other paths that will result.339 The dominant players will have again written 
the rules, but this time indirectly. Ongoing transparency with respect to the way in which private 
ordering works, as well as paying more than lip service to the public interest, will likely result in 
both better outcomes and wider acceptance. 
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C. Private Ordering to Respond to Trademark Concerns – eBay’s 
VERO Program 
In the United States, trademarks are words, phrases, symbols, and other indicia used to identify 
the source or sponsorship of goods or services.340 Trademark law serves the dual purpose of 
protecting brand integrity and preventing customer confusion with regard to a product’s source 
or affiliation. Federal trademark law is codified in the Lanham Act, a statute that makes it 
unlawful to use a valid trademark in a manner that would cause confusion as to the source or 
sponsorship of goods or services.341 Ownership of a trademark does not vest upon the mark’s 
creation, and an aspiring trademark owner must actually use their trademark in commerce in 
connection with goods or services. The Lanham Act also authorizes trademark owners to bring 
infringement suits to stop or prevent use of a mark by other parties. Unlike other intellectual 
properties, trademark law is a hybrid of both federal and state law, which complicates the 
creation and prevalence of concrete standards, particularly issues involving trademark 
infringement.  
Trademark infringement occurs when one party uses another’s trademark without permission in 
commerce, causing confusion at the point of sale or a third party’s initial interest. A typical 
scenario involves the sale of counterfeit goods, or when one party uses the trademark of another 
in the hopes of free riding off the goodwill created by the trademark owner’s investment. 
Another type of infringement involves false sponsorship or affiliation, where an infringer uses 
another party’s trademark not to mislead consumers as to the source of the product, but rather to 
attract the goodwill of the borrowed trademark’s brand by association with its own product. 
Initial interest confusion is where an infringer uses another party’s trademark, often a 
competitors’, to draw consumers in and ultimately purchase their own product.  
Counterfeit goods have always been problematic for brand owners, but the Internet’s emergence 
as a market for goods has made it extremely difficult for trademark owners to bring suit against 
direct infringers. No longer burdened by international boundaries, and aided by anonymity and 
the lax registration requirements of online marketplaces, counterfeiters can push counterfeit 
goods manufactured across the globe into domestic markets with little risk of legal 
consequences.342 Finding lawsuits against individual counterfeiters for direct infringement to be 
both time consuming and financially inefficient, trademark owners began to target online 
intermediaries under a theory of contributory trademark liability.343 
Contributory trademark liability is a judicially created legal doctrine rooted in the common law 
of torts.344 The seminal case on the subject is Inwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Inc., where the Supreme 
Court held that a third party is legally accountable to a trademark owner if it “intentionally 
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induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.”345 The Inwood test initially 
applied exclusively to manufacturers and distributers of infringing goods, but courts eventually 
expanded the scope of the doctrine to include Internet service providers (ISPs), which were 
analogized to flea markets based on their ability to control and monitor the activity of the 
infringing users.346 In cases featuring claims against ISPs, judicial analysis has focused on the 
second part of the Inwood test, or the quantum of knowledge necessary to trigger liability.347  
1. Tiffany v. eBay 
In Tiffany v. eBay, the Second Circuit attempted to answer the question of whether an online 
marketplace could be liable for facilitating the infringing conduct of its users.348 Tiffany, a 
purveyor of fine jewelry, brought suit against eBay, the leading online auction site, in part for 
failing to police the site for counterfeit Tiffany products. After identifying eBay’s site as a 
marketplace for goods with sufficient control and monitoring it to be liable under a theory of 
contributory liability, the court nevertheless determined that generalized knowledge of infringing 
conduct was not enough to assign liability to eBay based on the infringing actions of its users.349 
The court reasoned that in the absence of specific knowledge of infringing activity, eBay could 
not be expected to seek out and remove counterfeit listings, and that  rights holders were better 
situated to identify infringing items and bring them to eBay’s attention through its Verified 
Owner’s Rights Program (VeRO), discussed below.350  
The court also considered whether eBay could be liable under a theory of willful blindness, 
based on its general knowledge of infringing activity. Stating that a service provider may be 
liable if it has “reason to suspect” that its users are engaging infringing conduct and “looks the 
other way,” the court noted that eBay removed every specific listing brought to its attention and 
had considerable anti-counterfeit measures in place to combat infringing use.351 Unfortunately, 
the court neglected to specify what types of user actions or information would trigger a “reason 
to suspect” infringing activity. On its face, the language would seem to include general 
knowledge, which could be a problem for companies with many employees under an agency 
theory of liability. For example, it is not clear whether liability would attach if an eBay employee 
received notice of a specific infringing auction and failed to take action, and the court’s willful 
blindness standard may become a battleground for litigation in future actions until some 
clarification is provided.  
2. Moving Forward 
The Tiffany holding seems to balance the parties’ competing interests while distributing burdens 
according to relative expertise and resources. Encumbering eBay with the legal responsibility to 
police its site for infringing auctions would have forced it to completely change its operating 
model, while relieving it from all responsibility would have encouraged it to facilitate even more 
                                                 
345 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 2182, 72 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1982) 
346 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999) 
347 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 600 F.3d 93 
(2d Cir. 2010) 
348 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) 
349 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) 
350 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) 
351 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) 
  48 
counterfeit auctions. By placing the initial burden of notice on  rights holders, the court 
authorized eBay’s existing model and supported VeRO as a self-policing tool that would allow 
them to combat counterfeit sales. A  rights holder presumably possesses expertise in identifying 
its own products and trademarks, so owners are presumably better situated than market 
intermediaries to determine whether an auction contains infringing items. But as the 
administrator and facilitator of the auction platform, eBay is uniquely situated to remove the 
identified infringement, and thus assumes the burden of action after sufficient notice of 
infringing conduct.  
While the court moored its decision in the distinction between general and specific knowledge, 
the opinion was distinctly flavored by eBay’s heavy investment in anti-counterfeiting measures. 
During the relevant period, eBay was spending around $20 million per year on counterfeit 
prevention initiatives, including a buyer protection program and a fraud engine that 
automatically searches for counterfeit auctions.352 Additionally, the court was satisfied that eBay 
had removed every listing flagged by Tiffany as potentially infringing.  
3. The VeRO Program 
For online intermediaries facilitating user-to-user sales, the Tiffany court’s acceptance of eBay’s 
VeRO program is perhaps more instructive than its decision to absolve eBay of any legal 
obligation to actively monitor its site for infringing content. Generally, VeRO is a self-policing 
mechanism that places the initial burden of identifying infringing auctions on the holders of 
intellectual property rights.353 Under the VeRO program, a  rights holder alleging infringement 
must download and submit a Notice of Claimed Infringement (NoCI) to one of eBay’s 
designated agents. In addition to swearing ownership and a good faith belief that the identified 
listing actually infringes its rights, the owner must associate the alleged infringement with one of 
twelve reason codes, which correspond to different types of intellectual property claims.354 After 
receipt of a NoCI, eBay removes the identified listings within 24 hours, and often much 
sooner.355 EBay then provides the seller with the e-mail address of the accusing rights holder, 
and the burden shifts to the seller to prove that its auction was legitimate. To reinstate the item 
flagged for trademark infringement, eBay must receive permission from the filer of the NoCI.  
4. History of VeRO 
EBay designed VeRO in the wake of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which 
established a safe harbor for Internet service providers with copyright infringing users. Under the 
DMCA, ISPs could avoid liability by removing infringing content after being notified of its 
existence.356 Similar to the DMCA, VeRO places the burden of policing eBay’s site for 
trademark infringement on rights holders, who must submit a NoCI to eBay each time an 
infringing auction is identified. Again mirroring the DMCA, the burden of action shifts to eBay 
only after notice of specific instances of user infringement. But unlike the DMCA, there is no 
legally supported recourse for sellers whose auctions are taken down at the request of  rights 
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holders, and eBay conducts no independent investigation into the validity of ownership claimed 
in a NoCI. Accused sellers are simply provided with the information of the accusing rights 
holder and asked to contact them directly to resolve any disputes. Consequently, rights holders 
have every incentive to overzealously send NoCIs, and many auctions for authentic goods are 
removed and the accounts of individual sellers are wrongly suspended or removed completely.357  
While serving as eBay’s shield, the VeRO program functions as a sword for brand owners 
interested in curbing legitimate sales protected by the first sale doctrine and nominative fair use. 
Companies like Tiffany and Louie Vuitton would love the ability to regulate or eliminate 
legitimate secondary markets for their products, and part of Tiffany’s inspiration for bringing 
claims was eBay’s refusal to prohibit the sale of all Tiffany items on its site. But the law gives 
them no right to regulate these markets, and in many ways the VeRO program sacrifices the 
rights of its users to allow eBay to escape liability. Ultimately, judicial acceptance of VeRO does 
not provide any new legal authority to mitigate legitimate sales, but it does act as a powerful 
extralegal tool for rights holders with the desire and wherewithal to regulate a vast secondary 
market for their products.  
5. Outcomes 
The Second Circuit’s opinion was favorable to online auction sites, but may have been too fact-
specific for general application beyond eBay’s specific business model. Ultimately, the opinion 
failed to delineate a clear standard for secondary liability claims against online intermediaries 
generally, and other online intermediaries wondering whether their own practices are legally 
sufficient must proceed without clearly demarcated boundaries. Regardless, there are a few facts 
that seemed particularly persuasive to the court’s decision, and similarly situated intermediaries 
hoping to avoid trademark infringement liability can look to the case for at least some direction 
for avoiding liability.  
First, in light of Tiffany, it is fairly reasonable to assume that a notice and takedown system 
similar to the VeRO program is persuasive, so long as care is taken to actually remove identified 
listings after receipt of notice. The court made repeated references to eBay’s prompt compliance 
with infringement notices, and similar diligence would seem to greatly increase the likelihood of 
avoiding trademark liability. Indeed, other online marketplaces have adapted in the wake of 
Tiffany, and Amazon currently utilizes a notice and takedown mechanism very similar to the 
VeRO program. The familiar looking “rights holder notification” even requires the same 
assurance of good faith as to rights holders’ identities and infringing activity.358 
Uncertainty remains however, as eBay had several counterfeit initiatives cited by the court, 
making it difficult to determine whether a VeRO-like program is sufficient, necessary, or simply 
persuasive. For example, it is unclear whether an online marketplace must also utilize an internal 
infringement filter akin to eBay’s Fraud Engine, whether users accused of infringement must be 
suspended or removed in certain circumstances, or if simply removing the listing is sufficient. 
The court also highlighted eBay’s consistent steps to “improve its technology and develop anti-
fraudulent measures as such measures became technologically feasible and reasonably 
available,” which may suggest that online marketplaces are expected to continually upgrade their 
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protective measures as new technology becomes feasible.359 Also, while the sum of eBay’s 
practices were deemed sufficient, the court gave no indication as to whether those practices 
represent the bare minimum or exceed the legal requirements of an online auction site with 
trademark infringing users.  
Since the holding, Tiffany has been cited in over 100 cases, but rarely for cases concerning 
liability for online intermediaries. In Rosetta Stone v. Google, a district court found Google’s 
anti-infringement efforts sufficiently similar to eBay’s and absolved Google of any contributory 
liability on the basis of Tiffany.360 But the Fourth Circuit overturned the decision, holding that 
Tiffany did not apply to Rosetta Stone’s claims on Google’s motion for summary judgment.361 
The case subsequently settled out of court, leaving an open question of whether Google’s 
AdWords policy amounted to trademark infringement. Additionally, the decision would seem to 
preclude any reliance on Tiffany in a motion for summary judgment, limiting any application of 
its holding to fact-specific inquiries before fact is tried.   
In 1-800 Contacts Inc. v. Lens.com, the 10th Circuit advocated a stricter standard for online 
intermediaries providing service to trademark infringing users.362 Specifically, the court held that 
nothing in Tiffany prevents contributory liability from attaching where the service provider did 
not need specific knowledge of the infringing users identity to prevent the illegal conduct. The 
court reasoned that “when modern technology enables one to communicate easily and effectively 
with an infringer without knowing the infringers specific identity, there is no reason for a rigid 
line requiring knowledge of that identity…”363 This logic tracks the implicit understanding in 
Tiffany that online marketplaces are expected to update their anti-infringing initiatives alongside 
technology, which effectively creates a fluid and unknowable standard for contributory 
trademark liability. Additionally, whether a service provider with general knowledge could have 
utilized technology to prevent counterfeit infringement would appear to be a question of fact, and 
widespread adoption of the 10th Circuit interpretation could lead to considerable litigation as 
identity screening mechanisms become more sophisticated.  
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D. The State as Soft Power – The Intermediaries Around 
Wikileaks 
1. Introduction 
The mission of WikiLeaks.org, which launched on October 4, 2006, is to anonymously publish 
otherwise private or censored documents in order to promote government and corporate 
transparency across the world.364 Led by its editor-in-chief Julian Assange, an Australian 
computer programmer, publisher, and journalist, and largely relying on anonymous sources, 
WikiLeaks has subsequently been responsible for publicizing several very large leaks of 
confidential government information.365 These leaks made WikiLeaks, its employees, and its 
sources the target of possible criminal liability.366 But the online intermediaries that provided 
services, hosted, or supported WikiLeaks also incurred many risks. Although not faced with 
direct criminal charges, intermediary supporters of WikiLeaks have been forced to confront 
government pressures and the potential that legal action could be taken against them. Without 
much guidance from courts or prior business experiences, online intermediaries responded in 
various ways to these pressures. This analysis of the WikiLeaks case will examine how online 
intermediaries responded in the wake of WikiLeaks’ dissemination of controversial documents, 
the United States government’s effect on those responses, and what this case means for the future 
of online intermediaries. 
2. Background 
Beginning in 2007, WikiLeaks made headlines in the United States by independently releasing 
numerous confidential documents. These leaks included the Standard Operating Procedures of 
the Guantanamo Bay Prison, reports on Scientology, U.S. military rules of engagement in Iraq, 
emails from then-Governor of Alaska Sarah Palin, and, most controversially, a video showing 
two Apache attack helicopters killing two Reuters employees in Iraq.367 After WikiLeaks 
released the Iraq video, the United States arrested and charged U.S. army intelligence analyst 
Chelsea Manning for obtaining and leaking confidential national security information to 
WikiLeaks in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which includes the Espionage 
Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.368 The United States later convicted Manning of 20 
offenses and sentenced her to 35 years in prison.369  
After Manning’s arrest, WikiLeaks worked with more established media outlets, such as The 
New York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel, to release Afghanistan War Diaries and Iraq 
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War Logs in 2010.370 Then, on November 28, 2010, WikiLeaks and its media partners released 
220 United States Embassy Cables to the public.371 The leaking of thousands of cables, dubbed 
“Cablegate,” contained confidential internal communications between the U.S. government and 
various embassies from 1966 to 2010.372 Although WikiLeaks’ previous releases had earned 
worldwide attention, Cablegate nevertheless set off unprecedented scrutiny from the public and 
the government.373  
After WikiLeaks released the Cablegate memos, the White House immediately issued a 
statement, stating that “[b]y releasing stolen and classified documents, WikiLeaks has put at risk 
not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals.”374 Three 
days later, on December 1, 2010, United States Senator Joe Lieberman, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security, released a statement asking the intermediaries supporting 
WikiLeaks to end their relationship with WikiLeaks. In Lieberman’s statement, he stated, “I call 
on any other company or organization that is hosting Wikileaks to immediately terminate its 
relationship with them. . . No responsible company – whether American or foreign – should 
assist Wikileaks in its efforts to disseminate these stolen materials.”375 Lieberman’s staff 
members also called Amazon to inquire about its hosting of WikiLeaks and the confidential 
documents.376  
3. Legal Liability 
At the time of the Cablegate releases, WikiLeaks used various intermediary companies to help it 
maintain its online presence and financial viability. Amazon hosted WikiLeaks.org on its cloud 
hosting services, while EveryDNS provided the domain name service. WikiLeaks solicited 
donations through its website using payment processing services such as PayPal, MasterCard, 
Visa, and Bank of America. Citizens could also access WikiLeaks content through its many 
social media platforms and other websites and applications that linked to WikiLeaks material.  
In general, these online intermediaries would have legal immunity from most liability under 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA),377 but Section 230 of the CDA does 
not apply to federal criminal law.378 Therefore, online intermediaries such as Amazon, 
EveryDNS, Twitter, and PayPal could have potentially been liable under federal statutes, 
including the Espionage Act379 and laws against material support for terrorism380 or treason.381  
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Although the United States convened a grand jury to consider possible charges against 
WikiLeaks and Assange,382 the United States Department of Justice has not taken any formal 
action against WikiLeaks, Assange, or any third party or business associated with the website.383 
In general, the United States has never prosecuted a journalist or an online intermediary for 
publishing classified information.384 In the WikiLeaks case, the United States only brought 
charges under the Espionage Act against Manning, the source of the illegally obtained 
documents.385 But the vague language of the Espionage Act leaves open the possibility of 
charging non-government employees such as journalists, media outlets, and intermediaries.386 It 
is difficult to determine exactly who could be found liable under the Espionage Act.387 Even 
though the threat looms, the United States continues to suggest it does not plan to charge a 
publisher or intermediary in connection to WikiLeaks. A legislative attorney wrote that “There 
may be First Amendment implications that would make such a prosecution difficult, not to 
mention political ramifications based on concerns about government censorship.”388  
Those First Amendment implications stem from extensive United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, mostly notably New York Times Co. v. United States,389 also known as the 
“Pentagon Papers” case, in 1971 and Bartnicki v. Vopper390 in 2001. In the “Pentagon Papers” 
case, the United States Supreme Court held that under the First Amendment government actions 
to prevent publication, known as prior restraints, receive the most stringent judicial scrutiny and 
would only be allowed in extremely rare situations.391 In Bartnicki, the Court extended a 
principle from the 1979 case of Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.392 and established that 
publishing truthful information about a matter of public concern, even if obtained through the 
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illegal activity of a third party, is constitutionally protected unless the government’s restriction 
on the speech satisfies a “state interest of the highest order.”393  
Since the relevant documents are truthful, newsworthy, and the intermediaries are not connected 
to their illegal obtainment, applying the “Pentagon Papers” case and Bartnicki to WikiLeaks, 
means that the only chance an online intermediary would be held liable and not protected by the 
First Amendment would be if a Court determined there was a high likelihood that the content 
released through WikiLeaks would bring immediate and grave harm to the country.394  
4. Online Intermediaries React 
It was easy for WikiLeaks to initiate relationships with online intermediaries as the website was 
still developing and relatively uncontroversial, but as soon as governmental attention and 
pressures began to mount, the intermediaries quickly began disassociating themselves from 
WikiLeaks. Many of the intermediaries decided to end their relationship with WikiLeaks even 
though they had clear First Amendment protection.  
On December 1, 2010, three days after WikiLeaks published the embassy cables, Amazon 
removed WikiLeaks.org from its cloud hosting services, citing violations of its terms of service 
and that the content on WikiLeaks was potentially damaging.395 After Amazon’s decision, 
WikiLeaks began using servers in Sweden and France. Two days later, the French company 
OVH, which was hosting WikiLeaks, went offline after pressure from French Industry Minister 
Eric Bresson.396 The Pirate Party in Sweden then became WikiLeaks’ sole hosting service.397 
EveryDNS, which provided domain name service to WikiLeaks, also denied service to 
WikiLeaks, claiming WikiLeaks received distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that 
affected other EveryDNS clients.398 For a period of time, Internet users who typed 
“www.wikileaks.org” into their URL would not be directed to the website. Some users resorted 
to typing the IP address of WikiLeaks in order to directly connect to the website.399 WikiLeaks 
quickly switched to a domain name service in Switzerland and could be temporarily found via 
“www.wikileaks.ch.”400 
PayPal, an online payment service through which the public could financially support 
WikiLeaks, suspended its service to WikiLeaks on December 4, 2010.401 This decision came 
after the U.S. State Department legal adviser Harold Koh wrote a letter to WikiLeaks stating the 
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website was engaging in illegal activity.402 In a statement, PayPal said that it suspended the 
WikiLeaks account because “our payment service cannot be used for any activities that 
encourage, promote, facilitate or instruct others to engage in illegal activity.”403 Soon after, 
MasterCard, Visa, and Bank of America announced they would no longer allow WikiLeaks to 
accept process payments using their products.404 This resulted in a 95 percent decrease of 
donations to WikiLeaks even though the website found some limited funding through other third 
parties.405  
Later, in December 2010, Apple removed an iPhone application that allowed users to access 
WikiLeaks documents.406 Even though the developer of the app had no direct ties to WikiLeaks, 
Apple said it removed the app because the app did not comply with local laws and could put 
people in harm’s way.407  
Although Amazon, EveryDNS, PayPal, and Apple seemed to make their decisions after soft, 
indirect government pressures, Twitter, another online intermediary, felt direct pressure from 
United States courts. On December 14, 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice subpoenaed Twitter 
for WikiLeaks’ account information.408 The subpoena, which came with a gag order, requested 
the user names, addresses, telephone numbers, bank account details, and credit card numbers of 
five WikiLeaks leaders associated with WikiLeaks’ Twitter account.409 The subpoena also 
sought the email addresses and IP addresses for any communications stored on those accounts, 
which included identifying information of some of the more than 600,000 followers of 
WikiLeaks’ Twitter page.410 Twitter successfully appealed the gag order in order to disclose the 
subpoena to its users, but on November 11, 2011, a U.S. federal judge upheld the subpoena 
under the Stored Communications Act.411 Although Twitter was the only social media outlet to 
publicly contest the subpoenas and gag orders, WikiLeaks claims that similar subpoenas have 
been issued to Google and Facebook.412  
5. Analysis 
Some of the intermediaries publically cited violations of Terms of Use or other contractual 
violations as why they ended their relationship with WikiLeaks, but pressure from the United 
States government and threats of criminal liability undoubtedly played a large role.413 Questions 
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remain as to what these decisions by the intermediaries tell us about the relationship between the 
United States government and online intermediaries and what it means for the future of the 
Internet and free speech. 
The WikiLeaks case is an example of how the United States government censored potential 
Internet content through extralegal means. Although the law did not empower the government to 
stop the intermediaries from associating with WikiLeaks, the soft power of the government led to 
the suppression of speech by limiting the means in which the content could reach the public. The 
government’s influence stemmed, for at least the time being, the dissemination of WikiLeaks 
materials. Just as traditional print media relied on common mail carriers to transmit newspapers, 
so do modern-day online media outlets rely on online intermediaries for distribution and 
spreading of their content. Instead of the government, private companies who maintain the 
Internet’s infrastructure are increasingly often the gatekeepers of which messages are allowed to 
freely flow online.414 If the United States government, through extralegal avenues, is able to 
control online intermediaries by skirting the limits of the Constitution, the government, in turn, is 
able to stifle online speech without running afoul of the First Amendment. Although practical 
considerations are of course a major obstacle, truly guaranteeing free speech online will require 
an Internet free from of government censorship in conjunction with a robust private 
infrastructure that supports free speech.415 
i. What, If Anything, Can be Done? 
Since online intermediates are private companies and are not constrained by the limits of the 
Constitution, they are only governed by the contracts they sign with their customers. As a result, 
the terms of service controlling online speech end up being stricter than restrictions on public 
speech. There are limited options for WikiLeaks or other disseminators of online speech to fight 
against suppression by intermediaries. WikiLeaks could sue the intermediary for wrongful denial 
of service, arguing there is an implied contractual obligation to not withhold service 
unreasonably or without good faith.416 WikiLeaks could also sue the government for tortuous 
interference with contractual relations, but it would be difficult to prove that government 
intervention caused the intermediary to break the contract with WikiLeaks.417  
Without the power of law encouraging intermediaries to keep freedom of expression robust on 
the Internet, one of the only remaining influences over the intermediaries is the power of the 
consumer. If public backlash is strong enough, intermediaries may think twice about refusing 
service to organizations like WikiLeaks. This is difficult because of the layers of secrecy 
between the government and the intermediaries that restrict disclosures to the public. For 
example, it was only after Twitter appealed the gag order that the public found out about the 
subpoenas it received from the government. This earned praise from many organizations and 
users of the social networking website.418 The United States government submits more than 
50,000 subpoenas each year, known as national security letters, with gag orders that prevent 
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revealing to the public what the subpoenas seek or even that the subpoenas exist.419 These gag 
orders stifle public debate on the topic of national security letters. If the public does not know 
what is going on between the intermediaries and the government, the public will not be able to 
put pressure on intermediaries. 
ii. Why Only WikiLeaks? 
The WikiLeaks case study also brings up the question of why the intermediaries disassociated 
themselves from WikiLeaks.org but not the other websites that were distributing the same 
material. The Cablegate documents that caused the intermediaries to separate themselves from 
WikiLeaks were not uniquely posted on WikiLeaks.org; they were also available on the websites 
of The New York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel.420 Nevertheless, the intermediaries did 
not change their policies related to the more established press entities. The intermediaries drew a 
line between the established press and WikiLeaks, a website who claims to be part of the press 
but is often cast as “rogue” or anti-American.421 Although the Constitutional protections given to 
WikiLeaks and the other outlets are largely the same,422 the decisions by the intermediaries 
showed a clear difference in policy between the intermediaries and WikiLeaks and the 
intermediaries and other media outlets.423 For whatever reason this policy difference exists – 
possibly due to differences in organizational structure, technology, or the intent of WikiLeaks 
compared to the established press – this stark difference in treatment puts online ventures, 
especially ones not conforming to traditional norms or paradigms, e.g. “the press”, at a greater 
risk than traditional media outlets.424 This disparate treatment undermines the quality of our 
public disclosure and weakens the important function of the newly developing fourth estate in 
the networked information society.425  
iii. What Will the Impact be on Economics, Social Progress, and Innovation? 
There are several different downstream consequences of the WikiLeaks case study. After seeing 
Amazon, EveryDNS, PayPal, and Apple bow to government pressure, online intermediaries 
faced with similar dilemmas will more easily make the same decision. If and when future online 
intermediaries are approached with the question of whether to support OIs that are publishing 
questionable material, especially confidential national security material, an example has already 
set by some of the most powerful intermediaries in the country. Additionally, the outcome of its 
efforts with respect to WikiLeaks surely reassures the United States government that pressuring 
private companies yields successful results, which will only encourage similar pressure in the 
future. Finally, it may chill the speech of other online speakers who may think twice about 
voicing their opinion online for fear their speech will be suppressed by the intermediaries.  
                                                 
419 Noam Cohen, Twitter Shins a Spotlight on Secret F.B.I. Subpoenas, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/business/media/10link.html? 
partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0. 
420 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 326. 
421 Id. at 385–396. 
422 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See also Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010). “We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional 
privilege beyond that of other speakers.” 
423 See Benkler, supra note 2, at 358. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. at 362.  
  58 
 
E. Online Intermediaries and Transparency Reporting 
1. Introduction  
As online intermediaries move beyond simply delivering content to end users and become 
persistent cloud storage networks for all of a user’s communications and online interactions, 
these intermediaries have become incredible resources for law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies. This puts online intermediaries in a difficult situation with respect to their users. On the 
one hand, user trust is a central part of their business model: if users cannot trust these 
companies, they will not entrust them with sensitive personal material such as photographs, e-
mails, texts, and other documents. But on the other hand, companies are legally required to 
comply with the law of the countries in which they operate. Some of these laws require 
companies to disclose their users’ sensitive data (ranging from metadata to actual content) when 
presented with a valid legal request such as a warrant, subpoena, or court order. 
Many of the world’s largest online intermediaries are products of California’s Silicon Valley, 
and are thus US companies bound by US law. When discussing issues such as human rights and 
online censorship, this location has been considered an asset, often allowing companies to claim 
immunity from the laws of the countries in which they don’t (yet) operate.426 
US-based intermediaries, however, have never claimed to be immune from US legal jurisdiction. 
And the revelations of Edward Snowden regarding the NSA have shown how that jurisdiction 
subjects these companies to the surveillance demands of US intelligence agencies.427 While the 
media focus of the past year and a half has been on the depth and breadth of those intelligence 
demands, these companies are equally subject to the requests of other US law enforcement 
agencies from the federal level all the way down to the local level. 
Regardless of whether the demands are from intelligence agencies or local sheriff’s offices, they 
place the companies in a difficult situation. How do they comply with valid requests while 
maintaining the critical trust of their users? Over the past year there has been an explosion in the 
use of transparency reports as one way to navigate this difficult tension. One of the audiences for 
these reports is the users of the service;428 for these users, the report symbolizes a commitment to 
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openness and offers assurances that the company is not complicit in mass or indiscriminate 
surveillance. The reports, however, are an incomplete solution. They are subject to 
misunderstandings and ultimately serve as incomplete proxies for the real issue: the 
trustworthiness of companies and the extent to which they will go to protect the privacy of their 
users. 
2. Legal Background 
The legal requirements for the disclosure of user data are found in several areas. At the federal 
level, the requirements come from two key sources. The primary authority enabling the federal 
government to compel companies to surrender customer data in criminal investigations is found 
in the Stored Communications Act (SCA). By contrast, the authority for intelligence 
investigations is found primarily in the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA). The 
authority used to compel the data disclosure is important for several reasons: it determines the 
legal standard that must be used, the kind of data that can be collected, and even how companies 
can write their transparency reports. 
Although these authorities are described in greater detail in the legal primer section of this 
paper,429 a brief review is useful here. In short, there are three main kinds of legal processes for 
criminal investigations: subpoenas, court orders (often called d orders because the authority is 
located in Section 2703(d) of SCA), and warrants. Because subpoenas and d orders are easier to 
obtain, law enforcement may only use them to collect basic subscriber information and other 
non-content information. Warrants are more difficult to obtain, requiring convincing a court that 
there is “probable cause” that information related to a crime is in the specific place to be 
searched. Because they are harder to obtain, warrants can be used to collect content information, 
such e-mail subject lines, e-mail content, and instant message text. 
There are also three legal processes for intelligence investigations: National Security Letters 
(NSLs), section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. 
NSLs allow the FBI to obtain telephone and e-mail records (and associated billing records), 
“relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities,” but not the content of the messages themselves.430 Section 215 authority 
allows secret court orders, approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), 
requiring third parties, such as ISPs or telephone providers, to provide business records deemed 
relevant to terrorism or intelligence investigations. The third authority is Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act, which allows the government to collect both the content and non-content 
information of targeted non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside of the United States. 
Subpoenas, d orders, warrants, 215, and 702 orders represent just some of the wide array of legal 
tools at the disposal of American law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It is this collection 
of legal tools that put American-based online intermediaries into a difficult position. There are 
very few options available for companies that are served valid legal process, other than 
compliance. Generally speaking, that is for the best – it would undermine civil society and 
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respect for law if companies could pick and choose the laws that they comply with. 
Unfortunately, the invasiveness of these legal demands risks undermining the relationship 
between the companies and their users. 
3. Transparency Reporting: Resolving the Tension Between Compliance and 
Trust? 
One of the key ways that companies have tried to maintain the trust of their users while still 
complying with valid legal process is through the publication of transparency reports. These 
reports, which document the amount and type of legal process that law enforcement agencies and 
government have served on a company, are a relatively new phenomenon. Prior to Edward 
Snowden’s first NSA leak on June 9, 2013, only seven American Internet or telecommunications 
companies had published transparency reports (LinkedIn, Google, Sonic, Dropbox, SpiderOak, 
Twitter, and Microsoft). In the year that followed, 18 additional companies released transparency 
reports. Thus, the revelations about the scope of NSA surveillance – and the attention that those 
news stories garnered – served to build momentum for transparency reporting. 
With this surge in reporting taking place only within the last year, transparency reports are very 
much an on-going experiment. The 25 current transparency reports represent a vast array of 
preferences, choices, and techniques for presenting this information. And because they are so 
new, a clear consensus has not yet developed around them. That being said, there are three 
important observations we can draw from transparency reports and the companies’ attempts to 
use them to restore and maintain user trust. 
4.  National Security Data is Complicated  
Although the stories of NSA surveillance may have catalyzed the use of transparency reporting, 
domestic law enforcement data requests are actually the more commonly reported category of 
data. 18 of the 25 transparency reports include domestic law enforcement requests, and only 15 
include data on FISA requests or NSLs. However, more significant than the number of reports is 
the fact that companies provide far greater detail about domestic law enforcement requests than 
they do for national security requests. 
The reason for this disparity in detail between reporting about domestic law enforcement 
requests and reporting about national security surveillance is due to complex legal restraints. 
Companies are generally free to publish as much detail as they wish with regards to domestic law 
enforcement requests. In fact, one company has taken the maximalist approach of publishing a 
list of every single such report it has received.431 
By contrast, the government requires companies’ reports to be quite circumspect with regards to 
disclosures about FISA and NSL requests. These restrictions come from a January 27, 2014 
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and the major Internet companies.432 This 
agreement leaves companies with two, and only two, approaches to publishing information about 
national security related requests. The first option allows companies to report the following 
categories of data:  
• Number of NSLs received  
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• Number of customer accounts affected by NSLs  
• Number of FISA orders for content information  
• Number of “customer selectors targeted under FISA content orders”  
• Number of FISA orders for non-content information  
• Number of “customer selectors targeted under FISA non-content orders”  
However, all of those categories can only be reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0–999. The 
second option allows companies to report in bands of 250 starting with 0–249. But companies 
using this option may only report:  
• Number of national security requests received (FISA and NSL together in one 
number)  
• Number of “customer selectors targeted under all national security process” 
Because of these restrictions, it has been difficult to extract from transparency reports valuable 
information relating to national security process. While NSA surveillance may have prompted an 
explosion in transparency reporting, the reports available say far more about domestic law 
enforcement than they do about the NSA. That fact, however, does not diminish the value of 
transparency reports as a way of understanding domestic criminal surveillance. Indeed, one thing 
that we’ve learned from transparency reports is that online intermediaries receive just as many 
requests (if not more) for domestic criminal surveillance than intelligence related surveillance.433 
Thus, although the focus on the NSA may have been misplaced as the motivation for 
transparency reporting, the end result has provided data helpful for understanding the scale and 
scope of the surveillance burdens placed upon online intermediaries as a whole. 
5. Transparency Reports Describe a Passive Event  
The biggest challenge for transparency reports as a tool for reestablishing and maintaining trust 
between companies and their users is that the data often provides little that explains how 
companies are trying to protect user data. The reason for this stems from the fact that 
transparency reports are largely documenting a passive event on the part of companies; 
transparency reports say more about governments than companies. If a company’s transparency 
report shows a large number of government requests for their user data, that could indicate one 
of three things:  
• The government is aggressively investigating the users of this company  
• The company has a large number of users  
• The users of this service are more likely to be engaged in criminal activity  
Importantly, none of those three possibilities relates to the trustworthiness of the company itself, 
and that’s because companies have no control over the number of requests they receive. 
Companies do, however, have control over how they handle those requests. Companies can 
carefully scrutinize requests to ensure that they are responding only to valid requests. But, once 
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again, transparency reports are ill suited to document this. If a company’s transparency report 
shows that they have responded to every single government request, it may be because they 
haven’t scrutinized the validity of the requests. But it may also be because every single request 
was valid, even after careful scrutiny. Thus, transparency reports are often weak proxies for 
determining company trustworthiness. 
6. Companies Are Competing With Transparency Reports  
Although there are clearly challenges with transparency reports, many companies are innovating 
with their reports, both to address some of these weaknesses, and to compete with their peers. 
A good example of innovation comes from the user notice section of Tumblr’s transparency 
report.434 User notice, like the volume of requests received, presents a problem for transparency 
reports because there may be many reasons why a company may or may not provide notice to a 
user, making a basic percentage misleading. For example, a company may choose (or be 
compelled) to not provide notice because the request is sealed or because or because the 
company concluded on its own that notice might disrupt an investigation. This concern is 
particularly salient in child pornography investigations, where notice to the suspected user might 
prompt them to delete evidence. Transparency reports are often too blunt a tool to express these 
subtleties in company decision-making.  
Tumblr has tried to address this deficiency within existing reports by providing detailed data 
about the percent of notice for each of eight different kinds of legal investigations. For instance, 
Tumblr’s data shows that they provide notice in only 1% of “Harm to Minors” investigations and 
0% of suicide investigations. Had Tumblr reported the percent of time they provided user notice 
cumulatively for all types of investigations, their lack of notice in child pornography cases would 
have made it appear that Tumblr was providing less notice to users overall. Making the effort to 
categorize requests by type of investigation is not easy, but it pays dividends by helping users 
understand more about Tumblr’s approach to user notice in different circumstances. No other 
company is as of yet providing this level of specificity for user notice in their transparency 
report. 
There are other examples of innovation in transparency reporting. For instance, Verizon435 and 
AT&T,436 two of America’s biggest cellular service providers, have reported the number of 
requests for user location information, as well as the number of law enforcement requests for 
“cell tower dumps” – lists of every single phone number connected to a particular cellular tower. 
Although the latter is specific to mobile phone service, location data is something many 
intermediaries track and (presumably) share with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but 
it has yet to make it to many other transparency reports.  
In conversations with many companies that have released transparency reports, we’ve learned 
that companies often look to peer companies’ reports for inspiration when creating their own 
reports, but also seek to outdo existing reports with new levels of detail or innovative features. 
Thus, more recent transparency reports tend to make standard the features that were more 
                                                 
434 Tumblr’s Transparency Report, at http://transparency.tumblr.com/tagged/providing-user-notice 
435 Verizon Transparency Report: US Data, at http://transparency.verizon.com/us-report?/us-data 
436 AT&T Transparency Report, at http://about.att.com/content/csr/home/frequently-requested-
info/governance/transparencyreport.html 
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innovative just a year ago. For instance, separating content from non-content requests, 
identifying emergency requests, and listing subpoenas, court orders, and warrants separately 
have all become the norm in more recent reports, when they were rarely done a year ago. 
Because companies seek to outdo each other with their transparency reports, it would not be a 
surprise to see these innovations spread to other reports, and to see further innovations in 
reporting that do even more to help users regain trust in online intermediaries. 
7. Conclusion 
Online intermediaries increasingly find themselves in a difficult situation. How do they maintain 
the trust of their users while complying with valid legal demands to disclose user data to the 
government? One approach that has gained traction over the past year has been through 
transparency reporting. These reports, however, are incomplete proxies for company 
trustworthiness. This is largely due to the fact that companies have no control over the number of 
requests they receive and the validity of those requests. Despite this issue, reports, taken as a 
whole, help us better understand the often secretive and fragmented law enforcement 
environment that intermediaries operate within. 
Ultimately, law enforcement requests and surveillance are government issues, not corporate 
ones. Thus, a government that wanted to enhance user trust for the companies that operate within 
its legal boundaries might take it upon itself to offer transparency reports of its own. Or better 
still, it would place significant legal restraints upon its ability to collect user data in the first 
place. But in the absence of those steps, transparency reports serve a useful role in providing a 
sense of the scope of law enforcement requests and government surveillance. To the extent that 
such reports show that only a small percentage of users are impacted by law enforcement 
requests and surveillance, they are indeed helpful for reestablishing and maintaining user trust. 
However, transparency reports are primarily statements about government activity, and there is 
little a transparency report can do to directly change government behavior. Additionally, there 
have been no studies conducted to identify any impact from transparency reports on either user 
behavior or corporate bottom lines.437 However, to the extent that they demonstrate the scope of 
government data collection, the reports may help contribute to the policy discussion that could 








                                                 
437 We do, however, has evidence that the revelations about NSA surveillance have cost online intermediaries 
somewhere between $35 and $180 billion dollars in lost business. Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying 
Cost U.S. Tech Companies, NY Times, Mar. 21, 2014, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-
from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html 
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!NoC Online Intermediaries Case Studies Series: Roles and 
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Regulations in the Mixture of Hope and Fear 
Thuy Nguyen1 
Editorial Note: Context, Character, and Purpose of the Case Study 
This case study is part of a globally coordinated, independent academic research project by the Global 
Network of Interdisciplinary Internet & Society Research Centers (NoC). Facilitated by the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, the project is the first output of a larger policy-
oriented research initiative that examines the rapidly changing landscape of online intermediary 
governance at the intersection of law, technology, norms, and markets. In concert with other research 
projects, it seeks to develop criteria, comparative methods, and a shared data repository, and to compile 
insights and lessons learned across diverse communities of knowledge aimed at informing and improving 
Internet policy-making globally. 
The initial research output consists of a case study series exploring online intermediary liability 
frameworks and issues in Brazil, the European Union, India, South Korea, the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Vietnam, and a synthesis paper that seeks to distill key observations and provide a high-level 
analysis of some of the structural elements that characterize varying governance frameworks, with a focus 
on intermediary liability regimes and their evolution. 
The authors of these case studies have participated in a multi-step process of in-person consultations and 
remote collaborations among a global team of researchers from the Network of Centers. Additionally, the 
case studies are based on a set of broader questions regarding the role of online intermediaries in the 
digital age.2 
The research effort is grounded in a diversity of global perspectives and collaborative research 
techniques, committed to objective and independent academic standards, and aspires to be useful, 
actionable, and timely for policymakers and stakeholders. More broadly, the Network of Centers seeks to 
contribute to a more generalized vision and longer-term strategy regarding the role of academic research, 
facilitation and convening, and education and communication in the Internet age. For additional 
information on the initiative, please contact Urs Gasser, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, at 
ugasser@cyber.law.harvard.edu.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Thuy Nguyen wrote this chapter when she was an LL.M candidate at Harvard Law School and an intern at the 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society. All translations appearing within this essay are considered unofficial and 
prepared by the author for the ease of the reader’s reference, unless otherwise noted. 
2 The process is documented at: “Online Intermediaries: Functions, Values, and Governance Options”, The Global 









Abstract: This essay studies the policy and regulatory framework affecting the 
liability of online intermediaries in Vietnam. Through this essay, readers will 
explore how the liability of online intermediaries is shaped by the local 
authority’s ideology, concerns, and hopes, as well as other political and economic 
factors regarding the information, communications, and technology sector. 
Maximizing local regulatory sovereignty over all types of Internet activity is the 
dominant feature of the current Vietnamese policy and regulatory landscape. This 
happens through various regulatory tools: server localization requirements, 
compulsory licensing or registration with the local government, required 
authentication of users’ identification, and extensive reporting obligations, among 
others. At the same time, there is also an image of Vietnam as strongly desiring to 
grasp the opportunities brought by the online environment in order to boost 
domestic economic development. This desire is mixed with the protectionist 
effort, which aims to promote locally branded online goods and services, favor 
homegrown online intermediaries, and capture domestically a larger portion of the 
income generated inside Vietnam by foreign businesses. A close look at the 
Facebook blocking case will illustrate this particular situation. Finally, to 
complete the picture of the Vietnamese regulatory and policy landscape, this 
essay also discusses the local regulatory attempts regarding the responsibilities of 
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Vietnam seems to possess a notorious record regarding its treatment of the Internet. The 
organization Reporters without Borders refers to the country as one of the “enemies of the 
Internet.”3 The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation names Vietnam as the author 
of one of the “10 worst innovation mercantilist policies of 2013.”4 The country also has a record 
of suppressing online dissidents.5 However, there is also another Vietnam that is less known 
internationally − one with the ambition of becoming an information economy, with information 
technology as the “focal industry” for economic growth. Recent legal and policy developments 
regarding online intermediaries in Vietnam reflect both of these images. 
This essay focuses on analyzing the fears and hopes related to online activities, and the 
corresponding policies and regulations by the Vietnamese authorities. Relevant cases, 
regulations, and draft regulations will be analyzed to illustrate the roles and liabilities of online 
intermediaries. 
Online activities bring both hope and fear to the current regime. Since the early 1990s, fear of the 
Internet as an untested technology that might affect the integrity of the current regime has led to 
regulations that allow the Vietnamese authorities to exercise heavy censorship and maximum 
controlling power over online activities. One of the regulatory tools used then was requiring all 
entities wishing to connect to the Internet to locate their servers in Vietnam and to connect to the 
Internet through a limited number of government-licensed international gateways. Furthermore, 
setting limits for what was admissible online content and what had to be be removed was crucial 
for maintaining the current regime. This control was deemed particularly important in the context 
that online platforms could be used to easily gather or organize anti-government forces. This set 
of fears resulted in heavy burdens for online intermediaries. For instance, in order to fully control 
local online activities, the government recently required online social network service suppliers 
to ensure that their users supply accurate personal information. Related, a national online 
identification database, which is under construction, will be used to verify personal information 
of online social network users. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See Reporters without Borders, Enemies of the Internet 2013 Report, March 12, 2013, available at 
http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/03/enemies-of-the-Internet_2013.pdf, accessed on 
February 28, 2014. 
4 See Michelle A. Wein and Stephen J. Ezell, The 10 Worst Innovation Mercantilist Policies of 2013, The 
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, January 2014, available at http://www.itif.org/pressrelease/ten-
worst-innovation-mercantilist-policies-2013, accessed on February 28, 2014. 
5 See Human Rights Watch, Vietnam: Clinton Should Spotlight Internet Freedom, July 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/09/vietnam-clinton-should-spotlight-Internet-freedom, accessed on March 3, 
2014; See also Eva Galperin, Free Expression in Danger as Bloggers and Activists Go On Trial in Vietnam, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, January 7, 2013, available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/bloggers-trial-
vietnam-are-part-ongoing-crackdown-free-expression, accessed on February 10, 2014; See also Dara Kerr, Vietnam: 
Criticize Government on Social Media and Go to Jail, CNET, December 12, 2013, available at 
http://asia.cnet.com/vietnam-criticize-government-on-social-media-and-go-to-jail-62223058.htm, accessed on 
February 20, 2014; Committee to Protect Journalist, 2013 Prison Census - 211 Journalists Jailed Worldwide, as of 




In conjunction with the increasing popularity of the Internet in the country, Vietnam also 
gradually enacted regulations to address the traditional fears felt by other nations, including those 
concerning national security, fraud prevention, data and privacy protection, and network 
security. Some of the measures put into place in Vietnam are similar to those adopted in some 
other jurisdictions following the NSA revelation incident. Other measures addressed specific 
concerns regarding recent online frauds and security risks in Vietnam. 
Moreover, the fear of the consequences of inadequate control, and a perceived need to localize 
the benefits of online services, has recently resulted in regulations and proposed regulations that 
exhibit a protectionist tendency for the domestic service suppliers, which involves the use of 
some regulatory tools similar to those used in the 1990s. In particular, some recently adopted 
regulations require the localization of servers as one of the conditions for the provision of certain 
online services in Vietnam. The blocking of Facebook, which has been in place since 2009, will 
be analyzed in detail to reveal its potential protectionist motivations. The essay will also explain 
how the “Vietnamese people prefer Vietnamese products” campaign affects the liabilities of 
online intermediaries. 
At the same time, Vietnam’s government sees the benefits of developing a strong domestic 
information technology industry, attracting high tech foreign investment, training a tech-savvy 
generation, boosting e-commerce, enforcing intellectual property protection, creating clear and 
transparent rules for e-commerce, and using online social networks to promote local businesses. 
Some major regulations will be analyzed to demonstrate this contrary perspective of the 
Vietnamese government towards online intermediaries. 
Going forward, online intermediaries will likely experience strong opportunities to grow in 
Vietnam. However, they might have to shoulder heavy burdens to address the government’s 
specific fears. In particular, online intermediaries might face the choice of either cooperating 
with the local authorities to address relevant fears, or exiting the market. Though the liability of 
offshore online intermediaries that provide services to Vietnamese users on a cross-border basis 
currently remains ambiguous in certain cases, the same trend may soon apply to those 
intermediaries as well. However, in contrast to this trend toward heavy regulation, the specific 
commitments of Vietnam under applicable international trade arrangements may, to a certain 
extent, restrain Vietnamese discriminatory regulatory measures towards foreign online 
intermediaries. 
For the readers’ ease of reference – before going into detailed analysis – this essay provides a 
brief overview of key regulations concerning online intermediaries in Vietnam in Figure 1 and 
basic facts about the Internet in Vietnam in Figure 2 below. 
Key regulations concerning online intermediaries in Vietnam 
 
Under the Vietnamese legal system, laws are adopted by the General Assembly of Vietnam. Decrees are issued by 
the Government to implement adopted laws. An adopted decree can then be further detailed by circulars of a specific 
responsible ministry or by joint-circulars of multiple ministries. Only when a regulation has been adopted, it is 
assigned with a number. This essay refers to a regulation that has not been adopted as a “draft” regulation. Key 
regulations mentioned in this essay include the following: 
1. Law on Information Technology (IT Law) – (adopted in 2006, currently still in effect) 
- Promotes the application and development of information technology in various fields, including in 
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governmental operation and in commerce. " Makes online intermediaries liable for actively contributing to the production and distribution of the illegal 
content, such as generating, curating, or modifying the content; and explicitly exempts online intermediaries 
from liabilities in certain circumstances. (Arts. 16.4, 17.2) " Provides that entities applying information technologies are not responsible for tracking or monitoring digital 
information of third parties, or investigating infringing acts of third parities while transmitting or storing their 
information. (Art.20.2) " Requires online intermediaries to undertake necessary measures to block the access to or remove illegal 
information at authorities’ requests. (Arts. 16.3, 18.3, 19.3, and 20) " Contains principles on protecting personal information (Arts. 21 and 22); similar principles are stated under the 
Civil Code (adopted in 2005, Arts. 31 and 38); Law on e-Transaction (adopted in 2005, Art. 46), and the Law 
on Protection of Consumers’ Rights (adopted in 2010, Art.6). 
2. Press Law (adopted in 1989, amended in 2002, currently still in effect) 
- Defines press as “the mouthpiece of Party organizations, state bodies and social organizations, and a forum for 
the people.” (Art. 1) 
- A license is required to operate as a press agency in Vietnam; only limited entities are eligible to apply for a 
license. (Art. 6, Decree No. 51 implementing the Press Law) 
- Certain activities, which are vaguely defined, are prohibited. Included in the definition of prohibited behaviors 
and acts are, “seditious, libelous, defamatory, obscene and violent, and those that constitute hate speech or 
disclose State secrets.” (Art. 10) The Law on Publication (both 2012 and 2004 versions) contains a similar list 
of prohibited activities. 
3. Decree No. 72 on Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Online Information (adopted in 
2013 to replace Decree No. 97, which was adopted in 2008 and replaced Decree No. 55 below) 
- Requires owners of social networking sites and general news sites to get a license from a government agency 
before starting operation, locate at least one server in Vietnam, and make available information safety and 
security protection measures. (Arts. 23.4, 23.5(a) & (d), 24.1 and 25.8.) 
- Online intermediaries “are held liable for actively contributing to the production and distribution of the illegal 
content, such as generating, curating, or modifying the content.” (Art. 25.5.) 
- Requires online intermediaries to coordinate with authorities in blocking prohibited content. (Art. 25.6) 
- Restricts the activities of bloggers and users of online social networking sites to the provision and exchange of 
information of their own, not third parties’. (Art. 20.2) 
- Requires that online social network service suppliers ensure that only individuals who have supplied “accurate 
and complete personal information as required by law”, including the government-issued identity card number, 
may create blogs or provide information on online social networks. (Arts. 3.16 and 25.9) 
- When Decree No. 72 was still a draft regulation, there was a tentative proposition that offshore providers of 
public information - if they serviced a large amount of users in the territory of Vietnam - must establish 
representative offices or appoint legal representatives in Vietnam. When adopted, Decree No. 72 vaguely 
provides that foreign suppliers of “public information across the border, which are used in Vietnam or 
accessed from Vietnam, shall comply with Vietnam’s relevant laws. The Decree also defers to the MIC for 
detailed guidance on the provision of public information across the border. (Art. 22). 
- The Decree also expressly recognizes the economic benefits of Internet activities and confirms the policy of 
promoting the use of Internet to raise productivity, create jobs, and improve quality of life. (Arts. 4.1 and 4.2) 
4. Decree No. 55 on Management, provision and use of Internet services (adopted in 2001, replaced by Decree 
No. 97 in 2008, which itself was replaced by Decree No. 72 above in 2013) 
- Explicitly acknowledged the role of Internet services to Vietnam economic development (Arts. 3 and 5). 
- This Decree introduced OSP’s or Online Service Providers, as a category of service provider in 2001. OSPs 
provide application services, and are only subject to regulation through “specific State management agencies” 
(Art. 36). This makes OSPs different from IXPs, ISPs, and ICPs, which are subject to the licensing 
requirements directly provided by Decree No. 55. 
- Expressly permitted the use of Internet application services of both domestic and foreign OSPs (Art. 22.2). 
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- Decree No. 55 also contained provisions requiring online intermediaries to block prohibited content (Art. 7.1). 
5. Decree No. 21/CP regarding the Promulgation of “Temporary Regulation on the Management, Establishment, 
and Use of the Internet in Vietnam” (issued in 1997, replaced by Decree No. 55) 
- Subjected online content to the regulations on press and publication; contained general descriptions of types of 
content that cannot be transmitted on the Internet; and required online intermediaries to block prohibited 
content. (Art. 3) 
- Contained strict regulations on the use of the Internet by the Party, the government, public security and 
national defense function agencies: establishment of secured private network, encryption of information, 
prevention of data thief and unauthorized access. (Art. 20) 
- All organizations wishing to connect to the Internet, either for private use or for commercial purpose, must 
locate their servers in Vietnam and to connect to the Internet through a limited number of government-licensed 
international gateways. (Arts. 1 and 12) 
- IXPs, ISPs, and ICP must obtain written permission from designated governmental agencies before connecting 
to the Internet. (Art. 5) 
- Individual users had to enter into contracts for Internet services from local ISPs and must be responsible for the 
content they receive and deliver. (Art. 12) 
- It was illegal to use telephones, private leased lines, and other connection methods for accessing the Internet 
though an offshore server. (Part IV, Section 4, Item 3 of Joint Circular 08, which guided the implementation of 
certain provisions of Decree No. 21) 
- The government also controlled the identification of Internet users by demanding periodical and irregular 
reports of the same information from ISPs. (Part IV, Section 2, Item 6 of Joint Circular 08, which guided the 
implementation of certain provisions of Decree No. 21) 
6.   Decree No. 52 on E-commerce (issued in 2012, currently still in effect) 
- E-commerce business website owners, including foreign or cross border owners, must disclose their identities. 
- Owners of e-commerce business websites and e-commerce service websites, including foreign owners using 
.vn domain name, must respectively conduct notification and registration procedures with the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. (Arts. 2.1(c), 27.1, 36.1, 41.1, 46.1, and 55.1) 
- Emphasizes transparency in e-commerce by requiring the disclosure of certain information for specific types of 
websites. (Arts. 28-34) 
- Includes a broad range of prohibited acts .(Art. 4) 
- Recognizes the validity of electronic evidence, confirms the effectiveness of online contracts, and introduces 
mechanisms to rate websites’ creditability and data protection policy, and to authenticate electronic contracts. 
(Arts. 9-14, 15-23, 60-63)  
- Owners of websites with online payment functions and suppliers of online payment services are subject to 
specific obligations under Decree No. 52 regarding the safety and confidentiality of online payment 
transactions. They may be held jointly liable for any damage caused by the illegal disclosure, amendment, 
reproduction, cancellation, deletion, or transfer of online payment information via the website. In addition, 
website owners who develop their own online payment solutions to support the online sale of their goods must 
apply specific measures to ensure safety and confidentiality of customer data. (Arts. 74 and 75) 
7.   Joint Circular No. 07 on the Liabilities of Intermediary Service Suppliers in Protection of Copyrights and   
Related Rights on the Internet and Telecommunications Network Environment (issued in 2012, currently still 
in effect) 
- Online intermediaries are directly liable for infringing content only in limited circumstances, e.g. when they 
initiate the posting, transmission or provision of the infringing content over the Internet or telecommunications 
network, modify or copy the infringing content, deliberately circumvent technology measures applied by right 
owners to protect copyrights or related rights, or operate as the secondary distributors of the infringing content. 
(Arts. 3.1 and 5) 
8.   Draft Decree on Information Technology (IT) Services (not yet issued) " As of April 25, 2014, the MIC has made three different versions of the Draft Decree available to the public: the 
first was made available in 2010, the second in April 2012 (“April 2012 version”) and the third on August 3, 
2012 (“Version 3.8”). This essay focuses on the last two versions. 
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" The April 2012 version required that the servers and infrastructures for the provision of certain IT services 
must be located in Vietnam, including cloud computing services, web search portal services, and database 
center services. (Art. 15) This localization requirement was removed from Version 3.8. " The April 2012 version prohibited cross-border supply of certain services, including web search portal 
services, cloud computing services, and database center services and required foreign service suppliers to 
establish a local entity and locate their servers in the territory of Vietnam in order to be eligible for an 
operation license in Vietnam (Arts. 15 and 20.1). The Version 8.3 modified the April 2012 version such that 
cross border supply of cloud computing services, database center services, and web search portal services is 
permitted provided that they do so through local branches or local intermediaries. (Art. 19.3) 
9.   Draft circular detailing certain provisions of Decree No. 72 (not yet adopted) " Requires that for authentication purpose, the online social network service supplier must link the ID number 
provided by the user to the national online database on personal information at the authority’s request. (Art. 
3.2) 
Figure 1. Key regulations concerning online intermediaries in Vietnam 
Basic facts about Internet in Vietnam 
 
- The Internet came to Vietnam in the early 1990s. 
- By June 30, 2012, Vietnam had 31 million Internet users (equivalent to over 33% of Vietnamese population), 
ranking within the top 10 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region in terms of Internet growth. (Vietnam ICT 
White book 2013) 
- Facebook, Google’s search engine, YouTube, Gmail, and Yahoo! Mail are among the most popular online 
tools for Vietnamese users. 
- Access to Facebook in Vietnam has been on and off since 2009. The alleged blocking can be bypassed by 
using a proxy server or a virtual private network, or by changing their DNS. 
- In 2013, at least 46 bloggers or democracy activists were convicted and imprisoned on national security 
charges. (Associated Press (Oct 29, 2013)). 
- In May 2014, Microsoft Security Intelligence Report announced Vietnam as one of the top five countries with 
the highest rates of malware affection. (PC World VN (May 17, 2014)) 
- Estimated turn over of the digital advertising market in Vietnam was $32 million and it is expected to reach 
$45 million by 2015. (VietnamNet, Dec. 3, 2013)  
- Expected total revenues of Internet services and content to be VND 100 trillion (approximately USD 47 
billion) by 2018. (VietnamNet, Dec. 3, 2013) 
- Key strategies of the Vietnamese governments: 
+ Boosting e-commerce to enhance national enterprises’ competitiveness. (General Plan for the Development 
of Electronic Commerce in the 2011-2015 Period, approved by the Prime Minister of Vietnam on Jul. 12, 
2010) 
+ Promoting IT training, applications, and developments; providing basic governmental services online, 
applying information technology in management, operation, and business operation of 80% enterprises and 
social organizations, universalize IT application in the education and healthcare system, and enhance the 
application of IT in national defense and security. (The “Soon Turning Vietnam into a Strong Nation in 
Information Technology and Communications” Project, approved by the Prime Minister of Vietnam on 
Sept 22, 2010) 
+ Promoting the development of Vietnam ICT brand-name products and services (VIBrand). (Vietnam ICT 
White book 2012) 
Figure 2. Basic facts about Internet in Vietnam 
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II. Analysis 
A. Regulations Responding to Fears 
This section analyzes different sets of fears to illustrate their effect on the liabilities of online 
intermediaries in Vietnam. The country shares with other nations common fears regarding the 
Internet, including its possible effects on national security, online fraud prevention, data and 
privacy protection, and network security. However, the regime also demands specific regulations 
to address fears relating to uncontrollable content. Furthermore, Vietnam also worries about 
failing to capture domestically the financial benefits generated by foreign online intermediaries 
through their online activities in Vietnam. All of these fears result in a stringent liability regime 
for online intermediaries, the chokepoints of Internet activities. 
1. Untested Internet in 1990s– Maximize Government Control Over Online 
Activities 
Originally, the government’s concerns were related to the unprecedented nature of the Internet as 
a new technology, the benefits of which were untested in Vietnam. As a result, in the 1990s, 
regulations were of a cautious and exploratory nature, and Internet activities were permissible 
only to the extent that they were navigable and controllable by the government.  
In particular, the domestic Internet architecture was designed in such a way that the local 
authority had full control over domestic online activities: all organizations wishing to connect to 
the Internet, either for private use or for commercial purposes, were required to locate their 
servers in Vietnam and to connect to the Internet through a limited number of government-
licensed international gateways.6  
Internet exchange providers (IXPs), Internet service providers (ISPs), private organizational 
Internet users, and Internet content providers (ICPs) had to obtain written permission from 
designated governmental agencies before connecting to the Internet.7 Individual users had to 
enter into contracts for Internet services from local ISPs.8 It was illegal to use telephones, private 
leased lines, and other connection methods for accessing the Internet though an offshore server.9 
The government also controlled the identification of Internet users by demanding periodical and 
irregular reports of the same information from ISPs.10  
From the above structure, the government of Vietnam targeted IXPs, ISPs, private organizational 
Internet users, and ICPs as the chokepoints to control domestic Internet activities. This early !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Nghị định của Chính phủ số 21/cp ngày 5 tháng 3 năm 1997 về việc ban hành “Quy chế tạm thời về quản lý, 
thiết lập, sử dụng mạng Internet ở Việt Nam” [Decree No. 21/CP regarding the Promulgation of “Temporary 
Regulation on the Management, Establishment, and Use of the Internet in Vietnam,” issued by the Government of 
Vietnam on March 5, 1997], replaced by decree No. 55/2001/nd-cp in 2001, (Viet.) (hereinafter “Decree No. 21”), 
Art. 1.  
7 See Decree No. 21, Art. 5. 
8 See id., Art. 12. 
9 See Thông tư liên tịch Tổng Cục Bưu điện – Bộ Nội vụ - Bộ Văn hoá Thông tin số 08/TTLT ngày 24 tháng 5 năm 
1997 Hướng dẫn Cấp phép việc Kết nối, Cung cấp và Sử dụng Internet ở Việt Nam [Joint Circular between the 
General Postal Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Culture and Information No. 08/TTLT 
dated May 24, 1997, Guiding the Licensing Procedures for the Connection, Provision and Use of the Internet in 
Vietnam], Part IV, Section 4, Item 3 (Viet.). 
10 See id., Part IV, Section 2, Item 6. 
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model of heavy Internet control enabled the maximum local regulatory sovereignty, which, as 
discussed below, also closely resembles the current nature of Vietnamese Internet regulations. 
2. Fear of Uncontrollable Content - Heavy Censorship 
The second set of fears relates to the ideology of the current Vietnamese regime. The Internet 
and the availability of online platforms enabled by various online intermediaries changed the 
nature of traditional journalism and content production in general: every user can easily generate 
content, the number of Internet users has increased immensely globally, creating a massive 
audience for online content, and the platforms hosting this content can be provided on a cross-
border basis. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Arab Spring, online platforms may serve as an 
effective means to mobilize social forces against the government. This is exactly the kind of risk 
in relation to online intermediaries that the current Vietnamese regime would like to prevent.11 In 
such a context, controlling content – particularly that which conflicts with the communism 
ideology – at the user level is no longer the most efficient approach. Thus, the local authority has 
turned its censorship focus to online intermediaries – the Internet chokepoints. This new focus 
has resulted in intensive obligations being imposed on online intermediaries. However, it appears 
that due to international trade law obligation constraints, among other things, some of the 
proposed requirements have not been adopted. 
i. Exclusive “Mouthpiece” – Challenges on Censorship in the Internet Era and the Call for 
Censorship Innovations  
Unlike the press in the United States, which is treated as the “fourth estate,” providing “a public 
check on the three classes of branches of government,”12 the press in Vietnam is defined as the 
“mouthpiece of Party organizations, State bodies and social organizations, and a forum for the 
people.”13 Accordingly, only Party organizations, State bodies, and social organizations are 
eligible for a license to establish a press agency in Vietnam.14 Certain vaguely defined types of 
content are strictly prohibited, including those that are seditious, libelous, defamatory, obscene 
and violent, and those that constitute hate speech or disclose State secrets.15 A similar set of 
content was also prohibited from publication and distribution, including electronic publication 
and distribution, according to the Law on Publication.16  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Charlie Campbell, Internet Censorship is Taking Root in Southeast Asia, Time (Jul. 18, 2013), 
http://world.time.com/2013/07/18/Internet-censorship-is-taking-root-in-southeast-asia/#ixzz2uP36ZHbs. 
12 "US vs Bradley Manning, Volume 17 July 10, 2013 Morning Session", Freedom of the Press Foundation: 
Transcripts from Bradley Manning's Trial, 29, July 10, 2013, 
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/sites/default/files/07-10-13-AM-session.pdf. 
13 Luật Báo Chí [Press Law] adopted by the National Assembly of Vietnam on December 28, 1989, (Viet.) 
(hereinafter “Press Law”) Art. 1. 
14 Nghị định của Chính phủ số 51/2002/NĐ-CP ngày 26 tháng 4 năm 2002 Quy định chi tiết Thi hành Luật Báo chí, 
Luật sửa đổi, bổ sung một số điều của Luật Báo chí [Decree of the Government No. 51/2002/ND-CP dated April 26, 
2002 Providing Detailed Guidance on the Implementation of the Press Law, the Law Amending Certain Provisions 
of the Press Law] (Viet.) (hereinafter Decree No. 51), Art. 6. 
15 See Press Law, Art. 10; See also Decree No. 51, Art. 5. 
16 Luật Xuất bản [Law on Publication] No. 19/2012/QH13, adopted by the National Assembly on November 20, 
2012 (Viet.) (hereinafter “Publication Law”), Art. 10.1. The same languages were also included in previous version 
of the Publication Law such as Law No. 30/2004/QH11 dated December 3, 2004, Art. 10. 
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The Internet, as observed by Yochai Benkler, changed the nature of traditional journalism.17 
Thanks to the reduction of production and distribution costs, every individual Internet users with 
basic computer skills can nowadays generate and proliferate content on the Internet in a matter of 
seconds. In fact, online social networking websites, such as Yahoo! 360 in the past and Facebook 
currently, are popular platforms for Vietnamese individuals to exchange online information and 
directly generate online content. They discuss political and economic topics, criticize 
governmental policies, spread the news, and gather to demonstrate against such policies, among 
other things.18 Some of these activities were treated as libelous and seditious, and in violation of 
Vietnamese laws.  
For example, in 2013, at least 46 bloggers or democracy activists were convicted and imprisoned 
on national security charges.19 In particular, a Facebook user was sentenced to 15 months of 
house arrest for posting and exchanging false and distorting information, and harming the 
Government’s reputation, as well as the legitimate rights of organizations and citizens in October 
2013.20 
Since the introduction of the Internet in Vietnam, the government has insisted that all Internet 
users must be responsible for the content they deliver and receive online.21 The law also 
consistently requires IXPs, ISPs, online service providers (OSPs), ICPs, and Internet service 
agents to act as gatekeepers in adopting appropriate measures to block the prohibited content 
defined under the Press Law and the Publication Law, among others.22 However, a number of 
challenges have emerged over time, demanding regulatory innovations by the Vietnamese 
Government.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Yochai Benkler, A free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth 
Estate, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter 2012, Vol. 47 Issue 1, 311, at 371-379. 
18 See H.C., Facebook in Vietnam - Defriended, The Economist (Jan. 4, 2011, 17:46), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/01/facebook_vietnam. 
19 Vietnam Court Convicts Dissident Facebook User, Associated Press (Oct 29, 2013, 02:27:32), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/vietnam-court-convicts-dissident-facebook-user. 
20 The charge against this Facebook user was “abusing democracy and freedom rights, causing harms to the 
Government’s interest and the legitimate rights and interest of organizations [and] citizens.” His activities were the 
effort to overturn his brother’s conviction for anti-government propaganda. See Vietnamplus, Tuyên phạt 15 tháng 
tù treo đối tượng Dinh Nhật Uy [Sentencing 15 Months of House Arrest Against Dinh Nhat Uy], VTV, (Oct. 29, 
2013, 22:12), http://vtv.vn/Thoi-su-trong-nuoc/Tuyen-phat-15-thang-tu-treo-doi-tuong-Dinh-Nhat-Uy/87378.vtv. 
See also Martin Petty and Robert Birsel, Vietnam Court Sentences Facebook Campaigner to House Arrest, Reuteurs 
(Oct. 29, 2013, 5:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-vietnam-court-
idUSBRE99S0DP20131029.  
21 See Decree No. 21, Arts. 1 and 12. 
22 See Decree No. 21 Art. 3; Nghị định 55/2001/NĐ-CP ngày 23 tháng 8 năm 2001 về Quản lý, Cung cấp và Sử 
dụng Dịch vụ Internet [Decree No. 55/2001/ND-CP dated August 23, 2001 regarding the Management, Provision 
and Use of Internet Services], replaced by decree No. 97/2008/ND-CP IN 2008 (Viet.) (hereinafter “Decree No. 
55”), Arts. 3.1 and 7.1; IT Law, Arts. 16.3, 18.3, 19.3, and 20; Nghị định của Chính phủ số 97/2008/NĐ-CP ngày 28 
tháng 8 năm 2008 về Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet và Thông tin Điện tử trên Internet [Decree No. 
97/2008/ND-CP of the Government dated August 28, 2008 on Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services 
and Electronic Information on the Internet], replaced by decree No. 72/2013/nd-cp in 2013 (Viet.) (hereinafter 
“Decree No. 97”), Art. 10.2(c), 11.2(c), 21.1(c); Nghị định Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet và Thông 
tin trên mạng [Decree on Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Online Information] No. 
72/2013/ND-CP dated July 15, 2013 (Viet.) (hereinafter “Decree No. 72”), Art. 25.6;  
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The first challenge involved the immense increase in the number of Internet users in Vietnam. 
By June 30th, 2012, Vietnam already had 31 million Internet users, ranking within the top 10 
countries in the Asia-Pacific Region in terms of Internet growth.23 Although the Internet allows 
for the tracing of IP addresses, this tracing is not perfect. It is difficult to be certain of the real 
identity of an Internet user.24 For example, Facebook users must be 13 years or older, and 
alcohol advertisement is prohibited for minors under 18 years old. Unlike the face-to-face 
communications outside the Internet world, there is currently no perfect mechanism to 
authenticate online whether the person acquiring the service for the first time is declaring his or 
her real age. Thus, illegal content may be available on the Internet beyond the government’s 
ability to regulate.  
Secondly, many major online platforms are made available in Vietnam by foreign, rather than 
domestic, service suppliers. Since 2001, Vietnam has explicitly permitted the use of Internet 
application services of both domestic and foreign OSPs.25 As a result, foreign-based services 
such as Facebook, Google’s search engine, and YouTube are among the most popular online 
tools for Vietnamese users. These services are supplied on a cross-border basis without 
establishing any local presence in Vietnam. This feature raises additional challenges to the 
Vietnamese regulator’s content control efforts. As a result, the government has demanded 
mechanisms to control online activities that take place not only via locally licensed online 
intermediaries, but also via popular offshore online intermediaries. 
The Facebook blocking that began in 2009 represented one of the first responses against offshore 
online intermediaries who provide services on a cross-border basis in Vietnam. Although the 
government denied its involvement in the blocking, an unsigned official letter was circulated on 
the Internet bearing the instruction of a Department under the Vietnamese Ministry of Public 
Security for ISPs.26 Accordingly, ISPs were required to block a list of eight websites, including 
Facebook. Immediately following the date of that letter, Vietnamese users faced difficulties27 
accessing Facebook. With or without the government’s involvement, and regardless of the 
potential motivations behind this move (discussed further in the next section), this blocking was 
just the beginning of a much more systemic attempt to censor Internet content, signaling stricter 
burdens would be imposed on online intermediaries – the chokepoints in controlling online 
content. A series of regulations and draft regulations proposed since 2012 illustrate this attempt 
by the government of Vietnam, discussed below. 
ii. More Censorship on Internet Chokepoints 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See National Steering Committee on ICT (NSCICT) and Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC), 
White Book 2013: Vietnam information and communication technology, Information and Communications 
Publishing House, (2013), at 22. 
24 For a comparison between identity authentication in the Internet and that in real space and for more discussion on 
the relationship between users’ identification and the “regulability” of the Internet, see Lessig, at 38-60. 
25 Decree No. 55, Art. 22.2. 
26 The letter is available on Wikileaks at this link: http://file.wikileaks.org/file/vietnam-banned-facebook.jpg (last 
visited April 10, 2014) (Viet.). 
27 Though there were some inconveniences in accessing Facebook following the alleged blocking, the blocking was 
easily circumvented by using certain proxy techniques. The access speed varied among ISPs and accession via 
mobile phones was not affected. Please see further discussion and explanation in the next section of the essay. 
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In general, online intermediaries must remove or block access to the prohibited content that they 
self-detect or per the request of the competent authority in Vietnam.28 They are held liable for 
actively contributing to the production and distribution of the illegal content, such as generating, 
curating, or modifying the content.29  
Decree No. 72, adopted in July 2013,30 in line with the traditional Vietnamese command and 
control regulatory model, requires owners of online social networking websites and general news 
websites31 to obtain a license from the government agency before providing their services.32 
Notably, the licensee must satisfy certain conditions including, among other things, being 
established under Vietnam law,33 and having at least one server located in the territory of 
Vietnam.34 Similarly, under these regulations, publishers and distributors of electronic 
publications must also locate their servers in Vietnam.35  
Furthermore, the April 2012 version of the Draft Decree on Information Technology Services36 
required that the servers and infrastructure for the provision of certain IT services be located in 
Vietnam. These services include cloud computing services, web search portal services, and 
database center services.37 This approach to a certain extent reflects the regulatory approach that 
Vietnam originally applied in the 1990s – maximizing domestic control over online activities. In 
other words, the server localization, among others, allows Vietnam to effectively exercise its 
sovereignty over Internet activities in Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese Government also adopted measures to limit user content sharing activities such 
that its regulatory scope can focus on the chokepoints − online intermediaries. In particular, 
Decree No. 72 restricts the activities of bloggers and users of online social networking sites to 
the provision and exchange of information of their own, not third parties’ information. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See IT Law, Arts. 16.3, 18.3(b), 19.3 (regarding the liabilities of entities transmitting and disseminating digital 
information, leasing online storage, and providing digital information search tools); See also Decree No. 72, Arts. 
24.4 and 25.6 (regarding obligations of general news websites and online social networking websites). 
29 See IT Law, Art. 16.4 (providing cases where entities transmitting and disseminating electronic information are 
liable for illegal information); Art. 17.2 (providing cases where entities are liable for the information they 
temporarily store); See also Decree No. 72, Art. 25.5. 
30 Nghị định Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet và Thông tin trên mạng [Decree on Management, 
Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Online Information] No. 72/2013/ND-CP dated July 15, 2013 (Viet.) 
(hereinafter “Decree No. 72”). 
31 “General news website” means websites that provides aggregated information about politics, economics, culture 
and/or society, on the basis of citing textually and accurately from official sources and specify the names of the 
authors or agencies of the official sources, and the time when such information is published. Decree No. 72, Arts. 
3.19 and 20.2. 
32 Decree No. 72, Art. 23.4. 
33 See id. Art. 23.5(a). 
34 See id. Arts. 24.1 and 25.8. 
35 Nghị định Quy định Chi tiết Một số Điều và Biện pháp Thi hành Luật Xuất Bản [Decree Detailing Certain 
Provisions and the Implementation of the Law on Publication] No. 195/2013/ND-CP dated November 21, 2013, Art. 
17.1(a). 
36See Dự thảo Nghị định về Dịch vụ Công nghệ Thông tin [Draft Decree on Information Technology Services], 
Apr. 2012, available at http://qtsc.com.vn/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=63cd7c9e-065c-4f06-a6a0-
93ab819b7ce2&groupId=18, (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (Viet.), (hereinafter “April Version”). 
37 See April Version, Art. 15. The same requirements was removed from the latest publicly available version of this 
Draft Decree. See the collection of version 3.8 of the Draft Decree and a set of comments in both English and 
Vietnamese, http://www.vibonline.com.vn/Duthao/1250/Nghi-dinh-ve-dich-vu-cong-nghe-thong-tin.aspx, (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2014).  
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Accordingly, permissible activities do not include “posting aggregated information.”38 This 
provision seems to address the issue of content “curation,” as commonly referred to in other 
jurisdictions. In response to the accusation that this provision restricts freedom of speech, a 
representative of the Ministry of Information and Communications (“MIC”) called the 
accusation a “misunderstanding” and clarified that Vietnam “never bans people from sharing 
information or linking news from websites.”39 Rather, the provision “was aimed at protecting 
intellectual property and copyright” [relating to the posting of aggregated information].40 In an 
interview with VOV, MIC Deputy Minister called the accusation a “quibble,” and argued that the 
provision was actually helpful in guiding users as to the boundary of their online activities for 
their ease of compliance.41 
Regardless of whether the above provision restricts freedom of speech, it has an important direct 
effect with respect to which sites or individuals are subject to regulation. Particularly, once a 
blogger or a user of online social networking sites posts aggregated information, their websites 
will likely be treated as a general news website, which are subject to the licensing requirement 
mentioned above. This licensing procedure serves both as a mechanism for the government to 
review and evaluate the capability of every applicant, and as a burden that discourages individual 
users from posting aggregated information. Since only licensed owners of general news websites 
can post aggregated information, the government does not have to extend their control over 
aggregated information content beyond this limited group of licensees (such as bloggers posting 
aggregated news on their blogs).  
Furthermore, besides the traditional requirement for coordination from gatekeepers, the 
Government of Vietnam is currently attempting to take one step further to directly control users’ 
activities on online social networks. Specifically, Decree No. 72 requires that online social 
network service suppliers ensure that only individuals who have supplied “accurate and complete 
personal information as required by law,” including the government-issued identity card number, 
may create blogs or provide information on social networks.42  
The draft circular implementing Decree No. 72 further requires that for authentication purposes, 
the supplier must link the ID number provided by the user to the national online database on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Decree No. 72, Art. 20.2. “Aggregated information means information that is collected from multiple sources and 
types of information about politics, economics, culture and/or society.” Decree No. 72, Art. 3.19. 
39 Vietnam Rebuffs Criticism of ‘Misunderstood’ Web Decree, Reuters (Aug. 6, 2013, 7:53), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/06/vietnam-Internet-idUSL4N0G72IA20130806 
40 Id. 
41 Hương Giang, Nghị định 72 Không Hạn chế Quyền Tự do Ngôn luận [Decree No. 72 Does Not Restrict Freedom 
of Speech], VOV (Aug. 7, 2013, 16:41), http://vov.vn/Xa-hoi/Nghi-dinh-72-khong-han-che-quyen-tu-do-ngon-
luan/274653.vov (VOV reporter interviewed the Deputy Minister of Information and Communications, Mr. Do Quy 
Doan, regarding the provision of Decree No. 72). 
42 Decree No. 72, Arts. 3.16 and 25.9. 
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personal information at the authority’s request.43 The national online identification database is 
still a work in-progress, thus this requirement is not enforceable until the database is fully 
developed.44 However, once implemented, this ID verification scheme will possibly make the 
Internet users’ behaviors more - in Lawrence Lessig’s words - “regulable”.45 Verification will in 
theory prevent crimes, frauds, and defamation as well as promote trust on the online 
environment, which is good for e-commerce.46  
Nevertheless, at the same time, the required disclosure of users’ real identity may effectively 
contribute to the suppression of freedom of speech.47 For example, the awareness that speech can 
directly link to a real identity will hinder users from expressing anti-government and other 
controversial opinions, and may even discourage them from expressing opinions at all due to the 
risk of liability. This choice of architecture reflects a value choice by the government. Obviously, 
freedom of speech is not the government’s priority in this case. Rather, online intermediaries’ 
compliance with this requirement will likely enable the government to regulate the Internet more 
effectively at the cost of freedom of speech. 
So far, the liabilities of offshore online intermediaries that provide services to Vietnamese users 
on a cross-border48 basis are still ambiguous. When Decree No. 72 was still a draft regulation, 
there was a tentative proposition that offshore providers of public information – if they serviced 
a large amount of users in the territory of Vietnam – must establish representative offices or 
appoint legal representatives in Vietnam.49 Similarly, the April 2012 version of the Draft Decree 
on IT Services prohibits cross-border supply of certain services, including web search portal 
services, cloud computing services, and database center services.50 Rather, in order to provide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See Dự thảo Thông tư Quy định Chi tiết Một số Điều của Nghị định 72/2013/NĐ-CP Ngày 15 tháng 7 năm 2013 
về Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet và Thông tin Trên mạng Đối với Hoạt động quản lý trang thông tin 
điện tử và dịch vụ mạng xã hội [Draft Circular Detailing the implementation of Certain Provisions 
regardingManagement of General News Websites and Online Social Networking Services of Decree No. 
72/2003/ND-CP dated July 15, 2013 on the Management, Provision and Use of Internet Services and Online 
Information], Art. 3.2(b), downloadable at 
http://mic.gov.vn/Attachment%20Lay%20Y%20Kien%20Nhan%20Dan/Du%20thao%20thong%20tu%20MXH%2
0(Du%20thao%203%20ngay%204.%209).doc (last visited April 25, 2014). 
44 Lê Mỹ, Chưa Bắt Doanh nghiệp Xác thực Chứng minh thư Thành viên Mạng Xã hội [Not Yet Requiring 
Enterprises to Verify the Identification of Online Social Network Users], ICTNews (Jan. 10, 2014, 16:52), 
http://ictnews.vn/Internet/chua-bat-doanh-nghiep-xac-thuc-chung-minh-thu-thanh-vien-mang-xa-hoi-114111.ict.  
45 Lawrence Lessig, Code is Law 2.0, at 16. 
46 Lessig found this crucial for e-commerce. However, the identification authentication that Lessig foresees as the 
“most important tool for identification in the next ten years” is far different from the proposed requirement of the 
Vietnamese government. He endorses the technology that can verify specific users’ information for specific online 
purposes; but the disclosure of users’ identities to the authorities requires warrant. See Lessig at 50-54. 
47 For a succinct summary of the importance of pseudonymity, see Mike Masnick, What's In A Name: The 
Importance Of Pseudonymity & The Dangers Of Requiring 'Real Names', TECHDIRT, (Aug. 5, 2011; 6:36 PM.) 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110805/14103715409/whats-name-importance-pseudonymity-dangers-
requiring-real-names.shtml. 
48 The cross-border supply of a service occurs when the service supplier is not present within the territory of 
Vietnam but the service is delivered in Vietnam. See the Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments 
under GATS, S/L/92 (28 March 2001) 
49 See Dự thảo Nghị định Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet và Nội dung Thông tin Trên Mạng [Draft 
Decree on Management, Provision, [and] Use of Internet Services and Network Information Content], the third 
version, available at http://mic.gov.vn/layyknd/trang/dựthảonghịdinhInternet.aspx, (last visited April 20, 2014) 
(Viet.). 
50 See April Version, Art. 20.1. 
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the relevant services in Vietnam, the foreign service suppliers must establish a local entity and 
locate their servers in the territory of Vietnam in order to be eligible for a license.51 These 
proposed regulations, if adopted as such, would effectively extend Vietnamese local regulatory 
power to a broad range of otherwise cross-border Internet activities in Vietnam, similar to the 
state of affairs in the 1990s (as discussed above). 
iii. Censorship and International Trade Law Constraints 
However, in the current context of Vietnam, there are international factors that may restrain the 
successful implementation of the above regulatory structure. 
In particular, since 2000 Vietnam has entered into a number of international trade arrangements, 
in which the commitments by Vietnam constitute restraints or prohibitions against market access 
limitations of this type. Key international trade arrangements include the Bilateral Trade 
Agreement between Vietnam and the U.S. in 2000, Vietnam’s World Trade Organization 
membership beginning in 2007, and a number of regional trade agreements through the ASEAN.  
As a part of these trade arrangements, Vietnam made market access commitments on specific 
service sectors, including telecommunications services, computer and related services, 
distribution services, and advertising services, among others.52 Accordingly, Vietnam cannot 
impose any form of market access limitations53 on the cross-border supply of a specific service 
included in its Service Schedule unless the limitation is explicitly mentioned in the Service 
Schedule or such restrictions justify the exemptions provided under the applicable trade 
agreement.54 For example, where online services are included in Vietnam’s Service Schedule and 
no market access limitation was explicitly reserved therein, a prohibition against cross-border 
supply of these services might violate Vietnam’s obligations under the relevant international 
trade agreements.  
The above context might explain why Decree No. 72 vaguely provides that foreign suppliers of 
“public information across the border, which are used in Vietnam or accessed from Vietnam, 
shall comply with Vietnam’s relevant laws.”55 The Decree also deferred to the MIC for detailed 
provisions on the provision of public information across the border.56 Similarly, the April 2012 
version of the Draft Decree on IT Service removed the prohibition against the cross border 
supply of cloud computing services, database center services, and web search portal services. 
Rather, foreign suppliers are permitted to provide these services on a cross-border basis as long 
as that they do so through local branches or local intermediaries. Although the consistency of this 
revised provision with Vietnam’s international trade commitments is still questionable, if 
adopted as such, it will likely serve as one of the new mechanisms for the government to exercise 
their control over the content provided through cross-border online intermediaries’ services. In 
such cases, the local presences, local partners or agents of the foreign online intermediaries will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 See April Version, Arts. 15 and 20.1. 
52 See for example, the World Trade Organization, Working Party on The Accession of Viet Nam, Schedule CLX – 
Vietnam, Part II – Schedule of Specific commitments in Services, WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.2 (Oct. 27, 2006), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_vietnam_e.htm. 
53 There are six specific forms of market access limitation listed under the GATS Art. XVI.2. 
54 See GATS, Arts. XVI (providing the principle on market access) and Art. XIV (providing the general exceptions 
which allow WTO members to maintain or adopt measures that are inconsistent with GATS principles). 
55 Decree No. 72, Art. 22.1. 
56 Decree No. 72, Art. 22.2. 
! 14!
have to comply with the authority’s requirement, and thus directly lend assistance to the 
authority in controlling Internet content.  
In short, this section explains how ideology protection and content censorship needs shaped the 
regulation of online intermediaries in Vietnam. The vast increase in the volume of Internet users 
plus the popularity of online platforms, which are hosted both in Vietnam and overseas, have 
recently required the government to exercise their extensive control at the online intermediary 
level. A number of regulations have been put in place and some additional measures are being 
proposed to realize this objective. As such, online intermediaries are expected to comply with 
more and more local requirements, which hopefully will be within the scope of the international 
trade commitments of Vietnam. 
3. Traditional Fears 
Like many other countries in the world, the Vietnamese government has concerns regarding the 
risks the Internet poses to national security, online transaction frauds, data privacy, and network 
security. These fears also contribute to more stringent regulations against online intermediaries. 
i. National Security Risks 
Since the 1990s, the government has set strict regulations on the use of the Internet by the Party, 
the government, public security, and national defense function agencies. Specifically, a private 
network must be established for Internet connection, the information flow on the network must 
be encrypted, and efficient technical measures must be applied to prevent data thief or 
unauthorized access that may cause harm to the system. Furthermore, the communications on the 
network must be controllable.57 The recent revelation of NSA surveillance programs such as 
PRISM58 and MUSCULAR59 raised even more concerns regarding the exposure to national 
security risks through Internet use. The requirement of server localization imposed on certain 
forms of online intermediaries, among other things as discussed above, also serves as an effort to 
respond to this set of concerns. 
ii. Online Fraud 
Together with the growth of e-commerce activities in Vietnam, alarming scams and frauds have 
also emerged that demand regulation. The Vietnamese market has grown to include various !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Decree No. 21, Art. 20. 
58 PRISM enables NSA to collect data from U.S. electronic communications service providers according to the 
procedures provided under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (50 U.S.C. §1881a). See 
Director of National Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-
releases-2013/871-facts-on-the-collection-of-intelligence-pursuant-to-section-702-of-the-foreign-intelligence-
surveillance-act, (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). Disclosed participants to this program include Microsoft, Google, 
Yahoo!, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, Apple. Data collected through PRISM include information 
content of all types, such as e-mails, videos, voices, photos, and online social networking details, etc. See The 
Washington Post, NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, published on June 6, 2013, updated on 
July 10, 2013, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/, accessed 
on January 22, 2014.  
59 MUSCLAR program is a form of upstream data collection, which collects “communicatsions on fiber cables and 
infrastructure as data flows past.” See Craig Timberg, The NSA Slide You Haven’t Seen, The Washington Post, July 
10, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-
seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html?hpid=z1, accessed on 23 January 2014.  
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forms of online business, including online marketing and promotion, online sales, online 
auctioning, online payments, and online training, among others.60 However, the issue of trust 
seems to drag down e-commerce development in the country. The concerns range from 
fraudulent online activities, deceptive advertisements, security for online payments, and e-
signature and e-transaction validity.  
For example, the Muaban24 case involves a group of website owners who claimed to organize a 
trading platform for e-commerce services. Participants to this platform must contribute an initial 
amount of cash to own a virtual store on the website. The owners of the virtual store, instead of 
conducting any actual online trading activities on the stores, enjoyed a share of the money taken 
from every additional participant that they recruited.61 The website owners themselves made 
money by also received a share of these payments.62 Outside the online world, a similar business 
model for the sale of goods, as opposed to services, would constitute an illegitimate multi level 
marketing activity, (similar to a “pyramid scheme” in other jurisdictions), which is prohibited 
under the Competition Law of Vietnam.63 Meanwhile, the company masked itself as an e-
commerce business even in the absence of appropriate licenses from the authorities.64 By August 
2012, Muaban24 had thousands of participants, sold 120,000 virtual stores, collected 
approximately USD30 million, and operated in 32 over 64 provinces in Vietnam.65 The website 
owners were arrested and charged with “fraudulent appropriation of property” in numerous 
provinces.66 This case has raised serious concerns regarding the effectiveness of State 
management as to online business activities, as well as trust issues surrounding e-commerce.67  
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60 See Bộ Công Thương [Ministry of Industry and Trade], Báo cáo Thương mại Điện tử 2012 [2012 Report on E-
Commerce] (December 2012), http://www.vecita.gov.vn/App_File/laws/3afc0508-107b-4ff4-9687-
59b8a975cf79.PDF.  
61 See Vũ Văn Tiến - Hồng Kỹ, Vụ Muaban24: Cách thức Kinh doanh Đang Tạo Dư luận Tiêu cực [Muaban24 
Case: A Business Model That Is Causing Negative Public Opinion], Dân Trí (July 28, 2012; 6:38), 
http://dantri.com.vn/ban-doc/vu-muaban24-cach-thuc-kinh-doanh-dang-tao-du-luan-tieu-cuc-623702.htm. 
62 See Vũ Văn Tiến - Hồng Kỹ, Các “Sếp Sòng” Muaban24 Kiếm Bao nhiêu Tiền? [How Much does Muaban24 
“Chiefs” Have Earned?], Dân Trí (Aug. 4, 2012; 7:38), http://dantri.com.vn/kinh-doanh/cac-sep-song-muaban24-
kiem-bao-nhieu-tien-626172.htm.  
http://dantri.com.vn/event/muaban24-vu-an-rung-dong-2023.htm 
63 See Luật Cạnh tranh [Competition Law] No. 27/2004/QH11, adopted by the National Assembly of Vietnam on 
Dec. 3, 2004, Art. 48. Illegitimate multilevel marketing activities under this Law cover the marketing of goods only, 
not services. 
64 See Vũ Văn Tiến - Hồng Kỹ, Vụ Muaban24: Cách thức Kinh doanh Đang Tạo Dư luận Tiêu cực [Muaban24 
Case: A Business Model That Is Causing Negative Public Opinion], Dân Trí (July 28, 2012; 6:38), 
http://dantri.com.vn/ban-doc/vu-muaban24-cach-thuc-kinh-doanh-dang-tao-du-luan-tieu-cuc-623702.htm. 
65 See id. 
66 See Hồng Kỹ - Vũ Văn Tiến, Bắt Khẩn cấp 4 Nhân vật Chóp bu Đường dây Muaban24 [Urgently Arrest 4 Top 
Personnel of Muaban24 Chain] (Aug. 2, 2012), http://dantri.com.vn/xa-hoi/bat-khan-cap-4-nhan-vat-chop-bu-
duong-day-muaban24-625684.htm (regarding the arrest in Hanoi). See also An ninh Thủ đô, Tiếp tục Bắt giữ Nhiều 
Lãnh đạo Chủ chốt Của Muaban24 [Continue to Arrest Multiple Key Personnels of Muaban24] (citing Dân Trí) 
(Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.anninhthudo.vn/Phap-luat/Tiep-tuc-bat-giu-nhieu-lanh-dao-chu-chot-cua-
Muaban24/460112.antd.  
67 See Group of Reporters, Thương mại Điện tử bị... Vạ lây vì Muaban24 [E-Commerce’s Reputation Is …. 
Incidentally Hurt by Muaban24] (Aug. 5, 2012; 9:00), ICTNews, http://ictnews.vn/kinh-doanh/thuong-mai-dien-tu-
bi-va-lay-vi-muaban24-104086.ict.  
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In addition, there were reported cases where intermediaries for online promotion and online 
group deals failed to remit service payment to service providers.68 Users also complained about 
the quality of the services, which either failed to meet what was advertised or was subject to 
discrimination by the service suppliers.69 Furthermore, a survey conducted by PayPal in 2012 
revealed that 43% of those surveyed refrain from purchasing online due to risk concerns.70  
Key factors contributing to the above issues include the immaturity of e-commerce activities in 
Vietnam, users’ lack of awareness and experience, and ineffective enforcement of existing 
regulations. The government itself observed that many new forms of online business were “self-
initiating” and blamed the above-mentioned situation to the “lack of strict surveillance by 
appropriate competent authorities.”71 Thus, it called for new specific regulations, noting in 
particular the fundamentally different nature of e-commerce transactions, where, unlike in-
person transactions, buyers and sellers do not directly interact.  
Decree No. 5272 on e-commerce was part of the governmental efforts to address the above 
concerns. It is unclear to what extent the specific measures under Decree No. 52 may help 
improve trust and thus boost e-commerce activities in Vietnam. However, it is certain that under 
Decree no. 52 online intermediaries are subject to more compliance requirements. Specifically, 
owners of e-commerce business websites73 and e-commerce service websites74 must respectively 
conduct notification75 and registration76 procedures with the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
Notably, this requirement also applies for foreign owners of websites using .vn domain names.77 
Decree No. 52 also emphasizes transparency in e-commerce by requiring the disclosure of 
certain information for specific types of websites. For example, e-commerce business websites 
must disclose website owners’ identity, information of the products and services on sale, 
payment and delivery methods, general terms of transaction, limitations on liability, dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and data security protection.78 Furthermore, the Decree provides a broad 
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68 See Anh Quân, Mua Theo Nhóm – Được Ít Mất Nhiều [Group Deals – Gain Little Lose A Lot], VN Express 
(Nov. 22, 2012; 12:12), http://kinhdoanh.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/vi-mo/mua-theo-nhom-duoc-it-mat-nhieu-
2724174.html 
69 See id. 
70 See The Box, Thanh toán Trực tuyến tại Việt Nam: Chưa đủ An toàn? [Online Payments in Vietnam: Not Safe 
Enough?], Lao Động (Oct. 19, 2012; 4:20 PM.), http://laodong.com.vn/sci-tech/thanh-toan-truc-tuyen-tai-viet-nam-
chua-du-an-toan-88306.bld.  
71 See Tờ trình Chính phủ Dự thảo Nghị định về Thương mại Điện tử [Proposal to the Government regarding the 
Draft Decree on Electronic Commerce], Part I, available at 
http://www.vibonline.com.vn/Files/Download.aspx?id=2449 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).\ 
72 Nghị định về Thương mại Điện tử [Decree on E-commerce] No. 52/2013/ND-CP, issued by the Government of 
Vietnam on May 16, 2013 (hereinafter “Decree No. 52”) (Viet.). 
73 Websites established to promote and/or sell the goods and/or services of the website owners. See Decree No. 52, 
Arts. 24.1 and 25.1. 
74 Websites that provide a platform for third parties to conduct e-commerce trading activities, including e-commerce 
platform websites, online auction websites and online promotion websites and other websites to be added by the 
authorities in the future. See Decree No. 52, Arts. 24.2 and 25.2. 
75 See Decree No. 52, Art. 27.1. 
76See Decree No. 52, Arts. 36.1, 41.1, 46.1, and 55.1. 
77 See Decree No. 52, Art. 2.1(c).  
78 See Decree No. 52, Arts. 28-34. 
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range of prohibited acts,79 which specifically address Muaban24 and group deal cases discussed 
above. Accordingly, despite the aforementioned loophole of the existing Competition Law, 
activities akin to illegitimate multi level marketing of services on e-commerce websites become 
illegal under Decree No. 52. Other steps to promote trust in e-commerce include recognizing the 
validity of electronic evidence,80 clarifying the effectiveness of online contracts,81 introducing 
mechanisms to rate websites’ creditability, data protection policies, and to authenticate electronic 
contracts, 82 and providing measures to secure online payments.83  
iii. Data Privacy Protection Concerns 
The Civil Code of Vietnam addressed privacy protection issues even before the Internet was 
introduced in Vietnam.84 When the government first introduced the Internet in Vietnam in 1990s, 
it also emphasized the need to protect personal privacy.85 “Personal information,” though defined 
differently in different contexts, is protected under the IT Law,86 the Law on Electronic 
Transactions,87 the Law on Consumer Protection,88 and their implementing regulations. The 
collection, use, processing, transfer, and storage of personal information is subject to specific 
restrictions, including, inter alia, adequate disclosures, required security measures, and required 
consent of the data subject.  
In particular, the data protection responsibilities rest on the entity that collects, processes, uses,89 
and stores90 the data, regardless of where the data is stored. As such, the failure to obtain consent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 See Decree No. 52, Art 4 (including the following acts: organizing a marketing or trading network for e-
commerce services, to which participants must contribute an initial amount to buy the service, and are rewarded for 
recruiting new participants; taking advancate of the name of e-commerce operation to illegally mobilize capital from 
other traders, organizations, or individuals; committing fraud to consumers on e-commerce activities, among others.  
80 See Decree No. 52, Arts. 9-14.  
81 See Decree No. 52, Arts. 15-23 (Decree No. 52 sets out clearer conditions for establishing the legal validity of e-
commerce contracts. Accordingly, informational integrity of a document is established when parties agree to use 
certain measures such as using e-signatures certified by lawful certification organizations, or storing documents on 
the systems of licensed e-contract authentication organizations.) 
82 See Decree No. 52, Arts. 60-63 (a license from the MOIT is required in order to provide the following services: 
Rating the creditability of e-commerce websites; rating and certifying the policy (of a website owner) regarding the 
protection of personal information in e-commerce; and electronic contract authentication.)  
83 See Decree No. 52, Arts. 74 and 75 (owners of websites with online payment functions and suppliers of online 
payment services are subject to specific obligations under Decree No. 52 regarding the safety and confidentiality of 
online payment transactions. They may be held jointly liable for any damage caused by the illegal disclosure, 
amendment, reproduction, cancellation, deletion, or transfer of online payment information via the website. In 
addition, website owners who develop their own online payment solutions to support the online sale of their goods 
must apply specific measures to ensure safety and confidentiality of customer data.) 
84 Civil Code 1995 (Article 34 recognizes the right of individuals to have their privacy respected and protected by 
law; the collection and publication of individual privacy’s information require consent). A similar principle was 
included in the current Civil Code No. 33/2005/QH12, adopted by the National Assembly of Vietnam on Jun. 14, 
2005 (Viet.), Arts. 31 and 38. 
85 Decree No. 21, Art. 3.3. 
86 See Luật về Công nghệ thông tin [Law on Information Technology, No. 67/2006/QH11 adopted by the National 
Assembly of Vietnam on Jun. 29, 2006 (“IT Law”), Arts. 21 and 22 (Viet.). 
87 See Luật Giao dịch Điện tử [Law on E-Transactions], No. 51/2005/QH11 adopted by the National Assembly of 
Vietnam on Nov. 29, 2005, Art. 46 (Viet.). 
88 See Luật Bảo vệ Quyền lợi Người Tiêu dùng [Law on Protection of Consumers’ Rights] No. 59/2010/QH12, 
adopted by the National Assembly of Vietnam on Nov. 17, 2010, Art. 6 (Viet.). 
89 Art. 21, IT Law (Viet.). 
90 Art. 22, IT Law (Viet.). 
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and to secure the data at any of these steps will result in liabilities for online intermediaries, 
including offshore service suppliers who process and host the relevant data outside Vietnam. 
iv. Network Safety – Malware and Viruses 
Vietnam also shares the common fear of malware and virus attacks. In order to address this fear, 
the government has designed regulations to control not only individual hackers’ behaviors, but 
also those of online intermediaries.  
Although spreading spam and malware is subject to criminal liability under Vietnamese law,91 
individual hackers are not easily identifiable ex-ante and the liabilities are imposed on them only 
when the infringements have occurred. Therefore, the government also requires online 
intermediaries – the limited number of government-licensed entities/the chokepoints – to apply 
measures to prevent the risk.92  
For example, in order to obtain a license to provide online social networking services, suppliers 
must have measures to ensure information safety and security.93 Owners of websites that have 
online payment functions must conduct specific practices to ensure the security and 
confidentiality of customers’ payment transactions.94 Furthermore, in case of “serious Internet 
incidents,”95 the party facing the incident must report to appropriate members of the incident 
response network, including the relevant ISPs and the Vietnam Computer Emergency Response 
Team (VNCERT), for a coordinative solution.96 The failure to comply with statutory information 
security requirements may result in administrative fines, penalties, sanctions, or civil actions.97 
Despite all of these efforts, in May 2014 the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report announced 
that Vietnam was one of the top five countries with the highest rates of malware incidence.98 
Stricter liabilities against online intermediaries may thus be imposed in the near future to address 
this issue. In fact, the government is now introducing a draft law on information security. The 
proposed bill addresses information safety issues from multiple perspectives, including, inter 
alia, liabilities of online intermediaries in detecting, preventing and handling malwares, required !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 See Luật Hình sự [Penal Code] No.15/1999/QH10 dated December 21, 1999, as amended under Luật Sửa đổi, Bổ 
sung Một số Điều của Bộ Luật Hình sự [Law Amending and Supplementing Certain Provisions of the Penal Code] 
No. 37/2009/QH12, Arts. 224, 225, 226a, and 226b. 
92 See Decree No. 55, Art. 18.3. 
93 Decree No. 72, Art. 23.5(dd).  
94 Decree No. 52/2013/ND-CP, Art. 74.2 (required measures include, among other things, encryption of information, 
access control, early detection, warning, and prevention of illegal access, and data retention and data retrieval 
function). 
95 Thông tư Quy định về Điều phối Các Hoạt động ứng cứu sự cố mạng Internet Việt Nam [Circular Regulating the 
Coordination of Responses to Internet Incidents in Vietnam] No. 27/2011/TT-BTTTT (hereinafter Circular No. 27), 
Art. 2 (defining “serious Internet incidents” as incidents that caused, has caused, or will potentially cause 
information security failures on the Internet that occur on a large scale, spread quickly, threaten serious harm to 
computer and Internet network systems, cause serious loss of information or which require substantial national or 
international resources to resolve.) 
96 See Circular No. 27, Art. 7. 
97 See IT Law, Art. 22; Civil Code, Art. 25.  
98 See Đỗ Nguyễn, Việt Nam thuộc 5 Quốc gia có Tỉ lệ Nhiễm mã độc cao nhất Thế giớI [Vietnam within top 5 




information security breach responses, encryption technology control, information technology 
import control, and licensing requirements for security certification services.99  
In short, this section assesses the liability of online intermediaries from the perspective of the 
concerns that Vietnam commonly shares with other jurisdictions. The current regulatory 
framework is designed to include online intermediaries’ responsibilities to protect national 
security, prevent online fraud, protect the data and privacy of users, and secure the safety of the 
entire network. Failure to comply with such requirements will result in liability designated by 
law. Since these concerns remain ineffectively addressed, more stringent regulations might soon 
be added.  
4. The Fear of the Failure to Localize the Benefit of Online Services – 
Domestic Call   
Many countries, including Vietnam, are concerned about the fact that cross-border online 
businesses incurred profit locally, while leaving a small portion or no portion of such income 
behind domestically. So the question is how to localize the benefits of cross-border online 
services. 
Potential answers include: support domestic service suppliers to compete against foreign 
suppliers; mandate or encourage a profit sharing arrangement with local entities; and subject 
foreign service suppliers to greater regulatory burdens, such as imposing licensing requirements, 
requiring localization of infrastructure, or requiring the establishment of local entities. It appears 
that the Vietnamese government has tried all of these, which have had a substantial effect in 
shaping the business environment for online intermediaries, particularly for foreign online 
intermediaries. 
Overall, the policy has been to promote and facilitate homegrown businesses, including local 
online intermediaries’ businesses and the business activities by foreign intermediaries that also 
benefit local businesses. In 2009, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam announced a 
campaign titled, “Vietnamese people prefer Vietnamese products.”100 In line with this campaign, 
the Prime Minister of Vietnam approved the National Strategy on “Transforming Vietnam into 
an Advanced ICT Country” in 2010.101 “Improve the capacity and competitiveness of 
Vietnamese enterprises” and “develop Vietnam’s ICT brand-name products and services” are 
two key missions of this strategy.102 When Mr. Nguyen Bac Son became MIC Minister in 2011, 
the MIC implemented these missions by initiating the “Program on Promoting the development 
of Vietnam ICT brand-name products and services (VIBrand).”103 
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99 See Dự thảo Luật An toàn Thông tin [Draft Law on Information Security], available at 
http://mic.gov.vn/layyknd/Trang/LUẬTANTOÀNTHÔNGTINSỐ.aspx, (last visited May 10, 2014) 
100 TTXVN, Bộ Chính trị Vận động Người Việt Dùng Hàng Việt [The Politburo Campaigns for Vietnamese People 
to Use Vietnamese Products] (Aug. 7, 2009, 11:09), available at http://dantri.com.vn/su-kien/may-bay-malaysia-
mat-tich-mot-hanh-khach-dung-ho-chieu-an-cap-342309.htm (Viet.). 
101 NSCICT and MIC, White Book 2012: Information and Data on Information and communication Technology: 




One of the first moves – allegedly driven by the Vietnamese government – that affected a foreign 
online intermediary was the 2009 Facebook blocking.104 In 2010, soon after the blocking was 
reported, go.vn, a homegrown online social networking service (run by VTC Intercom, a State 
owned company)105 was introduced to users. The site had the stated goal to “knock out 
Facebook.”106 Though go.vn was reported to be State sponsored, the government has since 
denied its involvement in the Facebook blocking.  
Notably, unlike the blocking in China, which is conducted at the Internet protocol level,107 
Facebook access from Vietnam is blocked at the domain name system (DNS) level. Users can 
easily circumvent the blocking by using a proxy server or a virtual private network, or by 
changing their DNS.108 Thus, an alternative explanation by some local experts was that the 
blocking might not be to afford domestic protection.109 Rather, the main purpose was likely to 
draw foreign service suppliers’ attention to the fact that the local authority is looking for their 
cooperation110 in achieving governmental interests, including, for example, localizing certain 
portions of the locally generated income and obtaining convenient access to control online 
content accessible to local users.  
In fact, despite the alleged blocking, Facebook services in Vietnam are still growing 
significantly.111 Interestingly, this growth is happening in conjunction with certain local 
arrangements by Facebook. In January 2011, Facebook hired a Policy and Growth Manager for 
Vietnam.112 In March 2011, Facebook signed the Memorandum of Understanding with a local 
partner, FPT Group, regarding FPT’s membership to Facebook’s Preferred Developer 
Consultant. Accordingly, the local partner will “develop specific mobile-based applications and 
provide advertising services for Facebook in Vietnam.”113 Most recently, Facebook appointed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 OpenNet Initiative, Vietnam, Aug. 7, 2012, 387-388, available at http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-vietnam.pdf 
105 See Intercom VTC, http://intecom.vtc.vn/vn/about-us (last visited May 10, 2014). 
106 Anh Trọng, Go.vn Sẽ Đánh bại Facebook [Go.vn will Knock out Facebook], Thegioididong (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.thegioididong.com/tin-tuc/govn-se-danh-bai-facebook-12450. See also James Hookway, In Vietnam, 
State ‘Friends’ You, Wall Street Journal (updated Oct. 4, 2010 12:01 a.m. ET), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703305004575503561540612900?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052748703305004575503561540612900.ht
ml; Luke Allnutt, Fearing Facebook Vietnam Launches Its Own Social Networking Site, Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Fearing_Facebook_Vietnam_Launches_Its_Own_SocialNetworking_Site_/2177003.ht
ml 
107 See H.C., Banned, Maybe. For Some., The Economist (Nov. 10th, 2010, 22:40), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/11/facebook_vietnam.  
108 See id. See also OpenNet Initiative, Vietnam, Aug. 7, 2012, 387-388, available at http://access.opennet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-vietnam.pdf 
109 See Goutama Bachtiar, Nguyen Ngoc Hieu on the State of Social Networks in Vietnam, E27 (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://e27.co/nguyen-ngoc-hieu-on-the-state-of-social-networks-in-vietnam/. 
110 See id.  
111 See Tuoitrenews, Facebook Users in Vietnam Grow 200% in One Year, Tuoitrenews (updated Oct. 19, 2012; 
16:37), http://tuoitrenews.vn/features-news/2967/facebook-users-in-vietnam-grow-200-in-one-year. See also Anh-
Minh Do, Vietnam’s Facebook Penetration Hits Over 70%, Adding 14 Million Users in One Year, Techinasia (Sept. 
25, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.techinasia.com/facebook-12-million-users-vietnam/. 
112 See the Manager’s LinkedIn profile at https://www.linkedin.com/pub/tuoc-huynh/2/624/435.  
113 FPT, Facebook and PPT Announces Cooperation in Vietnam (April 4, 2011; 00:00), 
http://www.fpt.com.vn/en/newsroom/press_releases/2011/04/04/24492/. 
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T&A Ogilvy, a local partner, as its media representative in Vietnam beginning in January 
2014.114 This way of doing business by foreign service suppliers is welcomed by the government 
for a number of reasons. First, a part of the income incurred locally will be shared with the local 
partner, and thus captured domestically. Second, this local entity serves as the local contact 
point, bridging the foreign supplier and the local authority for liaison functions when necessary. 
Third, the local partner may also serve as the point of control in terms of online content 
management and compliance with relevant local tax obligations.  
Furthermore, the Government attempted to localize the benefits earned by foreign online 
businesses by proposing regulations that force cross border service suppliers to enter into 
commercial arrangements with local partners, do business through local intermediaries,115 
establish local entities, or locate infrastructures in Vietnam.116 As an additional effort, in April 
2012, the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam officially subjected foreign suppliers generating 
income from online advertising and marketing to tax obligations in Vietnam.117 With these 
requirements, certain parts of the income earned from the domestic market may remain within 
Vietnam. In addition, foreign service suppliers will be subject to the relatively equal footing with 
domestic suppliers in terms of establishing local infrastructure, obtaining required local licenses, 
and complying with other local requirements.  
As such, it is not a surprise that major foreign online intermediaries such as Google and 
Facebook will soon be subject to more and more scrutiny from the local government. The criteria 
used by the local government as the basis to exercise its authority are broadly whether the 
relevant sites are used in Vietnam or accessed from Vietnam, as mentioned by Decree No. 72.118 
The number of Vietnamese users reaching/accessing/using the foreign site might also be a 
relevant criteria depending on how the regulations implementing Decree No. 72 will be 
crafted.119  
All in all, Vietnamese online intermediaries will likely enjoy a facilitating environment, while 
foreign online intermediaries will be subject to more stringent local disciplines when generating 
income from Vietnam. Most of the constraints on the latter will likely be aimed at capturing a 
certain portion of the locally generating income inside Vietnam and facilitating censorship by the 
local authority.  
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114 SGT, Facebook Officially Enters Vietnam, Vietnamnet, (Jan. 27, 2014, 13:15), 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/science-it/94575/facebook-officially-enters-vietnam.html.  
115 See Dự thảo Nghị định về Dịch vụ Công nghệ Thông tin [Draft Decree on Information Technology Services], 
Version 3.8, Art. 19.3, available at http://www.vibonline.com.vn/Duthao/1250/Nghi-dinh-ve-dich-vu-cong-nghe-
thong-tin.aspx, (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (Viet.). 
116 See Dự thảo Nghị định về Dịch vụ Công nghệ Thông tin [Draft Decree on Information Technology Services], 
qtcs.com, Apr. 2012, Art. 20.1, available at http://qtsc.com.vn/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=63cd7c9e-065c-
4f06-a6a0-93ab819b7ce2&groupId=18, (last visited Jan. 1, 2014) (Viet.). 
117 Thông tư Hướng dẫn Thực hiện Nghĩa vụ Thuế Áp dụng Đối với Tổ chức, Cá nhân Nước ngoài Kinh doanh Tại 
Việt Nam hoặc có Thu nhập tại Việt Nam [Circular Guiding the Implementation of Tax Obligation Applicable to 
Foreign Organizations [and] Individuals Doing Businesses in Vietnam or Incurring Income from Vietnam] No. 
60/2012/TT-BTC issued by the Ministry of Finance on Apr. 12, 2012, Art. 4.4 (Viet.). 
118 Decree No. 72, Art. 22.1. 
119 This is hinted from the provisions on cross borders supply of public information to large users in Vietnam under 
the draft version of the then adopted Decree No. 72.  
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The above risks and concerns, though prevalent, are only a one-sided reflection of online 
activities in Vietnam. Various regulations and policies adopted by the Government through 
different periods of time also reflect a strong hope for growth opportunities brought by the 
Internet. According to these policies and regulations, online intermediaries’ roles are recognized 
in a number of fields.  
1. Embracing New Opportunities for Economic Growth  
As a result of the command-and-control approach in the 1990s period, Internet developments in 
Vietnam were constricted by the capabilities of the Vietnamese regulator. The Communist Party 
of Vietnam itself perceived the development of Vietnamese technology information industry in 
2000 as “outdated”, “low,” and “far lagging behind” the level of development of other 
countries.120 These disappointing outcomes and the desire to incorporate Internet growth into the 
wider development agenda of the country demanded that Vietnam amend its strategy. The 
country embraced this hope by making a leap in its economic growth through unleashing and 
promoting the potentials brought by the information technology (“IT”) industry.121  
The Party leaders adopted specific plans to promote IT application and development in order to 
serve the modernization and industrialization processes in Vietnam. The plans included measures 
to encourage the large scale application of IT, train human resources for the IT industry, create a 
supportive environment for investments in the IT sector, accelerate the construction of Internet 
and telecommunications infrastructure, and renovate state administration in the field.122 This top-
down instruction was implemented in three key regulations that substantially determined the 
roles and liabilities of online intermediaries: Decree No. 55 and its subsequent replacements,123 
the Law on Information Technology,124 and Joint Circular No. 07. 125  
i. Decree No. 55 and Its Subsequent Replacements – Doors Opened for Online 
Intermediaries 
Adopted in 2001, Decree No. 55 explicitly set forth the principle that “regulatory capability must 
keep up with developments’ demand.”126 According to this principle, instead of constricting 
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120Chỉ thị số 58/CT-TW về Đẩy mạnh Ứng dụng và Phát triển Công nghệ Thông tin Phục vụ Sự nghiệp Công nghiệp 
hoá, Hiện đại hoá [Directive No. 58/TW on Promoting the Application and Development of Information Technology 
in Support of the Modernization and Industrialization Process], approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Vietnam on Oct. 17, 2000, Part I (Viet.) (hereinafter “Directive No. 58”). 
121 See id. 
122 See id. Part II. 
123 Nghị định 55/2001/NĐ-CP ngày 23 tháng 8 năm 2001 về Quản lý, Cung cấp và Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet 
[Decree No. 55/2001/ND-CP dated August 23, 2001 regarding the Management, Provision and Use of Internet 
Services] (Viet.). 
124 Luật Công nghệ Thông tin của Quốc hội nước Cộng hoà Xã hội Chủ nghĩa Việt Nam số 67/2006/QH 11 ngày 29 
tháng 6 năm 2006 [Law on Information Technology No. 67/2006/QH 11, adopted by the National Assembly of the 
Socialist Republic ò Vietnam on 29 June 2006] (Viet.) (hereinafter “IT Law”). 
125Thông tư Liên tịch Quy định Trách nhiệm Của Doanh nghiệp Cung cấp Dịch vụ Trung gian Trong việc Bảo hộ 
Quyền Tác giả và Quyền Liên quan trên Môi trường Mạng Internet và Mạng Viễn thông [Joint Circular on the 
Liabilities of Intermediary Service Suppliers in Protection of Copyrights and Related Rights on the Internet and 
Telecommunications Network Environment] No. 07/2012/TTLT-BTTTT-BVHTTDL, jointly issued by the Ministry 
of Information and Communications and the Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism on Jun. 19, 2012 (hereinafter 
“Joint Circular No. 07”) (Viet.). 
126 Decree No. 55, Art. 3.1. 
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Internet developments to the authority’s regulatory capability (as adopted during the 1991-2000 
period), Internet developments are the goals that regulatory measures serve to achieve.  
The Decree also outlined the goal of “developing diversified Internet services at high quality and 
reasonable price in order to serve the nation’s industrialization and modernization progress.”127 
In particular, the Decree explicitly acknowledged the roles of Internet services in popularizing 
government policies to the public and facilitating the advertisements of private goods and 
services on the Internet.128  
While IXPs remained wholly or predominantly owned by the government, ISPs were open for all 
types of ownership. Notably, Decree No. 55 introduced a new category of service suppliers — 
“Online Service Providers” (OSP), which are enterprises that use the Internet to provide 
application services such as telecommunications, information, culture, commerce, banking, 
finance, healthcare, education, and technical assistance to users.129 Unlike IXPs, ISPs, and ICPs, 
which are subject to licensing requirements directly provided under Decree No. 55, OSPs are 
only subject to the regulations of specific State management agencies (if any).130 As one of the 
measures to promote the application of the Internet, the Decree explicitly entitled users to use 
Internet application services of both domestic and foreign OSPs, except for the services whose 
use is prohibited or not yet permitted.131 
Decree No. 97,132 which replaced Decree No. 55 in 2008, reiterated the spirit mentioned under 
Decree No. 55. Furthermore, despite some additional constraints as analyzed in the previous 
section, Decree No. 72,133 which recently replaced Decree No. 97, continues to emphasize the 
government’s policies of, among other things: 
“Promoting the use of Internet in all economic and social activities, especially in education and 
training, health care, and scientific and technological research in order to raise productivity, 
create jobs and improve the quality of life; Encouraging the development of contents and 
applications in Vietnamese to serve the Vietnamese community on the Internet; [and] 
Intensifying the upload of healthy and useful information to the Internet.”134 
ii. IT Law – Promoting IT Development and Application 
The IT Law similarly promotes the application and development of information technology in 
various fields, including governmental operation and commerce. The words “encourage,” 
“facilitate”, and “prioritize” were mentioned multiple times in the Law.  
In line with this encouraging atmosphere, the Law explicitly exempts online intermediaries from 
liabilities in certain circumstances. For example, entities transmitting digital information are not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Decree No. 55, Art. 3.2. 
128 See id., Art. 5. 
129 See id., Arts. 12.3, 13.3. 
130 See id., Art. 36. 
131 See id., Art. 22.2 
132 Nghị định của Chính phủ số 97/2008/NĐ-CP ngày 28 tháng 8 năm 2008 về Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ 
Internet và Thông tin Điện tử trên Internet [Decree No. 97/2008/ND-CP of the Government dated August 28, 2008 
on Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Electronic Information on the Internet] (Viet.) 
133 Nghị định Quản lý, Cung cấp, Sử dụng Dịch vụ Internet và Thông tin trên mạng [Decree on Management, 
Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Online Information] No. 72/2013/ND-CP dated July 15, 2013 (Viet.) 
134 Decree No. 72, Arts. 4.1 and 4.2. 
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liable for the information content unless they self-initiate, select or modify the content, or select 
the recipients of the information.135 Similarly, those who temporarily store digital information 
are not liable for the information content unless they modify the content, illegally collect data, 
disclose information, or fail to comply with regulations on information accession or update.136  
The Law also explicitly provides that, unless otherwise required by the competent authorities, 
entities applying information technologies are not responsible for tracking or monitoring digital 
information of third parties, or investigating infringing acts of third parities while transmitting or 
storing their information.137  
iii. Joint Circular No. 07 – Online Intermediaries’ Liabilities in Copyrights Protection 
In implementing the IT Law, Joint Circular No. 07138 clarifies the liabilities of intermediary 
service suppliers in protecting copyrights and related rights on the Internet and 
telecommunications network environment.  
Accordingly, telecommunications service suppliers, Internet service suppliers, providers of 
online social network services, providers of information search services, and companies leasing 
digital information storage space are directly liable for infringing content only in limited 
circumstances.139 The circumstances include when the service suppliers initiate the posting, 
transmit or provide of the infringing content over the Internet or telecommunications network, 
modify or copy the infringing content, deliberately circumvent technology measures applied by 
right owners to protect copyrights or related rights, or operate as the secondary distributors of the 
infringing content.140  
Though there are criticisms141 as to the government’s failure to adopt a “safe harbor” regime, 
which enables notice-and-take down mechanisms resembling that under the DMCA in the United 
States,142 these regulations illustrate the Government’s acknowledgement of the need to exempt 
online intermediaries from certain liability, as well as the role of online intermediaries in 
protecting copyrights and related rights.  
2. Turning Vietnam Into a Nation With a Strong IT Industry and With a 
Knowledge-Based Economy 
i. Online Intermediaries as Supporters of Business Development !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 IT Law, Art. 16.4.  
136 IT Law, Art. 17.2. 
137 IT Law, Art. 20.2. 
138Thông tư Liên tịch Quy định Trách nhiệm Của Doanh nghiệp Cung cấp Dịch vụ Trung gian Trong việc Bảo hộ 
Quyền Tác giả và Quyền Liên quan trên Môi trường Mạng Internet và Mạng Viễn thông [Joint Circular on the 
Liabilities of Intermediary Service Suppliers in Protection of Copyrights and Related Rights on the Internet and 
Telecommunications Network Environment] No. 07/2012/TTLT-BTTTT-BVHTTDL, jointly issued by the Ministry 
of Information and Communications and the Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism on Jun. 19, 2012 (hereinafter 
“Joint Circular No. 07”) (Viet.). 
139 See Joint Circular No. 07, Arts. 3.1 and 5. 
140 Joint Circular No. 07, Art. 5. 5. 
141 See Baker & McKenzie Vietnam, Intermediary Service Supplier’s Copyright Liabilities on the Internet, July 
2012,  
142 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 
U.S. Code §512. 
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In 2010, the Prime Minister of Vietnam approved a project named “Soon Turning Vietnam into a 
Strong Nation in Information Technology and Communications.”143  
Accordingly, the government continues to focus on training IT human resources to serve not 
only domestic demand, but also for labor export.144 Investments in infrastructure to support the 
application and development of information technology are also prioritized. Furthermore, the 
government “encourages enterprises to develop IT technologies for application in daily life and 
in governmental operation,” and “provide information and online services to support the people 
and businesses on the basis of cooperation between the Government and the enterprises.”145  
The authority sees the application of information technology in society as a means to “improve 
people’s knowledge.”146 The targets by 2015 are to provide basic governmental services online, 
apply information technology in management, operation, and business operation of 80% 
enterprises and social organizations, universalize IT application in the education and healthcare 
systems, and enhance the application of IT in national defense and security.147  
As such, this Project officially recognizes the role of online intermediaries as information 
providers and as supporters of business development. The strategy under this Project is in line 
with the broader agenda of Vietnam to industrialize and modernize the country by improving the 
quality of the labor force, such that the economy will become “knowledge based,”148 rather than 
manual (or cheap labor) based.  
ii. Opportunities Brought by E-Commerce 
Vietnam also recognizes the opportunities brought by e-commerce. In 2010, the Prime Minister 
of Vietnam approved a number of solutions for “making e-commerce a popular practice at the 
advanced level in the ASEAN region, contributing to enhance the competitiveness of enterprise 
and the nation, and promoting the country’s industrialization and modernization progress.”149 
The plan contains detailed targets for digitalizing a majority of business activities and 
governmental services by 2015, including the targeted percentile of enterprises embracing 
electronic means for their business operation.150  
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143 Quyết định Phê duyệt Đề án “Đưa Việt Nam Sớm Trở thành Nước mạnh về Công nghệ Thông tin Và Truyền 
thông” [Decision Approving the Project of “Soon Turning Vietnam into a Strong Nation in Information Technology 
and Communications”] No. 1755/QD-TTg, adopted by the Prime Minister of Vietnam on Sept. 22, 2010 (Viet.). 
144 Quyết định Phê duyệt Kế hoạch Tổng thể Phát triển Nguồn Nhân lực Công nghệ Thông tin Đến năm 2015, Định 
hướng đến Năm 2020 [Decision Approving the General Plan in Developing the Information Technology Human 
Resources by 2015 [and] Orientation Toward 2020] No. 698/QD-TTg adopted by the Prime Minister on June 1, 
2009. This Decision was then incorporated into an annex of Decision No. 1755. 
145 Decision No. 1755, Part IV, Section 5(a). 
146 Id., Part III, Section 4. 
147 See Decision No. 1755, Part I, Section 2(dd). 
148 Chỉ thị Về Định hướng Phát triển Công nghệ Thông tin và Truyền thông Việt Nam Giai đoạn 2011-2020 (gọi tắt 
là “Chiến lược Cất cánh”) [Directive on Orientation Strategy for the Development of Information Technology and 
Communications for the 2011-2020 period (abbreviated as the “Take Off Strategy”)] No. 07/CT-BBCVT, issued by 
the Ministry of Post and Telematics on Jul. 7, 2007, Section 2 (Viet.). 
149 Quyết định Phê duyệt Kế hoạch Tổng thể Phát triển Thương mại Điện tử Giai đoạn 2011-2015 [Decision 
Approving the General Plan for the Development of Electronic Commerce in the 2011-2015 Period] No. 1073/QD-
TTg, adopted by the Prime Minister of Vietnam on Jul. 12, 2010, Art. 1, Part A, Section I (Viet.). 
150 See id, Art.1, Part A, Section II. 
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In 2012, the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam set “quickly developing 
the e-commerce system” as the key focus of commercial infrastructure development efforts.151 
The Government identifies “studying, constructing, and applying appropriate mechanisms to 
encourage the development of electronic commerce” as one of the main approaches for the 
socio-economic development of the year 2012.152  
The Ministry of Industry and Trade, the State agency responsible for e-commerce management, 
has also tasked itself with strongly applying e-commerce and diversifying e-commerce activities, 
promoting paperless transactions to facilitate commercial activities, and quickly applying e-
commerce to create modern distribution channels.153 
iii. Booming of Internet Activities 
The above policies and regulations explain the boom of Internet use and application in Vietnam. 
Notably, Vietnam has been ranked among the nations with the fastest annual growth rates of 
Internet users.154 By June 30, 2012, the country had over 31 million Internet users, accounting 
for over 33% of its population.155  
Businesses such as airlines, travel agencies, and hotels embrace online platforms are the key 
channel for their sales.156 The national tourism promotion program for the 2013-2020 period 
identifies social networks, smart phones, and the Internet as the prioritized channels for tourism 
promotion.157 Experts labeled the digital advertising market in Vietnam as “booming” in 2013, 
with an estimated turnover of $32 million and this is expected to reach $45 million by 2015.158  
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According to the Chairman of the Vietnam Internet Association, “enterprises are making the shift 
to online marketing and advertising.”159 Experts also predict a “strong growth” in e-commerce in 
Vietnam in the years to come.160 Some expect that the total revenues of Internet services and 
content to be VND 100 trillion (approximately USD 47 billion) by 2018.161 
All in all, in parallel with the constraints originating from the fears analyzed in the previous 
section, Vietnam also embraces the opportunities brought by online intermediaries to the 
country’s business development. This gives room for the expansion of online intermediaries’ 
business activities in Vietnam, and implies a broader responsibility of online intermediaries 
regarding their contribution to the development of the local economy.  
III. Conclusion 
The above analysis illustrates both the fears and the hopes related to online activities in Vietnam. 
The policies and regulations by the Vietnamese authority correspond to and address these hopes 
and fears. Thus far, the fears seem to be dominant in comparison to the hopes. Besides the 
common fears regarding national security, prevention of fraud, data and privacy protection, and 
network security, fears also originate from the specific political and economic conditions of 
Vietnam.  
The fears involving the protection of the current regime’s ideology and the demand for localizing 
the benefits incurred from online activities dictate the stringent liabilities on online 
intermediaries. At the same time, online intermediaries will likely have room for strong 
developments in Vietnam due to the hope of the government to embrace new opportunities for 
economic growth, and its desire to turn Vietnam into a nation with a strong IT industry and with 
a knowledge-based economy. As a result, online intermediaries’ may have to exercise their roles 
in accordance with specific requests from the authorities in order to avoid liabilities. Though the 
liabilities of offshore online intermediaries that provide services to Vietnamese users on a cross-
border basis currently remain ambiguous in certain areas, the participation of these 
intermediaries in the Vietnamese market may also demand similar cooperation with the local 
Government to address relevant fears. Having said this, it is worth noting that the aggressiveness 
of government requirements may potentially be restrained by specific commitments of Vietnam 
under applicable international arrangements. 
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